Putting the Trump-Modi Bromance to the Test

Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

Last time Donald Trump was president, ties between the United States and India flourished. But the bilateral relationship began to fray during Joe Biden’s presidency, owing not least to divisions over the Ukraine war. Will Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s latest meeting with Trump at the White House mark the first step toward restoring this critical relationship?

Trump has made no secret of his conviction that personal bonds between leaders can underpin stronger bilateral relationships. And he and Modi certainly share an affinity: both are nationalist politicians who love little more than to please a roaring crowd with elaborate theatrics. In September 2019, the two came together for a public rally in Houston, attended by 50,000 Indian-Americans and several US legislators. The following February, Trump addressed more than 100,000 people in Ahmedabad. “America loves India,” he declared. “America respects India, and America will always be faithful and loyal friends [sic] to the Indian people.”

US-India relations took a turn for the worse after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Biden administration mobilized America’s allies and partners to join its campaign to punish Russia – and, ideally, compel it to change its behavior. But far from joining this effort, India stayed neutral and seized the opportunity to secure cheap Russian oil.

There were other points of contention, as well. The Biden administration sought to weaken Myanmar’s military junta by imposing stringent sanctions on the country and sending “non-lethal aid” to rebel groups – a policy that has contributed to instability in India’s border state of Manipur. Biden also coddled Pakistan’s military-backed regime, including by approving a $450 million deal in 2022 to upgrade the country’s fleet of F-16 fighter jets.

Similarly, Biden welcomed the interim government that Bangladesh’s military installed following the overthrow of the country’s India-friendly government last August. Bangladesh’s rapid descent into lawlessness and Islamist violence since then has raised serious security risks for India, which is already home to millions of illegally settled Bangladeshis.

America’s approach to Sikh separatist leaders on its soil has also raised India’s hackles. Under the Biden administration, the US carried out a criminal investigation into India’s alleged involvement in supposed assassination plots against Sikh militants in the US and Canada. Last September, just days before Biden met with Modi in Delaware, senior White House and US intelligence officials met with Sikh separatists to assure them that they would be protected from “transnational repression.” The following month, the US charged a former Indian intelligence officer in an alleged failed plot to kill a New York-based Sikh militant, who is on India’s most-wanted list.

Against this backdrop, it is easy to see why Trump’s victory in last November’s presidential election raised hopes in India for a reset in bilateral relations. It helps that Trump has repeatedly pledged to negotiate a quick conclusion to the Ukraine war, meaning that India’s choice not to pick a side in that conflict would no longer matter.

A few weeks into Trump’s second presidency, however, there are reasons to doubt this rosy scenario. So far, Trump has done nothing to spare India from his frenetic push to implement his campaign promises, from raising tariffs to deporting undocumented immigrants. When the Trump administration sent more than 100 Indian nationals back to India on a military aircraft – a 40-hour ordeal – their hands and feet were shackled. Modi said nothing.

In fact, far from standing up to Trump, Modi has preemptively slashed tariffs on US imports, hoping that this would keep India out of “Tariff Man’s” sights. But a dissatisfied Trump, who has called India a “very big abuser” of tariffs, has not spared India from his steel and aluminum levies. He wants India to wipe out its $35 billion bilateral trade surplus, by buying more oil and petroleum products, and more weapons, from the US.

India is the world’s third-largest primary energy consumer, after China and the US, and the largest source of oil demand growth. That makes the country a highly attractive market for a US administration that is committed to increasing domestic oil and gas production. It also means that Trump’s commitment to pushing down oil prices, including by applying pressure on OPEC leader Saudi Arabia, would benefit India’s economy.

But Trump has never been particularly concerned about ensuring that his trade agreements are mutually beneficial. Regarding India, his plan may well be to use the threat of tariffs to compel Modi’s government to accept the trade deal of his choosing. That is what he did to Japan during his first presidency. He also tried to do it to India, but failed, so he stripped India of its special trade status instead, prompting India to impose retaliatory tariffs on some US products.

If Trump ends up slapping more tariffs on India, the Indian economy could slow, at least marginally. More broadly, Trump’s “America First” trade agenda – which clashes with Modi’s “Make in India” initiative – threatens to undermine India’s status as the world’s “back office,” providing extensive IT and business services to US companies.

Where trade is concerned, Trump treats friends and foes alike. But it matters that India is a friend – and Trump should want to keep it that way. The US-India strategic partnership helps advance the two countries’ shared interests in the Indo-Pacific region, the world’s emerging economic and geopolitical hub, including strengthening maritime security and supporting a stable balance of power. Already, the two countries are working to deepen military interoperability, and the US has overtaken Russia as India’s leading weapons supplier, as new contracts show.

As Trump and Modi build on their rapport, both should recognize that India is America’s most important partner in countering China’s hegemonic ambitions. It is thus in both countries’ interest to restore and deepen the bilateral relationship, including by strengthening collaboration on critical and emerging technologies, from artificial intelligence to biotechnology. Warm personal relations are an added bonus.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2025.

Brash Trump diplomacy a better bet

Taipei Times, February 10, 2025

For Taipei, last year was a particularly dangerous period, with China stepping up coercive pressures on Taiwan amid signs of US President Joe Biden’s cognitive decline, which eventually led his Democratic Party to force him to abandon his re-election campaign.

The political drift in the US bred uncertainty in Taiwan and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region about American strategic commitment and resolve. With America deeply involved in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the last thing Washington wanted was a Taiwan Strait contingency, which is why Biden invested in personal diplomacy with China’s dictator Xi Jinping (習近平).

The return of Donald Trump to the White House is anything but good news for Xi’s regime. In his first term, Trump fundamentally changed America’s approach to Beijing by ending a four-decade-long US policy since the Richard Nixon era of aiding China’s economic rise, saying his predecessors “created a monster.” Trump’s national security strategy identified China as a strategic rival and threat.

Now, in his second term, Trump has fired a warning shot across Beijing’s bow by imposing new tariffs on imports from China.

The additional 10 percent US tariffs place Xi’s regime in a predicament. Any retaliatory Chinese measures would likely invite further rounds of American tariffs, resulting in Beijing exhausting US exports to target, as happened in the first Trump administration when tariffs were initially slapped on China in 2018. But doing little against Trump’s latest punitive action would make Xi look weak at home.

Given China’s sputtering economic-growth engine, a widening trade war with the US, with its likely international spillover, would seriously harm Chinese interests. China not only exports almost four times more goods to the US than it imports, but also its economic troubles at home have made it even more reliant on exports of excess industrial output that cannot be absorbed in the domestic market.

To make matters worse, China is running into long-term structural constraints, including a shrinking and rapidly aging population and slowing productivity growth, as well as a Western pushback against its neo-imperial ambitions. This may well explain why Xi seems to have concluded that China has a narrow window of strategic opportunity to shape the Asian and international order in its favor. Still, Xi is likely to think twice before seeking to provoke the US on Trump’s watch.

To be sure, Trump’s return is also set to create challenges for Taipei in its economic relationship with the US, given that Taiwan’s trade surplus with America has reached a record high. Trump is intent on wielding the tariffs card to close all of America’s bilateral trade deficits.

Many countries run trade deficits with China that they partly or wholly offset by running trade surpluses with the US. But Taiwan has large trade surpluses with both China and the US.

Trump views tariffs as a game-changing instrument to help fill the nation’s coffers and bring manufacturing back to the US. As he vowed in his inaugural address, “Instead of taxing our citizens to enrich other countries, we will tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich our citizens.”

Taiwan’s growing trade surplus with the US puts it in the crosshairs of Trump’s tariff strategy. Trump has already lamented that chip production “left us and went to Taiwan,” while slamming his predecessor’s US$6.6 billion funding award to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in November to establish three chipmaking facilities in Arizona.

While stepping up pressure on Taipei to boost its defense spending, Trump could use the tariff card against Taiwan as part of his broader plan to cut reliance on foreign suppliers for critical semiconductors by reversing decades of offshoring in the technology industry. Almost all of the advanced chips used in the US are currently imported from Taiwan.

Against this backdrop, Taipei may have little choice but to encourage its semiconductor companies to significantly boost investments in America for producing next-generation chips. That could help tame Trump’s tariff threat, given that tariffs alone cannot help the US to replicate at home Taiwan’s semiconductor model. Taipei could also seek to placate the Trump administration by offering to jointly establish an international semiconductor supply chain.

It is in Taiwan’s own interest to significantly boost its defense spending so as to deter a Chinese attack. Unfortunately, Taiwan’s opposition-controlled legislature recently imposed significant cuts to the defense budget, including programs for developing asymmetric capabilities like drones.

Diplomacy is in part transactional, and Trump’s predecessors gave precedence to national security and geopolitical calculations even if it meant ignoring human rights and democratic governance issues. One example was Nixon’s China “opening” of 1970-71. Another example was Jimmy Carter’s presidential memo to various US government departments instructing them to help in China’s economic rise.

What stands out about Trump is that he is first and foremost a dealmaker. To advance US interests, he is willing to cut deals with America’s friends and adversaries.

Trump’s new tariffs against China, however, seem to be part of an effort to turn the tables on a country whose foreign policy has long been driven by assertive mercantilism. The deal Trump may eventually offer is likely to be too unpalatable for Beijing.

Yet, with its economic slowdown deepening, China may be reluctant to escalate tensions with the US, let alone risk a military confrontation with a Trump-led America by launching overt aggression against Taiwan.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).

Trump shows the power of personality on the global stage

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

President Trump speaks to reporters on Jan. 23, 2025, in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington (Ben Curtis, Associated Press).

International relations theory gives weight to impersonal factors such as the cold calculations of national interest by different states and their cooperation, competition and conflict. But the return of Donald Trump as president, whose actions on trade, technology and security threaten to shake up global affairs, is a reminder that history is also shaped by the agendas and personalities of leaders, including their personal strengths and weaknesses, their idiosyncrasies and their hobbyhorses.

Decisions and actions of national leaders guide international relations. As the UNESCO constitution states, “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.”

In high-level diplomacy, personal bonds between leaders can make a significant difference. And Trump is a great believer in the notion that relationships between leaders can positively mold ties between nations.

In his first term, Trump pursued a personalized approach to diplomacy to help shape U.S. relationships with key countries. In 2019, he became the first sitting American president to set foot in North Korea, crossing the Demilitarized Zone for a brief meeting with dictator Kim Jong Un. And the volatile Middle East moved toward stability as Trump, far from starting a new war, brokered the Abraham Accords.

But Trump’s use of diplomacy to steer relationships from confrontation to cooperation and to end wars (like in Afghanistan) came under withering criticism from commentators and opponents, who wanted him to wield American power assertively.

Many world leaders pursue personalized diplomacy. They give diplomatic moves their imprimatur through social media posts under their names.

Understanding the role of personal factors is important in the study of interstate relations. The power of interpersonal relations in statecraft also extends to the knowledge gained about counterparts’ personalities through private interactions, which can strengthen one’s hand in negotiations.

Trump is first and foremost a dealmaker who views diplomacy through the prism of potential transactions. This makes personalized diplomacy — and personal outreach to other countries’ leaders — critical to his efforts to advance American interests. In fact, he often employs the tactics he outlined in his 1987 book, “Trump: The Art of the Deal.” “A little hyperbole never hurts,” Trump wrote of his deal-making, which he said could also be advanced through some flattery, cajoling and hardball tactics, including seeking to pummel the other side.

In his search for deals, Trump has not hesitated to flatter foreign leaders, including dictators, even as his threats remain barely disguised. For example, Trump has called Chinese President Xi Jinping “a brilliant man” and “a very good friend,” and said “nobody in Hollywood could play the role of President Xi.” And he has said that Russian President Vladimir Putin, like Xi, is “smart” and “tough.”

Trump has praised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for getting “very high marks” for governing “very, very strongly.” And after meeting Kim, Trump said, tongue-in-cheek, “We fell in love.”

Trump has reportedly expressed interest in making an early visit to Beijing. While the Chinese Communist Party finds Trump’s unpredictability somewhat perturbing, it must love his transactional approach to foreign policy, as the ruling party also likes to cut deals. In fact, assertive mercantilism is a central leitmotif of China’s foreign policy.

More fundamentally, Trump has upended traditional ideas about leadership and diplomacy through his complex personality, which blends refreshing candor with deliberate combativeness, braggadocio and grandiosity. And unlike former President Joe Biden, Trump isn’t scripted, as his freewheeling speeches and news conferences underscore.

Trump is known to talk tough. But his tough talk does not often translate into action. His Iran policy in the first term included withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran, reimposing sanctions and assassinating in Baghdad by drone strike Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani. Yet Trump was reluctant to take on Iran directly lest it embroil the U.S. in another war.

In 2017, Trump threatened “fire and fury” unless North Korea halted its nuclear-weapons program. But just months later, Trump embraced Kim in Singapore in the first-ever U.S.-North Korean summit.

When Trump’s threats center on more realistic action, such as slapping trade tariffs or stepping up or putting on hold military support to an ally, he is able to win through intimidation. Recently, Trump helped secure a Gaza ceasefire deal by warning that there would be “all hell to pay” if the hostages were not freed by his inauguration day — a threat aimed at not only Hamas but also Israel.

And through his pre-inauguration threat to impose a 25 percent tariff on all Canadian exports to the U.S., Trump precipitated a crisis in Canada’s governing Liberal Party that proved the last straw for the deeply unpopular Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who decided to resign. Indeed, Canada has announced a slew of border-security measures to address Trump’s main concerns — illegal border crossings by migrants and the smuggling of illegal firearms and drugs into the U.S.

Trump basically is a pragmatist. Despite his thunderous criticism of China as an economic predator, Trump did not impose any sweeping trade sanctions against China in his first term, choosing instead to employ the tariff card, while sprinkling some flattery on Xi.

Railing against “endless wars,” Trump finished his first term as the first American president since Jimmy Carter not to start a new war. And he wishes to have a similar record in his second term, saying he wants to be a “peacemaker” who builds the world’s strongest-ever military whose success would be measured “not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end — and perhaps, most importantly, the wars we never get into.”

But that has not restrained Trump’s expansionist itch, including taking back the Panama Canal and buying Greenland from Denmark. He has invoked the notion of “manifest destiny,” which drove 19th‑century U.S. territorial expansion.

Real political power comes not from the office a politician holds but from the way a leader is able to change people’s thinking. That power lasts beyond the leader’s term in office. The international power of Trump’s conservative populism will extend beyond his lifetime.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

Will Trump Crack the Mystery of COVID’s Origin?

Failure to get to the bottom of COVID-19’s origins and spread may not only allow China to evade responsibility, but could also weaken the world’s ability to prevent another global pandemic. Fortunately, there is reason to hope that Donald Trump’s incoming administration will revive the search for an answer.

Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

GENEVA – The COVID-19 pandemic killed an estimated 7.1 million people worldwide, causing global life expectancy to decline by 1.6 years between 2019 and 2021. It disrupted economies, destroyed livelihoods, and strained social cohesion in many countries. Yet no one has been held accountable for it. Will US President-elect Donald Trump change that?

Five years after the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19), we still do not know where the pathogen first arose. Did it emerge naturally in the wet markets of Wuhan, China, or did it escape from the nearby Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), where studies into bat coronaviruses were underway?

We do know that China’s government allowed what might have been a local outbreak to morph into a global health crisis. After the first COVID-19 cases were reported in Wuhan, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s regime censored reports about the disease and hid evidence of human-to-human transmission for weeks. Meanwhile, travel to and from Wuhan was allowed to continue unhindered.

Unlike the Muslim gulag in Xinjiang province or naval-base construction in the South China Sea, however, Chinese authorities could not conceal the “novel coronavirus” for long, nor could the rest of the world ignore it once the secret was out. So many people contracted COVID-19 so quickly that many hospitals were soon overwhelmed, leaving many victims to be treated in tents.

China’s government then shifted from concealment to damage control. State media reframed the crisis in Wuhan as a story of successful recovery, while touting unrealistically low mortality rates. Meanwhile, Xi thwarted international efforts to initiate an independent forensic inquiry into COVID-19’s genesis, which he claimed would amount to “origin-tracing terrorism.” The only “investigation” he allowed was a 2021 joint study with the World Health Organization that China controlled and steered.

While Trump, who was president for the first few months of the pandemic, often highlighted the link between China and COVID-19, his successor, Joe Biden, effectively let China off the hook. Less than a week after his inauguration, Biden produced a presidential memorandum urging federal agencies to avoid mentioning the virus’s geographic origins.

Biden’s goal was to stem a rise in bullying, harassment, and hate crimes against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. The toxicity of America’s partisan politics meant that pushing back against racism – which Trump and his cohort often stoked – also meant shutting down any discussion of China’s role in causing the crisis. Social-media platforms, mainstream media, and some prominent US scientists (who hid their conflicts of interest) also aided the suppression of debate about COVID-19.

The partisan divide over whether to investigate China’s responsibility for COVID-19 persists to this day. Just last month, Democrats challenged a 520-page report – produced by the Republican-controlled US House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic – which concluded, after a two-year investigation, that the virus likely escaped from the WIV, faulting the report’s methodology. So, while some US government agencies – including the Department of Energy and the FBI – have given credence to the lab-leak theory, there remains no consensus in Washington.

Failure to get to the bottom of where COVID-19 originated may not only allow China to evade responsibility; it will also weaken the world’s ability to prevent another global pandemic. But there is reason to hope that the incoming Trump administration will revive the search for an answer. Beyond Trump’s own willingness to point the finger at China, some of his cabinet picks – notably, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., as Secretary of Health and Human Services and Jay Bhattacharya as director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) – challenged prevailing narratives about COVID-19 (albeit sometimes in dangerous ways).

An effective investigation will require considerable transparency from the US. The NIH, the US government’s medical-research agency, was funding studies on bat coronaviruses at the WIV as far back as 2014. The NIH knew that the work was risky; it was being done in China precisely because the US has stricter rules governing “gain-of-function” research, which involves modifying a biological agent’s genetic structure to confer on it “new or enhanced activity,” such as increasing a pathogen’s transmissibility or virulence. The NIH continued to fund research at the WIV even after multiple State Department cables flagged the lab’s lax safety standards, stopping only after the pandemic began (when it also removed the description of gain-of-function research from its website).

Making matters worse, we now know that the WIV has been carrying out classified research on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017. A 2021 State Department fact sheet acknowledged that some US funding for civilian research could have been diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the institute.

One rule of thumb in forensic investigations is to “follow the money,” so the Trump administration should start by disclosing the full extent of US funding of coronavirus research in China. But investigators will also have to “follow the data,” meaning that the US will have to disclose the results of the research it funded in Wuhan, which was part of a collaborative US-China scientific program.

Holding China accountable for its role in the pandemic is only the first step. To safeguard humanity’s future, the Trump administration will also have to address a more fundamental issue: dangerous “gain-of-function” research is still taking place in some labs in China, Russia, and the West. The genetic enhancement of pathogens represents the greatest existential threat to humankind ever produced by science, even greater than nuclear weapons. By tightening rules on such activities – or, ideally, prohibiting lab research that could unleash a pandemic – Trump would leave an important positive legacy.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2025.

Trump must seize moment to forge ‘soft’ alliance with India

Washington needs New Delhi more than ever to prevail against China

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Brahma Chellaney, Nikkei Asia

20241226 modi biden

In April 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden’s top economic adviser, Brian Deese, told India that “the costs and consequences” for it would be “significant and long term” if it refused to cooperate with Washington over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Two and a half years later, it is apparent, whether by coincidence or design, that America’s once-blossoming strategic partnership with India is fraying.

India’s neutrality in the Ukraine conflict marked just the beginning of a series of disputes that have roiled the bilateral relationship, which Biden has acknowledged is “among the most consequential in the world.”

With the new strains becoming increasingly apparent, U.S.-India ties today are clearly at a low point. Yet, the White House recently declared, “The president is very proud of the way in which our bilateral relationship with India has transformed during his administration.” The relationship may have been transformed — but not exactly in a positive manner, other than stepped-up engagement through the Quad grouping and greater U.S. weapons sales to India, like the latest $3.8 billion drone contract.

In India’s own neighborhood, the divergence of U.S. and Indian interests is becoming stark. The Biden administration has given support to military-backed regimes in Bangladesh and Pakistan but sought to overthrow Myanmar’s military junta through stringent sanctions and “nonlethal” military aid to rebels, even as cross-border arms flows fuel ethnic conflict in India’s Manipur state. Bangladesh’s descent into violent Islamism threatens the security of India, which is already home to millions of illegally settled Bangladeshis.

Salvaging the relationship with India is one of several foreign-policy challenges — from the Ukraine war to the Middle East conflict — that Biden’s successor, Donald Trump, must address after he takes office.

The U.S.-India relationship is key to a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, the world’s emerging economic and geopolitical hub. Biden’s foreign policy, instead of driving a wedge between China and Russia, has turned the two natural competitors into budding allies. The Sino-Russian unholy alliance against America has made it more imperative for Washington to partner with another nuclear-armed giant, India, especially if the U.S. is to rein in China’s aggressive expansionism.

Restoring the momentum in ties with India, however, will require resolving the differences and concerns that underlie the new strains.

The tensions burst into the open recently when India’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party accused the “U.S. deep state” of using “false narratives” to destabilize India and its business conglomerates, especially the Adani Group, led by Asia’s second-richest man, Gautam Adani, whose major infrastructure projects at home and abroad help advance Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s efforts to showcase India’s rapid strides and enlarge its global footprint.

Biden may have publicly commended Modi’s contribution to strengthening bilateral relations, but he and other prominent U.S. Democrats have barely disguised their antipathy to the Indian leader’s Hindu-nationalist brand of politics. Some U.S. statements during India’s monthslong 2024 election process, by echoing Indian opposition parties’ positions, were viewed by the BJP as an attempt to interfere in the world’s largest democratic exercise.

The simmering bilateral tensions have now come to a head. While New Delhi was still smarting from the dramatic overthrow of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s India-friendly government, the U.S., by filing an indictment against a former Indian intelligence officer in October, implicitly accused elements in Modi’s government of orchestrating a failed plot to kill a New York-based Sikh militant wanted in India on terrorism charges.

And then, by indicting Adani last month on fraud-related charges, centered on alleged bribery in India to win contracts, Washington was widely seen in New Delhi as seeking to indirectly target Modi, given the perceived closeness between the billionaire and the Indian leader.

Those two politically sticky indictments have laid bare the new problems in Washington’s ties with New Delhi and strengthened the view in India that the U.S. legal system has not just been weaponized, as Trump contends, but also has become an instrument of foreign policy. Adani, meanwhile, has responded to the indictment by seeking to cut his U.S.-related risks, including deciding to forgo a Sri Lankan port-related $553 million American loan, which would have been the U.S. government’s largest infrastructure investment in Asia.

The striking irony over the tensions, which have perceptibly soured the mood in New Delhi, is that Modi has come to be seen as India’s most pro-U.S. prime minister ever. While hewing to the country’s traditionally independent approach to international affairs, Modi’s foreign policy has betrayed a not-so-subtle pro-Western tilt.

The new strains in ties with Washington are reinforcing the Indian imperative for better balance and greater maneuverability in foreign policy as a hedge against American unpredictability. This may well explain the agreement India recently reached with China to ease their Himalayan military standoff, which was triggered in 2020 by furtive Chinese encroachments on some Indian borderlands.

Against this backdrop, the future direction of the U.S.-India strategic partnership hinges on the path the incoming Trump administration takes.

Trump’s personal rapport with Modi offers some hope that the U.S. and India may be able to overcome their disputes to invigorate ties. Trump’s first term represented the halcyon days of Washington-New Delhi ties, with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy giving India pride of place in American strategy.

Trump, with a reputation of being a wily businessman who seeks to drive a hard campaign, has called India a “very big abuser” of tariffs and will likely demand lower tariffs and greater market access for U.S. products and companies.

But Trump knows the strategic importance of building stronger ties with India, especially given that Washington is unlikely to be able to split China and Russia. If the U.S. is to prevail in its escalating rivalry with China and Russia, and avoid strategic overstretch, it needs India more than ever. Reversing the alienation of America’s most important partner in countering China’s expansionist rise is also crucial for Asian security, as intensifying Chinese coercive pressure threatens to turn Taiwan into the next Ukraine.

Trump has a high favorability rating in India. And by mending bilateral ties, he could seize the historic opportunity to forge a “soft” alliance with India.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the independent, New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battleground” (Georgetown University Press), which won the Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

The China-India rivalry will define the future of Asia

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

China and India have sought in recent weeks to ease a tense military standoff along their mountainous frontier. The drawn-out standoff, triggered by China’s furtive encroachments on the icy borderlands of India’s Ladakh region in 2020, has fostered rival military buildups and intermittent clashes along the Himalayas.

An Oct. 23 meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of a BRICS summit highlighted mutual interest in improving relations between the Asian giants. Indeed, an agreement was reached for reciprocal steps toward defusing the military standoff and ensuring peace along their disputed frontier, which is one of the world’s longest land borders.

But can a potential thaw in the icy hostility marking bilateral relations blunt the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry, which is defining Asian geopolitics?

The origins of the tensions go back to the early 1950s, when China imposed itself as India’s neighbor by occupying the then-autonomous Tibet, a large region that historically served as a buffer between the Chinese and Indian civilizations. That annexation led to China’s 1962 border war with India. After Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the two countries restored diplomatic ties, but, despite efforts to establish a modus vivendi, mutual suspicions and antagonisms never disappeared.

In recent years, India is tasting the bitter fruits of Modi’s initial efforts to appease China. The 2020 Chinese territorial encroachments caught India unawares at a time when the country was preoccupied with enforcing one of the world’s strictest lockdowns in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Modi came to office in 2014 as a foreign policy novice. He thought that, by resetting the relationship with Beijing, he could help weaken China’s strategic alliance with Pakistan. Pakistan, like China, is a revisionist state that lays claims to sizable swaths of Indian territory. But Pakistan also has employed cross-border terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy.

The China-Pakistan axis has long generated high security costs for India, including raising the specter of a two-front war. Through a “defensive wedge strategy,” in which the status quo power seeks to split a revisionist alliance so as to focus capabilities on the more threatening challenger, India has long sought — unsuccessfully — to break the Sino-Pakistan axis.

The first prime minister from Modi’s Bharatiya Janata (Indian People’s) Party, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, tried to win over Pakistan, famously going there by bus in 1999. Modi, by contrast, focused on befriending China after coming to power, including hosting Xi before any other world leader and opening up the Indian economy for Chinese businesses by delisting China as a “country of concern.”

But Modi’s peace overtures spectacularly backfired. Xi visited India in 2014 bearing an unusual gift — a deep Chinese military incursion into an Indian borderland. This was followed by a bigger Sino-Indian military confrontation in 2017 on the Doklam Plateau, located at the Bhutan-Tibet-India trijunction. And the 2020 Chinese encroachments occurred despite 18 meetings between Modi and Xi over the previous five years.

After taking India on a rollercoaster ride on China, Modi has been injecting greater realism into his policy, including prioritizing military modernization and bolstering border defenses.

As the military standoff has underscored, India, by locking horns with China despite the risk of a full-scale war, openly challenged Chinese capability and power in a way no other power has done in this century. In fact, Xi seriously miscalculated that China would be able to impose the changed status quo on India as a fait accompli without inviting a robust military response.

The standoff has only highlighted Xi’s strategic shortsightedness in turning a once-conciliatory India into a foe that seems determined to forestall a Sinocentric Asia. With Xi accusing the U.S. of “containment from all directions, encirclement and suppression against us,” the last thing China needed to do was to make an enemy of its largest neighbor.

This is similar to how Xi’s muscular revisionism has impelled major shifts in the strategic postures of two other leading Indo-Pacific powers. Japan, by deciding to double its defense spending by 2027, is effectively abandoning its pacifist postwar security policy, and Australia has ended hedging by joining the U.S.-led, anti-China AUKUS alliance.

Today, the Sino-Indian efforts to reduce tensions and pull back forces massed along the common frontier are being driven by different geopolitical factors.

For India, one consideration is to gain greater maneuverability in foreign policy at a time when the once-blossoming strategic partnership with the U.S. has begun to fray, despite President Joe Biden acknowledging that this relationship is “among the most consequential in the world.”

China, for its part, is facing increasing Western pushback against its expansionism. With its economy already sputtering, China is running into long-term growth constraints, including a shrinking and rapidly aging population and slowing productivity increase. By contrast, India — which has one of the world’s most youthful populations with a median age of 28.4 — appears poised to reap a demographic dividend. While India’s economy remains smaller than China’s, it is now growing faster than any other important economy.

Whereas the People’s Liberation Army of China largely relies on conscripts who ostensibly “volunteer” for two years of service at age of 18, India’s all-volunteer military is considered the world’s most experienced force in hybrid mountain warfare. India’s military edge in the high-altitude Himalayan environment, however, could be blunted by China’s superior air power capabilities, including missile prowess.

Against this backdrop, Xi and Modi have sought to defuse the Himalayan military crisis without losing face. While deescalating tensions along the frontier makes eminent sense for both leaders, the Sino-Indian rivalry is unlikely to weaken. In fact, this rivalry promises to shape the Asian and global balance of power.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

Little reason for the West to exult over Assad’s downfall

A boy holding a rifle borrowed from a Syrian opposition fighter poses on the top of a government forces tank that was left on a street, at the Umayyad Square in Damascus, Syria, Wednesday, Dec. 11, 2024. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

With the dramatic fall of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s autocratic regime, the West may have achieved its objective in Syria. But the success could impose enduring costs on Western, and especially European, security.

Assad’s secular regime has been replaced by violent jihadist forces that Western governments regard as terrorists. On President Joe Biden’s watch, first Afghanistan and now Syria have emerged as jihadist citadels. As has already happened in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, the victorious Islamist leaders in Syria have pledged to introduce a system based on Islamic law. 

The main insurgent group that spearheaded the lightning blitz to Damascus seeks to establish a caliphate and has had historic links to both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (or ISIS). Formerly known as the Al Nusrah Front, it was officially labeled a foreign terrorist organization by the United States in 2014. 

Yet by seeking to engage with its victorious leadership, including sending secret messages to it, Biden is making the same mistake he did following his disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, when he drew specious distinctions between “good” and “bad” terrorists, in a bid to obscure both the significance of the Taliban’s takeover and his administration’s outreach to that terrorist militia.  

The current effort to portray this murderous band of terrorists as a reforming group that now cultivates an image of tolerance parallels the 2021 attempt, in the aftermath of Kabul’s fall, to rebrand the Taliban leadership as moderate. Washington is today considering removing its $10 million bounty on Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the head of this terrorist army, who is claiming to have turned over a new leaf. 

But just as the Taliban has turned Afghanistan into a terrorist super-state, Jolani could make Syria a breeding ground for transnational terrorists that share the Taliban’s ideology and commitment to violent jihad. Those waging violent jihad can never be moderate.   

Make no mistake: The surge of violent jihadism in Syria goes back to a multiyear CIA covert project to overthrow Assad — a $1 billion program that President Barack Obama initiated after seven months of NATO airstrikes toppled another secular dictator, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi.  

The Syria project — the second largest in the CIA’s history after its 1980s’ covert operation against Soviet forces in Afghanistan — trained and armed anti-Assad rebels from 2012 onward, furthering the jihadist movement and helping spawn the Islamic State in the Syria-Iraq belt, before President Donald Trump shut it down in 2017, calling the program “massive, dangerous and wasteful.” He also stated that some of the U.S.-supplied weapons went to al-Qaeda, an organization that emerged from the CIA-trained Afghan “mujahideen.” 

More broadly, the destabilization of Libya, Syria and Iraq resulted in a major refugee influx into Europe — 1.1 million into Germany alone in 2015. This, in turn, led to a surge of radical Islamism in several European countries, with terror attacks in Munich, Nice, Brussels, Paris and elsewhere necessitating a slew of antiterrorist measures. The new challenges contributed to a resurgence of nativism, populism and antiimmigrant sentiment across Europe, transforming politics. 

Today, the Syrian Rebels’ victory represents a huge boost for global jihadism, including for enlisting new recruits. The Islamist arc extending from the Middle East to North Africa’s Maghreb region could pose a challenge to Europe in the way countries located next to the Afghanistan-Pakistan belt are paying a security price. 

The beleaguered Assad regime, economically and politically weakened by regional developments and the almost decade-long U.S. control of production from Syrian oil fields, fell to the Islamist militants without putting up a fight.

Assad, and his late father, Hafez Assad, ruled Syria for over half a century, forming the longest political legacy in the Arab world. But, as U.S. interventions have shown, when a secular autocrat is overthrown in the Muslim world, the forces of radical Islam usually take over. This often leads to violent upheaval and societal transformation, including imposition of Medieval practices, with women’s status reduced to that of chattels.

This is what happened in Afghanistan after President Mohammed Najibullah was driven out of office in 1992, in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, and in Libya when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011. Arab Spring “revolutions” elsewhere spawned new strongmen or civil war. Libya, meanwhile, remains a failed state.

Even in Bangladesh, the recent U.S.-supported regime change has led to an upsurge of Islamist violence, with jihadists seeking to Arabize Islam by targeting the country’s syncretic traditions.  

In multiethnic Syria, the seizure of Damascus by Sunni Islamist fighters is unlikely to end the 13-year-long civil war. The recrudescence of bloody sectarian conflicts and power struggles in Syria could send a new wave of refugees to Europe, including radicalized Muslims.

In fact, with the downfall of one of the last remaining secular, anti-jihadist rulers in the Middle East, the partition of Syria looks more likely.

To be sure, Ukraine, too, faces partition: a Trump-backed ceasefire in the nearly three-year war would leave one-fifth of Ukrainian territory under Russian control. But Syria’s partition will be along sectarian lines, as happened in 1947 when Pakistan was carved out of India. Syria could eventually be divided into four parts: A large Sunni state in the center, comprising more than two-thirds of Syria; a U.S.-backed Kurdistan in the northeast, a Druze zone in the south; and an Alawite strip along the Mediterranean coast.  

The West has won the battle against Assad and delivered a strategic setback to his patron, Russia, whose interest long centered on maintaining its several military bases in Syria for power projection in the Middle East. But, having forgotten the lesson of 9/11 to shun the path of geopolitical expediency and focus on long-term interests, the West risks losing the already-flailing global war on terror, especially as the war’s fronts multiply as an unintended byproduct of its own policies. 

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

Biden’s vexed foreign policy legacy leaves hard choices ahead

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

(AP Photo/Ben Curtis) President Joe Biden boards Air Force One at Amilcar Cabral international airport on Sal island, Cape Verde Monday, Dec. 2, 2024.

President Biden wanted his foreign policy to be grounded in both realism and moral values, even as he came to define competition between democracies and autocracies as the central geopolitical struggle of today. Given his lifetime of foreign policy experience in Washington, did Biden manage to build a distinct legacy for which he will be remembered?

“America is back” was Biden’s refrain when he took office. But, with the balance of power shifting as the world becomes multipolar, translating that slogan into practice proved increasingly challenging.

In fact, thanks to Biden’s actions (or inaction), the incoming Trump administration faces difficult policy choices on the Ukraine war and China’s aggressive expansionism in Asia, as well as containing the Middle East conflicts.

With Biden’s foreign policy having driven Russia and China into an “unholy alliance” against the U.S., the new administration must also find ways to shove a wedge between these two nuclear powers, lest their growing collaboration unravel America’s global preeminence.

America’s eroding global primacy already signifies that Washington must work not just with its traditional allies but also with new partners to meaningfully exercise power and influence.

However, the Biden White House’s Cold War-style “us-vs.-them” rhetoric, while bracing for some Americans, undercut the U.S. imperative to forge new partnerships, including to isolate Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. The non-Western world largely chose to remain neutral on the Ukraine conflict, including even U.S. allies such as Israel, Turkey and the Gulf Arab states.

A less rigid, more adaptive approach would likely have served American diplomacy better. After all, in the eyes of countless non-American observers, Biden’s foreign policy generally did not square with his claim that the U.S. was leading a global battle for democracy against autocracy.

From visiting Communist-ruled Vietnam and fist-bumping Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to propping up a military-installed regime in Bangladesh, Biden undercut his own “democracy vs. autocracy” narrative. To make matters worse, he remained silent on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s own moves toward authoritarianism.

Zelensky has effectively snuffed out the country’s nascent democracy by outlawing opposition parties and independent media outlets and cracking down on dissent. In fact, Zelensky, who remains in office despite his five-year term having ended in May, has essentially followed in the footsteps of his nemesis, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Biden’s foreign policy used democracy and human rights promotion as a geopolitical tool to selectively target some nations while turning a blind eye to abuses in nondemocratic states whose leadership is friendly to America’s regional interests.

But nothing proved more damaging to the credibility of Biden’s diplomacy than the president’s backing of Israel’s devastating military operations in Gaza, puncturing his claim of pursuing a values-based foreign policy.

While standing by America’s longtime ally Israel was understandable given the existential crisis that country faces from hostile regional forces, Biden’s policy, by stepping up supply of weapons and other aid to Israel as it staged its military assaults, effectively condoned the large-scale destruction and human suffering in Gaza.

Worse still, this approach has left the U.S. internationally isolated and in a defensive crouch for almost a year. There is no better illustration of this than last month’s American veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution — supported by the other 14 members — calling for “immediate and unconditional release of all hostages” as well as “immediate access [to] humanitarian assistance” in Gaza. It was the fourth time the U.S. blocked a Security Council resolution demanding a ceasefire.

This all puts the incoming administration in a challenging situation that demands forward-looking and innovative approaches to international diplomacy to advance American interests.

Trump could use his personal rapport with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to convince him that his drive for permanent victory, instead of tangibly advancing Israel’s security, may be making the country’s situation more tenuous. Israel needs a more stable, not a more troubled, neighborhood.

More broadly, American interests demand a more pragmatic and balanced approach to human rights and democracy promotion, given that China and, to a lesser extent, Russia are gaining greater influence in the non-Western world. Democracy and human rights promotion may have a legitimate role in American foreign policy, but if pursued selectively or disproportionately, the U.S. will have few countries outside the Western bloc to partner with.

But, more fundamentally, the incoming administration’s biggest foreign policy challenge is to disentangle the U.S. from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East so that it can focus attention and resources on revitalizing America’s economic security and arresting its relative decline.

The only real winner from the Ukraine war, which Biden has escalated in his final days in office, is China, America’s main challenger at the global level, which dwarfs Russia in terms of economic output, military spending and other material measures.

China has more than doubled its nuclear-weapons arsenal since 2020 and is expanding its conventional forces faster than any other country has since World War II. It is using its growing might to supplant the U.S. as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific, a region that will shape the next world order.

Biden’s troubled legacy has also contributed to an increasing line of countries seeking to join the BRICS grouping, the world’s first major non-U.S. international initiative that represents a search for a post-American world.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

US-led dual deterrence is key to Taiwan’s security

Taipei Times, December 2, 2024

US president-elect Donald Trump is inheriting from President Joe Biden a challenging situation for American policy in the Indo-Pacific region, with an expansionist China on the march and threatening to incorporate Taiwan, by force if necessary.

US policy choices have become increasingly difficult, in part because Biden’s policy of engagement with China, including investing in personal diplomacy with President Xi Jinping (習近平), has not only yielded little but also allowed the Chinese military to gain a stronger footing in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

In Xi’s Nov. 16 Lima meeting with a diminished Biden, the Chinese strongman signaled little interest in softening his aggressive foreign policy or easing China’s coercive pressures on Taiwan. In fact, Xi reportedly singled out President William Lai Ching-te (賴清德) by name and cited not one but four Chinese “red lines” that he said America must not cross if it wanted to maintain peace in the region.

“The Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and China’s development right are four red lines for China. They must not be challenged,” Xi cautioned Biden, according to the Chinese readout of the meeting. In other words, the US must not even seek to challenge the Chinese Communist Party-run totalitarian system by promoting democracy and human rights in China.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s sentencing of 45 pro-democracy leaders to long prison terms for a non-violent offense marks the final step in Xi’s crushing of all dissent and snuffing out Hong Kong’s autonomy. Like in the South China Sea, where China has changed the geopolitical map by expanding its maritime borders and building 27 military outposts on disputed islands, Xi’s success in Hong Kong has come without incurring any international costs.

All this increases the dangers for Taiwan. Yet, with the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East claiming America’s attention and resources, and draining US stocks of critical munitions and air defense systems, the last thing Biden wanted is greater tensions with China. This explained his conciliatory moves to help ease Chinese concerns. For example, Biden declared while visiting Hanoi in September 2023, “I don’t want to contain China … we’re not looking to hurt China, sincerely.”

The reluctance to tangibly push back against China’s aggressive expansionism, however, has come at the expense of America’s own security and trade interests. It could also make Sino-US conflict more likely in the post-Biden era.

The new Trump administration will have to deal with Xi’s drive to secure strategic dominance for China in Asia, including his willingness to risk conflict to accomplish that.

Xi’s recurring vow to “reunify” Taiwan with China has no basis in international law or history. But it raises the possibility that Xi might make good on his pledge to take control of Taiwan.

In fact, as China takes steps like encroaching on Taiwan’s air-defense zone and encircling the island through large-scale military exercises, it creates the risk of a war that would transform global geopolitics. The military exercises appear to be dress rehearsals for possible aggression, including enforcing a quarantine or military blockade of Taiwan.

While a military blockade would be tantamount to an act of war, an undeclared quarantine of Taiwan to interdict its vital shipments like energy and block access to its ports could be enforced by China’s maritime militias and coast guard — the world’s largest and most militarized — with the People’s Liberation Army playing only a supporting role. In keeping with China’s strategy of camouflaging offense as defense and relying on deception, stealth and surprise to advance its objectives, Beijing could blame aggressive moves by Taiwan or its supporters like the US for provoking China to order “law enforcement” in its “own waters.”

The Trump administration will have to be ready to respond to such a contingency in order to prevent Taiwan’s throttling.

If Trump were to disentangle the US from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, America would be able to focus its attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific region, the center of Chinese expansionism. Trump’s reelection represents a powerful mandate to stop the Ukraine war and, in doing so, help revitalize American power and influence. A majority of Ukrainians, according to the latest Gallup poll, now favor a negotiated end to the war as soon as possible.

The new US administration will need to prioritize safeguarding Taiwan’s autonomous status. This is critical not just to international security but also to America’s continued global preeminence.

To be sure, Trump is likely to demand that Taiwan pay the US for helping defend it from China, just as he is expected to seek higher payments from Japan and South Korea to cover the cost of the more than 80,000 American troops deployed on Japanese or South Korean territories. In his first term, though, Trump stepped up weapons sales to Taipei and sent senior officials to visit Taiwan, including his secretary of health and human services.

Today, the key to Taiwan remaining self-governing is America’s focus on dual deterrence — strengthening US-led deterrence in Asia while bolstering Taiwan’s defenses so that it has the capability to thwart an invasion. A robust dual-deterrent posture will also likely prevent a Chinese quarantine or military blockade of Taiwan.

Such a strategy could benefit from an economic component, given Taiwan’s vulnerability to China’s economic coercion. China (including Hong Kong) accounted for 35.2 percent of Taiwan’s exports and 20.3 percent of its imports last year. A US free trade agreement with Taiwan would help Taipei to diversify its outbound and inbound trade flows away from China.

Taipei also needs more concrete US support to beat back China’s efforts to turn Taiwan into an international pariah. The new US administration would do well to assist Taiwan in enlarging its diplomatic footprint internationally.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).

Not so noble: The geopolitics of the Nobel Peace Prize

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

The Nobel Prize season ended last month when winners of the six different awards were announced for their outstanding accomplishments in fields ranging from medicine to literature. But over the years, no award has generated more controversy than the Nobel Peace Prize.

This year’s Peace Prize to the Japanese atomic bomb survivors’ group Nihon Hidankyo came as a surprise, signifying a welcome respite from the award’s increasing politicization.

The six prizes, each worth 10 million Swedish kronor ($917,000), are named after Alfred Nobel, a wealthy Swedish industrialist who made his fortune selling cannons and munitions, including the explosives he invented — dynamite and gelignite. The prizes are handed out on Dec. 10, the anniversary of Nobel’s 1896 death. While the Peace Prize winner is selected and honored in Norway, the other Nobel awardees are chosen by the Nobel Foundation in Stockholm, where the prizes are handed out.

Alfred Nobel’s will stipulated that the Peace Prize should go to “the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies, and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses.”

But an examination of the 104 Peace Prizes awarded since 1901 shows that this prize has not developed in line with what Nobel laid down. As the official Peace Prize website acknowledges, the parameters for selecting a winner have expanded over the decades to include humanitarian work, democracy and human rights, climate and environmental change and other issues.

Worse still, the Peace Prize committee in Oslo has increasingly allowed geopolitical considerations to guide the selection of an awardee. In fact, the Nobel Peace Prize has become more about geopolitics than about peace. Consequently, the prize over the years has gone to a number of undeserving recipients. The prize runs the risk of losing its legitimacy.

President Barack Obama had been in office for less than one year when the Norwegian Nobel Committee decided in 2009 to award him the Peace Prize for “his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples” and “his work for a world without nuclear weapons.”

The stunning decision was met with criticism in the U.S., including from some Obama supporters. He received the prize not for his accomplishments but merely for succeeding President George W. Bush, whose invasion of Iraq on false pretenses made him deeply unpopular internationally.

Far from being a peacemaker, Obama in office relied, like Bush, on hard power, even as he deplored the ethos of “might makes right.” Obama waged serial military campaigns from Somalia and Yemen to Iraq and Syria. His 2011 U.S.-led military campaign removing Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi from power created an enduring failed state, while his effort to overthrow Syrian President Bashar Assad helped spawn the terrorist Islamic State organization.

And while championing “a nuclear-free world,” Obama led an extensive modernization of the American nuclear arsenal, stoking a new arms race.

Another Nobel Prize recipient, Muhammad Yunus, today presides over rampant human rights abuses in Bangladesh. In August, the 84-year-old Yunus was installed as head of an interim regime by the country’s powerful military, which, capitalizing on deadly violent protests, packed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina off to neighboring India before she could formally resign.

Yunus pioneered microcredit, or giving small loans to rural families, for which he and the Grameen Bank that he headed jointly received a Nobel Prize in 2006 — not in economics but for peace, after former President Bill Clinton lobbied for him. While presenting Yunus with the Peace Prize, the head of the Norwegian Nobel Committee said, “In 2002, Bill Clinton put it this way: ‘Dr. Yunus is a man who long ago should have won the Nobel Prize and I’ll keep saying that until they finally give it to him.’ Now Clinton will no longer need to remind us.”

Underscoring the award’s geopolitical agenda, the committee chairman hoped that “this peace prize will represent a possible approach to the Muslim part of the world” given the post-9/11 tendency to “demonize Islam.” He added, “It is an important task for the Nobel Committee to try to narrow the gap between the West and Islam.”

Bangladesh, with Yunus as the regime’s nominal head, is today effectively under military-clerical rule and faces a growing risk of sliding into chaos. The country is wracked by Islamist attacks, including on religious and ethnic minorities; extrajudicial killings; and arbitrary arrests, with the regime jailing thousands just last month.

The Peace Prize has even gone to people who did more to scuttle peace than to promote it. One such awardee was Henry Kissinger, whose disastrous decisions while serving under President Richard Nixon resulted in immense death and destruction across vast regions, including the U.S. carpet-bombing of Cambodia and Laos. North Vietnamese leader Le Duc Tho, who was jointly awarded the prize with Kissinger, declined his half of the spoils, as he did not want to share the award with a war hawk.

The Peace Prize Committee has often demonstrated its geopolitical activism by awarding the prize to Western-backed anti-regime activists in the developing world, from Aung San Suu Kyi to Liu Xiaobo, or by seeking to promote the bridging of regional divides. For example, the 2014 prize was given jointly to a Pakistani Muslim and an Indian Hindu.

Against this background, the Peace Prize has become not only increasingly controversial but also, as one author put it, “the world’s most reviled award.” This year’s uncontroversial award to the Japanese organization of survivors of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be an effort to restore international faith in the prize.

But for such an effort to succeed, the Peace Prize Committee must no longer give the award to make a geopolitical point. It should stick to Alfred Nobel’s mandate that the prize be given for international peace and disarmament — not for human rights promotion, civil rights work, environmental protection, economic opportunities for the poor or antigovernment activism.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”