The Mother of All Mega-Dams: India Can No Longer Ignore the Water Bomb on Its Frontier

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Brahma Chellaney, OPEN magazine

China’s own scientists are warning the world about the serious risks posed by the colossal Chinese super-dam rising just miles from India’s border on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra. Why has India been loath to leverage those scientific warnings?

For more than five years since China’s rubber-stamp parliament approved the project in March 2021, India has responded to the threat the super-dam poses to downstream Indian communities with quiet diplomacy: confidential demarches, requests for transparency and cautious official statements. That strategy has produced virtually nothing.

Construction continues at full speed on what will become the world’s largest hydroelectric dam, rising in Medog county in Tibet’s Nyingchi prefecture.

The behemoth dam could singlehandedly reshape the course of the Yarlung Tsangpo, as the Brahmaputra is known in Tibet. While the intense rains across Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Meghalaya contribute immensely to the Brahmaputra’s flows during the fourth-month monsoon season, the river’s lean-season or dry-season flows depend for almost eight months on perennial sources such as glacier melt, mountain springs, snowmelt and other base flows originating mainly in Tibet.

The perennial flows carry nutrient-rich Himalayan silt. Trapping this sediment behind the mother of all mega-dams would starve downstream floodplains of vital nutrients, while releasing sediment-stripped water would incrementally erode riverbeds in India and Bangladesh regardless of the season. The super-dam’s flow regulation would thus represent a major geopolitical and ecological vulnerability downstream.

The Medog project itself poses a geological and humanitarian challenge whose consequences could reach millions of people across Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya and Bangladesh. Ironically, the strongest case against the project is coming from China’s own state-linked scientists.

Instead of a single dam with a reservoir, the unprecedented Medog project appears to be a vast, tunnel-linked hydropower and water-diversion complex deep in the Himalayas. It reportedly dams the Brahmaputra at more than one point around the Great Bend, where the river makes a dramatic U-turn around the towering Namcha Barwa peak before gushing south into India.

The project remains shrouded in secrecy. Yet some state-linked Chinese analysts claim it includes a tunnel dozens of kilometres long bored through Namcha Barwa, linking the northern and southern reaches of the river across its Great Bend. Taken together, this sprawling infrastructure is best described as a super-dam.

For Tibetans, the mega-project represents another assault on their land, culture and way of life. It is being built in one of Tibetan Buddhism’s most sacred landscapes. The tunnelling, damming and large-scale excavation are widely viewed as a desecration of territory long revered by Tibetans, who for centuries have served as environmental guardians by respecting nature as both their teacher and protector.

Against this backdrop, India should abandon its largely silent approach and highlight at multilateral forums the warnings published by Chinese geologists. New Delhi should spotlight Chinese scientific evidence that the dam is being constructed atop an active fault system with unusually fragile geological conditions. When China’s own experts describe the project as vulnerable to seismic instability, India possesses a powerful diplomatic opportunity that it has yet to seize.

The dam is staggering in scale. Planned with a generating capacity of 60,000 megawatts—nearly three times larger than the Three Gorges Dam—it is designed to exploit the dramatic 2,000-metre descent of the Yarlung Tsangpo as the river bends around the Namcha Barwa massif before entering India. The project, approved in China’s Five-Year Plan in 2021 and estimated to cost about $127 billion, embodies the Chinese Communist Party’s longstanding ambition to build the world’s biggest engineering marvels.

But the super-dam’s location is precisely what makes it extraordinarily dangerous. The dam sits within one of the world’s most seismically active regions, where the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates collide.

This Himalayan collision zone has produced some of Asia’s most destructive earthquakes, including the 1950 Assam-Tibet earthquake that was so powerful that it cut off India’s northeast from the rest of the country. It also caused significant changes to the Brahmaputra, including the blocking of tributaries by landslides and alterations to the river’s course and riverine morphology.

A more recent example of Himalayan seismic instability was the devastating earthquake that struck Myanmar in 2025, with tremors extending almost 1,000 kilometres to Bangkok. Meanwhile, the catastrophic flash flooding along the Tibet-Nepal border has served as a vivid demonstration of how tightly linked glacial, hydrological and geological systems are in the Himalayas.

Unlike conventional hydroelectric projects built on relatively stable terrain, the super-dam is being carved into mountains already fractured by persistent tectonic movement. The Himalayas continue to undergo active crustal deformation.

Geography magnifies the risk for millions living downstream in India. Any catastrophic failure of the super-dam would occur along the international boundary, directly affecting densely populated river valleys in northeastern India. While Bangladesh may not escape death and destruction, India would likely bear the overwhelming human cost.

The super-dam debate changed fundamentally in June 2026, when a team of Chinese geologists published a landmark study in Sedimentary Geology and Tethyan Geology, a journal overseen by the state-run China Geological Survey. The research was conducted by scientists affiliated with three state-backed Chinese institutions: the Middle Yarlung Tsangpo River Natural Resources Observation and Research Station; the Chengdu University of Technology; and the Civil-Military Integration Centre of the China Geological Survey.

The study’s conclusions are surprisingly direct. The researchers confirmed that the active Paizhen geological fault runs directly beneath the reservoir and key infrastructure zone of the Medog super-dam complex. They warned that repeated tectonic activity has fractured the surrounding bedrock, weakening the foundation upon which the dam, diversion tunnels and transport infrastructure will depend.

More strikingly, they concluded that the rock and soil surrounding the reservoir zone possess a “loose structure and weak cohesion,” making them highly susceptible to landslides and instability once the dam’s enormous reservoir is filled. Even moderate seismic activity or fault movement, they cautioned, could “very easily trigger” widespread slope failures, mass landslides and rock collapses into the river channel.

To illustrate the immediate threat, the study highlighted the magnitude-6.9 earthquake that struck the India-bordering Nyingchi prefecture, where the super-dam is being built. The earthquake occurred along the northern edge of the same Paizhen Fault network, demonstrating that the very fault system underlying the dam remains capable of generating powerful earthquakes.

The study’s warning extended to operational hazards affecting supporting infrastructure. The authors emphasized that seismic deformation along the fault threatens the structural integrity of the super-dam complex’s multi-kilometre subterranean diversion tunnels cut through the towering 7,782-metre-high Namcha Barwa mountain, as well as the bridges and logistics corridors located downstream from the dam.

If Beijing’s own scientific establishment acknowledges these grave geological hazards, why is India not making them central to the international conversation?

There is another reason these findings deserve global attention: China has an inglorious history of dismissing internal scientific warnings about dams.

Before the catastrophic 2008 Wenchuan earthquake on the eastern rim of the Tibetan Plateau, chief engineer Fan Xiao of the Sichuan Geology and Mineral Bureau repeatedly warned that the nearby Zipingpu Dam could induce seismic stresses by impounding massive quantities of water above an active geological fault. After nearly 90,000 people died in the earthquake, numerous international and domestic geologists later linked the rapid filling of Zipingpu Dam’s reservoir to the catastrophic magnitude-7.9 earthquake.

Impounding millions of cubic meters of water in high-pressure mountain valleys increases pore-fluid pressure along local faults, which can trigger earthquakes—a phenomenon known scientifically as “reservoir-induced seismicity,” or RIS.

This is not the only grim precedent to haunt China. Another prominent example was the catastrophic 1975 Banqiao Dam collapse, which occurred despite scientific warnings. Prominent Chinese hydrologist Chen Xing had repeatedly warned that excessive construction of dam reservoirs along rivers in Henan province, while ignoring geological limits and flood-discharge capacities, would lead to structural collapse. His warning was dismissed.

Yet despite the obvious lesson that ignoring credible geological warnings can carry catastrophic consequences, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s regime is persisting with the super-dam’s construction.

India’s restrained approach may be understandable. Beijing rejects binding water-sharing treaties, embraces an absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine over upstream rivers, and routinely resists transparency on projects that can significantly affect transboundary river flows. Without legal mechanisms to halt construction, New Delhi has concentrated on satellite monitoring, downstream infrastructure and disaster preparedness while raising concerns confidentially through bilateral channels.

But in stark contrast to China’s unilateralist approach to projects in border regions, including on shared rivers, India still hews to quiet diplomacy, although this approach has yielded little. China’s construction footprint has expanded continuously along the Himalayan frontier despite years of Indian objections.

Just imagine the reverse scenario. Had India begun constructing a 60,000-megawatt dam immediately upstream of Chinese territory near a contested frontier, Beijing would almost certainly have mobilized international opinion, emphasized environmental risks, highlighted scientific concerns, and portrayed the project as reckless and a direct strategic threat. China excels at shaping global narratives when its interests are involved.

India has essentially chosen silence where China would choose amplification.

The greatest irony is that India already possesses the evidence needed to reshape the international debate on the super-dam. It does not have to speculate about hidden faults or invent worst-case scenarios. Chinese scientists have documented the active Paizhen Fault, fractured bedrock, weakened foundation capacity, unstable reservoir slopes and seismic history in painstaking technical detail. Those findings deserve global scrutiny precisely because they originate within China’s own state-linked scientific system.

Quiet diplomacy has not slowed construction, increased transparency or secured binding safeguards. Continuing the same approach while the world’s largest and riskiest dam rises beside the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is less a strategy than an admission of helplessness.

When the potential danger from the super-dam is measured not only in megawatts but also in millions of downstream lives, New Delhi ought to demand evidence-based accountability by placing the Chinese scientific system’s own geological warnings at the centre of the global conversation.

China’s Dam Frenzy Spawns Dam Collapses

For more than seven decades, China has pursued the most ambitious dam-building program in human history. Since Mao Zedong declared that China must “tame the rivers,” dams have become symbols of national power, technological modernity and the Communist Party’s ideological triumph.

The country has transformed its landscape by damming every significant river, diverting waters across distant river basins, and exporting its dam-building model to Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Yet beneath this show of engineering prowess lies a sordid record Beijing has long sought to cloak: China has experienced more dam failures than any other nation. Thousands of dam reservoirs have collapsed because of substandard construction, political interference and geological miscalculation.

The world’s deadliest dam disaster occurred not in a colonial state but in modern China during the Mao era. Even today, aging infrastructure and extreme weather events continue to expose vulnerabilities within the country’s vast dam network, raising the risks of catastrophic dam collapses.

When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the country possessed just 22 dams of significant size. Today, it has more than 85,000 dams, including over half of the world’s approximately 50,000 large dams. In effect, China has completed, on average, at least one large dam every day since its so-called Communist revolution.

This extraordinary expansion of dams has been rooted in the Communist Party’s longstanding conviction that rivers should be reengineered to serve political and economic objectives. During Mao’s infamous “Great Leap Forward,” local authorities were encouraged to construct reservoirs at breakneck speed, often prioritizing production targets over engineering standards. Scientific caution frequently yielded to ideological goals, while experienced hydrologists who questioned ambitious projects faced political scorn or even persecution.

The consequences of such a dam-building frenzy have extended to the social domain. By 2007, Chinese authorities acknowledged that 22.9 million people had been uprooted by dam and other water projects since 1949, in one of the largest occurrences of development-induced resettlement in world history.

It is against this backdrop that China’s extraordinary dam-building record is matched by an equally staggering dam failure record. Official statistics released by the Chinese government acknowledge that at least 3,500 dams failed just between 1951 and 2008. Earlier government figures showed 2,796 collapses by 1980 and roughly 3,200 by 1981—equivalent to nearly 4% of all dams then in existence.

The true number may never be known. Information surrounding dam failures has long been treated as a state secret, and China has generally been reluctant to share failure data internationally. At a 1991 international conference on dam safety in Vienna, participating countries reported their historical dam collapses. China alone stated that it had none to report, despite its own published domestic statistics documenting thousands of failures.

This opacity has obscured an uncomfortable reality: many failures were not acts of nature alone, but products of systemic human error impelled by an authoritarian political system.

The defining catastrophe occurred in August 1975 in Henan province. Following unprecedented rainfall from Super Typhoon Nina, the Banqiao Dam overtopped and breached. Its collapse unleashed a chain reaction that destroyed the nearby Shimantan Dam and approximately 60 additional reservoirs in a cascading hydraulic failure.

The immediate deluge killed an estimated 26,000 people. Subsequent famine, disease and social collapse raised the total death toll to between 170,000 and 230,000, making Banqiao the deadliest structural dam failure ever recorded.

The catastrophe could have been averted had authorities heeded the warnings of Chinese hydrologists, especially as Chen Xing had repeatedly warned that over-building reservoirs would likely trigger structural collapse. Rather than revising the project, authorities denounced Chen’s criticisms as politically incorrect.

Details of the disaster, in fact, remained classified for three decades before being partially declassified in 2005.

More than an engineering failure, Banqiao was a failure of governance, where ideology overruled scientific expertise.

Although Banqiao remains unparalleled, later disasters have shown that the underlying problems did not end with Mao.

In 1993, the Gouhou Dam in Qinghai province collapsed, killing more than 300 people. Investigators attributed the failure to serious design defects, inadequate quality control and poor compaction during construction. Qinghai, the birthplace of the present Dalai Lama, has historically been part of the traditional Tibetan region of Amdo, a major cultural and spiritual homeland for Tibetans.

In 2000, a massive landslide created a natural dam on the Yiong Tsangpo, which is a tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo. It joins the main river just upstream of where the Yarlung Tsangpo makes its great bend around the Namcha Barwa mountain and enters Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang/Dihang, which then becomes the Brahmaputra.

Despite clear warning signs, the temporary dam on the Yiong Tsangpo eventually burst, sending destructive floodwaters through Tibet and into Arunachal Pradesh, destroying bridges and vital infrastructure downstream. The event illustrated how Himalayan geology can transform localized instability into an international disaster.

More recently, the connected Yongan and Xinfeng dams in Inner Mongolia failed in rapid succession in 2020 after heavy rainfall. Although evacuations prevented mass casualties, the dual failure inundated farmland, destroyed roads and renewed concerns about thousands of aging reservoirs constructed in pursuit of political quotas without modern safety standards.

These failures together underline continuity rather than exception. The recurring causes of failure reflect an infrastructure network built rapidly, expanded relentlessly and maintained unevenly. Thousands of older dams now lack modern monitoring systems, early-warning sensors and upgraded flood-control capacity.

China’s most famous dam, the Three Gorges Dam, has never suffered a major structural failure. Yet it has carried profound environmental impacts and significant geological risks.

The project officially displaced 1.4 million people, submerged cities and villages, altered aquatic ecosystems, intensified pollution within its mammoth reservoir and trapped enormous volumes of sediment. Geologists have also documented thousands of micro-earthquakes and widespread landslides associated with the immense weight and fluctuating levels of its reservoir, which holds 39.3 billion cubic meters of water.

Today, the principal concern over this giant dam is less an abrupt collapse than cascading risk. The Three Gorges Dam, on the Yangtze River, sits within a broader network of upstream reservoirs, meaning extreme rainfall could compound hydraulic pressures across multiple dams simultaneously, unleashing a sudden surge of water. Such a scenario, eerily reminiscent of Banqiao’s domino effect, could threaten downstream industrial hubs and mega-cities along the Yangtze.

This background is especially relevant as China erects its unprecedented super-dam on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra, within one of the world’s most seismically active mountain belts. China’s own hydraulic history offers a cautionary lesson: the greatest danger is often not the river but the belief that it can be bent to the Chinese will.

Beijing is again smothering inconvenient scientific warnings. In earlier decades, engineers, hydrologists and geologists who questioned excessive dam construction or inadequate flood-discharge capacity were frequently mocked and marginalized, allowing flawed projects to proceed without meaningful scrutiny. Now Beijing is persisting with the construction of what it calls “the project of the century” even as its own scientists warn of serious geological risks at the site.

‘Dam-For-A-Dam’ Strategy?

The fact that no country has built more dams than Beijing and that no country has witnessed more dam failures than China should shape how the world evaluates the Himalayan super-dam and how India responds. As the record shows, Chinese engineers are capable of building monumental structures. The deeper question is whether any government can safely impose permanent hydraulic control over a dynamic, earthquake-prone river system whose behaviour continually exceeds human prediction.

The greatest threat posed by the Medog mega-project is the possibility that the world’s largest hydroelectric dam could become the world’s greatest transboundary flood hazard. India’s response should prioritize resilience, surveillance and diplomacy.

For India, the project is a strategic and humanitarian challenge whose consequences threaten millions living downstream. Much attention has focused on whether the super-dam will allow China to manipulate cross-border river flows. That concern is legitimate. The Brahmaputra is the lifeline of northeastern India, irrigating farmland, sustaining fisheries, replenishing wetlands and supporting livelihoods before flowing into Bangladesh, where it becomes the country’s single largest source of freshwater.

Yet the more immediate danger may be one that receives far less discussion: the catastrophic risk of structural failure in one of the world’s most earthquake-prone landscapes. An unparalleled dam built inside the Eastern Himalayan Syntaxis creates not only Chinese geopolitical leverage but also systemic disaster risk for downstream communities.

India thus faces a defining policy choice. Should it respond by constructing its own giant counter-dam immediately downstream as a “water buffer” strategy? If China abruptly impounds water, creating a drought in the lean season, or suddenly releases massive volumes of water, unleashing an artificial flood, could India’s downstream counter-dam regulate river levels, absorb a surge and mitigate the “water bomb” risk? Or should India pursue a fundamentally different strategy centred on technology and flood resilience?

New Delhi’s proposed Upper Siang Multipurpose Project (USMP) is an 11,000-megawatt hydroelectric and flood-control dam in Arunachal Pradesh estimated to cost roughly $13 billion. Officially, the project serves two purposes: generating clean electricity and creating sufficient storage capacity to absorb sudden surges originating from China’s super-dam. On paper, the logic appears compelling. If China controls the river upstream, India should possess a hydraulic buffer downstream.

The problem is that rivers do not obey human logic. They follow gravity and geology. Human logic seeks control; nature embraces chaos.

A downstream mega-dam cannot reliably neutralize the catastrophic failure of a much larger upstream structure located only a relatively short distance away. Instead, it risks creating a cascading disaster in which one dam’s collapse triggers another.

The geography makes this risk particularly disquieting. China’s Medog project sits just upstream of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while the proposed Upper Siang dam would be constructed shortly after the river enters India. Between them lies the steep, narrow Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Canyon, the world’s deepest and longest canyon. Rather than dissipating the energy of moving or falling water, this terrain accelerates it, channelling enormous volumes of water through confined valleys at extraordinary velocity.

Should China’s super-dam ever experience a catastrophic breach—whether from a powerful earthquake, a massive landslide from the Namcha Barwa massif or some other extreme geological event—the resulting flood wave would not resemble an ordinary river flood. It would be a high-energy torrent carrying sediment, boulders, liquefied mud and shattered concrete capable of destroying infrastructure across its path.

The downstream Indian reservoir would then become part of the hazard rather than the solution.

The central weakness of the counter-dam concept lies in an operational contradiction. A flood-control reservoir is effective only when it is substantially empty. A hydroelectric reservoir is economically productive, especially as a power generator, only when it remains relatively full.

The Upper Siang project cannot maximize both objectives simultaneously. If operators maintain high water levels to generate 11,000 megawatts of electricity, the available flood cushion shrinks dramatically. If they keep a large empty buffer for emergency protection, electricity generation and project economics suffer correspondingly.

A second constraint is time. Because of the close proximity between China’s super-dam and India’s planned Upper Siang dam, downstream authorities might receive little more than several tens of minutes of warning following an upstream structural failure. Even with perfect communications, safely releasing billions of cubic meters of water from the Upper Siang structure through spillways within such a narrow window would be virtually impossible.

The third, and perhaps most important, problem is seismic. The Eastern Himalayan Syntaxis is among the world’s most active tectonic regions, with the devastating 1950 Assam–Tibet earthquake demonstrating the enormous geological forces capable of reshaping entire river systems.

Any future earthquake of similar magnitude or impact could damage both the Chinese and Indian dams during the same seismic event, transforming two strategic assets into a cascading infrastructure catastrophe.

It is a classic case of correlated risk: when two or more critical systems occupy the same hazard zone, their failures become mutually reinforcing rather than independent.

Given that downstream engineering cannot effectively mitigate the risks posed by the Medog super-dam, India must leverage its rapidly expanding space and remote-sensing capabilities to eliminate strategic blindness over the Tibetan Plateau.

Just as China does not have a water-sharing treaty with any downstream country, it also lacks comprehensive, year-round, real-time, automated hydrological data-sharing and emergency-notification mechanisms with any neighbour.

During crises, India, therefore, cannot assume that Beijing will provide timely information about reservoir conditions or geological emergencies. The obvious solution is autonomous observation. Rather than depending upon Chinese disclosures, India can build an independent picture of upstream risk.

India’s NISAR and RISAT series satellites, together with Cartosat imaging satellites, offer precisely the technological foundation required for continuous monitoring of the Medog project, including detecting subtle structural movement, reservoir expansion, unstable mountain slopes and landslide precursors.

Jointly launched by ISRO and NASA, the NISAR satellite, with its dual-frequency radar technology, measures millimetre-scale ground deformation and monitors natural hazards like Himalayan landslides and glacier dynamics. The Cartosat satellites provide high-resolution sub-meter stereo imagery for building 3D models of steep Himalayan slopes, while the RISAT series gives round-the-clock synthetic aperture radar (SAR) coverage during heavy monsoon downpours when optical cameras are blinded by clouds.

Equally important is what happens on the ground. A dense network of automated acoustic and radar water-level sensors positioned near the LAC along the Siang River would transmit instantaneous water-level anomalies into India’s disaster management architecture. Sudden upstream impoundment, abnormal discharge or unusual flow acceleration would automatically trigger downstream alerts without requiring human interpretation.

In an age of satellite intelligence, early warning is becoming as strategically valuable as physical infrastructure.

Furthermore, India should invest in distributed flood-management systems along the Siang and Brahmaputra floodplains. Controlled flood-bypass channels, diversion tunnels and dry floodways could redirect extreme surge waters away from densely populated settlements into designated unpopulated, low-lying areas.

Restoring Assam’s historical wetlands, beels and oxbow lakes would recreate natural sponge basins that absorb flood peaks while simultaneously enhancing biodiversity and groundwater recharge. Embankment setbacks (moving traditional levees further back from the riverbank) would provide the Brahmaputra greater room to expand during exceptional floods instead of forcing enormous hydraulic energy into narrow corridors.

Transparency itself can become a strategic instrument of pressure on Beijing. India should routinely publish open-source satellite analyses, seismic assessments and independently verified geological reports concerning conditions around Medog. The message to Beijing should be that establishing infrastructure capable of endangering millions of people across the international boundary carries corresponding responsibilities of disclosure and accountability.

A first step toward compelling Beijing to lift its opacity should be a formal diplomatic request demanding full technical disclosure of the Medog project, including design specifications, geological assessments, reservoir safety studies, seismic modelling and emergency response protocols. India should simultaneously request permission for an independent international scientific inspection involving experts from multiple countries.

Beijing will probably refuse. But refusal itself carries diplomatic value. A government genuinely confident in the safety of its engineering should welcome independent scrutiny, particularly when millions of downstream lives are potentially affected. Opacity reinforces suspicion.

India should also elevate the issue in international scientific and environmental forums rather than treating it solely as a bilateral matter. The central question is universal: Should the world’s largest dam be constructed directly across an active geological fault in one of Earth’s most seismically unstable mountain systems without independent international oversight?

At the same time, India must prepare for China’s unparalleled super-dam ultimately becoming an enduring reality. The more durable Indian response should centre on layered resilience: autonomous satellite surveillance, AI-assisted flood forecasting, automated river sensors, restored wetlands, engineered floodways, evacuation infrastructure and sustained diplomatic pressure for transboundary transparency. Together, these measures could contribute to reducing both uncertainty and human vulnerability.

But India must also reshape the international narrative by placing China’s own scientific warnings, dam-failure record and refusal to allow independent scrutiny at the centre of the global debate. The super-dam may well stand as a monument to China’s ambition; it should not become a tombstone for downstream millions.

China’s Super-Dam Is Becoming an Upstream Water Bomb

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The latest evidence suggests that the Chinese scientific establishment understands the dangers of the under-construction Himalayan dam—the world’s largest—more clearly than its political leadership is willing to acknowledge. With the livelihoods of two billion people at stake, the international community needs to weigh in.

By Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

The world’s largest dam is rising in one of the world’s most geopolitically treacherous and seismically unstable regions. Just a few kilometers from the heavily militarized border with India, China is constructing an unprecedented hydropower project in Tibet on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the world’s highest-altitude major river, better known internationally as the Brahmaputra.

The super-dam will dwarf China’s Three Gorges Dam, currently the world’s largest, in power-generating capacity. Its reservoir will impound a gargantuan volume of water above millions of people downstream in India’s northeast and deltaic Bangladesh, much of which lies barely above sea level.

Now the most troubling warning is coming not from foreign critics but from China’s own scientists. A recent paper published in the state-linked, Mandarin-language journal Sedimentary Geology and Tethyan Geology identifies serious geological hazards at the construction site. The geologists conclude that the terrain has a “loose structure and weak cohesion” and warn that fault movement or an earthquake could easily trigger large-scale instability, threatening both the reservoir and surrounding infrastructure. The authors recommend reinforcing the reservoir slopes, installing retaining structures, and redesigning key elements to reduce the risk of catastrophe.

When scientists working under a communist regime issue such warnings, the international community must pay attention.

The new dam is rising at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra, where the river plunges steeply through the world’s deepest and longest canyon before entering India. It also sits squarely within the Himalayan seismic belt, created by the slow-motion collision of the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates. This is among Earth’s most earthquake-prone regions, with a record of producing devastating temblors.

The danger is not simply that an earthquake might damage a dam. A gigantic reservoir could itself trigger a quake by intensifying geological stresses. Reservoir-triggered seismicity, or RTS, has been documented for decades.

One likely example occurred in China. In one of the deadliest natural disasters in modern Chinese history, an earthquake on the Tibetan Plateau’s eastern rim in 2008 killed nearly 90,000 people, mainly in Sichuan province. While scientists continue debating the precise relationship, influential research concluded that the immense weight of water stored in the reservoir of the new Zipingpu Dam may have increased pressure along an underlying fault, potentially advancing the earthquake by decades or even centuries.

Instead of facing up to that scientific possibility, China has embarked on a vastly larger dam project in an even more fragile geological setting. But the Himalayan fault system does not respect national borders; nor would the consequences of a major dam failure. The powerful 2025 Myanmar earthquake demonstrated how interconnected this seismic zone is, with tremors traveling far enough to trigger the collapse of a high-rise building in Bangkok, some 1,000 kilometers away.

The Brahmaputra is the lifeline of northeastern India, irrigating farms, sustaining fisheries, replenishing wetlands, and supporting millions of livelihoods before flowing into Bangladesh, where it is the single largest source of freshwater. Like China’s giant dams on the Mekong, the super-dam threatens to alter cross-border river flows and reduce the downstream transport of nutrient-rich sediment essential to the river’s ecology and riparian countries’ agriculture.

Worse, a catastrophic structural failure—or even an emergency release of impounded water following seismic damage—could unleash devastating floods across densely populated downstream plains with little warning. What begins as an engineering failure in Tibet could become a humanitarian catastrophe extending all the way to Bangladesh, the world’s most densely populated country outside microstates and mini-states.

The geological danger is only part of the story. China is increasingly transforming its control of the Tibetan Plateau—the source of most of Asia’s major rivers—into strategic leverage. It has built cascades of dams on transboundary rivers, withheld hydrological data during periods of tension, and resisted entering any water-sharing treaty with downstream states. Water has become another instrument of coercive statecraft.

The sheer scale of what China calls “the project of the century” will inevitably give it unprecedented control over river flows. Even routine reservoir operations can affect downstream ecosystems, agriculture, sediment transport, and flood patterns.

Yet the project remains shrouded in secrecy, with the Chinese government releasing remarkably little technical information despite the enormous transboundary implications. There has been no meaningful environmental transparency, no independent geological review, and no credible consultation with the countries facing the greatest downstream risks.

International law has long recognized that states sharing transboundary rivers bear responsibilities toward one another, including preventing significant cross-border harm, exchanging relevant information, and consulting on projects that could materially affect downstream neighbors. Adherence to these principles is essential to safeguard shared resources. China’s continuing opacity undermines them.

The Himalayan watershed is often called Asia’s water tower because its rivers sustain nearly two billion people across multiple countries. When the largest dam ever attempted is introduced into this fragile ecosystem, secrecy becomes a regional security risk.

Given the extraordinary stakes, China should immediately invite an independent panel of international seismologists, geologists, and dam-safety experts to inspect the site, review the project’s geological assumptions, and assess whether the recommended design modifications are sufficient. China should also institutionalize year-round, real-time hydrological data-sharing and emergency notification mechanisms with India and Bangladesh, and commit to ongoing transboundary consultation on major design changes.

Ironically, the latest evidence suggests that the Chinese scientific establishment understands the dangers more clearly than its political leadership appears willing to acknowledge. Now that China’s own geologists have raised the alarm, policymakers must embrace transparency and accept transboundary responsibilities before a potential water bomb is fully assembled upstream.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2026.

Taiwan is becoming a harder target for China

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Taipei Times

The Iran and Ukraine wars are rewriting modern military strategy. These conflicts are demonstrating that a less conventionally powerful state, by leveraging asymmetric capabilities, can impose major costs on an aggressor and fundamentally reshape the outcome of conflict. Taiwan is not only drawing lessons from those conflicts, but also translating them into practice.

Far from seeking to match China ship for ship, missile for missile or aircraft for aircraft, Taiwan needs to make Chinese aggression so costly, problematic and uncertain that Beijing is deterred from launching an attack. Taiwan cannot become a bigger wolf than China, but it can ensure that no predator seeks to swallow it without getting badly wounded.

That is the logic driving Taiwan’s long-overdue pivot toward asymmetric capabilities — aerial drones, autonomous attack boats, land-based anti-ship missiles, mobile air defenses and other relatively inexpensive, distributed weapons.

The shift has been accelerated by developments in two very different wars: Ukraine’s growing capability to target energy and other strategic sites deep inside Russia and Iran’s refusal to bend to American coercion, leaving US President Donald Trump struggling for a face-saving way to exit the war he initiated. Both conflicts have shown that, despite sophisticated and expensive weapons remaining important, large numbers of cheap, mobile and expendable systems can impose disproportionate costs on a stronger opponent.

Ukraine has been the more important model for Taipei, given how Kyiv has stalled Russia’s advances on the battlefield by taking the war to the enemy’s heartland. Ukraine has shown that drones can transform the battlefield by providing surveillance, targeting and strike capabilities at a fraction of the cost of conventional aircraft. Taiwan’s defense planners are also studying Iran’s use of drones and missiles to impose regional costs on the US by striking American bases and facilities in the Middle East.

Nothing matters more for Taipei than deterring Chinese aggression.

For Beijing, invading Taiwan would be an exceptionally difficult amphibious operation for several reasons: the Taiwan Strait is about 130 kilometers wide at the narrowest point; weather is favorable for a major crossing only during a few windows each year; Taiwan has relatively few beaches suitable for large-scale amphibious landings; and many of those beach approaches lead into mountainous or urban terrain. Above all, China would have to move enormous quantities of troops, equipment, ammunition and supplies across the Strait while under attack.

That is exactly where Taiwan’s asymmetric strategy can impose significant costs on its foe. To turn the Strait and the approaches to Taiwan’s coastline into a killing zone, land-based anti-ship missiles can attack Chinese vessels while autonomous attack boats can swarm larger naval ships and landing craft. Drones, for their part, can provide constant surveillance and strike targets without putting Taiwanese pilots at risk. Mobile air defenses can frustrate China’s effort to establish air superiority.

In such a scenario, the objective will not be to win a traditional naval battle, but to prevent Beijing from achieving the quick victory on which its invasion strategy would depend.

Taiwan, learning the right lessons from conflicts elsewhere, is already making substantial progress. It is on track to produce more than 1,000 Hsiung Feng II and III anti-ship missiles by this year-end. Its heavy investment in layered air defenses combines expensive Patriot interceptors with much cheaper and more widely distributable Stinger missiles.

What stands out, however, is the scale of Taiwan’s drone-manufacturing goal, which is aimed at creating deterrence against China while also building export leverage abroad. It plans to produce 100,000 drones a month within four and a half years, with roughly half intended for export, while its military is likely to acquire more than 210,000 aerial and sea-based drones.

To plug a potential vulnerability, Taiwan has formed a new “Littoral Combat Command” to help integrate drones, mobile missiles and artillery so that these separate systems become components of a unified coastal-defense architecture. This is a wise step.

Reducing its traditional reliance on imported big-ticket platforms in favor of relatively cheap, distributed asymmetric systems is making Taiwan a harder target for China.

Taiwan, of course, still needs fighter aircraft, submarines, sophisticated air defenses and other high-end capabilities. But big-ticket systems should form the upper layer of a broader defense architecture rather than constitute its foundation. The foundation should be survivability, dispersion and punitive response.

That is especially important because China may choose to begin a war not with an amphibious invasion, but by seeking to isolate and slowly strangle Taiwan.

A blockade or quarantine could be used to disrupt shipping, intimidate commercial traffic, restrict energy supplies and even sever Taiwan’s communications with the outside world. Taiwan’s dependence on subsea cables makes this a particularly acute vulnerability. Without a single Chinese soldier setting foot on Taiwan, a communications blackout could create confusion and panic, disrupting financial markets, government operations, emergency services, logistics, military command-and-control, and the flow of information to the outside world.

Seen in this light, Taiwan’s recent exercise simulating an internet disruption was more than just a civil-defense drill. By deliberately throttling mobile data across parts of the island, Taiwan tested how citizens, businesses and institutions would function if communications were degraded during a crisis.

Such preparations are pivotal to an asymmetric strategy. Overwhelming an invading force with asymmetric capabilities depends on resilient networks so that drones and unmanned attack boats can detect targets, sensors can transmit information, missile batteries can receive targeting data, military commanders can communicate with dispersed units, and civilian authorities can coordinate emergency responses. If China were to sever Taiwan’s communications before the Taiwanese military could respond to an invasion, even an impressive arsenal of drones, missiles, artillery and autonomous attack boats would not be able to repulse aggression.

If resilience is to define national defense, Taiwan needs to invest not only in redundant communications and alternative satellite links, but also in hardened command networks, distributed data centers, backup power, and communications systems that can function when conventional internet access is cut. Taiwanese society should be able to operate under degraded communications conditions for weeks. And even when portions of the communications network are destroyed or jammed, Taiwan’s drones, missiles, sensors and command centers must remain operational.

Taiwan is rightly seeking to leverage its extraordinary technological and manufacturing base to build a defense-industrial ecosystem capable of mass-producing drones, autonomous systems, sensors, communications equipment and other expendable technologies. In fact, Taiwan has already begun to emerge as a significant drone exporter.

The ultimate purpose of the pivot from prestige weapons to asymmetric capabilities is not to prepare Taiwan to fight a war indefinitely. Rather, it is to make Beijing realize that starting a war would be a disastrous gamble.

Making Taiwan too hard to blind, too hard to blockade, too hard to invade and ultimately too painful to conquer would establish enduring deterrence.

Brahma Chellaney, professor emeritus of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).

Nepal-Tibet floods expose dangers of China’s Himalayan gamble

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Upstream engineering and missing warnings may have magnified the natural disaster

A damaged section of a highway in Nuwakot, central Nepal, is seen on August 27, 2026, following a cryospheric collapse in the Himalayas. © Getty Images
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Brahma Chellaney

Nikkei Asia

The devastating flash floods that tore through Nepal’s Trishuli and Koshi river valleys should not be seen as simply another Himalayan tragedy.

What began as an act of nature — a massive ice-and-rock avalanche that sheared away part of a glacier at an altitude of 5,200 meters near Tibet’s border with Nepal — became a cascading catastrophe after colliding with an increasingly engineered mountain landscape upstream.

The lesson is clear: In the fragile Himalayas, human alterations to rivers and mountain landscapes can dramatically amplify the impact of natural disasters.

The catastrophe unfolded with astonishing speed. The immense mass of ice and rock plunged into the upper Lhende Khola catchment, pulverizing into a dense slurry that temporarily dammed the narrow gorge before the improvised barrier collapsed. Within minutes, a wall of water, mud and boulders surged downstream, raising river levels. The collapse generated seismic waves so unusual that automated monitoring systems initially mistook the event for a magnitude-5.2 earthquake.

As the deluge thundered through Nepal’s steep valleys, it swept away villages, bridges and roads with devastating force. Several downstream hydroelectric facilities were wrecked by debris, triggering widespread power and communications failures. The floods also ravaged the Tibetan side of the border. In Nepal, however, they left a vast trail of death and destruction, while immense deposits of mud and rubble severely hampered search-and-rescue operations.

But the natural trigger of the disaster discloses only half the story.

The key question is why the floods became so destructive downstream. The answer lies in the cumulative effect of Chinese upstream infrastructure, altered river channels and the absence of meaningful transboundary cooperation. None of these caused the glacier failure, though together they may have amplified its consequences.

One important human factor was the transformation of the river corridor itself near the Tibet-Nepal border.

Over the past decade, China’s expansion of embankments, border facilities, highways and other civil works has narrowed sections of the upper valley by concentrating construction activity along the riverbanks. In ordinary conditions, such projects facilitate trade and transport. During an extreme flood, however, they become sources of vulnerability.

The torrent swept up loose spoil, concrete rubble, heavy machinery and structural debris, turning an already violent debris flow into what hydrologists aptly compare to liquid concrete — a battering ram capable of crushing almost any structure in its path. The deluge caused significant damage to infrastructure downstream.

The second human contribution was reengineered hydrology.

Diversion weirs, intake structures, embankments and other upstream river or stream modifications created localized bottlenecks in the narrow Himalayan gorges. As the avalanche-driven surge struck these chokepoints, temporary ponding and overtopping likely generated secondary flood pulses, accelerating the rapid downstream rise in river levels. The cascading impacts meant that some downstream communities faced not one but multiple destructive waves in quick succession.

Perhaps the most preventable failure was informational rather than physical.

China operates hydrological monitoring stations across the Tibetan headwaters, collecting real-time data on river levels and upstream conditions. Yet, despite its deepening relationship with Kathmandu, Beijing has not established comprehensive, year-round, real-time hydrological data-sharing and emergency notification mechanisms with Nepal (or with any other downstream country).

Even without a fully integrated 24/7 telemetry link feeding upstream water-level data directly into Nepal’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, an immediate Chinese emergency notification of sudden water-level spikes, debris-dam formation or other upstream anomalies could have bought precious time to evacuate settlements, trekking routes and vulnerable infrastructure, potentially reducing the death toll.

The absence of institutionalized hydrological transparency thus transformed a natural hazard into a governance failure.

For Nepal, rebuilding shattered hydropower stations, roads, bridges and other infrastructure will require years of investment. Another key task is institutional rather than physical: Nepal should seek from China mandatory real-time hydrological data sharing, cross-border emergency notification protocols, and independent assessments — should Beijing permit them — of how upstream engineering influences flood propagation in shared river basins. Transboundary rivers demand transboundary responsibility.

The Nepal tragedy exposes a more fundamental reality about the Himalayas, the world’s most seismically active major mountain range. The range remains under immense tectonic pressure as the Indian and the Eurasian continental plates collide, leaving its terrain exceptionally unstable.

Climate change is increasingly unsettling glaciers, but climate alone does not determine disaster outcomes. In the world’s youngest and most geologically fragile mountain range, engineering choices, river modifications and the absence of cross-border hydrological cooperation increasingly determine whether a natural hazard remains localized or cascades into a broader catastrophe.

Against this backdrop, the Nepal catastrophe may revive international scrutiny of a far larger gamble unfolding in a different section of the Himalayas: China’s super-dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo at the Great Bend, where the river makes a sharp U-turn around a towering mountain peak before gushing south into India. Constructing a mammoth dam with almost three times the power-generating capacity of the Three Gorges Dam beside a major geological fault carries extraordinary risks, especially for millions living downstream in India and Bangladesh.

China’s damming of rivers in Tibet is already wreaking environmental havoc. Scientists have long warned that the gravest threat to Himalayan dams may not be earthquakes alone, but massive rock-and-ice avalanches plunging into reservoirs and generating tsunami-like impulse waves capable of overtopping engineered structures.

The Nepal disaster is more than a national calamity. It is a warning that the boundary between natural disaster and human-made catastrophe is blurring in the Himalayas. As infrastructure expands across one of Earth’s most volatile mountain systems and glaciers weaken, the question is whether governments upstream and downstream will act before the next cascading catastrophe strikes.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the independent New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battleground,” which won the Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

What a Sino-American G2 Would Mean for Asian Security

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The G2 concept that Donald Trump has lately been touting is a highly unstable proposition, which could make the emergence of a unipolar Asia more likely. Fortunately, Japan remains committed to advancing the far more effective “free and open Indo-Pacific” framework, with India as an indispensable partner.

By Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

Grand foreign-policy strategies rarely disappear overnight. More often, they are dismantled gradually through subtle rhetorical shifts, bureaucratic adjustments, and changing diplomatic priorities. America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is no exception.

A decade ago, then-Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō unveiled the concept of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Based on the idea that the Indian and Pacific Oceans form a single strategic theater, he sought to build a coalition of democracies committed to preventing any one power from dominating the region.

The United States subsequently embraced this vision, reviving the Quad coalition and establishing its members—Australia, India, Japan, and the US—as the principal anchors of the regional balance of power. The underlying strategic logic was compelling. Like the alliance system more broadly, the Indo-Pacific coalition would amplify US influence by encouraging middle powers to shoulder greater responsibility for regional stability. Moreover, its multiple centers of power and shared objective would make it inherently resilient.

More recently, however, US President Donald Trump has advanced the idea of a “G2” comprising just the US and China. Unlike the free and open Indo-Pacific vision, which seeks to maintain stability by cultivating a broad network of like-minded partners, the G2 concept assumes that the world’s two leading powers should shape the regional and global order through direct negotiations.

The approach elevates bilateral deal-making at the expense of multilateral diplomacy, thereby diminishing the strategic weight of middle powers—and, by extension, US influence. Its durability largely rests on the personal chemistry and shifting calculations of leaders in Washington and Beijing. While Trump seems to be warming up to Chinese President Xi Jinping today, there is no telling what tomorrow will bring. Simply put, the G2 is a highly unstable proposition.

One might be tempted to dismiss this as just another example of Trump’s unconventional diplomacy, which often emphasizes bilateral bargaining over coalition-building. But his administration has also systematically deprioritized the Quad, with its latest National Security Strategy making just a single passing mention of the grouping. The US Department of Defense, for its part, has reverted to referring to its principal theater as the “Pacific,” instead of the “Indo-Pacific.”

Together, these developments suggest that this is no temporary bluff or brief diplomatic glitch. Under Trump, the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is unraveling.

This carries grave risks for Japan. Over the past decade, Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision has anchored Japan’s national security strategy, with the goal of ensuring that China does not concentrate its military pressure in East Asia. If the US focuses exclusively on the Western Pacific, Japan would lose its strategic depth and risk finding itself face-to-face with China’s maritime might.

None of this is lost on Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who has redoubled her commitment to the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In May, she unveiled an updated Indo-Pacific framework emphasizing regional economic resilience and enhanced security cooperation. Her government has been reinforcing the partnerships that give the strategy practical effect by deepening strategic ties with India and Australia and expanding “minilateral” arrangements, including the Japan-US-Philippines and Japan-US-South Korea trilateral groupings.

In Japan’s strategy for preserving Asia’s balance of power, India occupies a central position. This was apparent during Takaichi’s visit to New Delhi last month, when she and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed their commitment to the Indo-Pacific framework and agreed to expand cooperation in areas ranging from AI and critical minerals to defense technology. For Japan, India is not just another strategic partner. With its vast size, formidable military, dynamic economy, and commanding position astride the Indian Ocean, it is the indispensable western pillar of the Indo-Pacific architecture.

India presents China with a two-front dilemma, forcing Chinese military planners to split their attention and resources between the continental and maritime theaters. If China did not have to monitor its long, tense Himalayan frontier with India—where dozens of soldiers died after Chinese land grabs triggered clashes in 2020—and protect critical Indian Ocean trade routes, it would be able to concentrate overwhelming force in the Western Pacific.

By removing the “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific,” the Trump administration has exposed its lack of understanding of this critical dynamic. Together with its G2 vision, the shift amounts to an important symbolic and geopolitical victory for China. After all, Chinese leaders have long argued that the Indo-Pacific strategy’s real aim was to “contain China” and “make Asia-Pacific countries ‘pawns’ of US hegemony.” They would vastly prefer a Pacific-centric framework in which the US and China negotiate directly, and other regional powers do as they are told.

Whatever the Pentagon names its strategic theater, the geography will not change. China’s most important energy and trade lifelines still pass through the Indian Ocean, and the Himalayan frontier still constrains Chinese military planning. Preventing the emergence of a unipolar Asia, therefore, still depends on maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, underpinned by a broad coalition of democracies committed to that objective.

Whether the US returns to this framework remains to be seen. Japan, however, has already made its choice.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2026.

The missing India lobby in Washington

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Why can’t Indian immigrants influence policy in America? As U.S.-India ties fray, America’s most successful immigrants still lack a voice in Washington.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi greets supporters during his trip to New York City in June 2023. | REUTERS

By Brahma Chellaney
The Japan Times

As America’s congressional midterm campaigns gather momentum, politicians from both parties will once again court Indian-American voters, donors and volunteers. They have good reason to do so.

Indian Americans have become one of the greatest immigrant success stories in American history. They are among the country’s wealthiest and most highly-educated communities. They lead Silicon Valley, dominate large segments of the medical profession, head some of America’s iconic corporations like Google and Microsoft, and are emerging as an increasingly visible force in electoral politics, with growing influence in several battleground states that could determine control of Congress.

Yet, despite this remarkable ascent, Indian Americans have failed where it arguably matters most for a diaspora: influencing Washington’s policy toward their country of origin — or even preventing a succession of U.S. actions since last year that have disproportionately hurt Indians.

Over the past four years, the U.S.-India relationship has steadily deteriorated under two successive American administrations. The Biden administration allowed bilateral frictions to accentuate and strain ties. President Donald Trump’s second administration has accelerated the decline through trade and energy coercion, tighter restrictions on student and work visas, and a more openly transactional approach that is effectively demoting India in American grand strategy.

Taken together, these measures represent the most sustained period of policy setbacks affecting India and Indians in decades. Yet they have encountered little organized resistance from the increasingly influential Indian-American community.

This paradox deserves attention because it exposes a central reality of Washington: economic success and political visibility do not automatically translate into foreign-policy influence.

Measured by conventional indicators, Indian Americans should possess considerable leverage. Numbering just over five million, they have the highest median household income of any major ethnic group in America. They have impressive voter participation and growing electoral significance in battleground states such as Georgia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Arizona and Michigan. Members of Congress, governors, mayors and nationally known political figures now come from the Indian-American community across both parties.

Indian Americans have mastered nearly every arena of American life except the one that matters most in foreign policy — organized political power. Consequently, there is no effective India lobby.

Unlike the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) or the influential Cuban-American organizations, Indian Americans have never built a durable, bipartisan, single-issue lobbying infrastructure capable of changing political incentives in Congress or the White House.

Instead, the community is represented by an assortment of business councils, cultural associations, advocacy groups and political action committees pursuing multiple, sometimes competing, objectives. They excel at networking, philanthropy and promoting commercial ties, but they have never developed the institutional cohesion needed to influence high-stakes decisions on trade, immigration or strategic policy.

Washington rewards focus. The most successful foreign-policy lobbies do not merely contribute campaign money. They create political consequences. They identify a small number of priorities, cultivate relationships with lawmakers of both parties, and reward — or punish — politicians according to how they vote. Most importantly, they persuade American policymakers that supporting their objectives advances U.S. national interests, not simply the interests of another country. Indian-American advocacy has rarely operated that way.

The community also suffers from an internal divergence of interests. Naturalized citizens and second-generation Indian Americans understandably vote like other Americans. Their priorities are inflation, taxes, crime, healthcare, schools and local governance — not bilateral diplomacy or immigration policy. The Indians most directly affected by recent policy changes — professionals on H-1B visas, students (the largest from any country) and green-card applicants — cannot vote.

This creates an unusual political asymmetry. The people with electoral influence are often insulated from the policies affecting Indians most severely. Those bearing the greatest burden possess virtually no electoral leverage.

Trump’s second presidency has made this structural weakness increasingly evident. His administration no longer treats India primarily as a strategic counterweight to China. Instead, it increasingly views India through a transactional commercial lens — as a fast-growing market for American exports and an economic competitor whose technological rise should be carefully managed through tariffs and tech-transfer controls. U.S. restrictions affecting skilled immigration, tighter student visa rules, pressure over energy imports, and disputes over technology transfers all reflect that recalibration.

Nor can Democrats claim a better record. The once-blossoming bilateral relationship began losing momentum before Trump returned to office.

The comforting assumption that the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership would inevitably deepen has proved misplaced. For all the talk of an “indispensable partnership” with India, Washington has shown that diaspora goodwill carries little weight when it conflicts with electoral or strategic priorities.

If Indian Americans wish to acquire greater influence over Washington’s India policy, they may need to rethink their approach fundamentally.

That does not mean replicating another community’s political model. Every diaspora has its own history and priorities. But successful lobbying in Washington invariably requires certain ingredients: bipartisan engagement, institutional continuity, disciplined messaging, coordinated fundraising and, above all, a willingness to frame policy objectives as advancing America’s own strategic interests.

Indian Americans already possess the financial resources, professional networks and intellectual capital needed to build political infrastructure. What they lack is sustained collective action.

That distinction helps explain why a community that has become indispensable to America’s innovation economy remains largely dispensable when Washington makes decisions affecting India.

Until that changes, Indian Americans are likely to remain a political paradox: one of America’s most accomplished immigrant communities, yet unable to translate that success into meaningful influence over one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships.

Brahma Chellaney, a longstanding contributor to The Japan Times, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battlefield,” which won the Bernard Schwartz Award.

America’s new India doctrine: Never repeat the China mistake

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U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi take part in a joint news conference at the White House in February 2025.

By Brahma Chellaney
The Japan Times

For nearly a quarter century, a rare bipartisan consensus guided American policy toward India. Washington believed that helping the world’s largest democracy become stronger — economically, technologically and militarily — served U.S. interests by creating a durable counterweight to an increasingly assertive China.

Washington’s India consensus is now quietly unraveling.

The clearest indication came not from a leaked strategy paper but from U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau speaking in New Delhi. Declaring that Washington “will not repeat its China mistake,” Landau said the U.S. would not allow India to “develop all these markets” only to outcompete America commercially.

Those remarks deserve far more attention than they received. They amount to a remarkably candid acknowledgment that Washington no longer views India’s rise as an unqualified strategic asset. Instead, it increasingly sees India through the same prism that now shapes its approach toward China: as an emerging economic giant whose technological ascent must be carefully managed.

It marks a structural shift in American strategy.

The shift is also visible in American strategic vocabulary. The Pentagon’s recent decision to drop the “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific” is far more than bureaucratic rebranding. Names in strategy reveal priorities.

For nearly a decade, the Indo-Pacific concept placed India at the heart of America’s vision for balancing China’s rise across two oceans. It reflected the belief that India’s emergence as a major power was indispensable to ensuring a stable balance in Asia.

Removing “Indo” sends a different signal. It suggests that Washington is narrowing its strategic horizon, placing greater emphasis on managing relations directly with Beijing while downgrading India’s role in its larger regional calculus. The change also aligns with U.S. President Donald Trump’s more conciliatory approach to Beijing since mid-2025 and his repeated references to a U.S.-China “Group of Two,” a framework in which the world’s two largest powers bargain directly over global affairs rather than relying on broad coalitions of partners.

Successive U.S. administrations in this century promoted India’s emergence through expanding defense cooperation, a civil nuclear deal, growing technology partnerships and repeated invocations of shared democratic values. They believed India’s rise would strengthen, not challenge, American leadership. Today that assumption is giving way to a different strategic calculation.

The lesson many policymakers in Washington drew from China’s ascent is not simply that Beijing became militarily formidable. It is that the U.S. aided the rise of an industrial and technological rival capable of dominating global manufacturing, critical supply chains and advanced technologies and challenging American primacy.

America’s new objective is to avoid repeating that experience with India. Landau merely articulated publicly what American policy has begun to reflect.

Trump’s 50% punitive tariffs on Indian exports were more than trade measures. They conveyed that “America First” applies as much to strategic partners as to competitors. His administration increasingly treats India less as a geopolitical pillar than as a market for American goods and investment. Indeed, Trump’s National Security Strategy frames the relationship in transactional commercial terms rather than as a long-term geopolitical investment.

Even more revealing are the growing obstacles surrounding the transfer of advanced jet-engine technology.

The agreement between General Electric and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics was celebrated as a watershed because it promised unprecedented technology transfer for engines to power India’s three separate indigenous fighter programs: Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk2 and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft. The multibillion-dollar deal was never simply about supplying engines. It represented a potential breakthrough for India’s ambition to become an independent aerospace power.

Instead, implementation has become bogged down in unexpected roadblocks. Engine deliveries have stalled, delaying fighter production and leaving completed Indian-built aircraft stranded without propulsion systems.

That, in turn, has placed the Indian Air Force under severe operational strain, with its active strength plummeting to approximately 29 operational squadrons, as against the required 42.5 combat squadrons to effectively counter a dual-front threat from nuclear-armed allies China and Pakistan.

Whatever the official explanations, the broader strategic message is difficult to miss. Washington appears increasingly reluctant to facilitate technologies that could enable India eventually to compete at the highest end of advanced industrial manufacturing.

The U.S. shift extends to India’s own strategic backyard. If India is no longer viewed as the indispensable anchor of America’s Asian strategy, it becomes easier for Washington to pursue regional policies that diverge from New Delhi’s interests.

For much of the past decade, New Delhi assumed that growing strategic ties with Washington would naturally translate into greater American sensitivity toward India’s concerns in its immediate neighborhood. That assumption no longer holds.

In Bangladesh, Washington supported the violent overthrow of the India-friendly government of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Bangladesh’s consequent descent into violent Islamism threatens the security of India, which is already home to millions of illegally settled Bangladeshis.

Myanmar presents another example of how policies conceived in Washington carry direct security consequences for India. Washington’s stringent sanctions against Myanmar’s military government and “nonlethal” military aid for anti-junta forces may reflect broader American objectives, but they have contributed to instability along India’s sensitive northeastern frontier, where insurgent movements have long exploited cross-border sanctuaries.

While seeking to topple Myanmar’s junta, Washington has embraced Pakistan’s military-backed regime, feting the country’s de facto ruler, Field Marshal Asim Munir.

The U.S. modernization of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet, expanding military contacts and repeated statements by senior American officials that U.S. policy seeks to prevent any single power from dominating the Indian subcontinent have revived uncomfortable memories in New Delhi of Cold War-era balancing. Many in India see that objective as closely mirroring China’s own interest in keeping India boxed in.

America’s changing attitude toward India suggests that it is now being guided by a different strategic logic. Washington is no longer asking whether its regional policies strengthen India’s position. Instead, it appears increasingly comfortable limiting India’s geopolitical room for maneuver while simultaneously restricting the technologies that would underpin its long-term industrial ascent.

The irony is striking. For two decades, Washington encouraged India’s rise because it believed a powerful democratic India would reinforce American strategy in Asia. Today, many U.S. policymakers appear to fear that helping India become too successful economically could recreate the very mistake they believe Washington made with China.

That does not mean America seeks to contain India as it seeks to contain China. Rather, it suggests something subtler but no less consequential. Washington wants India strong enough to complicate Chinese strategy, wealthy enough to remain an attractive market for American exports and influential enough to contribute to Indian Ocean security — but not so technologically advanced or economically competitive that it eventually becomes another global economic challenger.

That is a far narrower conception of partnership than the one that guided U.S. policy for much of this century. India should recognize that this is not a passing disagreement over tariffs, energy purchases or defense contracts. It reflects a deeper reordering of American strategic priorities.

The relationship with India is consequently becoming more transactional, with Washington primarily interested in securing a larger share of the world’s fastest-growing major market.

The U.S. now views India’s rise no longer as an inherently benign development, but as a phenomenon to be carefully managed, moderated and, where necessary, constrained.

The quiet demotion of India in America’s grand strategy represents the most significant shift in U.S. policy since Washington embraced New Delhi as a strategic partner at the turn of the century.

Brahma Chellaney, a longstanding contributor to The Japan Times, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battlefield,” which won the Bernard Schwartz Award.

China’s Erasure of Tibet Is Accelerating

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In recent years, the international community has stood idly by while China has systematically eradicated Tibetan culture and identity. With the authorities stepping up their assimilation efforts, Asia risks not only losing one of its oldest civilizations, but also facing a China that is bigger, bolder, and more powerful than ever.

By Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

The self-immolation of exiled Tibetan activist Lobga Rangzen outside United Nations headquarters in New York on July 2 was not an expression of personal despair. It was a desperate attempt to jolt the world out of its growing indifference to one of the most important international issues of our time: Tibet’s systematic erasure.

China occupied then-autonomous Tibet shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic.. The occupation is often viewed primarily through the prism of human rights, and for good reason. But it should also be understood as an effort to lay claim to one of Asia’s most valuable geopolitical assets: the vast, resource-rich Tibetan Plateau dominates the Himalayas, contains the headwaters of Asia’s great rivers, and overlooks South, Central, and Southeast Asia.

In recent decades, China has invested heavily in the Plateau—building extensive military infrastructure, constructing mega-dams on Asia’s great rivers, and expanding extraction of strategic minerals—while relying on surveillance, coercion, and security forces to suppress resistance. But physical control of Tibet is not enough for Chinese President Xi Jinping. He wants complete and lasting control over the entire Tibetan Plateau.

The best way to achieve that, Xi has concluded, is by erasing the identity of the people who inhabit it. The Tibetan people are a distinct ethnicity, with their own language, traditions, cuisine, and dress. Stripping Tibetans of their identity—ensuring that they no longer think of themselves as Tibetan—has one goal: to extinguish resistance to permanent Chinese rule over the “Roof of the World.”

To this end, China has steadily expanded its system of state-run boarding schools, channeling Tibetan children there at younger and younger ages. Beijing portrays these “residential schools” as engines of development. In fact, the curriculum is designed to erase children’s Tibetan identity and replace it with allegiance to the Chinese state.

United Nations experts report that more than one million Tibetan children aged 6-18—about 78% of the total—attend these schools. They are separated from their families and cultures for most of each year, taught in Mandarin, exposed only to Han culture and experiences, and conditioned to view their own culture, religion, and language as inferior. In other words, China is raising a generation of Tibetans to assimilate to Chinese culture—and lose their own.

China has also taken other steps to erase Tibet. Since late 2023, Beijing has systematically replaced “Tibet” with “Xizang” as the official English-language designation in its government documents, diplomatic communications, and state media. The name derives from the Manchu Qing dynasty’s imperial terminology for Tibet. Its adoption is intended to buttress Beijing’s claim that Tibet is not a distinct historical entity, but merely an appendage of China.

The international community is making this erasure all too easy. Some museums, universities, and research institutions outside China have accepted this imperial renaming. The Musée du Quai Branly in Paris has labeled Tibetan artifacts as coming from “Xizang.” The British Museum has referred to “Tibet or the Xizang Autonomous Region” in an exhibit on the Silk Road.

Now, China is taking this effort to the next level. On July 1, a sweeping new “Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” took effect, codifying Xi’s drive to force the assimilation of Tibetans and other ethnic minorities to a single state-defined Chinese identity centered on loyalty to the Communist Party. By criminalizing broadly defined threats to “ethnic unity,” the legislation amounts to yet another weapon with which China can intimidate Tibetan activists, scholars, and diaspora communities. Families in Tibet already face retaliation for the activities of relatives overseas.

The timing of the new law is not a coincidence. The Tibet question has gradually faded from the global agenda in recent years. This partly reflects the international community’s preoccupation with the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, tensions over Taiwan, and acute global economic uncertainty. But many governments are also reluctant to jeopardize their relations with China. So, while they rightly condemn cultural destruction elsewhere, they largely ignore the destruction of Tibetan identity.

But this calculation overlooks an inescapable reality: China’s assault on Tibetan identity is inseparable from its great-power ambitions. A permanently assimilated Tibet would consolidate China’s military advantage over the Himalayan piedmont, strengthen its control over Asia’s water resources, secure immense deposits of strategic minerals, and remove what China perceives as the last potential source of political resistance in the region. Such a China would be better equipped—and significantly emboldened—to assert more authority beyond its borders.

The international response need not be extreme. Democratic governments should sanction officials responsible for the forced-assimilation campaign, reject official pressure to refer to the region as Xizang, and expand support for Tibetan educational and cultural institutions in exile. These modest but meaningful steps would help to preserve one of Asia’s oldest civilizations while making clear that cultural erasure cannot become an accepted instrument of statecraft.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2026.

India can no longer take Nepal for granted

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Once firmly in New Delhi’s orbit, Nepal is now a three-way contest

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Brahma Chellaney

Nikkei Asia

A highway in Kathmandu on March 20, 2024. © AP Photo

India has long viewed Nepal as lying firmly within its natural sphere of influence. The two countries are bound together by geography, culture, religion and an open border. Nepal’s economy remains deeply intertwined with India’s.

Few international relationships anywhere in Asia combine such extensive people-to-people contact, cultural affinity and freedom of movement as that between India and Nepal.

Today, however, Nepal is no longer defined solely by its ties to India. China has spent the past two decades steadily expanding its political and economic footprint there. Now the U.S. is emerging as a significant third player.

The era when New Delhi could be regarded as Nepal’s indispensable external partner is quietly drawing to a close.

Recent high-level visits by senior American and Chinese officials to Kathmandu underscore a broader reality: Nepal has become an arena of strategic competition among Asia’s two great powers and the world’s leading superpower. With the three competing for influence, investment and strategic access, Nepal has become one of the clearest examples of how India’s traditional dominance on the subcontinent is increasingly under serious challenge.

The U.S. and India remain partners globally yet, as Nepal illustrates, Washington increasingly pursues policies that diverge from New Delhi’s interests on the subcontinent. Before visiting Nepal in April, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs S. Paul Kapur bluntly stated that a primary American regional objective is to “prevent the dominance of any single power in South Asia.”

Nepal, wedged between India and Chinese-ruled Tibet, remains uniquely important to New Delhi, including for internal security, given the nearly 1,800-kilometer open border that allows Nepalis and Indians to move freely without passports. Millions of Nepalis live and work in India. Hindu and Buddhist traditions connect communities on both sides of the frontier. No other power enjoys such deep historical, cultural and societal ties.

Yet such ties alone no longer guarantee political influence.

China recognized this reality before most others. Through infrastructure investments, political engagement and sustained diplomatic outreach, Beijing gradually established itself as a major player in Nepal. It built close relations with Nepal’s two, long-dominant communist parties to help cultivate a friendly government there and expand its influence along India’s northern frontier.

The communists’ crushing defeat in the March national elections has left Beijing’s preferred political channels in Nepal marginalized. Yet Chinese influence may not erode significantly as Nepal’s new Gen Z rulers realize the risks of relying too heavily on a single partner, India.

For Beijing, Nepal’s significance extends beyond economics. The country sits astride China’s sensitive Tibetan frontier and occupies a strategic position between the world’s two most populous nations. Maintaining influence in Kathmandu has become an important element of China’s broader regional strategy.

What is new is the growing American role. While both Washington and New Delhi seek to limit Chinese influence in Nepal, the U.S. is also helping create a regional environment in which India’s privileged position becomes less exclusive.

The result is not outright rivalry between the U.S. and India. Rather, it is subtle differences in outlook and strategy that suggest Washington and New Delhi do not share identical interests in India’s immediate neighborhood, including Nepal.

Washington increasingly treats Kathmandu as an independent strategic actor whose external relationships should not be constrained by any regional power. High-level American engagement with Nepal has become more frequent, while U.S.-backed development initiatives and investment programs have sharply raised Washington’s profile in Kathmandu.

America’s growing strategic footprint, however, has alarmed Beijing, which opposes U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects, warning Kathmandu of potential “ramifications” and “outside interference,” especially if the five-year MCC grant program were extended beyond 2028. It has also cautioned Nepal against joining the U.S. State Partnership Program or allowing Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network to operate in Nepal, viewing the former as implicit strategic alignment with Washington and the latter as a security risk.

Yet focusing solely on the external powers misses the most important part of the story: Nepal itself.

Kathmandu is not merely the object of great-power competition. Successive Nepali governments have become increasingly adept at leveraging rivalries among India, China and the U.S. to expand their diplomatic room for maneuver. Rather than choosing sides, Nepal seeks to maximize opportunities from all three relationships.

This reflects a broader shift in the country’s foreign policy. Nepal’s leaders increasingly view India, China and the U.S. not as mutually exclusive partners but as complementary sources of investment, technology, development assistance and diplomatic support. What appears from New Delhi as a loss of influence often appears from Kathmandu as an expansion of strategic options.

That dynamic is likely to endure. Nepal’s political class recognizes that competition among larger powers creates opportunities that did not exist when India exercised near-exclusive influence. By maintaining ties with all major players, Kathmandu can extract benefits from each while securing greater autonomy.

For New Delhi, this changing landscape presents a challenge. India retains enormous advantages in Nepal that neither China nor the U.S. can replicate. But influence and exclusivity are not the same thing.

China has already ended India’s near-monopoly on strategic influence in Nepal. The growing American presence is further diversifying Kathmandu’s external partnerships. Nepal is becoming a genuinely competitive geopolitical space.

The real lesson is not that India is being displaced. It is that the age when New Delhi could assume primacy in its strategic backyard is fading. Across the subcontinent, influence increasingly must be earned through sustained engagement and competitive statecraft rather than inherited through geography and history.

Few countries illustrate that transformation more clearly than Nepal.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the independent New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battleground,” which won the Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

Welcome to ‘Xizang’: China is quietly, permanently trying to erase Tibet

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By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

A Tibetan exile at a rally in India in 2017. AP Photo/Ashwini Bhatia

While international attention has rightly focused on China’s mass internment of Uyghurs and other ethnic-minority Muslims in Xinjiang, a quieter but no less consequential campaign is unfolding on the Tibetan Plateau.

In Tibet, China is not merely policing dissent or curbing religious practice, but attempting something more permanent: the systematic erasure of a people’s culture, language and identity by targeting its children.

Over the past decade, Beijing has forcibly placed more than one million Tibetan children — almost four out of every five — into state-run, Mandarin-language boarding schools. Many are taken from their families at the age of four or five and kept away for most of the year.

These institutions are presented as instruments of development. In reality, they function as tools of forced assimilation, designed to sever children from their language, faith and cultural inheritance.

This is not simply a human-rights scandal, but a geopolitical project with far-reaching implications for Asia’s future balance of power.

The boarding-school system in Tibet is built on a neo-imperial premise: “Control the child and you control the future.” Children are taught — explicitly and implicitly — that Tibetan traditions are backward, their faith suspect, and their identity subordinate to a homogenized Chinese nation.

By displacing the family and monastery as the core institutions of socialization, the state inserts itself as the primary arbiter of values and belonging. The result is a generation growing up alienated from its roots, conditioned to view its own heritage through the lens of inferiority.

This is a classic colonial maneuver. Residential schooling has long been used by imperial powers to break indigenous societies from within. Western nations now acknowledge the devastating legacy of such systems imposed on Native peoples in North America, Australia and New Zealand. China, in contrast, is actively expanding this very model in the 21st century — on an industrial scale.

The silence of Western democracies in the face of this campaign is striking. Governments that routinely condemn abuses elsewhere have largely treated Tibet’s boarding schools as an internal Chinese matter and chosen to look away.

Tibet is not a peripheral region. It is the geographic and strategic heart of Asia. Often described as the “Roof of the World,” the vast Tibetan Plateau dominates the Himalayan range and overlooks South, Southeast and Central Asia.

Control over Tibet allows China to project power across the Himalayas and exert pressure on these regions, including as the upstream controller of cross-border river flows. Tibet is the source of Asia’s main river systems. In Tibet, China is currently not only constructing the largest dam ever built on earth but also rapidly extracting the region’s rich mineral resources.

Before China’s invasion and annexation in the early 1950s, Tibet was a self-governing entity. Had it remained so, it would today rank as the world’s tenth-largest country by area. Its absorption into the People’s Republic fundamentally altered Asia’s strategic geography, including its hydrological map.

The geopolitical reality is that whoever controls Tibet holds a commanding position over the Himalayan piedmont, enjoying unparalleled military, hydrological and strategic leverage. This reality explains Beijing’s tightening grip on Tibet and its determination to extinguish any distinct Tibetan consciousness that might challenge Chinese rule.

The campaign against Tibetan identity is thus inseparable from China’s broader strategic ambitions. By reducing Tibetans to a depoliticized, assimilated population, Beijing seeks to lock in perpetual control over one of the world’s most sensitive geopolitical corridors.

The assault on identity extends beyond classrooms. Beijing has also sought to erase Tibet from global consciousness by expunging its very name. It has replaced the term “Tibet” with “Xizang,” a Qing-dynasty label meaning “Western Treasure Land.”

The goal is clear: to recast Tibet not as a distinct historical entity but as an inseparable, resource-rich appendage of China.

Disturbingly, this linguistic shift is beginning to find acceptance beyond China’s borders. Some Western museums and academic institutions have started adopting “Xizang” in place of Tibet, lending inadvertent legitimacy to Beijing’s narrative. Accepting this rebranding is acquiescence in the erasure of a nation’s historical identity.

Tibetan children, meanwhile, continue to risk dangerous journeys into exile, particularly to India, in order to preserve their language, religion and culture. India, home to the world’s largest Tibetan exile community, subsidizes Tibetan-language schools. That such risks for children are necessary is an indictment of international inaction.

Western democracies cannot plausibly claim ignorance of China’s forced-assimilation goal — to eliminate a potential source of resistance in a strategically vital region. Through the forced separation of a million children, Beijing is systematically attempting to obliterate a civilization.

At a minimum, democratic governments and international institutions should abandon their posture of silent spectatorship.

First, officials directly responsible for the Tibetan boarding-school system should face targeted Western diplomatic and economic sanctions. Cultural genocide should carry consequences more tangible than the largely symbolic visa restrictions announced by the Biden administration in 2023.

Second, governments, universities, museums and international organizations must reject the enforced use of “Xizang” in place of Tibet. Preserving historical and cultural nomenclature is a small but essential act of resistance against erasure.

Third, greater material and political support is needed for Tibetan educational and cultural institutions in exile, which remain the last line of defense for this unique culture.

The fate of Tibet’s children is a bellwether for the future of Asia’s security order. To ignore their forced separation and indoctrination is to acquiesce in China’s tightening grip on Tibet — and by extension on the strategic heart of Asia.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.“