By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill
History shows that when leaders face political setbacks at home, they often seek to restore their standing through decisive action abroad. The temptation is to double down on an uncompromising foreign-policy objective rather than acknowledge failure or retreat. This quest can overshadow the strategic costs of achieving it.
President Trump faces such a moment with the unfinished war with Iran that he launched on February 28. Lacking a clear endgame, the war has proved costly and deeply unpopular at home and abroad.
Re-igniting or expanding the high-stakes conflict with Iran shortly after midterm election losses runs the risk of holding the already-reeling global economy hostage and further alienating a war-weary U.S. electorate concerned with economic stability and military overreach. The war was clearly a factor in Republicans’ loss of both chambers of Congress.
To salvage his image from the Iran war debacle, Trump, however, may reignite hostilities in the belief that his legacy hinges on compelling Iran to verifiably abandon its nuclear program. That includes low-level enrichment, which Tehran regards as its inalienable right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows peaceful nuclear-energy activities under International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.
Despite the recent electoral drubbing, Trump declared that he has no regrets about launching the war, even if American voters “weren’t happy with the oil price.” To make matters worse, there is intense internal friction within Trump’s national security team, with disagreeing advisers presenting him with starkly divergent risk assessments.
Advisers supporting escalation argue that unyielding military pressure is the only mechanism to compel Iran into total compliance. In this zero-compromise approach, stopping short of total victory renders the initial blood and treasure wasted.
Moderates, in contrast, caution that further strikes risk escalating into a broader regional confrontation, disrupting energy markets and locking the U.S. into an endless war. They also warn that Tehran can absorb immense punishment, resulting in a likely quagmire that would cloud the remainder of Trump’s term. Their prescription leans toward managed exits or off-ramps before political damage deepens further.
The blunt truth is that the Iran war has already proved to be one of the most strategically self-defeating wars in modern American history. It has weakened U.S. power, strengthened the very clerical regime it sought to overthrow, and handed geostrategic advantages to America’s principal global challenger, China. No less significant is the erosion in America’s international credibility and standing, even as the war has imposed significant economic costs on U.S. allies and partners (from Asia to Europe) by spiking energy prices and slowing growth.
The war already has fundamentally altered the strategic calculations of the Gulf monarchies, the central pillars of American power in the Middle East that today are pressing for de-escalation. These states, by prioritizing “Gulf First,” are no longer willing to blindly follow an “America First” administration. Any U.S.-initiated resumption of hostilities would only accelerate the rethink in the royal courts of the Gulf sheikhdoms.
Having already paid the domestic political costs of the Iran war, the White House has little incentive to accept an ambiguous draw. Indeed, Trump may want the conflict to end in a way that allows him to boast that launching it was worth the cost to the U.S. and the global economy.
The elevation of hardline loyalist Stephen Miller to chief of staff aligns with this logic. Miller’s public posture on the Iran campaign has framed the military campaign through an uncompromising lens (“not fighting with hands tied behind the back”).
To achieve a victory narrative dramatic enough to offset the political damage, the administration may seek to maximize coercive pressure through renewed hostilities to achieve Iran’s capitulation at the negotiating table or on the battlefield. However, if the Iranian regime were to give up its right to enrich uranium or admitted defeat under foreign duress, it could threaten its internal survival. If both sides view capitulation as politically costlier than continued conflict, escalation risks becoming self-sustaining.
Whether this leads to reignited hostilities depends on one key variable: whether the White House perceives the geopolitical and domestic backlash of renewed hostilities as lower than the political cost of an inconclusive outcome.
Trump is being forced to choose between two unpalatable options. He can cut the mounting losses — borne by the U.S., its allies and the global economy — and accept an inconclusive outcome, risking the narrative that launching the war was a major strategic error with no tangible payoff. Or he can double down on compellence, betting that an even tighter squeeze or further escalation can force Iran’s total capitulation on enrichment, thereby recasting the war as a historic victory.
With the U.S. again massing major forces near Iran, the sunk-cost logic may drive White House strategy. Once political capital is already spent, conservative conflict-management strategies give way to high-risk legacy moves. Forcing a complete, uncompromising outcome (“absolute victory”) carries massive strategic, economic and political trade-offs that may far outweigh any gains.
Absolute victory, in war as in politics, is often the costliest illusion. For the U.S., the choice is not between victory and retreat, but between an inconclusive peace and a deeper strategic defeat. A war launched to restore American strength must not end by further weakening America.
Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”
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