What a Sino-American G2 Would Mean for Asian Security

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The G2 concept that Donald Trump has lately been touting is a highly unstable proposition, which could make the emergence of a unipolar Asia more likely. Fortunately, Japan remains committed to advancing the far more effective “free and open Indo-Pacific” framework, with India as an indispensable partner.

By Brahma ChellaneyProject Syndicate

Grand foreign-policy strategies rarely disappear overnight. More often, they are dismantled gradually through subtle rhetorical shifts, bureaucratic adjustments, and changing diplomatic priorities. America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is no exception.

A decade ago, then-Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō unveiled the concept of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Based on the idea that the Indian and Pacific Oceans form a single strategic theater, he sought to build a coalition of democracies committed to preventing any one power from dominating the region.

The United States subsequently embraced this vision, reviving the Quad coalition and establishing its members—Australia, India, Japan, and the US—as the principal anchors of the regional balance of power. The underlying strategic logic was compelling. Like the alliance system more broadly, the Indo-Pacific coalition would amplify US influence by encouraging middle powers to shoulder greater responsibility for regional stability. Moreover, its multiple centers of power and shared objective would make it inherently resilient.

More recently, however, US President Donald Trump has advanced the idea of a “G2” comprising just the US and China. Unlike the free and open Indo-Pacific vision, which seeks to maintain stability by cultivating a broad network of like-minded partners, the G2 concept assumes that the world’s two leading powers should shape the regional and global order through direct negotiations.

The approach elevates bilateral deal-making at the expense of multilateral diplomacy, thereby diminishing the strategic weight of middle powers—and, by extension, US influence. Its durability largely rests on the personal chemistry and shifting calculations of leaders in Washington and Beijing. While Trump seems to be warming up to Chinese President Xi Jinping today, there is no telling what tomorrow will bring. Simply put, the G2 is a highly unstable proposition.

One might be tempted to dismiss this as just another example of Trump’s unconventional diplomacy, which often emphasizes bilateral bargaining over coalition-building. But his administration has also systematically deprioritized the Quad, with its latest National Security Strategy making just a single passing mention of the grouping. The US Department of Defense, for its part, has reverted to referring to its principal theater as the “Pacific,” instead of the “Indo-Pacific.”

Together, these developments suggest that this is no temporary bluff or brief diplomatic glitch. Under Trump, the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is unraveling.

This carries grave risks for Japan. Over the past decade, Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision has anchored Japan’s national security strategy, with the goal of ensuring that China does not concentrate its military pressure in East Asia. If the US focuses exclusively on the Western Pacific, Japan would lose its strategic depth and risk finding itself face-to-face with China’s maritime might.

None of this is lost on Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who has redoubled her commitment to the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In May, she unveiled an updated Indo-Pacific framework emphasizing regional economic resilience and enhanced security cooperation. Her government has been reinforcing the partnerships that give the strategy practical effect by deepening strategic ties with India and Australia and expanding “minilateral” arrangements, including the Japan-US-Philippines and Japan-US-South Korea trilateral groupings.

In Japan’s strategy for preserving Asia’s balance of power, India occupies a central position. This was apparent during Takaichi’s visit to New Delhi last month, when she and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed their commitment to the Indo-Pacific framework and agreed to expand cooperation in areas ranging from AI and critical minerals to defense technology. For Japan, India is not just another strategic partner. With its vast size, formidable military, dynamic economy, and commanding position astride the Indian Ocean, it is the indispensable western pillar of the Indo-Pacific architecture.

India presents China with a two-front dilemma, forcing Chinese military planners to split their attention and resources between the continental and maritime theaters. If China did not have to monitor its long, tense Himalayan frontier with India—where dozens of soldiers died after Chinese land grabs triggered clashes in 2020—and protect critical Indian Ocean trade routes, it would be able to concentrate overwhelming force in the Western Pacific.

By removing the “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific,” the Trump administration has exposed its lack of understanding of this critical dynamic. Together with its G2 vision, the shift amounts to an important symbolic and geopolitical victory for China. After all, Chinese leaders have long argued that the Indo-Pacific strategy’s real aim was to “contain China” and “make Asia-Pacific countries ‘pawns’ of US hegemony.” They would vastly prefer a Pacific-centric framework in which the US and China negotiate directly, and other regional powers do as they are told.

Whatever the Pentagon names its strategic theater, the geography will not change. China’s most important energy and trade lifelines still pass through the Indian Ocean, and the Himalayan frontier still constrains Chinese military planning. Preventing the emergence of a unipolar Asia, therefore, still depends on maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, underpinned by a broad coalition of democracies committed to that objective.

Whether the US returns to this framework remains to be seen. Japan, however, has already made its choice.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2026.

The missing India lobby in Washington

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Why can’t Indian immigrants influence policy in America? As U.S.-India ties fray, America’s most successful immigrants still lack a voice in Washington.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi greets supporters during his trip to New York City in June 2023. | REUTERS

By Brahma Chellaney
The Japan Times

As America’s congressional midterm campaigns gather momentum, politicians from both parties will once again court Indian-American voters, donors and volunteers. They have good reason to do so.

Indian Americans have become one of the greatest immigrant success stories in American history. They are among the country’s wealthiest and most highly-educated communities. They lead Silicon Valley, dominate large segments of the medical profession, head some of America’s iconic corporations like Google and Microsoft, and are emerging as an increasingly visible force in electoral politics, with growing influence in several battleground states that could determine control of Congress.

Yet, despite this remarkable ascent, Indian Americans have failed where it arguably matters most for a diaspora: influencing Washington’s policy toward their country of origin — or even preventing a succession of U.S. actions since last year that have disproportionately hurt Indians.

Over the past four years, the U.S.-India relationship has steadily deteriorated under two successive American administrations. The Biden administration allowed bilateral frictions to accentuate and strain ties. President Donald Trump’s second administration has accelerated the decline through trade and energy coercion, tighter restrictions on student and work visas, and a more openly transactional approach that is effectively demoting India in American grand strategy.

Taken together, these measures represent the most sustained period of policy setbacks affecting India and Indians in decades. Yet they have encountered little organized resistance from the increasingly influential Indian-American community.

This paradox deserves attention because it exposes a central reality of Washington: economic success and political visibility do not automatically translate into foreign-policy influence.

Measured by conventional indicators, Indian Americans should possess considerable leverage. Numbering just over five million, they have the highest median household income of any major ethnic group in America. They have impressive voter participation and growing electoral significance in battleground states such as Georgia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Arizona and Michigan. Members of Congress, governors, mayors and nationally known political figures now come from the Indian-American community across both parties.

Indian Americans have mastered nearly every arena of American life except the one that matters most in foreign policy — organized political power. Consequently, there is no effective India lobby.

Unlike the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) or the influential Cuban-American organizations, Indian Americans have never built a durable, bipartisan, single-issue lobbying infrastructure capable of changing political incentives in Congress or the White House.

Instead, the community is represented by an assortment of business councils, cultural associations, advocacy groups and political action committees pursuing multiple, sometimes competing, objectives. They excel at networking, philanthropy and promoting commercial ties, but they have never developed the institutional cohesion needed to influence high-stakes decisions on trade, immigration or strategic policy.

Washington rewards focus. The most successful foreign-policy lobbies do not merely contribute campaign money. They create political consequences. They identify a small number of priorities, cultivate relationships with lawmakers of both parties, and reward — or punish — politicians according to how they vote. Most importantly, they persuade American policymakers that supporting their objectives advances U.S. national interests, not simply the interests of another country. Indian-American advocacy has rarely operated that way.

The community also suffers from an internal divergence of interests. Naturalized citizens and second-generation Indian Americans understandably vote like other Americans. Their priorities are inflation, taxes, crime, healthcare, schools and local governance — not bilateral diplomacy or immigration policy. The Indians most directly affected by recent policy changes — professionals on H-1B visas, students (the largest from any country) and green-card applicants — cannot vote.

This creates an unusual political asymmetry. The people with electoral influence are often insulated from the policies affecting Indians most severely. Those bearing the greatest burden possess virtually no electoral leverage.

Trump’s second presidency has made this structural weakness increasingly evident. His administration no longer treats India primarily as a strategic counterweight to China. Instead, it increasingly views India through a transactional commercial lens — as a fast-growing market for American exports and an economic competitor whose technological rise should be carefully managed through tariffs and tech-transfer controls. U.S. restrictions affecting skilled immigration, tighter student visa rules, pressure over energy imports, and disputes over technology transfers all reflect that recalibration.

Nor can Democrats claim a better record. The once-blossoming bilateral relationship began losing momentum before Trump returned to office.

The comforting assumption that the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership would inevitably deepen has proved misplaced. For all the talk of an “indispensable partnership” with India, Washington has shown that diaspora goodwill carries little weight when it conflicts with electoral or strategic priorities.

If Indian Americans wish to acquire greater influence over Washington’s India policy, they may need to rethink their approach fundamentally.

That does not mean replicating another community’s political model. Every diaspora has its own history and priorities. But successful lobbying in Washington invariably requires certain ingredients: bipartisan engagement, institutional continuity, disciplined messaging, coordinated fundraising and, above all, a willingness to frame policy objectives as advancing America’s own strategic interests.

Indian Americans already possess the financial resources, professional networks and intellectual capital needed to build political infrastructure. What they lack is sustained collective action.

That distinction helps explain why a community that has become indispensable to America’s innovation economy remains largely dispensable when Washington makes decisions affecting India.

Until that changes, Indian Americans are likely to remain a political paradox: one of America’s most accomplished immigrant communities, yet unable to translate that success into meaningful influence over one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships.

Brahma Chellaney, a longstanding contributor to The Japan Times, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battlefield,” which won the Bernard Schwartz Award.

America’s new India doctrine: Never repeat the China mistake

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U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi take part in a joint news conference at the White House in February 2025.

By Brahma Chellaney
The Japan Times

For nearly a quarter century, a rare bipartisan consensus guided American policy toward India. Washington believed that helping the world’s largest democracy become stronger — economically, technologically and militarily — served U.S. interests by creating a durable counterweight to an increasingly assertive China.

Washington’s India consensus is now quietly unraveling.

The clearest indication came not from a leaked strategy paper but from U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau speaking in New Delhi. Declaring that Washington “will not repeat its China mistake,” Landau said the U.S. would not allow India to “develop all these markets” only to outcompete America commercially.

Those remarks deserve far more attention than they received. They amount to a remarkably candid acknowledgment that Washington no longer views India’s rise as an unqualified strategic asset. Instead, it increasingly sees India through the same prism that now shapes its approach toward China: as an emerging economic giant whose technological ascent must be carefully managed.

It marks a structural shift in American strategy.

The shift is also visible in American strategic vocabulary. The Pentagon’s recent decision to drop the “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific” is far more than bureaucratic rebranding. Names in strategy reveal priorities.

For nearly a decade, the Indo-Pacific concept placed India at the heart of America’s vision for balancing China’s rise across two oceans. It reflected the belief that India’s emergence as a major power was indispensable to ensuring a stable balance in Asia.

Removing “Indo” sends a different signal. It suggests that Washington is narrowing its strategic horizon, placing greater emphasis on managing relations directly with Beijing while downgrading India’s role in its larger regional calculus. The change also aligns with U.S. President Donald Trump’s more conciliatory approach to Beijing since mid-2025 and his repeated references to a U.S.-China “Group of Two,” a framework in which the world’s two largest powers bargain directly over global affairs rather than relying on broad coalitions of partners.

Successive U.S. administrations in this century promoted India’s emergence through expanding defense cooperation, a civil nuclear deal, growing technology partnerships and repeated invocations of shared democratic values. They believed India’s rise would strengthen, not challenge, American leadership. Today that assumption is giving way to a different strategic calculation.

The lesson many policymakers in Washington drew from China’s ascent is not simply that Beijing became militarily formidable. It is that the U.S. aided the rise of an industrial and technological rival capable of dominating global manufacturing, critical supply chains and advanced technologies and challenging American primacy.

America’s new objective is to avoid repeating that experience with India. Landau merely articulated publicly what American policy has begun to reflect.

Trump’s 50% punitive tariffs on Indian exports were more than trade measures. They conveyed that “America First” applies as much to strategic partners as to competitors. His administration increasingly treats India less as a geopolitical pillar than as a market for American goods and investment. Indeed, Trump’s National Security Strategy frames the relationship in transactional commercial terms rather than as a long-term geopolitical investment.

Even more revealing are the growing obstacles surrounding the transfer of advanced jet-engine technology.

The agreement between General Electric and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics was celebrated as a watershed because it promised unprecedented technology transfer for engines to power India’s three separate indigenous fighter programs: Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk2 and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft. The multibillion-dollar deal was never simply about supplying engines. It represented a potential breakthrough for India’s ambition to become an independent aerospace power.

Instead, implementation has become bogged down in unexpected roadblocks. Engine deliveries have stalled, delaying fighter production and leaving completed Indian-built aircraft stranded without propulsion systems.

That, in turn, has placed the Indian Air Force under severe operational strain, with its active strength plummeting to approximately 29 operational squadrons, as against the required 42.5 combat squadrons to effectively counter a dual-front threat from nuclear-armed allies China and Pakistan.

Whatever the official explanations, the broader strategic message is difficult to miss. Washington appears increasingly reluctant to facilitate technologies that could enable India eventually to compete at the highest end of advanced industrial manufacturing.

The U.S. shift extends to India’s own strategic backyard. If India is no longer viewed as the indispensable anchor of America’s Asian strategy, it becomes easier for Washington to pursue regional policies that diverge from New Delhi’s interests.

For much of the past decade, New Delhi assumed that growing strategic ties with Washington would naturally translate into greater American sensitivity toward India’s concerns in its immediate neighborhood. That assumption no longer holds.

In Bangladesh, Washington supported the violent overthrow of the India-friendly government of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Bangladesh’s consequent descent into violent Islamism threatens the security of India, which is already home to millions of illegally settled Bangladeshis.

Myanmar presents another example of how policies conceived in Washington carry direct security consequences for India. Washington’s stringent sanctions against Myanmar’s military government and “nonlethal” military aid for anti-junta forces may reflect broader American objectives, but they have contributed to instability along India’s sensitive northeastern frontier, where insurgent movements have long exploited cross-border sanctuaries.

While seeking to topple Myanmar’s junta, Washington has embraced Pakistan’s military-backed regime, feting the country’s de facto ruler, Field Marshal Asim Munir.

The U.S. modernization of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet, expanding military contacts and repeated statements by senior American officials that U.S. policy seeks to prevent any single power from dominating the Indian subcontinent have revived uncomfortable memories in New Delhi of Cold War-era balancing. Many in India see that objective as closely mirroring China’s own interest in keeping India boxed in.

America’s changing attitude toward India suggests that it is now being guided by a different strategic logic. Washington is no longer asking whether its regional policies strengthen India’s position. Instead, it appears increasingly comfortable limiting India’s geopolitical room for maneuver while simultaneously restricting the technologies that would underpin its long-term industrial ascent.

The irony is striking. For two decades, Washington encouraged India’s rise because it believed a powerful democratic India would reinforce American strategy in Asia. Today, many U.S. policymakers appear to fear that helping India become too successful economically could recreate the very mistake they believe Washington made with China.

That does not mean America seeks to contain India as it seeks to contain China. Rather, it suggests something subtler but no less consequential. Washington wants India strong enough to complicate Chinese strategy, wealthy enough to remain an attractive market for American exports and influential enough to contribute to Indian Ocean security — but not so technologically advanced or economically competitive that it eventually becomes another global economic challenger.

That is a far narrower conception of partnership than the one that guided U.S. policy for much of this century. India should recognize that this is not a passing disagreement over tariffs, energy purchases or defense contracts. It reflects a deeper reordering of American strategic priorities.

The relationship with India is consequently becoming more transactional, with Washington primarily interested in securing a larger share of the world’s fastest-growing major market.

The U.S. now views India’s rise no longer as an inherently benign development, but as a phenomenon to be carefully managed, moderated and, where necessary, constrained.

The quiet demotion of India in America’s grand strategy represents the most significant shift in U.S. policy since Washington embraced New Delhi as a strategic partner at the turn of the century.

Brahma Chellaney, a longstanding contributor to The Japan Times, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battlefield,” which won the Bernard Schwartz Award.

India can no longer take Nepal for granted

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Once firmly in New Delhi’s orbit, Nepal is now a three-way contest

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Brahma Chellaney

Nikkei Asia

A highway in Kathmandu on March 20, 2024. © AP Photo

India has long viewed Nepal as lying firmly within its natural sphere of influence. The two countries are bound together by geography, culture, religion and an open border. Nepal’s economy remains deeply intertwined with India’s.

Few international relationships anywhere in Asia combine such extensive people-to-people contact, cultural affinity and freedom of movement as that between India and Nepal.

Today, however, Nepal is no longer defined solely by its ties to India. China has spent the past two decades steadily expanding its political and economic footprint there. Now the U.S. is emerging as a significant third player.

The era when New Delhi could be regarded as Nepal’s indispensable external partner is quietly drawing to a close.

Recent high-level visits by senior American and Chinese officials to Kathmandu underscore a broader reality: Nepal has become an arena of strategic competition among Asia’s two great powers and the world’s leading superpower. With the three competing for influence, investment and strategic access, Nepal has become one of the clearest examples of how India’s traditional dominance on the subcontinent is increasingly under serious challenge.

The U.S. and India remain partners globally yet, as Nepal illustrates, Washington increasingly pursues policies that diverge from New Delhi’s interests on the subcontinent. Before visiting Nepal in April, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs S. Paul Kapur bluntly stated that a primary American regional objective is to “prevent the dominance of any single power in South Asia.”

Nepal, wedged between India and Chinese-ruled Tibet, remains uniquely important to New Delhi, including for internal security, given the nearly 1,800-kilometer open border that allows Nepalis and Indians to move freely without passports. Millions of Nepalis live and work in India. Hindu and Buddhist traditions connect communities on both sides of the frontier. No other power enjoys such deep historical, cultural and societal ties.

Yet such ties alone no longer guarantee political influence.

China recognized this reality before most others. Through infrastructure investments, political engagement and sustained diplomatic outreach, Beijing gradually established itself as a major player in Nepal. It built close relations with Nepal’s two, long-dominant communist parties to help cultivate a friendly government there and expand its influence along India’s northern frontier.

The communists’ crushing defeat in the March national elections has left Beijing’s preferred political channels in Nepal marginalized. Yet Chinese influence may not erode significantly as Nepal’s new Gen Z rulers realize the risks of relying too heavily on a single partner, India.

For Beijing, Nepal’s significance extends beyond economics. The country sits astride China’s sensitive Tibetan frontier and occupies a strategic position between the world’s two most populous nations. Maintaining influence in Kathmandu has become an important element of China’s broader regional strategy.

What is new is the growing American role. While both Washington and New Delhi seek to limit Chinese influence in Nepal, the U.S. is also helping create a regional environment in which India’s privileged position becomes less exclusive.

The result is not outright rivalry between the U.S. and India. Rather, it is subtle differences in outlook and strategy that suggest Washington and New Delhi do not share identical interests in India’s immediate neighborhood, including Nepal.

Washington increasingly treats Kathmandu as an independent strategic actor whose external relationships should not be constrained by any regional power. High-level American engagement with Nepal has become more frequent, while U.S.-backed development initiatives and investment programs have sharply raised Washington’s profile in Kathmandu.

America’s growing strategic footprint, however, has alarmed Beijing, which opposes U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects, warning Kathmandu of potential “ramifications” and “outside interference,” especially if the five-year MCC grant program were extended beyond 2028. It has also cautioned Nepal against joining the U.S. State Partnership Program or allowing Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network to operate in Nepal, viewing the former as implicit strategic alignment with Washington and the latter as a security risk.

Yet focusing solely on the external powers misses the most important part of the story: Nepal itself.

Kathmandu is not merely the object of great-power competition. Successive Nepali governments have become increasingly adept at leveraging rivalries among India, China and the U.S. to expand their diplomatic room for maneuver. Rather than choosing sides, Nepal seeks to maximize opportunities from all three relationships.

This reflects a broader shift in the country’s foreign policy. Nepal’s leaders increasingly view India, China and the U.S. not as mutually exclusive partners but as complementary sources of investment, technology, development assistance and diplomatic support. What appears from New Delhi as a loss of influence often appears from Kathmandu as an expansion of strategic options.

That dynamic is likely to endure. Nepal’s political class recognizes that competition among larger powers creates opportunities that did not exist when India exercised near-exclusive influence. By maintaining ties with all major players, Kathmandu can extract benefits from each while securing greater autonomy.

For New Delhi, this changing landscape presents a challenge. India retains enormous advantages in Nepal that neither China nor the U.S. can replicate. But influence and exclusivity are not the same thing.

China has already ended India’s near-monopoly on strategic influence in Nepal. The growing American presence is further diversifying Kathmandu’s external partnerships. Nepal is becoming a genuinely competitive geopolitical space.

The real lesson is not that India is being displaced. It is that the age when New Delhi could assume primacy in its strategic backyard is fading. Across the subcontinent, influence increasingly must be earned through sustained engagement and competitive statecraft rather than inherited through geography and history.

Few countries illustrate that transformation more clearly than Nepal.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the independent New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battleground,” which won the Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

Trump’s ambush diplomacy comes with long-term costs

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By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

Photo: Alex Brandon, Associated Press

President Trump once bragged in “The Art of the Deal” about the virtues of “truthful hyperbole” — manipulating perceptions, exaggerating momentum and creating leverage through illusion. In foreign policy, however, the same instinct has evolved into something far more dangerous: diplomacy as ambush.

One defining feature of Trump’s second presidency has been his repeated use of diplomatic negotiations not as pathways to peace or settlement but as instruments of tactical deception. Again and again, diplomatic engagement has coincided with — and appears in some cases to have facilitated — sudden military escalation. The pattern is now too consistent to dismiss as coincidence.

The risk is that if negotiations becomes associated with strategic chicanery, it could destroy the very credibility that gives U.S. diplomacy its power.

Iran offers the clearest example. In June 2025, U.S. nuclear talks with Iran in Oman provided cover for Israel’s devastating aerial assaults that caught Tehran completely off-guard, before Trump himself widened the conflict by ordering U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites.

Months later, as renewed Oman-mediated negotiations between Washington and Tehran appeared to be nearing a breakthrough, the Trump administration on February 28 abruptly launched “Operation Epic Fury” alongside Israel. Iranian negotiators reportedly believed they were moving toward a “nuclear freeze for sanctions ease” framework accord. Instead, Trump launched the war while Iranian forces were operating under reduced alert conditions.

Even after the conflict erupted, Trump repeatedly signaled possible de-escalation while widening the bombing campaign to target Iran’s civilian and economic infrastructure.

Then came the latest example. On May 25, shortly after Trump claimed that a deal with Iran to end the conflict was “largely negotiated,” U.S. forces sank two Iranian mine-laying vessels and bombed missile-launch sites in southern Iran, with the president threatening a full-scale resumption of the “shooting.”

The pattern is unmistakable: Diplomacy and military escalation are not operating on separate tracks. They are fused into a single strategy of confusion, misdirection and surprise.

Nor is Iran unique. In Venezuela, negotiations between U.S. officials and President Nicolas Maduro’s close associates continued almost until the moment Washington launched “Operation Absolute Resolve” in January. Venezuelan negotiators believed discussions over a power transition and immunity deal were making progress, even as U.S. intelligence reportedly used the diplomatic channel itself to gather targeting information and breach Maduro’s compound.

Using the negotiation process as a massive intelligence-gathering exercise enabled American agencies to pinpoint Maduro’s location before the strike order was issued, leading to his swift capture.

The same pattern appeared in Yemen. In March 2025, Omani mediators were in Washington discussing a possible maritime and security deal with the Houthis when the U.S. launched “Operation Rough Rider.” Houthi leaders, apparently expecting a diplomatic breakthrough, had not dispersed key missile assets. The opening barrage destroyed a substantial portion of their long-range strike capability, yet the operation failed to defeat the Houthis decisively.

Nigeria offers an even more jarring example, because the country has been a nominal U.S. partner. Throughout fall 2025, Washington held high-level security consultations with Nigerian authorities and negotiated expanded counterterrorism cooperation. Yet on Christmas Day, the U.S. launched strikes inside Nigeria against alleged ISIS-West Africa targets without informing the Nigerian defense ministry beforehand. Intelligence gathered by U.S. surveillance flights and during joint planning sessions reportedly helped facilitate the strikes.

In Syria, the strategy early this year took a different form — a feigned retreat. U.S. officials used deconfliction channels with Russian and Syrian counterparts to signal a “drawdown” of active patrols in the Badia desert. ISIS remnants moved into what appeared to be a security vacuum, only to find themselves drawn into predesignated kill zones targeted by U.S. loitering munitions.

Viewed individually, each case can be defended as clever statecraft or operational necessity. Together, they reveal a negotiate-to-strike doctrine. Under Trump, negotiations increasingly appear designed not merely to resolve disputes or conflicts but to lull adversaries into complacency, lower defenses, gather intelligence and maximize surprise before kinetic action begins. The diplomatic carrot remains visible until the instant the military stick lands its first blow.

Trump’s defenders argue that such tactics save American lives and that diplomacy is simply another instrument of war. But this logic ignores the long-term strategic cost. Diplomacy ultimately depends less on power than on credibility.

Military power can destroy infrastructure, topple governments and intimidate adversaries. It cannot by itself create legitimacy or durable political settlements. Those require credible diplomacy — diplomacy understood not as theater, bait or manipulation, but as a genuine effort to end conflicts or resolve disputes.

Tactical surprise can produce short-term military gains. But great powers require something deeper to sustain influence: durable trust in their intentions and commitments. Once that trust erodes, coalition-building becomes harder, crisis management becomes more dangerous, and deterrence becomes less stable.

During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow engaged in arms-control talks despite profound mistrust because both sides understood that the negotiating table was not itself a targeting mechanism. Once diplomacy is linked to deception, the incentive to negotiate collapses.

Russian officials now increasingly view U.S. diplomacy on Ukraine through a lens of dual-track manipulation — public engagement coupled with covert escalation.

Even allies are uneasy, with Trump’s Iran adventure deepening perceptions of American unpredictability.

Once adversaries conclude that American negotiations are merely preludes to coercion, they will adapt accordingly. They will become less willing to engage and more inclined to escalate preemptively.

That is the paradox at the heart of Trump’s “diplomacy as ambush” strategy: tactics designed to maximize short-term leverage may ultimately weaken America’s long-term global influence.

A superpower can survive military setbacks. It is far harder to recover once its word loses value.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.

Gulf allies are quietly starting to break with Washington

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By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

President Donald Trump meets with Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani aboard Air Force One. AP Photo

For decades, Washington treated the Gulf monarchies as the immovable pillars of American power in the Middle East. The U.S. military presence there evolved into a vast, interconnected web of bases and infrastructure stretching across Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman.

These states hosted U.S. troops, bought American weapons and aligned themselves with Washington’s regional priorities. In return, they expected the ultimate prize: protection under the American security umbrella.

That bargain is now fraying — and perhaps breaking.

The most important geopolitical shift in the Middle East today is not happening in Tehran, Tel Aviv or Ankara. It is happening quietly inside the royal courts of the Gulf sheikhdoms, which are reassessing whether the U.S. is still a reliable security guarantor or merely a power that uses their territory while leaving them exposed to retaliation.

President Trump’s Iran war has accelerated this reassessment dramatically.

When the U.S., in concert with Israel, launched war on Iran earlier this year, Gulf Arab states cooperated. American warplanes operated from bases on their soil. Trump singled out Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE as “excellent” partners while deriding NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners for refusing to participate.

But the praise concealed a deeper problem: The Gulf states discovered that supporting American military operations carried potentially catastrophic costs for them, as their energy facilities and desalination plants became targets of Iranian reprisals. Gulf rulers watched as the U.S. deployed enormous military resources (including Aegis-equipped destroyers and advanced interceptors) to shield Israel from Iranian retaliation while Gulf states absorbed the payback for enabling American strikes.

That experience appears to have fundamentally altered their calculations.

Another turning point came recently when Trump announced “Project Freedom,” a U.S. naval initiative to escort commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz after Iran disrupted maritime traffic. Washington viewed the mission as a demonstration of resolve. Tehran viewed it as an escalation. The Gulf monarchies viewed it as a potential disaster.

Saudi Arabia refused to grant the U.S. access to its airspace and bases to support the operation. Kuwait followed suit. Qatar, seeking de-escalation, imposed restrictions on activity from Al-Udeid Air Base, the largest U.S. military installation in the Middle East. Without Gulf cooperation, the mission quickly became logistically and politically unsustainable. Trump abruptly suspended it after just two escorted U.S.-flagged vessels passed through the strait.

In effect, Gulf states vetoed a major American military initiative — something that would have been almost unthinkable only a year ago. Only after Trump paused the operation did Gulf governments restore U.S. access to basing and overflight rights, underscoring that such cooperation is no longer automatic but conditional.

Washington had long operated under the assumption that Gulf bases were essentially available on demand during crises in return for American military protection. Now, however, Gulf states are increasingly asking a different question: Protection for whom?

From their perspective, the current arrangements look dangerously asymmetric. The U.S. can launch operations, rotate forces and eventually withdraw. But the six Gulf states remain geographically trapped beside Iran permanently. In any confrontation between Washington and Tehran, the Gulf monarchies become the frontline targets.

The lesson these states appear to have learned from recent hostilities is stark: They are platforms for American power, not equal partners in American protection. That realization is driving a profound strategic shift.

The Gulf states no longer appear willing to practice automatic alignment with Washington. Instead, they are moving toward what might be called “transactional neutrality.” In effect, they are applying Trump’s own worldview back onto the U.S. itself.

“America First” is increasingly being answered with “the Gulf First.”

That means Gulf monarchs are becoming far more selective about which American operations they support. The shift extends beyond military access. Major Gulf states are diversifying their defense partnerships, purchasing non-American technologies and exploring alternative security arrangements. Some Gulf governments are also intensifying diplomatic outreach to regional rivals, including Iran itself.

For them, de-escalation is no longer simply diplomacy; it is strategic self-preservation.

This should deeply concern Washington. The entire architecture of American regional dominance — air operations, naval deployments, intelligence coordination and energy security — has depended on nearly unconditional Gulf cooperation. That era may be ending.

Ironically, Trump himself has helped accelerate the process. His transactional approach to alliances convinced Gulf rulers that relationships with Washington are no longer rooted in enduring strategic commitments but in fluctuating cost-benefit calculations.

Once alliances become transactional, partners naturally begin asking whether the transaction remains worthwhile. The Gulf monarchies increasingly seem to believe it is not.

The implications extend far beyond the current Iran crisis. If Gulf states become reluctant hosts for American military operations, Washington’s ability to project power across the Middle East will shrink dramatically. The U.S. may still possess unmatched military hardware, but hardware alone is insufficient without reliable access, basing and political support.

This is the strategic paradox now confronting Washington. In alienating NATO and Indo-Pacific allies while simultaneously alarming Gulf partners, Washington risks discovering that even a superpower cannot operate effectively in isolation.

The Gulf monarchies are not abandoning the U.S., but they are redefining the relationship on narrower terms. The age of blank-check cooperation is over. Gulf allies are no longer willing to be the lightning rods for U.S. military campaigns while relying on uncertain protection when retaliation arrives.

And once allies learn they can say “no” to Washington, they rarely return to automatic obedience.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.

In Beijing, Trump faced America’s equal

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Beijing no longer behaves like a rising power seeking acceptance into an American-led order. It behaves like a co-owner of the international system. And increasingly, Washington treats China that way.


Brahma Chellaney, USA Today

For years, Washington comforted itself with a reassuring phrase: China was a “near-peer competitor.” Near-peer implied China was close but not equal. It was a challenger still climbing the ladder while America remained securely at the top.

President Donald Trump’s just-concluded summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing shattered that illusion.

The visit showed that the world’s largest autocratic state is no longer America’s near-peer. It is America’s peer.

The symbolism alone was striking. Trump arrived in Beijing not as the triumphant leader of an unchallenged superpower, but as the head of a country increasingly constrained abroad, economically vulnerable at home, and struggling to impose its will even on far weaker adversaries.

When Trump postponed the Beijing trip from March to May, he likely expected to arrive after forcing Iran into submission. Instead, he landed in Beijing with the Iran war still unresolved, America’s military stockpiles depleted, and U.S. credibility bruised.

Xi understood the moment perfectly. The carefully choreographed summit was designed to project parity: two leaders, two superpowers, two equals managing global stability together. Beijing no longer behaves like a rising power seeking acceptance into an American-led order. It behaves like a co-owner of the international system. And increasingly, Washington is treating China that way.

Trump’s tone during the visit reflected the altered realities. The same president who routinely berates allies as freeloaders adopted a strikingly deferential posture toward America’s principal geopolitical rival. He praised Xi lavishly, calling it “an honor” to be his friend.

Equally striking was what Trump did not say. There was no mention of China’s human rights abuses – not of the mass incarceration and surveillance of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, not of the crushing of freedoms in Hong Kong, not of tightening repression in Tibet or Inner Mongolia. A decade ago, such silence from an American president visiting Beijing would have been politically unthinkable.

Today, it reflects a deeper reality: Washington increasingly treats China less as a wayward authoritarian state to be lectured and more as a peer superpower whose cooperation it needs and whose sensitivities it must manage.

In Trump’s first term, Washington still believed it could fundamentally reshape China’s behavior through tariffs, sanctions and technological pressure. The assumption was that America possessed overwhelming leverage. That confidence has eroded.

China today is not the China of 2017. It has built the world’s largest navy. It has dramatically expanded its nuclear arsenal. It has narrowed the technological gap in artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, robotics and quantum computing. In several strategic industries – batteriesdronesrare earth processing and green technologies – China now dominates outright.

Most importantly, Beijing has demonstrated that interdependence cuts both ways.

When Trump last year escalated tariffs, China retaliated by tightening rare-earth exports, exposing America’s deep dependence on Chinese supply chains. Suddenly, the world’s strongest economy looked vulnerable to industrial choke points controlled by Beijing.

That vulnerability hovered over the summit.

The most telling aspect of Trump’s Beijing visit was that both sides emphasized “stability” in their relationship. This is no longer a relationship defined by American primacy. It is one increasingly defined by mutual constraint.

The U.S. still possesses enormous advantages. The dollar remains dominant. America retains unmatched alliance networks, global military reach and world-leading innovation ecosystems. China also faces severe internal problems, including mounting debtdemographic decline and slowing growth.

But peer competition does not require symmetry. The Soviet Union was America’s peer despite being economically weaker. Britain was once Germany’s peer despite Germany’s larger industrial base. The defining characteristic is the ability to resist coercion and shape global outcomes independently.

China can now clearly do both.

Indeed, the summit underscored how much Washington’s ambitions have narrowed. Trump once talked about decoupling from China. Now the goal appears far more modest: managed coexistence, stabilized trade and guardrails against open conflict.

That is what peer rivalry looks like.

The danger for the U.S. lies in refusing to adapt to the new reality. Much of Washington still oscillates between complacency and denial, either dismissing China as fundamentally fragile or assuming America can easily restore uncontested dominance.

Yet China’s message during the summit was unmistakable: It no longer seeks admission into an American-led order. It seeks acknowledgment as an equal center of power.

And despite all the pageantry, Trump’s visit ultimately conveyed something Xi desperately wanted the world to see: The U.S. may still be the world’s strongest country but it no longer stands alone at the apex of global power.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

The High Cost of Trump’s Crony Diplomacy

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Effective diplomacy depends on credibility, consistency, and a clear alignment with national interests. The US administration’s personalized, opaque, and venal shadow diplomacy delivers none of that, and it will leave the US less respected, less trusted, and less effective on the world stage.

By Brahma ChellaneyProject Syndicate

In most democracies, a leader outsourcing high-stakes diplomacy to family members and business associates would provoke outrage. But US President Donald Trump has faced little pushback for doing so, with many downplaying his crony diplomacy as mere “heterodoxy.” The long-term consequences will be severe.

Instead of relying on the secretary of state and the professional diplomatic corps, Trump has placed pivotal diplomacy largely in the hands of his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and his business partner, the Manhattan real-estate mogul Steve Witkoff. Kushner was a senior adviser in Trump’s first administration, responsible for helping to broker the Abraham Accords between Israel and four Arab states, and is now, like Witkoff, a Special Envoy for Peace.

Together, Kushner and Witkoff have spearheaded negotiations on Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran. Yet neither had any diplomatic experience before Trump tasked them with resolving some of the thorniest and highest-stakes foreign-policy challenges of our time, and both have glaring conflicts of interest.

Start with Witkoff. Last year, Pakistan signed a controversial investment deal with World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency firm whose CEO is Witkoff’s son, Zach, and in which the Trump and Witkoff families hold a dominant ownership stake. This past January, a WLF affiliate reached another deal with Pakistan—this time, to introduce the company’s stablecoin for use in cross-border transactions.

But Pakistan has also been the site and, to an extent, the broker of talks between the United States and Iran. When actors are negotiating geopolitical outcomes and pursuing business opportunities in the same arena, diplomacy begins to resemble a marketplace: access, influence, and profit are tightly interwoven.

As for Kushner, after leaving Trump’s first administration, he set up a private-equity firm, Affinity Partners, and took billions of dollars from Gulf monarchies, including about $2 billion from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. In other words, Kushner is dependent on Saudi capital. Yet he is now expected to negotiate a détente with Iran, even as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly urges Trump to continue the war.

And it is not just Iran. Kushner’s “New Gaza” proposal, unveiled at Davos this past January, has been widely criticized as “real-estate diplomacy,” as it effectively recasts reconstruction as a business venture while ignoring questions of sovereignty and rights.

Kushner and Witkoff’s conflicts of interest, together with their lack of foreign-policy credentials, explain why Trump has not sought to appoint them to official diplomatic positions. Special envoys avoid Senate confirmation hearings, as well as the disclosure requirements, ethics rules, and congressional oversight that bind professional diplomats. Kushner and Witkoff are thus able to exercise influence without transparency, and to negotiate on behalf of the US without accountability.

Of course, Kushner and Witkoff are hardly the only figures capitalizing on their proximity to Trump. Prominent allies and donors, such as Oracle’s Larry Ellison, have won big from their investment in the majority American-owned TikTok venture that Trump effectively forced the Chinese parent company to create, supposedly over national-security concerns.

Moreover, Trump’s sons, Eric and Donald, Jr., recently joined a drone company Powerus, and are attempting to sell drone interceptors to the Gulf states to ward off attacks from Iran as it retaliates for their father’s war. Foundation Future Industries, a robotics startup where Eric is chief strategy adviser, was recently awarded a $24 million Pentagon contract.

Now, reports are emerging of possible insider trading around the Iran war, with large bets being made right before market-moving public statements from Trump. Yet the American public, whether desensitized to Trump’s breaking of norms or simply unable to keep up with the pace and scale of the violations, hardly reacts to such news. Scandals that would have brought any past US administration down—or at least prompted urgent investigation—have become routine under Trump.

With a Republican Party that bows to Trump’s every whim and justifies his every crime—while controlling both houses of Congress—a kind of resignation has taken hold. But as outrage fades, so does the restraining power of political norms. As a result, abuses become increasingly blatant and egregious, and trust is eroded. Even if Trump’s cronies did manage to reach a peace deal, it would warrant suspicion, with every concession raising questions about who really benefits—and who is compromised.

This undercuts not only specific agreements, but also US global leadership more broadly. With US foreign policy now guided by personal loyalty, informal networks, and private gain, whatever credibility the US had as a reliable partner, good-faith negotiator, and champion of the rule of law has been decimated. None of this will be easily restored.

In the meantime, if foreign governments want to influence US policy or secure the country’s geopolitical cooperation, they must make it worth Trump’s while. Nowhere is that more apparent than in Trump’s so-called Board of Peace—a putative alternative to the United Nations where a permanent seat carries a billion-dollar price tag. This is less a multilateral institution than a pay-to-play geopolitical franchise, but some countries appear willing to cough up the cash to stay in the US president’s good graces.

Others seeking to shape US policy head to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, which he increasingly uses for official diplomatic engagements. And, of course, there are those who go there to get in on the self-dealing, making business deals with Trump’s inner circle. Meanwhile, wars continue to rage, with far-reaching human and economic consequences.

Trump’s defenders argue that unconventional actors can produce breakthroughs where conventional processes have failed. But diplomacy is not merely deal-making; it depends on credibility, consistency, and a clear alignment with national interests. The personalized, opaque, and venal shadow diplomacy being pursued by Kushner and Witkoff can deliver none of that. What it can and will do is ensure that the US is less respected, less trusted, and less effective on the world stage.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2026.

Trump, the Demolition Man of Global Order

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US President Donald Trump speaks about the conflict in Iran in the James S. Brady Press Briefing Room of the White House on April 6, 2026, in Washington, DC. (Photo by AFP)

By Brahma Chellaney
The Japan Times

In barely 15 months, U.S. President Donald Trump has generated more global upheaval than most leaders do in a lifetime.

By eroding international norms, unleashing cascading crises and roiling world markets, he has emerged as a principal driver of global instability. And he still has 33 months left.

There is no modern precedent for what is now unfolding. A single leader — at the helm of the superpower that built and sustained the post-World War II international order — is dismantling it at speed, while openly mocking the very rules that once underpinned American power.

Since returning to the White House, Trump has cast aside longstanding legal norms, authorized military strikes across multiple sovereign states and weaponized economic interdependence against allies and adversaries alike. From the slow strangulation of Cuba through blockade-induced deprivation to a war on Iran that has triggered worldwide turmoil, his actions have pushed the international system into uncharted territory.

Trump launched his war on Iran, as he did his military intervention in Venezuela weeks earlier, in the language of dominance. But its consequences unfolded globally in the language of scarcity — of fuel, food and even survival.

Iran and Venezuela account for almost one-third of global proven oil reserves. Bringing both into Washington’s strategic orbit would give the U.S. an unprecedented lever over global energy markets — one that could be used not merely to influence prices and supply, but to discipline rivals and steer the economic and foreign-policy trajectories of partners.

Trump’s vision of America’s global “energy dominance” was on display again at his April 6 news conference, where he pointed to Venezuela as a model for dealing with Iran, citing his seizure of Venezuelan oil. Describing himself as a businessman, Trump said he wants to likewise take Iran’s energy resources once the conflict is over. “To the victor belong the spoils,” he declared.

It was a revealing admission: Control over Iran’s vast energy wealth lies at the heart of his war of aggression.

What began on Feb. 28 as a joint U.S.-Israeli assault on Iran, however, quickly metastasized into the most consequential energy shock in modern history. Unlike the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, driven largely by political embargoes, the current upheaval stems from the physical destruction of energy infrastructure and the breakdown of critical supply routes.

Because energy underpins the global economy, the shock could not be contained. It rippled outward — destabilizing food systems, straining financial markets and hitting the poorest countries the hardest.

In terms of global impact, the Ukraine conflict pales by comparison. What began as a regional war with global implications evolved into a globe-spanning crisis driven by a single regional conflict. That is the enduring lesson of the Iran war.

More fundamentally, Trump’s neoimperial impulse is no longer latent; it is hardening into an expansionist doctrine that echoes the playbook of colonial empires rather than the norms of the post-1945 order. His push to increase already massive U.S. defense spending by over 50%, to $1.5 trillion, underscores the scale of that ambition.

From renewed pressure for U.S. control over Greenland and the Panama Canal to open-ended military interventions in Venezuela and Iran — and even talk of redrawing borders or relocating populations — Trump has revived a logic more familiar to the age of empires. The Monroe Doctrine, once regional, has effectively been globalized.

The question is no longer whether Trump is disrupting the international order. It is whether there is any historical parallel for such systematic disruption from within. There is not.

The U.S. was the principal architect of the current system. The rules governing trade, sovereignty and collective security were largely American designs, forged after World War II to prevent precisely the kind of instability now unfolding.

What makes this moment unique is not simply that these rules are being broken, but that they are being dismantled by an American president.

History offers examples of destructive leaders — such as Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, Idi Amin and Moammar Gadhafi  — but they operated on the margins of the international system or in opposition to it. Trump is different. He is tearing down the house from inside.

Nowhere is this more evident than in his weaponization of interdependence. Trade, once treated as a stabilizing force, has been recast as an instrument of coercion. Tariffs are no longer just economic tools; they are strategic weapons.

By linking military protection to trade concessions and tribute-like payments, Trump has transformed alliances into transactional arrangements — security for sale. The postwar idea of collective defense is giving way to something closer to protection racketeering.

This shift signals a profound reordering of international relationships, in which commitments are perpetually subject to renegotiation.

Equally consequential is the erosion of sovereignty. U.S. military strikes have extended across the Middle East, Africa and even into the Caribbean, targeting states without clear legal justification under the U.N. Charter.

Earlier eras did see U.S. expansionist doctrines — from Theodore Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” diplomacy to William McKinley’s imperial ventures. But those belonged to a pre-1945 world, before the current international norms took shape. Today’s actions carry greater weight precisely because they defy a system the U.S. itself helped build.

The war on Iran marked a particularly dangerous gamble. Trump is the first leader to trigger a global energy crisis through direct military action of his own making.

At the same time, his administration is hollowing out multilateralism — the connective tissue of the international system. Just weeks before launching the Iran war, the U.S. withdrew from 66 international organizations in a single stroke, including the World Health Organization, while sanctioning International Criminal Court officials.

Other leaders have challenged international norms, including Saddam Hussein and Vladimir Putin, but as outsiders. Trump’s approach is more destabilizing because it represents an insider threat. By abandoning agreements like the Paris climate accord, while openly entertaining territorial ambitions from Greenland and Canada to the Panama Canal, his administration has signaled that it no longer considers itself bound by the rules Washington once championed.

If the international system’s principal guarantor no longer believes in it, what remains?

To find even a loose historical analogy, one must look further back. Napoleon reshaped Europe through force; Bismarck discarded alliances in pursuit of advantage. Yet neither operated within a global order they themselves had constructed and sustained. What we are witnessing is something unprecedented: a great power dismantling its own architecture of order.

The consequences are already visible. Alliances are fragmenting. Markets are volatile. Smaller states are hedging, recalibrating or simply absorbing the shocks. The world is moving beyond Pax Americana — but not toward a stable alternative. Instead, it is drifting into uncertainty.

Today, the greatest threat to international peace and security is not a rising challenger. It is the transformation of the international system’s central pillar — the U.S. — into its principal destabilizer.

From rising fuel and food prices in Africa to fiscal stress across Asia and Latin America, the costs of Trump’s ambitions are being borne far from the corridors of power where they were conceived.

Brahma Chellaney, a longtime contributor to The Japan Times, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

Canada’s relationship with India is set to evolve

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Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, right, shakes hands with Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, during a news conference at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, on March 2, 2026. Photo: Bloomberg

By Brahma Chellaney, The Globe and Mail

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to India is intended to close one of the most acrimonious diplomatic chapters between two major democracies in recent memory and inaugurate a more pragmatic, interest-driven partnership for an age of geopolitical uncertainty. 

Rarely have Canada and India found themselves so publicly at odds as they did in 2023-24, when the relationship sank to its lowest point ever. Then-prime minister Justin Trudeau’s allegation of a potential link between the Indian government and the killing of a Sikh-Canadian on Canadian soil triggered a spiral of recriminations, expulsions, visa suspensions and nationalist outrage. 

The dispute also exposed a deeper structural fault line: Canada’s permissive approach toward Sikh separatist activism versus India’s zero-tolerance view of Khalistan militancy. For New Delhi, the issue has not been merely diaspora politics but national security, shaped by the memory of the deadly 1985 Air India bombing by Canada-based Sikh terrorists. For Ottawa, the challenge has been to balance civil liberties with public safety in a diverse democracy. 

Mr. Carney’s visit signals that both governments have decided the costs of continued estrangement are too high. 

The visit’s strategic logic is rooted in a shared reassessment of the global order. Both Canada and India are hedging against the volatility of great-power rivalry. Mr. Carney’s emerging “middle-power” doctrine emphasizes building networks of trusted relationships beyond Washington’s orbit. India, for its part, has long sought diversified partnerships to avoid overdependence on any single pole. 

In this sense, the visit is not just a bilateral reset but part of a broader pattern: a quiet consolidation among middle powers seeking resilience in a fragmenting world. Both Canada and India, though, are walking a tightrope. They want to diversify away from an unpredictable U.S. without triggering further retaliation from Washington. 

At the heart of the visit lies a concrete economic agenda. The most eye-catching initiative is a 10-year, US$2.8-billion uranium supply agreement, which could be signed during Mr. Carney’s visit. For India, Canadian fuel offers a pathway to reduce reliance on both Russian imports and coal. For Canada, it secures a long-term market at a moment when Western demand is uncertain. 

Canada, which sees more than 90 per cent of its energy exports go to the U.S., is seeking to become a major oil and liquefied natural gas supplier to India, the world’s fastest-growing major energy consumer, with demand expected to double by 2045. India is already the world’s third-largestenergy consumer. 

Alongside energy, the two sides are accelerating negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), with a target of doubling bilateral trade to $70-billion in four years. The scope extends well beyond tariffs: services trade, digital commerce, labour mobility, agriculture and critical minerals are all on the table. A CEPA would anchor a supply-chain corridor linking Canada’s resource base with India’s manufacturing and technological capacity. 

This economic agenda reflects a shared desire to “derisk” from China-centric supply chains without embracing full decoupling, and to hedge against shifting currents of U.S. policy. 

Yet the economic reset cannot stand without a parallel security understanding. Both governments recognize that another crisis over extremism or sovereignty could derail the entire project. 

In Canada, Bill C-9, the Combatting Hate Act, would, if passed, criminalize the public display of terrorist symbols. It could signal to New Delhi that Canada is taking more seriously the issue of Sikh militancy. 

At the same time, both countries are expected to revive and upgrade their Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, shifting toward real-time intelligence sharing and more streamlined extradition processes. India, for its part, is reaffirming respect for Canadian sovereignty after the controversies of 2023-24. 

The aim is to create institutional “guardrails”: mechanisms that allow co-operation to continue even when sensitive issues arise. 

Mr. Carney’s challenge, however, is as much domestic as diplomatic. Bill C-9 faces strong resistance from civil-liberties advocates, and parliamentary delays have already stalled its progress. Mr. Carney thus faces a delicate balancing act – demonstrating to India that Ottawa will act against extremist activity, while convincing Canadians he will not dilute constitutional freedoms or bow to external pressure. 

More fundamentally, Mr. Carney’s India visit marks a transition from an emotionally charged relationship to a transactional one. The bitterness of the Trudeau era is being set aside in favour of a sober recognition of mutual interests. 

If the uranium and hydrocarbon deals advance and CEPA negotiations stay on track, February, 2026, may be remembered as the moment Canada-India ties matured into a modern strategic partnership. For two pluralistic democracies navigating an uncertain century, this may prove to be the most sustainable foundation of all.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground.