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Water for Peace

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How India can embed new water-sharing arrangements with downstream Pakistan and Bangladesh in peace frameworks by emulating the Israel-Jordan model

Illustration by Saurabh Singh

Brahma Chellaney, OPEN magazine

India has long maintained that its water largesse to Pakistan cannot be repaid with blood, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi declaring that “blood and water cannot flow together. ”Pakistan has effectively waged a proxy war against India through terrorism, with the 2008 Mumbai massacre, in particular, still etched in India’s national memory.

But after Pakistan-backed Islamist gunmen, two of whom were identified as Pakistani nationals, slaughtered 25 Hindu tourists in a brutal attack at a resort in Jammu & Kashmir, New Delhi placed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) “in abeyance”. Concluded in 1960, the IWT has remained the world’s most generous water-sharing treaty, giving downstream Pakistan access to over 80 per cent of the Indus Basin waters.

Unlike the IWT, which has an indefinite duration, India’s Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty with Bangladesh contains a 30-year term and is set to expire soon on December 12, unless it is renewed or extended with potential amendments. The Ganges treaty was signed when Sheikh Hasina was Bangladesh’s prime minister. But Bangladesh has now emerged as a South Asian flashpoint amid rising Islamist extremism and intensifying repression of minorities and political opponents, with the current regime in Dhaka anything but India-friendly.

The Ganges treaty guarantees Bangladesh specific cross-border flows in the critical five-month dry season, setting a new principle in international water relations.

Asia’s water resources are largely transnational, making inter-country cooperation essential. Yet the vast majority of the 57 transnational river basins in continental Asia have no water-sharing treaty or other cooperative mechanism. Indeed, the only treaties in Asia that establish specific formulas for sharing cross-border river flows are those between India and its two downstream neighbours, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

India, meanwhile, confronts its own deepening water crisis, driven by a growing mismatch between demand and supply. With surface-water resources under increasing pressure, the crisis has fuelled massive groundwater extraction, further aggravated by climate-induced hydrological unpredictability.

India’s dilemma today over the Indus and Ganges treaties is rooted partly in how these pacts were structured. The two treaties conferred rights without establishing corresponding responsibilities for downstream Pakistan and Bangladesh. Yet rights should come with duties. The treaty obligations fall mainly on India, explaining why Pakistan and Bangladesh have focused overwhelmingly on their treaty-accorded rights.

Pakistan has repeatedly invoked the IWT’s dispute-settlement provisions to constrain India’s ability to address chronic electricity shortages in J&K through modest run-of-the-river hydropower projects. Yet Pakistan itself has generated grassroots opposition in its restive northern regions by pursuing huge storage dams, including the 4,500-megawatt Diamer-Bhasha Dam and the planned 7,000 MW Bunji Dam. Many of Pakistan’s major dam projects are concentrated in Gilgit-Baltistan, where Islamabad has faced persistent local opposition to its rule.

Both the Indus and Ganges treaties were negotiated on the premise that water was essentially a technical resource whose sharing could be agreed upon independently of broader inter-country relations. India’s water munificence, in other words, was not linked to downstream states’ obligations to uphold basic norms of good-neighbourly conduct.

It is past time for India to move towards a new water-sharing framework with its neighbours—one that links the sharing of this vital resource to peace and verifiable good behaviour. Any bilateral treaty must respect the sovereignty, security and well-being of both parties.

This would be a necessary recalibration, recognising that the old framework is no longer tenable. Peace cannot flow from terrorism, hatred or overtly hostile policies.

Instead, upstream India should regard water as an instrument of peace and security. The Israel-Jordan treaty provides a useful template for linking water sharing to a broader peace and security framework.

India’s very different strategic circumstances require adaptation, not replication. Israel’s control over critical water resources in its sub-region was shaped by its capture of the Golan Heights and the West Bank during the 1967 Six-Day War. China’s seizure of the then-autonomous Tibet in 1950-51, by contrast, transformed the communist giant into Asia’s pre-eminent hydro-hegemon.

India has multiple riparian identities. It is the uppermost riparian on rivers originating on its territory, such as the Chenab and Jhelum, which flow into Pakistan, and the Teesta, which drains into northern Bangladesh. India is a mid-riparian on the Brahmaputra and the main Indus stream. While the Ganges originates on the Indian side of the Himalayas, India is the lowermost riparian on tributaries that begin in Tibet and flow southward through Nepal before entering the Ganges basin in northern India, including the Karnali, Gandak and Kosi (Arun). Few other Asian states occupy all three positions—as upper, middle and lower riparians.

While Pakistan is heavily dependent on the Indus, Bangladesh’s largest source of freshwater is not the Ganges but the Brahmaputra. Yet Dhaka has remained silent on China’s ongoing construction of an unprecedented super-dam near the Indian border that would likely have major implications for the quality and quantity of downstream flows.

China’s upstream dominance and its growing dam-building footprint on the Brahmaputra and other transboundary rivers make it imperative for India to adapt the Israel-Jordan model to South Asian realities. A water-for-peace framework could transform water from an unconditional entitlement into a strategic instrument of cooperation—one in which water sharing is accompanied by reciprocal obligations on security, good-neighbourly conduct and protection of mutual interests.

Such a framework would offer India something the existing treaties do not: A way to make water sharing part of a broader peace architecture, potentially addressing concerns over cross-border terrorism from Pakistan and unconventional security threats emanating from Bangladesh.

By insisting that water sharing is accompanied by reciprocal obligations, India would be updating and strengthening international water norms for an era in which water security, climate stress and national security are increasingly intertwined.

The Israel-Jordan Model

By making water sharing an integral part of a broader peace and security architecture, the Israel-Jordan water arrangement is one of the most distinctive examples of water diplomacy in the world. The arrangement is embedded directly in the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, principally through Article 6 and Annex II.

The architecture transforms water from a potential source of conflict into an instrument of mutual security and interdependence. The treaty establishes legally binding allocations from the Jordan River and its Yarmouk tributary, as well as from groundwater resources. It specifies seasonal quantities and operational rules and creates a Joint Water Committee (JWC) to oversee implementation, water transfers, data exchange and compliance.

In this way, water sharing between the two countries has been institutionalised within the peace process itself.

The arrangement also creates a direct connection between water security and broader security commitments. Article 4 of the peace treaty obligates both countries to prevent hostile acts, terrorism and military activity against the other from their territory.

It was the absence of any such mutual obligation in the Indus treaty that emboldened Pakistan, just five years after the IWT came into force, to launch the 1965 war in an abortive attempt to grab India’s J&K.

In the Israel-Jordan treaty, water provisions are implanted inside a comprehensive peace agreement. Article 30 integrates the water-centred Annex II into the whole treaty, and compliance with water allocations is directly tied to Article 4 (Security and Non-Hostility).

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Incorporating reciprocal rights and responsibilities, the treaty offers mutual benefits. One of the world’s most water-stressed countries, Jordan relies heavily on water supplied from or through Israel. Israel significantly benefits from a stable and cooperative eastern border and sustained security coordination in the Jordan Valley.

Because Israel controls important upstream diversion and transfer infrastructure, reliable water deliveries require continuing technical cooperation, communication and security coordination between the two governments. Annex II requires each side to protect water systems in its territory that supply the other from pollution, damage, contamination or unauthorised withdrawals. Protecting water infrastructure and maintaining the conditions for reliable water transfers are, therefore, part of the broader obligations of peace.

While Annex II established a baseline obligation for Israel to supply Jordan with about 50 million cubic metres in total water transfers, bilateral protocols and commercial agreements brokered through the JWC subsequently expanded transfers to address severe droughts in Jordan.

In a 2021 deal, Israel agreed to sell Jordan an additional 50 million cubic metres of desalinated water annually on top of the original 50 million cubic metres guaranteed under the 1994 treaty. But those supplementary allotments were scrapped in late 2025 after Jordan declined to make diplomatic concessions sought by Israel. This shows that the treaty, while establishing a durable legal foundation, has left room for the parties to adapt water cooperation to changing climatic and political circumstances.

The water allocations in the Israel-Jordan treaty are indeed very small compared with what India agreed to reserve for Pakistan under the Indus pact. Yet what makes the Israel-Jordan arrangement particularly significant is not the volume of water exchanged but its uniqueness in integrating water into a larger bargain for peace. In this framework, water is simultaneously a humanitarian necessity, an economic resource, a security interest and a mechanism for continued political engagement.

The arrangement establishes reciprocal dependence: Jordan has a vital interest in maintaining peace and reliable water cooperation, while Israel has a major stake in preserving the stable security environment and bilateral mechanisms that make that cooperation possible.

This model should hold special appeal in other water-stressed regions such as South Asia, where rivers cross political borders and water scarcity exacerbates existing inter-country tensions. By embedding water-sharing obligations within broader peace and security arrangements, co-riparian states could make predictable water access, infrastructure protection, data sharing, drought management and emergency water release components of a larger political bargain.

By adapting this model to local hydrology, power asymmetries and upstream realities, other states sharing transnational rivers could create a parallel architecture of reciprocal dependence. That would create legally defined water entitlements, joint institutions, continuous hydrological-data exchange, water-infrastructure protection, mechanisms for adjusting allocations during droughts and, above all, a political understanding that water security and regional security are inseparable.

A Peace Dividend

India needs a new way to think about water, especially because it has major water-sharing treaties with both its downstream neighbours. This is in stark contrast to China, which has not concluded a single water-sharing treaty with any of the multiple countries that depend on cross-border flows of rivers originating on the Tibetan Plateau.

The region’s great rivers cross some of the world’s most contentious and militarised borders. Climate change, for its part, is making water supplies increasingly unpredictable. Yet India’s treaties governing the rivers flowing to Pakistan and Bangladesh have treated water as a purely technical resource, insulated from the political, security and economic issues that bedevil bilateral relations.

Learning from the experience of Israel and Jordan, India should seek to make water sharing an instrument of peace to help advance regional security and its own well-being. The Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty offers a unique model because it explicitly links water-cooperation commitments to the maintenance of peace and security. Water sharing is thus not a standalone technical agreement but part of a larger political bargain.

The traditional approach in South Asia has been to insulate water from politics. The Indus treaty, for example, was focused on the separation and allocation of river systems, while the Ganges treaty centred on dry-season flows. But the experience over the years has underscored the limits of trying to separate hydrology from geopolitics. When one side flouts even international norms of good-neighbourly conduct, even technically constructed water arrangements come under increasing strain.

Treaties are built on mutual trust and good faith—or, as the IWT’s preamble puts it: “a spirit of goodwill and friendship.” India steadfastly adhered to the IWT for 65 years, even when it meant compromising development in its water-stressed regions, even though Pakistan persistently acted in bad faith, including employing the treaty’s dispute-resolution mechanisms to drag India repeatedly into international arbitration over minor engineering differences so as to obstruct India’s ability to use its rightful share of water.

Rather than pretending that security and water are unrelated, a treaty should make them mutually reinforcing. That way water becomes an incentive for maintaining peace, and peace in turn becomes the basis for maintaining reliable water supplies.

That approach has particular relevance to India’s relationships with Pakistan and Bangladesh, although the two cases require very different adaptations.

With Pakistan, the most difficult issue is its asymmetric warfare in the form of cross-border terrorism, including helping state-trained Islamist gunmen sneak into Indian territory. Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, has been fanning the flames of conflict by exhorting Pakistanis to teach their children that Muslims are “different from Hindus in every possible way.”

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International law supports the view that when a treaty’s fundamental conditions collapse, or one party persistently violates them, the other party has the right to suspend or withdraw from the pact. For now, India has stopped short of formally walking away from the IWT, instead placing the treaty “in abeyance”, a term undefined in international law.

New Delhi has thus retained strategic ambiguity, while sending a resolute message that water sharing can no longer be unconditional. It has not sought to disrupt current cross-border water flows. Yet Pakistan has responded by suspending all bilateral agreements, including the 1972 Simla Agreement, which governs peaceful dispute resolution.

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India should propose a new water-sharing treaty with Pakistan that explicitly links water quotas to maintenance of peace. India could offer Pakistan the lion’s share of the Indus-system waters but embed the arrangements in a bilateral peace pact.

The new treaty would incorporate a form of “water for security” reciprocity: India’s continued commitment to predictable transboundary water flows would be linked to verifiable Pakistani commitments to prevent hostile activity, including sponsorship of cross-border terrorism.

Far from using “water as a weapon” against Pakistan, India would be doing the opposite—helping to shape “water for peace”. The objective of the new treaty would be to allow both sides to acquire something vital. Pakistan would receive predictable and transparent water flows. And India would get binding security assurances and mechanisms for verifying compliance.

The Israel-Jordan precedent is instructive precisely because its water provisions exist within an integrated treaty framework in which security, non-hostility, infrastructure protection and water cooperation are mutually connected. That means a material breach of fundamental treaty obligations is likely to have consequences for treaty performance under international law.

For India and Pakistan, that principle could be translated into a carefully calibrated arrangement, with New Delhi guaranteeing transboundary baseline flows. While protecting core downstream entitlements, the new treaty would also offer supplemental water arrangements or water-trading mechanisms tied to measurable security commitments.

This would create a major incentive for Pakistan to preserve the treaty-based framework. The objective would be to transform water from an arena of confrontation into a resource for subcontinental stability.

The Bangladesh case offers an equally important but somewhat different opportunity. India and Bangladesh share the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and smaller rivers. Their water relationship increasingly intersects with climate change, flooding, groundwater depletion, coastal vulnerability and salinity intrusion.

Low-lying Bangladesh has too much water during the annual summer monsoon, when large parts of the deltaic country become inundated, and too little in the dry season. Bangladesh’s annual per capita water availability averages 8,252 cubic metres—or more than five times that of India—but the major inter-seasonal variations and the limited storage capacity of its aquifers make its water situation challenging.

As the Ganges Treaty approaches its December expiration, this creates an opportunity for India to update the architecture of bilateral water cooperation. This opportunity has been reinforced by Dhaka’s stated preference for negotiating a new agreement or heavily revised framework rather than a simple extension. Ahead of formal bilateral talks, Bangladesh has established a dedicated expert and technical panel to draft its proposal points, including greater dry-season flows.

India could offer a broader water-for-cooperation bargain. In return for a mutual commitment in the new treaty to prevent hostile actions, acts of terrorism or third-party military deployments from their territory against the other party and to maintain active bilateral security cooperation, India could guarantee dry-season flows combined with flood-data sharing, joint river-basin management, transit and connectivity arrangements, coastal-erosion management and investment in water infrastructure.

The water-sharing terms would be legally contingent on an overarching peace agreement.

The strategic rationale for such a treaty is particularly weighty given the porous Indo-Bangladesh border and Indian concerns over the potential spillover of growing Islamist violence in Bangladesh. Instead of letting water, security and political differences become mutually reinforcing, India could seek to build institutionalised interdependence that gives Dhaka a strong interest in stable, friendly and cooperative ties with New Delhi.

India and Bangladesh already have the bilateral Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), through which the Ganges Treaty’s renewal or revision is to be discussed. Like the Israeli-Jordanian JWC, the JRC provides a permanent institutional mechanism beneath the political level that allows technical officials to deal with seasonal water transfers, hydrological data, operational disputes and other issues. Yet, with Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s government stoking anti-India sentiment, Dhaka might be loath to accept peace and security commitments in exchange for a broader water package with India.

Still, a separate water-for-peace treaty with Bangladesh and Pakistan would open the possibility of establishing permanent bilateral river-basin commissions with authority to jointly monitor flows, exchange real-time hydrological data, manage droughts and floods, and adjust operational arrangements as hydrological conditions change.

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Such cooperation would be particularly valuable as climate change makes historical averages of river flows increasingly unreliable. Fixed water allocations or the reservation of flows of major tributaries almost entirely for the downstream country may with time become less workable due to erratic monsoons, retreating glaciers and more frequent extreme weather events. The Israel-Jordan treaty offers a useful principle that the legal framework should be durable but the operational arrangements within it must be adaptable.

However, there is an important difference between the two regions, which explains why the Israel-Jordan model cannot simply be transplanted to South Asia.

Israel controls the upstream water resources and infrastructure, whereas India is downstream of China on the Brahmaputra, Indus and Sutlej systems as well as the Ganges tributaries. India cannot guarantee fixed cross-border flows over the long run when an upstream power can alter river flows, timing or sediment regimes through mega-projects. Therefore, joint mechanisms may be needed for adjusting water allocations according to verified upstream inflows from Tibet.

The new India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan treaties should extend beyond surface water to groundwater resources, which, like rivers, cross political borders. The groundwater dimension has long been neglected on the subcontinent. Excessive pumping in the upstream and downstream basins of transboundary rivers is depleting shared aquifers and causing groundwater contamination and salinity. Such problems cannot be solved by allocating river waters alone.

A South Asian water-for-peace framework should thus include joint groundwater monitoring, extraction limits, shared aquifer mapping and real-time data exchange. In divided Punjab, India and Pakistan could cooperate on monitoring transboundary aquifers and preventing unsustainable extraction. In the Bengal Basin, India and Bangladesh could combine surface-water cooperation with groundwater management, arsenic mitigation and protection against saltwater intrusion into coastal areas.

More fundamentally, water security could become part of regional security architecture only if Indian policymakers recognise the central importance of linking predictable water-sharing to verifiable good-neighbourly conduct. To make water security and national security mutually reinforcing, New Delhi must view a bilateral water agreement not just as a resource-sharing mechanism but also as a security instrument and a stake in upholding peace.

India must bring water and geopolitics into the same bargain, thus making each a reason to preserve the other. If Pakistan and Bangladesh want India to do what China refuses—agree to long-term sharing of river waters—they must at least accept verifiable commitments to peace under new water-for-peace arrangements. In fact, China’s refusal to enter water-sharing arrangements with any downstream neighbour makes a reciprocal model for India both more necessary and more challenging.

Water should become a peace dividend, not an unconditional entitlement. Instead of water being a casualty of geopolitical conflict, it must become a key incentive that sustains peace itself, transforming shared water vulnerability into shared strategic interest.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of two award-winning books on water: Water, Peace, and War; and Water: Asia’s New Battleground.

Taiwan risks becoming a bargaining chip in Trump’s China pivot

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By speaking of America’s World War II alliance with China in a way that connects it to Chinese communist rule, Trump not only walked into Xi’s diplomatic trap but also is unwittingly helping Beijing appropriate history. Such historical distortion is only one part of the problem. Trump’s inclination to treat Taiwan as a negotiating asset underscores the larger challenge.

Brahma Chellaney, Taipei Times

The most troubling message coming out of Washington for Taipei is not any single statement but the cumulative effect of a series of signals suggesting that US President Donald Trump is rethinking Taiwan’s strategic value while viewing the US-China relationship through the lens of a transactional great-power bargain. The danger behind Trump’s new softness toward Beijing is a potential US-China bargain that undermines Taiwan’s core interests.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) recent state visit to Washington, Trump and Xi appeared to rewrite the history of World War II.

In a Sept. 25 fact sheet on Xi’s visit, the White House said, “The two leaders recalled that the US and China were allies in World War II and fought side by side to win the war.” At a welcome ceremony for Xi on Sept. 24, Trump claimed that the pursuit of “common interests … even made us allies in World War II.” Xi echoed the theme later at the state dinner, contending that China and the US had fought “shoulder to shoulder against fascist aggression” by Japan.

America’s wartime ally, however, was the Republic of China, then governed by Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). The communist People’s Republic of China did not emerge until October 1949, more than four years after the war ended. Chinese communists did participate in guerrilla warfare against imperial Japanese forces as part of the nominal “Second United Front” with the KMT. But Washington’s diplomatic recognition, military assistance and formal alliance were with Chiang’s government, which later relocated to Taiwan.

By speaking of America’s wartime alliance in a way that connects it to Chinese communist rule, Trump not only walked into Xi’s diplomatic trap but also is unwittingly helping Beijing appropriate history. Such historical distortion is only one part of the problem. Trump’s inclination to treat Taiwan as a negotiating asset underscores the larger challenge.

Taipei naturally is concerned that Washington has delayed pending foreign military sales to Taiwan, or has discussed the scope of such arms sales with Xi, as leverage in negotiations with Beijing over tariffs, trade, technology and rare earths. No less striking is US Ambassador to China David Perdue’s confirmation that Trump had floated the idea of selling American military equipment to China, America’s principal strategic rival.

The message this sends Taiwan is that US security commitments may no longer be insulated from US-China economic bargaining.

The contrast with the Biden administration is also worth noting. Former US president Joe Biden repeatedly said the US would defend Taiwan militarily if China attacked. Trump has instead emphasized the physical distance separating America from Taiwan, asking why Americans should fight a war “9,500 miles away.” He has also urged Taiwan to “cool it” and warned against steps toward formal independence, effectively echoing Xi’s own rhetoric.

At the same time, Trump’s economic rhetoric has challenged another pillar of Taiwan’s security: its semiconductor industry.

For years, Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance has been described as a “silicon shield.” This is because the global economy’s dependence on Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) makes Taiwan’s security a vital interest for the US and other democratic nations.

But Trump has repeatedly complained that Taiwan “stole” America’s chip business and has suggested that Taiwan should effectively pay the US for its defense. His administration has also used tariffs to extract trade and investment concessions from Taipei.

Taipei thus faces a jarring paradox: The very economic strength that was supposed to make Taiwan indispensable is increasingly being portrayed in Washington as evidence that Taipei has benefited at America’s expense.

Meanwhile, Trump’s demand that Taipei raise military expenditure dramatically is adding another layer of uncertainty. Taiwan is already starting to do more to defend itself. But when such a demand is accompanied by ambiguity over the durability of US security commitments, it risks creating an impression that American protection is conditional.

These developments point toward “strategic transactionalism” — a shift from viewing Taiwan principally through the prism of democratic values, regional stability and a rules-based order toward seeing its security as one variable in a much broader US negotiation with Beijing.

Trump has already elevated China to America’s peer. By repeatedly framing the US-China relationship as a G2, or Group of Two, Trump is implicitly granting China recognition as an equal great power. Xi has long promoted a “new model of major-country relations” in which the US and China co-manage global affairs while respecting each other’s “core interests,” a term that for Beijing includes Taiwan.

If Washington were to accept such a framework, Taiwan could find itself caught on the wrong side of a great-power bargain. The danger is not an explicit American abandonment of Taiwan but a subtle and gradual normalization of the idea that the US and China have separate spheres of influence.

That scenario could also weaken the coalition on which Taiwan’s security depends. Taiwan’s deterrence depends on the ability of the US, Japan, Australia, European democracies and other partners to convince Beijing that aggression would impose prohibitive costs. If Washington increasingly conducts bilateral deals with Beijing without consulting its allies, those partners may become less certain that their own interests will be protected in a Taiwan crisis.

Against this backdrop, Taipei needs to draw the appropriate lesson and strengthen its own capacity to deter aggression. That means accelerating the implementation of an asymmetric defense strategy built around mobile, survivable and mass-producible systems. It means strengthening reserves, civil defense and critical infrastructure so that Taiwan can withstand a blockade, cyberattacks and other forms of coercion.

Diversifying trade and supply chains, particularly across the Indo-Pacific, can likewise reduce Taiwan’s vulnerability to economic pressures.

If Taiwan is to become less exposed to the vagaries of any one president, whether in Beijing or Washington, it should make itself harder to coerce, harder to isolate and harder to bargain away.

Brahma Chellaney, professor emeritus of strategic studies at the independent Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).

America’s China lesson is reshaping its India policy

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India’s role in U.S. strategy is being downgraded, as is apparent from the White House’s latest National Security Strategy, the Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy, the State Department’s 2026-2030 Strategic Plan, the dropping of the prefix “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific,” and the Quad’s marginalization in American strategy. Trump has accelerated a structural shift that began under Biden and stripped away much of the diplomatic cushioning that once softened bilateral differences.

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

Washington does not want to make the same mistake twice.

Having helped China become an economic and technological powerhouse, only to create its greatest strategic rival, Washington now appears determined to approach India’s rise differently.

Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau made the point during his New Delhi visit earlier this year. Landau stated bluntly that America would not make its China mistake again by allowing India to “develop all these markets” and capabilities, only to discover that India was “beating us in a lot of commercial things.”

The remarks echoed a broader reassessment in Washington of India’s rise. Two months earlier, the State Department’s five-year strategic plan made only one reference to India and declared that Washington would “seek partnership with growing regional economies such as India but on terms that advance U.S. security and economic interests and avoid repeating past mistakes.”

For two decades, Washington saw a rising democratic India as inherently good for the free world, especially as a counterweight to an increasingly autocratic and expansionist China. A stronger India also meant a larger market for American companies and a more capable Indo-Pacific partner. India was thus given pride of place in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, first unveiled in 2017.

Now, the administration no longer appears to view India’s rise as entirely benign. India’s role in U.S. policy is being downgraded, especially as President Trump adopts a more conciliatory approach to China, including recognizing it as America’s principal strategic peer.

The White House’s latest National Security Strategy, unlike previous iterations, demotes India’s role by making only a passing reference to the country. The Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy, for its part, does not mention India at all, although New Delhi holds more annual military exercises with America than any other country. In another signal of India’s strategic downgrading, the Pentagon in June dropped the prefix “Indo” from “Indo-Pacific.”

India’s eroding salience in U.S. policy is also weakening the Quad, America’s strategic coalition with India, Japan and Australia. Increasingly marginal to U.S. strategy, the Quad risks strategic irrelevance. No Quad leaders’ summit has been held since 2024. Trump’s trade war against India derailed last year’s summit, and none has been scheduled this year. Trump’s own National Security Strategy reflects the Quad’s diminished standing, giving the grouping a single passing mention and only in relation to India.

Much of India’s strategic establishment still sees Trump merely as an aberration. They view his tariffs, pressure tactics and transactional approach to New Delhi as the excesses of an unusually disruptive president. Once Trump leaves office, the thinking goes, the U.S. and India can return to the trajectory that preceded him.

But that assumption mistakes a structural shift for a presidential interlude. The deeper shift in Washington’s thinking about India began in the latter half of Joe Biden’s presidency and is likely to outlast Trump.

As India’s power grew, disagreements over trade, U.S. policies in South Asia and New Delhi’s Ukraine-war neutrality spurred tensions. Trump has accelerated that shift and stripped away much of the diplomatic cushioning that once softened bilateral differences.

India, however, is no longer a relatively weak power whose strategic policies Washington can shape. India’s economy has almost quadrupled in real terms since 2000. India has also developed its own industrial ambitions, energy strategy, technology policies and geopolitical relationships. As a rising power, India seeks to preserve the freedom to make its own strategic choices.

Strategic autonomy is not uniquely Indian. Every major power safeguards its freedom of action, and America is no exception.

The problem, then, is not strategic autonomy itself. It is the growing tension between Washington’s expectation that India’s rise should reinforce American strategic objectives and New Delhi’s determination to ensure that its growing power expands rather than narrows its freedom of action.

Bilateral trade negotiations are currently deadlocked. India wants to become a manufacturing powerhouse, reduce external dependence and protect strategic industries. The U.S., on the other side, wants greater access to India’s enormous domestic market, the world’s largest and fastest-growing.

The tensions, however, are manageable, provided Washington does not mistake partnership for alignment and New Delhi does not confuse strategic autonomy with strategic defiance.

Washington’s experience with Beijing helps explain the renewed China analogy: It has changed how U.S. policymakers view economic interdependence. The old assumption was that helping a rising power become wealthier and more integrated into the global economy would make it a more responsible stakeholder and perhaps even a strategic partner.

The lesson Washington is drawing today is not necessarily that India’s rise should be stopped, but that America should be more careful about the terms on which it helps another major power rise. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to visit India early next week for the second time in five months.

The irony is that China is also taking steps to constrain India’s rise. This year, Beijing has imposed India-specific export curbs, widely seen as efforts to slow India’s emergence as an alternative global manufacturing hub. Leveraging its dominance of global supply chains, China has restricted exports to India of manufacturing equipment, industrial components, lithium-ion and battery technologies, and critical minerals.

India and the U.S. still need each other, but the relationship must be built on a more realistic foundation. For New Delhi, the test is to manage U.S. expectations without sacrificing its own interests. For Washington, it is to accept that a genuinely powerful India will sometimes make choices America dislikes.

Washington should recognize that a powerful India can be a valuable partner precisely because it is capable of acting independently. With the Trump administration asking U.S. allies to take greater responsibility for their own security, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby declared, “India is a model ally that takes its own defense with utmost seriousness.”

America’s China lesson could ultimately strengthen the U.S.-India relationship. But that will happen only if Washington learns to distinguish an independent partner from a prospective rival, and New Delhi shows that autonomy need not preclude collaboration.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.“

China’s Panda Diplomacy Is Losing Its Charm

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Since giving a pair of giant pandas to the Smithsonian’s National Zoo in 1972 following President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing, China has used panda loans as a means of projecting a harmless and friendly image globally. But it was always an act — and foreign audiences are no longer falling for it.

By Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

During his recent visit to Washington, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would send a breeding pair of giant pandas to Zoo Atlanta. The “envoys of friendship,” Ping Ping and Fu Shuang, arrived just a few days later. This is hardly the first time China has used its iconic bear as an instrument of soft power. By loaning the animals to overseas zoos, it seeks to project an image of China not as a threatening dragon, but rather as a tough but cuddly charmer.

But perhaps the true message of this “panda diplomacy” lies in the manipulation and exploitation it embodies. For starters, while China claims the familiar black-and-white bear as its mascot, one of the species’ primary natural habitats is Wolong, which sits on the steep edge of the Tibetan Plateau. Within a horizontal distance of about 30 miles, elevations range from alpine peaks exceeding 17,000 feet to below 1,600 feet, creating a moist, temperate microclimate that sustains the high-altitude bamboo forests where pandas thrive.

Historically part of the Tibetan region of Kham, Wolong is now under Sichuan provincial jurisdiction, in Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture—and China is all too eager to subsume everything that makes it culturally unique. Since China’s annexation of resource-rich Tibet in 1950-51, the government has systematically sought to erase Tibetan culture and identity, not least by incorporating the Plateau’s distinctive geography, wildlife, and natural resources into mainstream Chinese national identity. China’s appropriation of others extends even to cherry-tree cultivation, which it has claimed began not in Japan or Korea, but in “China’s Himalayan highlands”—that is, Tibet.

The Tibetan Plateau is home to the endangered red panda, a house-cat-sized mammal with a long, bushy tail, in addition to giant pandas, which are classified as a vulnerable species. There are fewer than 2,000 giant pandas left in the wild, and China claims ownership of almost all of them. This brings us to the second dubious element of China’s panda diplomacy: it is based on a lucrative “rent-a-panda-pair” program.

While China reaps the soft-power benefits of keeping its endearing mascot in foreign zoos, it also charges those zoos high prices: up to $1.1 million per year for the right to display and breed a pair of pandas. China retains ownership not only of the leased adults, but also of any offspring they produce. And yet, the leasing zoo must pay a one-time fee of approximately $600,000 for each cub that is born during its lease. Facilities also often pay up to $2 million in additional sponsorship and research commitments.

The bills add up. Between 1994 and 2023, China raked in almost $300 million from its panda-rental program. Small wonder the Guinness World Records lists the giant panda as the “most expensive species in captivity.”

But the money is just the start. The increasingly one-sided contracts that the state-run China Wildlife Conservation Association signs with zoos allow China to terminate an agreement unilaterally and prematurely recall pandas for a wide variety of reasons, such as the “unauthorized release of relevant information” to the public. This includes information that is seemingly innocuous: China prohibits zoos from using terms such as “lease,” “rental,” “loan,” or “contract,” apparently to obscure the transactional nature of the arrangement.

China also uses panda loans to send political messages. China gave a pair of pandas to the Smithsonian’s National Zoo in 1972, following President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing. In 2010, however, it accelerated the recall of two US-born panda cubs after the White House announced that President Barack Obama would not cancel a meeting with the Dalai Lama. In 2023, the three remaining pandas at the Smithsonian’s National Zoo were returned to China, marking the end of a tradition that had lasted more than a half-century.

And it is not just the United States. This year, Japan returned its last two giant pandas to China, leaving it without any for the first time since normalizing relations with China in 1972. By contrast, when China sent a pair of pandas to Qatar before the 2022 World Cup, officials hailed the move as a reflection of the countries’ “depth of relations.”

But the power of China’s panda diplomacy now seems to be waning. While the general public might still find pandas appealing, visits to panda-hosting zoos tend to plateau after the novelty wears off. Meanwhile, conservationists loudly criticize the commercial and diplomatic use of a vulnerable species.

Most importantly for China, political analysts and lawmakers increasingly view panda loans as more of a charming distraction than a meaningful barometer of bilateral relations. This helps to explain why Xi’s recent “gift” to Zoo Atlanta attracted little US media coverage. With active international panda-leasing programs having dropped from 21 countries in 2019 to just 16 today, even Chinese state media are now asking whether panda diplomacy has “lost its sparkle.”

Giant pandas may appear cuddly and docile, but they are formidable bears with long, sharp claws and a highly developed jaw structure, which delivers a bite force of nearly 1,300 Newtons, almost on par with that of lions. While captive-bred pandas introduced into the wild tend to die because they lack critical survival skills, wild pandas can be aggressive and dangerous. In this sense, perhaps pandas really are an accurate symbol of China: even when it appears harmless, it cannot conceal its teeth.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2026.

Trump’s greatest gift to Xi: Making China America’s peer

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Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Trump
Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Trump pose for photographers as they arrive to view documents at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., on Friday, September 25, 2026, as a part of Xi’s state visit.

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

China has long sought peer validation from the only country whose recognition would carry decisive strategic weight — the U.S.

President Trump has now handed Beijing that prize. By repeatedly framing his summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping as a U.S.-China “G2” or “group of two,” Trump is granting China recognition as America’s principal strategic peer.

In fact, by hosting Xi last week for a state visit while world leaders gathered at the United Nations, Trump effectively portrayed the U.S.-China relationship as the axis of a bipolar world — a depiction that risks alienatingU.S. allies and partners, such as Japan, India, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea and NATO members.

The symbolism surrounding the latest Trump-Xi summit was hard to miss. In an unprecedented departure from American diplomatic practice, Trump personally traveled to Joint Base Andrews, Md., to greet the arriving Xi with a lavish ceremony, which included a red carpet lined by U.S. service members and a military flyover featuring two B-1 bombers. 

The following morning, a 479-member military honor guard greeted the Chinese leader during a White House arrival ceremony, capped by a flyover of a B-2 Spirit bomber escorted by four F-22 Raptors. Besides a state dinner, the visit also included a Trump-escorted tour of the National Archives.

These ceremonial flourishes communicated a powerful message: The leaders of the world’s two preeminent powers were meeting as equals.

More revealing than the pomp and pageantry of the summits with Xi has been Trump’s own language. He has repeatedly described his meetings with Xi as the G2. Before last October’s summit in Busan, South Korea, he announced on Truth Social, “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!” Afterward, he celebrated “My G2 meeting with President Xi.” Secretary of War Pete Hegseth also echoed the summit encounter as a “historic ‘G2 meeting.’”

Trump revived the G2 terminology during his Beijing visit in May, as if to highlight the formal end of the unipolar age. While previous American presidents carefully avoided legitimizing China’s claim to peer status, Trump’s use of the G2 concept during press encounters projected that the U.S. was now treating China as its true peer.

Trump has also been displaying a strikingly deferential posture toward America’s principal geopolitical rival. In the run-up to Xi’s Washington visit, Trump dismissed or excused reports of China’s actions against the U.S., such as providing Iran satellite imagery to target American assets, while portraying the Chinese leader as a personal friend, claiming he had “never gotten along better” with Xi.

Beijing has long rejected American hegemony while simultaneously seeking equal treatment from Washington. Beijing’s preferred phrase has been a “new model of major power relations” — a formula that seeks mutual respect for each side’s core interests, including China’s communist system and its territorial claims, including on Taiwan and the South China Sea. 

The objective was not to establish a formal G2 institution but to normalize the idea that no major global issue could be decided without China. Trump’s summit diplomacy has brought Beijing much closer to realizing that objective.

The latest summit may have achieved little in concrete terms, with no agreement on any of the contentious bilateral issues and the truce in the trade war extended only by two months. 

But for Xi, the visit was a propaganda coup, conveying to the Chinese people and the wider world that, under his leadership, China has become America’s equal. The optics indeed reinforced Beijing’s narrative of Xi-led national rejuvenation. Trump’s summit diplomacy has also helped Beijing advance one of the key objectives of its broader strategic messaging: demonstrating to domestic and international audiences that the U.S. can no longer dictate terms unilaterally.

Trump’s courtship of Xi represents a remarkable evolution from Trump’s first term, when tariffs, sanctions and technological restrictions were presented as instruments for reshaping China’s behavior. Today, Washington’s objective is no longer to transform China but to manage strategic rivalry through direct leader-to-leader bargaining, even if it means accepting the world’s largest autocracy as a co-equal on the global stage.

China is still not America’s equal in terms of economic, diplomatic or military power. But peer competition has never required matching strengths. The defining characteristic is the capacity to resist coercion and independently shape international outcomes. When Beijing last year responded to American tariffs by restricting rare-earth exports, it not only showed that economic interdependence cuts both ways but also demonstrated its capacity to impose retaliatory costs on the U.S.

The problem is not engaging a powerful rival to help avert costly miscalculations, but the public elevation of China into a privileged bilateral condominium. The real losers are likely to be America’s own allies and partners, whose interests could be subordinated to Washington-Beijing bargains, forcing them to hedge against U.S. unreliability.

The prospect of a U.S.-China duopoly, in which Washington and Beijing negotiate the rules of global governance while everyone else adjusts to the outcome, is a strategic nightmare for U.S. friends in Asia in particular. They want a stable balance of power, not a Sino-centric Asia.

History offers ample reason for their anxiety. Major powers have repeatedly sought stability through exclusive understandings while middle powers and smaller states absorbed the consequences.

The White House’s accommodative approach will likely gain greater salience as Trump has indicated that he will meet Xi again in November and December — first at the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen, China, and then at the G20 summit in Miami.

China’s greatest diplomatic victory in recent years has been won not on the battlefield or through economic coercion, but in Washington, where Trump has validated Beijing’s claim to peer status. For Xi, no concession could have delivered a more valuable prize than America itself recognizing China as a co-leader of the international system.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.“

BRICS is challenging the US-led order but can’t replace it yet

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By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

One of the biggest geopolitical stories of the 21st century is the emergence of a broad coalition of countries determined to dilute the West’s monopoly on global governance.

That coalition is officially known as BRICS, an acronym for its five original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Although BRIC began as an investment term for four emerging economies, the group expanded to include South Africa and held its first BRICS summit in 2011. 

Since 2024, BRICS has expanded into an 11-member grouping that includes states as diverse as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia and Iran.

To many Americans, BRICS is little more than an anti-Western talking shop. But it is a mistake to dismiss a coalition that represents nearly half of humanity (the Group of Seven accounts for less than 10 percent), a growing share of global output, and an increasingly influential voice of the Global South. Whereas the G7 share of the world economy has steadily declined since the 1990s, BRICS’s share continues to rise.

Its growing influence reflects a profound reality: much of the non-Western world wants greater strategic autonomy and deeper economic cooperation beyond Western-led frameworks.

So the real question is not whether BRICS matters, but whether it can catalyze the development of a genuine alternative to the current U.S.-led world order. Its summit in New Delhi last weekend offered an illuminating answer.

The summit concluded with a 140-point New Delhi Declaration. Despite deep divisions, India brokered consensus among rivals by grounding the text in established U.N. legal frameworks and other standard multilateral principles.

But the summit also underscored a central paradox: BRICS members agree that the international system is unfair because it does not reflect today’s distribution of economic and political power. Yet they disagree deeply about what should replace it — or even how to begin overhauling it.

India and Brazil advocate reforming institutions such as the U.N. Security Council, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to give developing countries greater representation. They want to keep BRICS as non-Western but not to let it become anti-Western.

China and Russia, in contrast, are often more interested in building parallel structures to curtail Western influence altogether.

And then some newer members, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, maintain close security ties with the U.S., even as they deepen engagement with BRICS. The Emiratis and Saudis even host American military bases. Being part of BRICS allows these countries to diversify their geopolitical options and build alternative partnerships to help insulate themselves from Washington’s policy swings.

BRICS’s initiatives include local currency settlements, alternative payment mechanisms, and development financing through its New Development Bank. They are designed not so much to directly challenge the dollar’s global dominance — which in any case is eroding — as to reduce vulnerability to unilateral Western sanctions. BRICS essentially functions as a geopolitical hedge.

From Washington’s perspective, BRICS is best understood not as an anti-American alliance but as a coalition of countries seeking to reduce dependence on U.S.-led institutions. For many member states, BRICS is largely about expanding their diplomatic and economic choices.

Yet the New Delhi Declaration also exposed one of BRICS’s major weaknesses: its own double standards.

The declaration strongly condemns “unilateral coercive measures,” language aimed primarily at U.S. sanctions and trade levies such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. That criticism resonates across much of the non-Western world, where many governments view such unilateral action as something the Western-dominated international system makes possible.

But the declaration had one conspicuous omission: China is increasingly employing export restrictions on rare earths, critical minerals, manufacturing equipment and key industrial components as instruments of geopolitical leverage, including against its own BRICS partners.

For example, Beijing has recently imposed formal and informal India-specific export curbs, which have been widely interpreted as efforts to slow India’s emergence as an alternative global manufacturing hub. If unilateral economic coercion is objectionable when practiced by Washington, how can it be ignored when practiced by Beijing?

The answer has much to do with the mechanics of consensus diplomacy. Every BRICS declaration requires unanimous approval. So members are willing to collectively criticize external powers, but they have little space to name coercive behavior within their own ranks.

That, in turn, reveals an uncomfortable truth: BRICS is often united more by what it opposes than by what it practices — or by any shared vision of the alternative international order it hopes to build.

None of this means the U.S. should underestimate the organization. BRICS has already succeeded in signaling that the era of Western dominance is drawing to a close. More than three dozen countries have formally applied or expressed interest in joining BRICS, including states that remain close U.S. allies, such as Bahrain and Turkey, a NATO member.

The attraction is that BRICS helps broaden international options for governments, many of which increasingly want multiple centers of economic and diplomatic influence rather than reliance on a single superpower.

For Washington, ignoring legitimate demands for greater representation in global institutions would be counterproductive to its own interest in upholding the present international order. A willingness to reform multilateral governance may prove more effective than attempting to preserve structures designed in and for 1945.

The New Delhi summit may have demonstrated both the promise and the limits of BRICS. It is an influential coalition but not yet a unified alliance. It can coordinate diplomatic messaging but struggles to reconcile rival national ambitions. Its members share strong dissatisfaction with the current order but remain divided over the architecture of the next.

Such underlying strain does not diminish BRICS’s significance. The future order will likely be shaped by a diverse group of middle powers seeking a multipolar world in which no single nation or bloc writes all the rules, East or West.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

The Mother of All Mega-Dams: India Can No Longer Ignore the Water Bomb on Its Frontier

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Brahma Chellaney, OPEN magazine

China’s own scientists are warning the world about the serious risks posed by the colossal Chinese super-dam rising just miles from India’s border on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra. Why has India been loath to leverage those scientific warnings?

For more than five years since China’s rubber-stamp parliament approved the project in March 2021, India has responded to the threat the super-dam poses to downstream Indian communities with quiet diplomacy: confidential demarches, requests for transparency and cautious official statements. That strategy has produced virtually nothing.

Construction continues at full speed on what will become the world’s largest hydroelectric dam, rising in Medog county in Tibet’s Nyingchi prefecture.

The behemoth dam could singlehandedly reshape the course of the Yarlung Tsangpo, as the Brahmaputra is known in Tibet. While the intense rains across Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Meghalaya contribute immensely to the Brahmaputra’s flows during the fourth-month monsoon season, the river’s lean-season or dry-season flows depend for almost eight months on perennial sources such as glacier melt, mountain springs, snowmelt and other base flows originating mainly in Tibet.

The perennial flows carry nutrient-rich Himalayan silt. Trapping this sediment behind the mother of all mega-dams would starve downstream floodplains of vital nutrients, while releasing sediment-stripped water would incrementally erode riverbeds in India and Bangladesh regardless of the season. The super-dam’s flow regulation would thus represent a major geopolitical and ecological vulnerability downstream.

The Medog project itself poses a geological and humanitarian challenge whose consequences could reach millions of people across Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya and Bangladesh. Ironically, the strongest case against the project is coming from China’s own state-linked scientists.

Instead of a single dam with a reservoir, the unprecedented Medog project appears to be a vast, tunnel-linked hydropower and water-diversion complex deep in the Himalayas. It reportedly dams the Brahmaputra at more than one point around the Great Bend, where the river makes a dramatic U-turn around the towering Namcha Barwa peak before gushing south into India.

The project remains shrouded in secrecy. Yet some state-linked Chinese analysts claim it includes a tunnel dozens of kilometres long bored through Namcha Barwa, linking the northern and southern reaches of the river across its Great Bend. Taken together, this sprawling infrastructure is best described as a super-dam.

For Tibetans, the mega-project represents another assault on their land, culture and way of life. It is being built in one of Tibetan Buddhism’s most sacred landscapes. The tunnelling, damming and large-scale excavation are widely viewed as a desecration of territory long revered by Tibetans, who for centuries have served as environmental guardians by respecting nature as both their teacher and protector.

Against this backdrop, India should abandon its largely silent approach and highlight at multilateral forums the warnings published by Chinese geologists. New Delhi should spotlight Chinese scientific evidence that the dam is being constructed atop an active fault system with unusually fragile geological conditions. When China’s own experts describe the project as vulnerable to seismic instability, India possesses a powerful diplomatic opportunity that it has yet to seize.

The dam is staggering in scale. Planned with a generating capacity of 60,000 megawatts—nearly three times larger than the Three Gorges Dam—it is designed to exploit the dramatic 2,000-metre descent of the Yarlung Tsangpo as the river bends around the Namcha Barwa massif before entering India. The project, approved in China’s Five-Year Plan in 2021 and estimated to cost about $127 billion, embodies the Chinese Communist Party’s longstanding ambition to build the world’s biggest engineering marvels.

But the super-dam’s location is precisely what makes it extraordinarily dangerous. The dam sits within one of the world’s most seismically active regions, where the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates collide.

This Himalayan collision zone has produced some of Asia’s most destructive earthquakes, including the 1950 Assam-Tibet earthquake that was so powerful that it cut off India’s northeast from the rest of the country. It also caused significant changes to the Brahmaputra, including the blocking of tributaries by landslides and alterations to the river’s course and riverine morphology.

A more recent example of Himalayan seismic instability was the devastating earthquake that struck Myanmar in 2025, with tremors extending almost 1,000 kilometres to Bangkok. Meanwhile, the catastrophic flash flooding along the Tibet-Nepal border has served as a vivid demonstration of how tightly linked glacial, hydrological and geological systems are in the Himalayas.

Unlike conventional hydroelectric projects built on relatively stable terrain, the super-dam is being carved into mountains already fractured by persistent tectonic movement. The Himalayas continue to undergo active crustal deformation.

Geography magnifies the risk for millions living downstream in India. Any catastrophic failure of the super-dam would occur along the international boundary, directly affecting densely populated river valleys in northeastern India. While Bangladesh may not escape death and destruction, India would likely bear the overwhelming human cost.

The super-dam debate changed fundamentally in June 2026, when a team of Chinese geologists published a landmark study in Sedimentary Geology and Tethyan Geology, a journal overseen by the state-run China Geological Survey. The research was conducted by scientists affiliated with three state-backed Chinese institutions: the Middle Yarlung Tsangpo River Natural Resources Observation and Research Station; the Chengdu University of Technology; and the Civil-Military Integration Centre of the China Geological Survey.

The study’s conclusions are surprisingly direct. The researchers confirmed that the active Paizhen geological fault runs directly beneath the reservoir and key infrastructure zone of the Medog super-dam complex. They warned that repeated tectonic activity has fractured the surrounding bedrock, weakening the foundation upon which the dam, diversion tunnels and transport infrastructure will depend.

More strikingly, they concluded that the rock and soil surrounding the reservoir zone possess a “loose structure and weak cohesion,” making them highly susceptible to landslides and instability once the dam’s enormous reservoir is filled. Even moderate seismic activity or fault movement, they cautioned, could “very easily trigger” widespread slope failures, mass landslides and rock collapses into the river channel.

To illustrate the immediate threat, the study highlighted the magnitude-6.9 earthquake that struck the India-bordering Nyingchi prefecture, where the super-dam is being built. The earthquake occurred along the northern edge of the same Paizhen Fault network, demonstrating that the very fault system underlying the dam remains capable of generating powerful earthquakes.

The study’s warning extended to operational hazards affecting supporting infrastructure. The authors emphasized that seismic deformation along the fault threatens the structural integrity of the super-dam complex’s multi-kilometre subterranean diversion tunnels cut through the towering 7,782-metre-high Namcha Barwa mountain, as well as the bridges and logistics corridors located downstream from the dam.

If Beijing’s own scientific establishment acknowledges these grave geological hazards, why is India not making them central to the international conversation?

There is another reason these findings deserve global attention: China has an inglorious history of dismissing internal scientific warnings about dams.

Before the catastrophic 2008 Wenchuan earthquake on the eastern rim of the Tibetan Plateau, chief engineer Fan Xiao of the Sichuan Geology and Mineral Bureau repeatedly warned that the nearby Zipingpu Dam could induce seismic stresses by impounding massive quantities of water above an active geological fault. After nearly 90,000 people died in the earthquake, numerous international and domestic geologists later linked the rapid filling of Zipingpu Dam’s reservoir to the catastrophic magnitude-7.9 earthquake.

Impounding millions of cubic meters of water in high-pressure mountain valleys increases pore-fluid pressure along local faults, which can trigger earthquakes—a phenomenon known scientifically as “reservoir-induced seismicity,” or RIS.

This is not the only grim precedent to haunt China. Another prominent example was the catastrophic 1975 Banqiao Dam collapse, which occurred despite scientific warnings. Prominent Chinese hydrologist Chen Xing had repeatedly warned that excessive construction of dam reservoirs along rivers in Henan province, while ignoring geological limits and flood-discharge capacities, would lead to structural collapse. His warning was dismissed.

Yet despite the obvious lesson that ignoring credible geological warnings can carry catastrophic consequences, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s regime is persisting with the super-dam’s construction.

India’s restrained approach may be understandable. Beijing rejects binding water-sharing treaties, embraces an absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine over upstream rivers, and routinely resists transparency on projects that can significantly affect transboundary river flows. Without legal mechanisms to halt construction, New Delhi has concentrated on satellite monitoring, downstream infrastructure and disaster preparedness while raising concerns confidentially through bilateral channels.

But in stark contrast to China’s unilateralist approach to projects in border regions, including on shared rivers, India still hews to quiet diplomacy, although this approach has yielded little. China’s construction footprint has expanded continuously along the Himalayan frontier despite years of Indian objections.

Just imagine the reverse scenario. Had India begun constructing a 60,000-megawatt dam immediately upstream of Chinese territory near a contested frontier, Beijing would almost certainly have mobilized international opinion, emphasized environmental risks, highlighted scientific concerns, and portrayed the project as reckless and a direct strategic threat. China excels at shaping global narratives when its interests are involved.

India has essentially chosen silence where China would choose amplification.

The greatest irony is that India already possesses the evidence needed to reshape the international debate on the super-dam. It does not have to speculate about hidden faults or invent worst-case scenarios. Chinese scientists have documented the active Paizhen Fault, fractured bedrock, weakened foundation capacity, unstable reservoir slopes and seismic history in painstaking technical detail. Those findings deserve global scrutiny precisely because they originate within China’s own state-linked scientific system.

Quiet diplomacy has not slowed construction, increased transparency or secured binding safeguards. Continuing the same approach while the world’s largest and riskiest dam rises beside the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is less a strategy than an admission of helplessness.

When the potential danger from the super-dam is measured not only in megawatts but also in millions of downstream lives, New Delhi ought to demand evidence-based accountability by placing the Chinese scientific system’s own geological warnings at the centre of the global conversation.

China’s Dam Frenzy Spawns Dam Collapses

For more than seven decades, China has pursued the most ambitious dam-building program in human history. Since Mao Zedong declared that China must “tame the rivers,” dams have become symbols of national power, technological modernity and the Communist Party’s ideological triumph.

The country has transformed its landscape by damming every significant river, diverting waters across distant river basins, and exporting its dam-building model to Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Yet beneath this show of engineering prowess lies a sordid record Beijing has long sought to cloak: China has experienced more dam failures than any other nation. Thousands of dam reservoirs have collapsed because of substandard construction, political interference and geological miscalculation.

The world’s deadliest dam disaster occurred not in a colonial state but in modern China during the Mao era. Even today, aging infrastructure and extreme weather events continue to expose vulnerabilities within the country’s vast dam network, raising the risks of catastrophic dam collapses.

When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the country possessed just 22 dams of significant size. Today, it has more than 85,000 dams, including over half of the world’s approximately 50,000 large dams. In effect, China has completed, on average, at least one large dam every day since its so-called Communist revolution.

This extraordinary expansion of dams has been rooted in the Communist Party’s longstanding conviction that rivers should be reengineered to serve political and economic objectives. During Mao’s infamous “Great Leap Forward,” local authorities were encouraged to construct reservoirs at breakneck speed, often prioritizing production targets over engineering standards. Scientific caution frequently yielded to ideological goals, while experienced hydrologists who questioned ambitious projects faced political scorn or even persecution.

The consequences of such a dam-building frenzy have extended to the social domain. By 2007, Chinese authorities acknowledged that 22.9 million people had been uprooted by dam and other water projects since 1949, in one of the largest occurrences of development-induced resettlement in world history.

It is against this backdrop that China’s extraordinary dam-building record is matched by an equally staggering dam failure record. Official statistics released by the Chinese government acknowledge that at least 3,500 dams failed just between 1951 and 2008. Earlier government figures showed 2,796 collapses by 1980 and roughly 3,200 by 1981—equivalent to nearly 4% of all dams then in existence.

The true number may never be known. Information surrounding dam failures has long been treated as a state secret, and China has generally been reluctant to share failure data internationally. At a 1991 international conference on dam safety in Vienna, participating countries reported their historical dam collapses. China alone stated that it had none to report, despite its own published domestic statistics documenting thousands of failures.

This opacity has obscured an uncomfortable reality: many failures were not acts of nature alone, but products of systemic human error impelled by an authoritarian political system.

The defining catastrophe occurred in August 1975 in Henan province. Following unprecedented rainfall from Super Typhoon Nina, the Banqiao Dam overtopped and breached. Its collapse unleashed a chain reaction that destroyed the nearby Shimantan Dam and approximately 60 additional reservoirs in a cascading hydraulic failure.

The immediate deluge killed an estimated 26,000 people. Subsequent famine, disease and social collapse raised the total death toll to between 170,000 and 230,000, making Banqiao the deadliest structural dam failure ever recorded.

The catastrophe could have been averted had authorities heeded the warnings of Chinese hydrologists, especially as Chen Xing had repeatedly warned that over-building reservoirs would likely trigger structural collapse. Rather than revising the project, authorities denounced Chen’s criticisms as politically incorrect.

Details of the disaster, in fact, remained classified for three decades before being partially declassified in 2005.

More than an engineering failure, Banqiao was a failure of governance, where ideology overruled scientific expertise.

Although Banqiao remains unparalleled, later disasters have shown that the underlying problems did not end with Mao.

In 1993, the Gouhou Dam in Qinghai province collapsed, killing more than 300 people. Investigators attributed the failure to serious design defects, inadequate quality control and poor compaction during construction. Qinghai, the birthplace of the present Dalai Lama, has historically been part of the traditional Tibetan region of Amdo, a major cultural and spiritual homeland for Tibetans.

In 2000, a massive landslide created a natural dam on the Yiong Tsangpo, which is a tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo. It joins the main river just upstream of where the Yarlung Tsangpo makes its great bend around the Namcha Barwa mountain and enters Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang/Dihang, which then becomes the Brahmaputra.

Despite clear warning signs, the temporary dam on the Yiong Tsangpo eventually burst, sending destructive floodwaters through Tibet and into Arunachal Pradesh, destroying bridges and vital infrastructure downstream. The event illustrated how Himalayan geology can transform localized instability into an international disaster.

More recently, the connected Yongan and Xinfeng dams in Inner Mongolia failed in rapid succession in 2020 after heavy rainfall. Although evacuations prevented mass casualties, the dual failure inundated farmland, destroyed roads and renewed concerns about thousands of aging reservoirs constructed in pursuit of political quotas without modern safety standards.

These failures together underline continuity rather than exception. The recurring causes of failure reflect an infrastructure network built rapidly, expanded relentlessly and maintained unevenly. Thousands of older dams now lack modern monitoring systems, early-warning sensors and upgraded flood-control capacity.

China’s most famous dam, the Three Gorges Dam, has never suffered a major structural failure. Yet it has carried profound environmental impacts and significant geological risks.

The project officially displaced 1.4 million people, submerged cities and villages, altered aquatic ecosystems, intensified pollution within its mammoth reservoir and trapped enormous volumes of sediment. Geologists have also documented thousands of micro-earthquakes and widespread landslides associated with the immense weight and fluctuating levels of its reservoir, which holds 39.3 billion cubic meters of water.

Today, the principal concern over this giant dam is less an abrupt collapse than cascading risk. The Three Gorges Dam, on the Yangtze River, sits within a broader network of upstream reservoirs, meaning extreme rainfall could compound hydraulic pressures across multiple dams simultaneously, unleashing a sudden surge of water. Such a scenario, eerily reminiscent of Banqiao’s domino effect, could threaten downstream industrial hubs and mega-cities along the Yangtze.

This background is especially relevant as China erects its unprecedented super-dam on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra, within one of the world’s most seismically active mountain belts. China’s own hydraulic history offers a cautionary lesson: the greatest danger is often not the river but the belief that it can be bent to the Chinese will.

Beijing is again smothering inconvenient scientific warnings. In earlier decades, engineers, hydrologists and geologists who questioned excessive dam construction or inadequate flood-discharge capacity were frequently mocked and marginalized, allowing flawed projects to proceed without meaningful scrutiny. Now Beijing is persisting with the construction of what it calls “the project of the century” even as its own scientists warn of serious geological risks at the site.

‘Dam-For-A-Dam’ Strategy?

The fact that no country has built more dams than Beijing and that no country has witnessed more dam failures than China should shape how the world evaluates the Himalayan super-dam and how India responds. As the record shows, Chinese engineers are capable of building monumental structures. The deeper question is whether any government can safely impose permanent hydraulic control over a dynamic, earthquake-prone river system whose behaviour continually exceeds human prediction.

The greatest threat posed by the Medog mega-project is the possibility that the world’s largest hydroelectric dam could become the world’s greatest transboundary flood hazard. India’s response should prioritize resilience, surveillance and diplomacy.

For India, the project is a strategic and humanitarian challenge whose consequences threaten millions living downstream. Much attention has focused on whether the super-dam will allow China to manipulate cross-border river flows. That concern is legitimate. The Brahmaputra is the lifeline of northeastern India, irrigating farmland, sustaining fisheries, replenishing wetlands and supporting livelihoods before flowing into Bangladesh, where it becomes the country’s single largest source of freshwater.

Yet the more immediate danger may be one that receives far less discussion: the catastrophic risk of structural failure in one of the world’s most earthquake-prone landscapes. An unparalleled dam built inside the Eastern Himalayan Syntaxis creates not only Chinese geopolitical leverage but also systemic disaster risk for downstream communities.

India thus faces a defining policy choice. Should it respond by constructing its own giant counter-dam immediately downstream as a “water buffer” strategy? If China abruptly impounds water, creating a drought in the lean season, or suddenly releases massive volumes of water, unleashing an artificial flood, could India’s downstream counter-dam regulate river levels, absorb a surge and mitigate the “water bomb” risk? Or should India pursue a fundamentally different strategy centred on technology and flood resilience?

New Delhi’s proposed Upper Siang Multipurpose Project (USMP) is an 11,000-megawatt hydroelectric and flood-control dam in Arunachal Pradesh estimated to cost roughly $13 billion. Officially, the project serves two purposes: generating clean electricity and creating sufficient storage capacity to absorb sudden surges originating from China’s super-dam. On paper, the logic appears compelling. If China controls the river upstream, India should possess a hydraulic buffer downstream.

The problem is that rivers do not obey human logic. They follow gravity and geology. Human logic seeks control; nature embraces chaos.

A downstream mega-dam cannot reliably neutralize the catastrophic failure of a much larger upstream structure located only a relatively short distance away. Instead, it risks creating a cascading disaster in which one dam’s collapse triggers another.

The geography makes this risk particularly disquieting. China’s Medog project sits just upstream of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while the proposed Upper Siang dam would be constructed shortly after the river enters India. Between them lies the steep, narrow Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Canyon, the world’s deepest and longest canyon. Rather than dissipating the energy of moving or falling water, this terrain accelerates it, channelling enormous volumes of water through confined valleys at extraordinary velocity.

Should China’s super-dam ever experience a catastrophic breach—whether from a powerful earthquake, a massive landslide from the Namcha Barwa massif or some other extreme geological event—the resulting flood wave would not resemble an ordinary river flood. It would be a high-energy torrent carrying sediment, boulders, liquefied mud and shattered concrete capable of destroying infrastructure across its path.

The downstream Indian reservoir would then become part of the hazard rather than the solution.

The central weakness of the counter-dam concept lies in an operational contradiction. A flood-control reservoir is effective only when it is substantially empty. A hydroelectric reservoir is economically productive, especially as a power generator, only when it remains relatively full.

The Upper Siang project cannot maximize both objectives simultaneously. If operators maintain high water levels to generate 11,000 megawatts of electricity, the available flood cushion shrinks dramatically. If they keep a large empty buffer for emergency protection, electricity generation and project economics suffer correspondingly.

A second constraint is time. Because of the close proximity between China’s super-dam and India’s planned Upper Siang dam, downstream authorities might receive little more than several tens of minutes of warning following an upstream structural failure. Even with perfect communications, safely releasing billions of cubic meters of water from the Upper Siang structure through spillways within such a narrow window would be virtually impossible.

The third, and perhaps most important, problem is seismic. The Eastern Himalayan Syntaxis is among the world’s most active tectonic regions, with the devastating 1950 Assam–Tibet earthquake demonstrating the enormous geological forces capable of reshaping entire river systems.

Any future earthquake of similar magnitude or impact could damage both the Chinese and Indian dams during the same seismic event, transforming two strategic assets into a cascading infrastructure catastrophe.

It is a classic case of correlated risk: when two or more critical systems occupy the same hazard zone, their failures become mutually reinforcing rather than independent.

Given that downstream engineering cannot effectively mitigate the risks posed by the Medog super-dam, India must leverage its rapidly expanding space and remote-sensing capabilities to eliminate strategic blindness over the Tibetan Plateau.

Just as China does not have a water-sharing treaty with any downstream country, it also lacks comprehensive, year-round, real-time, automated hydrological data-sharing and emergency-notification mechanisms with any neighbour.

During crises, India, therefore, cannot assume that Beijing will provide timely information about reservoir conditions or geological emergencies. The obvious solution is autonomous observation. Rather than depending upon Chinese disclosures, India can build an independent picture of upstream risk.

India’s NISAR and RISAT series satellites, together with Cartosat imaging satellites, offer precisely the technological foundation required for continuous monitoring of the Medog project, including detecting subtle structural movement, reservoir expansion, unstable mountain slopes and landslide precursors.

Jointly launched by ISRO and NASA, the NISAR satellite, with its dual-frequency radar technology, measures millimetre-scale ground deformation and monitors natural hazards like Himalayan landslides and glacier dynamics. The Cartosat satellites provide high-resolution sub-meter stereo imagery for building 3D models of steep Himalayan slopes, while the RISAT series gives round-the-clock synthetic aperture radar (SAR) coverage during heavy monsoon downpours when optical cameras are blinded by clouds.

Equally important is what happens on the ground. A dense network of automated acoustic and radar water-level sensors positioned near the LAC along the Siang River would transmit instantaneous water-level anomalies into India’s disaster management architecture. Sudden upstream impoundment, abnormal discharge or unusual flow acceleration would automatically trigger downstream alerts without requiring human interpretation.

In an age of satellite intelligence, early warning is becoming as strategically valuable as physical infrastructure.

Furthermore, India should invest in distributed flood-management systems along the Siang and Brahmaputra floodplains. Controlled flood-bypass channels, diversion tunnels and dry floodways could redirect extreme surge waters away from densely populated settlements into designated unpopulated, low-lying areas.

Restoring Assam’s historical wetlands, beels and oxbow lakes would recreate natural sponge basins that absorb flood peaks while simultaneously enhancing biodiversity and groundwater recharge. Embankment setbacks (moving traditional levees further back from the riverbank) would provide the Brahmaputra greater room to expand during exceptional floods instead of forcing enormous hydraulic energy into narrow corridors.

Transparency itself can become a strategic instrument of pressure on Beijing. India should routinely publish open-source satellite analyses, seismic assessments and independently verified geological reports concerning conditions around Medog. The message to Beijing should be that establishing infrastructure capable of endangering millions of people across the international boundary carries corresponding responsibilities of disclosure and accountability.

A first step toward compelling Beijing to lift its opacity should be a formal diplomatic request demanding full technical disclosure of the Medog project, including design specifications, geological assessments, reservoir safety studies, seismic modelling and emergency response protocols. India should simultaneously request permission for an independent international scientific inspection involving experts from multiple countries.

Beijing will probably refuse. But refusal itself carries diplomatic value. A government genuinely confident in the safety of its engineering should welcome independent scrutiny, particularly when millions of downstream lives are potentially affected. Opacity reinforces suspicion.

India should also elevate the issue in international scientific and environmental forums rather than treating it solely as a bilateral matter. The central question is universal: Should the world’s largest dam be constructed directly across an active geological fault in one of Earth’s most seismically unstable mountain systems without independent international oversight?

At the same time, India must prepare for China’s unparalleled super-dam ultimately becoming an enduring reality. The more durable Indian response should centre on layered resilience: autonomous satellite surveillance, AI-assisted flood forecasting, automated river sensors, restored wetlands, engineered floodways, evacuation infrastructure and sustained diplomatic pressure for transboundary transparency. Together, these measures could contribute to reducing both uncertainty and human vulnerability.

But India must also reshape the international narrative by placing China’s own scientific warnings, dam-failure record and refusal to allow independent scrutiny at the centre of the global debate. The super-dam may well stand as a monument to China’s ambition; it should not become a tombstone for downstream millions.

The BRICS at 20

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If the promise of the BRICS was to establish a monetary union, a single market, or a tightly integrated political alliance, it has not been fulfilled. But if it was to build a platform for emerging economies to cooperate while advancing their own strategic autonomy, the BRICS has exceeded expectations.

By Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

Twenty years ago this month, the foreign ministers of Brazil, Russia, India, and China held the first meeting of the BRICs. Since then, the grouping has been formalized—the first BRIC summit took place in June 2009—and expanded, with South Africa joining in 2011 and several more countries later coming on board, either as full members or official partners. Today, the BRICS represents a highly consequential experiment in international cooperation, which epitomizes the gradual rebalancing of global power away from the West and the emergence of a multipolar order.

Few acronyms have undergone as dramatic an evolution as the BRICS. Coined by Jim O’Neill, then of Goldman Sachs, in 2001 to encapsulate four fast-growing emerging markets, the “BRICs” grouping has developed into the BRICS, an 11-country political and economic coalition and an increasingly influential voice for the Global South.

Since adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to its ranks in 2024-25, the BRICS accounts for nearly half of the world’s population and about 40% of global GDP (in purchasing-power-parity terms). By contrast, the G7 accounts for less than 10% of the global population and less than 30% of world GDP. And whereas the BRICS’ share of the global economy continues to grow, the pace of productivity and economic growth in advanced economies has been declining steadily since the 1990s.

This economic reversal is increasingly matched in the geopolitical domain, with Western global dominance giving way to a more diffuse distribution of power and influence. Amid this transformation—the likes of which occur only once every 50–100 years—the BRICS has challenged the assumption that global governance should remain centered on the Western-led institutions established after World War II.

For non-Western countries, the BRICS represents a hedge against rising economic and geopolitical uncertainty—generated, not least, by a United States seemingly bent on withdrawing from global leadership—and an institutional platform for advancing strategic autonomy and broadening economic cooperation. Small wonder there has been such enthusiasm for joining: more than three dozen countries have formally applied or expressed interest in becoming members, including Turkey, a NATO member, and Bahrain, the primary operational hub for US naval forces in the Middle East.

The BRICS also has ten “partner countries”—Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam—which can participate in summits. This framework helps to expand the BRICS’ network for cooperation and strengthen its ability to represent the Global South, without jeopardizing cohesion.

The BRICS is much more than a symbolic grouping—merely a message to the world that the era of Western dominance is coming to an end. The grouping has made tangible progress on institution-building. The New Development Bank (NDB) is the first multilateral development bank with global scope conceived and led solely by emerging economies, with the founding BRICS members holding equal shares and voting rights. By contrast, the United States is the largest shareholder at both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, where it holds effective veto power. Unlike these US-led institutions, the NDB does not attach political conditions to its infrastructure financing, allowing borrowers to retain greater policy autonomy.

The BRICS has also been working to reduce vulnerabilities within the international financial system. Contrary to speculation, a single BRICS currency akin to the euro is not on the agenda. Instead, the upcoming summit will focus on expanding trade settlement in national currencies, improving interoperability among members’ digital-payment systems, linking central-bank digital currencies, and developing alternative cross-border payment infrastructure. The goal is not to upend the global financial system and supplant the US dollar, which still accounts for about 57% of foreign-exchange reserves held by central banks worldwide, but rather to strengthen resilience against external financial shocks.

As much progress as the BRICS has made over the last 20 years, however, the grouping also faces significant headwinds, rooted not least in its exceptional internal diversity. The BRICS includes liberal democracies and authoritarian states, leading energy exporters and major energy importers, manufacturing powers and commodity economies. The grouping also includes geopolitical rivals: China and India, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and Ethiopia. Divisions exist even among its founding members, with Brazil and India generally advocating reform of existing international institutions, while China and Russia seek to challenge the US-led world order.

Diversity brings different ideas and advantages to the table, and ideological uniformity and close strategic alignment are not necessarily prerequisites to cooperation. But a highly diverse grouping, with sharply divergent priorities and geopolitical concerns, will always struggle to forge consensus. Every round of enlargement compounds the challenge, even as it raises the BRICS’ profile as a broadly representative international coalition.

As the group convenes in New Delhi for its 18th summit, one might ask whether it has lived up to its original promise. If that promise was to establish a monetary union, a single market, or a tightly integrated political alliance, the answer is plainly no. But if it was to reshape international relations, broaden the space available to emerging economies on the world stage, strengthen South-South cooperation, and increase pressure for reform of existing international institutions, the BRICS has exceeded expectations.

More fundamentally, the BRICS has normalized an idea that once seemed impossible: that emerging economies can cooperate with one another, build their own institutions, and change how the international order is organized. That is no small feat.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2026.

The Tibet-Nepal flood is a warning against defying nature

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The Nepal-Tibet catastrophe unfolded just as two international scientific studies had anticipated by modelling how flood surges behave as they emerge from engineered corridors in the Tibetan border region into downstream Nepal.

Debris from a bridge damaged by flash flooding lies along the banks of the swollen Trishuli River at 1 Number Pul, in Nepal’s Nuwakot district. AP Photo.

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

Humanity is altering natural ecosystems more rapidly than it is developing an adequate scientific understanding of the consequences. Those alterations are contributing to climate change, which in turn is amplifying the damage to ecosystems. The Nepal-Tibet flood disaster is a stark reminder that humanity must stop trying to bend nature to its will.

The catastrophe that began high in the mighty Himalayas on the Tibet-Nepal border is a warning from the world’s youngest, tallest and most volatile mountain range about the dangerous illusion that humans can engineer nature into submission.

An immense ice-and-rock avalanche sheared off a glacier situated directly along the crest of the international boundary on the Nepalese side, plunged into the China-controlled Tibetan upper basin, and unleashed a devastating torrent that ripped through transboundary rivers, wrecking upstream Chinese infrastructure and leaving a vast trail of death and destruction downstream in Nepal.

The disaster exemplified how human interventions can magnify nature’s fury. Nepal bore no responsibility for the catastrophic flash floods, yet it faced their main brunt. Extensive infrastructure-centered alterations to the upstream river corridor and mountain landscape in the Tibetan border region compounded the downstream effects through physical, structural and operational vulnerabilities.

The tragedy’s central lesson is best summed up by the 1970s American television advertising slogan that became a pop-culture catchphrase: “It’s not nice to fool Mother Nature.”

In the name of development, countries have long sought to redirect river flows, flatten mountains, tame weather and conquer landscapes. Such engineering has undeniably brought energy, water and prosperity. But when it disregards the fundamental logic of natural systems, manageable risks potentially turn into calamitous ones.

The Tibet-Nepal disaster offers the latest illustration of why respecting nature has become an imperative for humanity’s future.

Yet much of the analysis of this disaster in U.S. and international media has focused on climate change while obscuring how human alteration of ecosystems is itself increasing natural hazards and accelerating global warming. Climate change should not become a catch-all explanation that deflects attention from the broader ecological and environmental damage caused by human activity. Climate change is one consequence of these wider human impacts.

The unstable Himalayas are a living geological laboratory. Large-scale construction and river engineering there can significantly compound risk.

Pounded by the slow-motion collision of the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates, the Himalayas remain among the most seismically active and structurally fragile regions on Earth. Their rocks continue to fracture and rise; glaciers expand and retreat; and monsoon rains and freeze-thaw cycles constantly weaken steep valley walls. In such an environment, landslides, cryospheric collapses and flash floods are anything but rare.

The latest catastrophe underscores that inherent instability. But what followed the initial act of nature was shaped as much by human construction as by natural processes.

Natural floodplains, gravel bars and meandering channels act as hydraulic shock absorbers, dissipating energy by allowing water to spread laterally. When they are replaced with concrete embankments, retaining walls, highways, diversion structures and narrowed channels, the river system loses its natural flood buffer. Water is forced into tighter corridors from Tibet, accelerating its speed and increasing its destructive power in Nepal, as a 2022 scientific study had forewarned.

That is exactly how the flood tragedy appears to have unfolded, with extensive embankments, border facilities, highways, intake works and riverbank engineering creating artificial bottlenecks in the upper Tibetan valley. Instead of allowing the floodwaters and debris to disperse naturally, these structures funneled the liquid-rock-mud mass through a narrow gorge, dramatically increasing its velocity before it surged downstream into Nepal’s river basins.

This resulted in devastating consequences. Loose sediment and debris from upstream construction sites were swept into the deluge, creating a dense, hyper-concentrated slurry that smashed bridges, roads, buildings and hydropower infrastructure with enormous kinetic force. Temporary debris dams formed behind bridges and culverts before bursting, releasing secondary flood pulses that were even more destructive than the original surge, as another peer-reviewed study had foreseen.

The tragedy fits into a much broader global pattern. Modern states increasingly pursue projects that seek to reshape natural systems.

China has become the world’s most ambitious practitioner of this approach — from its environmentally damaging Three Gorges Dam and gigantic South-to-North Water Diversion Project to massive weather-modification programs and the colossal super-dam now rising on Tibet’s Yarlung Tsangpo, the world’s highest-altitude major river. Such projects reflect a seductive belief that nature can be bent to the Chinese will.

Complex ecosystems, however, rarely behave like human-made machines. Natural systems function through intricate networks of feedback and balance. Every significant human intervention can alter interconnected natural processes whose cumulative effects may emerge years later or even in places far removed from where the original construction occurred.

The Tibet-Nepal disaster is a strong expression of a universal truth: disrupting one component of a tightly connected natural system creates cascading consequences throughout the whole.

Humanity has entered an age in which its engineering capacity has become extraordinary, but so too has its ability to magnify natural hazards. It is thus imperative for humanity to understand its safe operating space.

Respecting Mother Nature does not mean abandoning development or rejecting engineering. It means recognizing that human ingenuity must work with natural processes rather than against them.

The sustainable path is stewardship, not mastery, of nature. It includes protecting floodplains instead of endlessly constricting rivers, preserving biodiversity instead of simplifying ecosystems, and designing infrastructure that accommodates natural flows rather than reengineering them.

We can keep trying to bend nature to human ambition and greed, or learn to live within nature’s design. The Himalayas have delivered their verdict with clarity.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.“

China’s Super-Dam Is Becoming an Upstream Water Bomb

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The latest evidence suggests that the Chinese scientific establishment understands the dangers of the under-construction Himalayan dam—the world’s largest—more clearly than its political leadership is willing to acknowledge. With the livelihoods of two billion people at stake, the international community needs to weigh in.

By Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

The world’s largest dam is rising in one of the world’s most geopolitically treacherous and seismically unstable regions. Just a few kilometers from the heavily militarized border with India, China is constructing an unprecedented hydropower project in Tibet on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the world’s highest-altitude major river, better known internationally as the Brahmaputra.

The super-dam will dwarf China’s Three Gorges Dam, currently the world’s largest, in power-generating capacity. Its reservoir will impound a gargantuan volume of water above millions of people downstream in India’s northeast and deltaic Bangladesh, much of which lies barely above sea level.

Now the most troubling warning is coming not from foreign critics but from China’s own scientists. A recent paper published in the state-linked, Mandarin-language journal Sedimentary Geology and Tethyan Geology identifies serious geological hazards at the construction site. The geologists conclude that the terrain has a “loose structure and weak cohesion” and warn that fault movement or an earthquake could easily trigger large-scale instability, threatening both the reservoir and surrounding infrastructure. The authors recommend reinforcing the reservoir slopes, installing retaining structures, and redesigning key elements to reduce the risk of catastrophe.

When scientists working under a communist regime issue such warnings, the international community must pay attention.

The new dam is rising at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra, where the river plunges steeply through the world’s deepest and longest canyon before entering India. It also sits squarely within the Himalayan seismic belt, created by the slow-motion collision of the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates. This is among Earth’s most earthquake-prone regions, with a record of producing devastating temblors.

The danger is not simply that an earthquake might damage a dam. A gigantic reservoir could itself trigger a quake by intensifying geological stresses. Reservoir-triggered seismicity, or RTS, has been documented for decades.

One likely example occurred in China. In one of the deadliest natural disasters in modern Chinese history, an earthquake on the Tibetan Plateau’s eastern rim in 2008 killed nearly 90,000 people, mainly in Sichuan province. While scientists continue debating the precise relationship, influential research concluded that the immense weight of water stored in the reservoir of the new Zipingpu Dam may have increased pressure along an underlying fault, potentially advancing the earthquake by decades or even centuries.

Instead of facing up to that scientific possibility, China has embarked on a vastly larger dam project in an even more fragile geological setting. But the Himalayan fault system does not respect national borders; nor would the consequences of a major dam failure. The powerful 2025 Myanmar earthquake demonstrated how interconnected this seismic zone is, with tremors traveling far enough to trigger the collapse of a high-rise building in Bangkok, some 1,000 kilometers away.

The Brahmaputra is the lifeline of northeastern India, irrigating farms, sustaining fisheries, replenishing wetlands, and supporting millions of livelihoods before flowing into Bangladesh, where it is the single largest source of freshwater. Like China’s giant dams on the Mekong, the super-dam threatens to alter cross-border river flows and reduce the downstream transport of nutrient-rich sediment essential to the river’s ecology and riparian countries’ agriculture.

Worse, a catastrophic structural failure—or even an emergency release of impounded water following seismic damage—could unleash devastating floods across densely populated downstream plains with little warning. What begins as an engineering failure in Tibet could become a humanitarian catastrophe extending all the way to Bangladesh, the world’s most densely populated country outside microstates and mini-states.

The geological danger is only part of the story. China is increasingly transforming its control of the Tibetan Plateau—the source of most of Asia’s major rivers—into strategic leverage. It has built cascades of dams on transboundary rivers, withheld hydrological data during periods of tension, and resisted entering any water-sharing treaty with downstream states. Water has become another instrument of coercive statecraft.

The sheer scale of what China calls “the project of the century” will inevitably give it unprecedented control over river flows. Even routine reservoir operations can affect downstream ecosystems, agriculture, sediment transport, and flood patterns.

Yet the project remains shrouded in secrecy, with the Chinese government releasing remarkably little technical information despite the enormous transboundary implications. There has been no meaningful environmental transparency, no independent geological review, and no credible consultation with the countries facing the greatest downstream risks.

International law has long recognized that states sharing transboundary rivers bear responsibilities toward one another, including preventing significant cross-border harm, exchanging relevant information, and consulting on projects that could materially affect downstream neighbors. Adherence to these principles is essential to safeguard shared resources. China’s continuing opacity undermines them.

The Himalayan watershed is often called Asia’s water tower because its rivers sustain nearly two billion people across multiple countries. When the largest dam ever attempted is introduced into this fragile ecosystem, secrecy becomes a regional security risk.

Given the extraordinary stakes, China should immediately invite an independent panel of international seismologists, geologists, and dam-safety experts to inspect the site, review the project’s geological assumptions, and assess whether the recommended design modifications are sufficient. China should also institutionalize year-round, real-time hydrological data-sharing and emergency notification mechanisms with India and Bangladesh, and commit to ongoing transboundary consultation on major design changes.

Ironically, the latest evidence suggests that the Chinese scientific establishment understands the dangers more clearly than its political leadership appears willing to acknowledge. Now that China’s own geologists have raised the alarm, policymakers must embrace transparency and accept transboundary responsibilities before a potential water bomb is fully assembled upstream.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2026.