How Obama Won Over India

Posted on November 12, 2010 by Chellaney

Stroking India’s Ego

For Obama, it was a strikingly successful visit to flaunt major US job-creation gains and cast a spell on India by pandering to its craving for international recognition and status, says Brahma Chellaney

The Economic Times, November 12, 2010

Barack Obama, the charmer, won over India. The US president enthralled Indians by declaring that “in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.” He comforted them by saying he will “continue to insist to Pakistan’s leaders that terrorist safe-havens within their borders are unacceptable, and that the terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks be brought to justice.” He flattered them by recalling India’s “treasured past,” its invention of the digit ‘zero’ and its civilization that “has been shaping the world for thousands of years.” And he delighted them by labelling the US-India relationship “the defining partnership of the 21st century.” Mahatma Gandhi found mention in almost all his speeches, to the extent that he linked his rise as president to “Gandhi and the message he shared with America and the world.”

Obama came as a salesman for his country, bagging multibillion-dollar deals and laying the ground for more big contracts, yet the visit will be remembered for his public diplomacy in seeking to elevate his host nation to “its rightful place in the world.” A year earlier, Obama had stroked India’s collective ego by inviting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for his presidency’s first state dinner, leading to the joke that while China gets a deferential America and Pakistan secures billions of dollars in US aid periodically, India is easily won over with a sumptuous dinner and nice compliments.

India actually has exposed its main weakness for long — a craving for international recognition and status. While some states have been able to surmount their colonial legacies, India remains hobbled by a subaltern mindset. It attaches greater value to receiving external recognition and approbation than to the pursuit of resolute, goal-oriented statecraft. It is thus particularly vulnerable to seduction by praise. Other powers play to that weakness through pleasing but empty gestures or statements amounting to little more than ego massage.

In fact, Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush, openly played to India’s ego and to Pakistan’s longing for security while unveiling his momentous decision to sell F-16s to Islamabad in March 2005. The same day his administration patronizingly offered to help make India a “major world power in the 21st century.” The Indian elation that greeted the offer helped obscure the larger implications of the F-16 decision.

That decision marked the beginning of a major US rearming of Pakistan with largely India-centric weapon systems. Such lethal supply to Islamabad has continued to date even as the US has emerged as the single largest arms seller to India since 2008. Indian diplomacy has not only failed to persuade Washington to stop arming a terror-exporting Pakistan, but also has put up with the US building parallel intelligence-sharing, defence-cooperation and strategic relationships with Islamabad and New Delhi.

US policy effectively has moved from hyphenation to parallelism. The new approach involves following separate parallel tracks with India and Pakistan, thereby allowing the US to push its interests better. That approach also permits the US to prop up the Pakistani state without causing a crisis with India, with Obama pledging more than $10 billion in aid to Islamabad since last year.

In New Delhi, Obama, “the great communicator,” not only pandered to India’s love of flattery, but also exploited its itch to join every club, including those that were formed to target it. He dangled the prospect of India’s admission — “in a phased manner” after the “evolution” of new membership criteria — to four US-led, technology-control cartels. The capstone of his outreach, however, came when he dangled another carrot — helping India “in the years ahead” to secure a permanent place on the UN Security Council.

That dangling proved the shortest and surest way to India’s heart. The loud applause in Parliament and the national euphoria that greeted that statement helped block out the caveats that Obama had slipped in. Like a schoolmaster lecturing a pupil, Obama told India that if it wanted to make the grade as a candidate for a UNSC permanent seat in the years ahead, it needed to do more, including sharing “increased responsibility” and helping strengthen international norms.

Merely acknowledging India’s claim to a permanent seat costs the US nothing, other than displeasing Pakistan. The US long ago acknowledged Japan’s right to UNSC permanent membership, but that hasn’t brought Tokyo closer to that goal. In truth, Washington has yet to endorse any proposal for UNSC enlargement that can be put to vote. In fact, no existing permanent member favours enlargement in reality (as opposed to rhetoric). And it is doubtful that new veto-holding permanent members will ever be added to an institution that emerged from the ruins of a world war. But that has not stopped India from chasing dreams.

Another area where Obama used beguiling words to thrill his hosts was on US technology controls, to the extent that Dr. Singh prematurely thanked him for his “decision” to “lift” those controls. Far from agreeing to free India from the rigours of such trade curbs, the US has merely committed itself to a continued step-by-step liberalization of its export controls, in sync with Indian actions and concessions. If any decision was announced, it was the US plan to remove some more Indian entities from its blacklist, the “Entity List.” While a welcome move, the removal does not automatically entitle those entities to import high technology because of the broader controls that remain in place against India.

Obama’s visit will undoubtedly strengthen an already-warming bilateral relationship whose geostrategic direction is clearly set — towards closer collaboration. While it is too much to expect a congruence of US and Indian national-security objectives in all spheres, the two countries are likely to deepen their cooperation in areas where their interests converge. Having been nonaligned, India is set to become multi-aligned, while tilting more towards Washington, even as it preserves the core element of nonalignment — strategic autonomy. Obama, for his part, will be remembered for using his power of oratory to recast himself as India’s friend in the same class as Bush. He came with very little to deliver and more to take, yet cast a spell on India.

A weakened Obama visits India

Posted on November 5, 2010 by Chellaney

Obama will take more than give

Brahma Chellaney

The Economic Times, November 4, 2010

U.S. President Barack Obama comes to India when his presidency has been considerably dented by the mid-term election drubbing, with the poll losses in key swing states like Pennsylvania, Ohio and Florida likely to encumber his 2012 re-election bid. The president who harped on being transformational has been delivered a no-confidence in his own leadership by the voters.

It is remarkable that just a year ago, Obama was riding high, having unexpectedly won the Nobel prize for peace — a cause for which he has little to show up to now. A year, obviously, is a very long time in politics.

Obama’s Democratic Party lost the House of Representatives to the Republicans, while its razor-thin edge in the 100-seat Senate offers little consolation. It takes 60 votes to get anything done in the Senate. The Democrats’ continued control of the Senate thus is nominal. In effect, they stand kicked out of power.

Obama came to office with tremendous international goodwill. Yet, saddled with problems of historic proportion, he had little time to savour his epochal victory against rival John McCain. After all, he inherited national and global challenges more formidable than any faced by an American president at the beginning of the term. With the U.S. economic recession threatening to become a depression and two overseas wars raging, Obama had his work clearly cut out for him.

Now, midway through his term, these election losses ensure his hands will be full for the rest of his term. First, the high unemployment, growing U.S. debt and other economic problems that contributed to the poll reverses will preoccupy his presidency, especially if he hopes to be re-elected. That means he will shift to a more domestically focused agenda than before, with his international diplomacy geared towards trade deals to boost job and wealth creation at home. Second, he is likely to get tied down by the legislative actions and investigations of a Republican-influenced Congress, with a resurgent Tea party movement likely to target him increasingly.

That, plus an American public weary of the war, makes certain that Obama will start pulling U.S. forces out of Afghanistan before the job is done, leaving India on the front lines to face the brunt of greater terrorism from the Af-Pak belt. In fact, the recent unveiling of a new $2.3-billion U.S. aid package for the Pakistani military, along with the continued sale of offensive weapon systems, can only embolden an institution that is at the root of Pakistan’s problems and regional instability.

The good news on the U.S.-India front is that a weakened Obama presidency will do little to change the dynamics of a relationship whose direction is clearly set — towards closer engagement. The not-so-good news is that having given short shrift to some of India’s concerns in the first 22 months of his presidency on the pressing issues of counterterrorism and the scofflaw roles of the Pakistani army and ISI, Obama will have lesser leeway to accommodate India’s interests in his regional strategy, pivoted on extricating the U.S. from Afghanistan with the aid of the Pakistani military.

The president, pushed by the election setbacks, is likely to focus his India visit on promoting U.S. commercial interests, including job creation back home. That means he will crave for more contracts, especially high-visibility multibillion-dollar arms deals.

From Washington’s perspective, the billions of dollars worth of arms the Obama administration already has contracted to sell India since last year symbolize the new Indo-U.S. partnership. Closer military-to-military ties and defence transactions are part of the vaunted strategic partnership. Yet, India ought to be concerned about its growing reliance on the U.S. for weapons and their replacement parts, given that Washington is selling arms on both sides of the subcontinental divide.

During the second half of the Cold War, India relied on the Soviet Union for weapons. Now, New Delhi has begun to switch its dependency to the U.S., which has quietly emerged in recent years through government-to-government deals as the single largest seller of arms to India. Embarrassingly, India today stands out in the world as the only large nation dependent on imports to meet even basic defence needs.

Overall, the U.S. and India have never been closer than they are now, with their relationship set to deepen in spite of the policy differences on regional issues. Still, one should realistically expect more “take” than “give” from this presidential visit.

Obama visit to India

Posted on October 31, 2010 by Chellaney

A strategically significant visit that will benefit both countries

Brahma Chellaney

GUEST COLUMN: The Economic Times, October 31, 2010

THE US-India relationship has picked up momentum that is independent of the two governments. US President Barack Obama’s impending visit will do little more than symbolically strengthen an already warming relationship with India. His predecessor had declared in his valedictory speech that, “We opened a new historic and strategic partnership with India.” Since then, despite a growing congruence of US and Indian interests on larger geostrategic issues, significant strategic content has yet to be added to a relationship that is largely being driven by the business community, which is spurred on by the expanding commercial opportunities in the Indian civilian and defence sectors.

The very fact that Obama is visiting India as part of a tour of Asia’s four leading democracies—the others being Japan, Indonesia and South Korea—is significant. Although Obama has already been to China once, the symbolism of a tour restricted to Asia’s major democracies cannot be lost on Beijing at a time when Chinese assertiveness on exchange rates, trade and security issues has upset US calculations.

In fact, the Obama administration spent last year assiduously courting China. The catchphrase coined by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg in relation to China, “strategic reassurance,” signalled an American intent to be more accommodative of China’s ambitions — a message reinforced earlier by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when she went out of her way to downgrade human rights in America’s China policy during a visit to Beijing. Obama, for his part, declared that America’s “most important bilateral relationship in the world” is with China.

Today, with his China strategy falling apart, Obama is seeking to do exactly what his predecessor attempted — to line up partners. Still, for several reasons, that is unlikely to significantly elevate India’s importance in his foreign policy.

First, he is coming to India when his presidency is likely to be weakened by reverses in congressional elections. With his approval ratings plummeting, Obama could end up as a one-term president.

Second, on key regional issues, especially Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iran and Myanmar, his administration sees Indian policy as not in sync with US strategy. That is particularly conspicuous on Pakistan.

The Obama administration, not content with

turning Pakistan into the largest recipient of US aid in the world, has just unveiled fresh military assistance of $2.3 billion to that country. Such aid will further fatten the Pakistani military and intelligence—the very institutions controlling the country’s foreign policy and nurturing terror groups.

With Obama determined to end the US-led war in Afghanistan, the US needs the Pakistani military and intelligence for its exit strategy in much the same way it relied on them to start and sustain the war.

Third, despite the more-recent erosion in trust and confidence between the US and China, Washington is unlikely to try and contain a country with which its economic and political linkages are likely to remain deeper than with India.

Indeed, since Obama came to office, the US has sought to abjure elements in its ties with New Delhi that could rile China, including a joint military drill of any type in Arunachal Pradesh or a 2007-style naval exercise involving the US, India, Australia, Japan and Singapore. Even trilateral US naval manoeuvres with India and Japan now are out so as not to raise China’s hackles. Washington has actually chartered a course of tacit neutrality on the Arunachal issue.

On the two key issues— China and counter-terrorism—that were supposed to help shape the US-India strategic partnership, the reality has turned out to be different. The David Headley case, for example, has belied expectations of close counter-terrorism cooperation. Moreover, despite the nuclear deal, the US has yet to ease export controls against India.

Still, the US and India have never been closer than they are now. Their multifaceted cooperation will continue to grow, irrespective of policy differences on some regional issues. The billions of dollars worth of arms the Obama administration has contracted to sell India symbolise the new partnership.

Asia’s new Great Game

Posted on October 30, 2010 by Chellaney

A Scramble for Asia?

Brahma Chellaney

Project Syndicate, 2010-10-29

Asia’s festering Cold War-era territorial and maritime disputes highlight the fact that securing long-term region-wide peace depends on respect for existing borders. Attempts to disturb Asia’s territorial status quo are an invitation to endemic conflict – a concern that led Asian states to welcome the US and Russia to their annual East Asian Summit.

The recent Sino-Japanese diplomatic spat over disputed islands in the East China Sea – followed, almost instantly, by a Sino-Vietnamese row over similar atolls – has put the spotlight on China and its regional policy. Governments across Asia are concerned that China’s rapidly accumulating power is emboldening it to assert territorial and maritime claims against neighbors stretching from Japan to India. Even against tiny Bhutan, China has stepped up its lands claims through military incursions.

China’s new stridency underscores Asia’s central diplomatic challenge: coming to terms with existing boundaries by shedding the baggage of history that burdens all of the region’s important inter-state relationships. Even as Asia is becoming more interdependent economically, it is becoming more politically divided.

A number of inter-state wars were fought in Asia since 1950, the year that both the Korean War and the annexation of Tibet started. But, whereas the Europe’s bloody wars in the first half of the twentieth century have made war there unthinkable today, the wars in Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, far from settling or ending disputes, only accentuated bitter rivalries.

China, significantly, has been involved in the largest number of military conflicts in Asia. A recent Pentagon report is unsparing: “The history of modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which China’s leaders have claimed military preemption as a strategically defensive act. For example, China refers to its intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the ‘War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea.’ Similarly, authoritative texts refer to border conflicts against India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam (1979) as ‘Self-Defense Counter Attacks.’” The seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974 by Chinese forces was another example of offense as defense.

All these cases of preemption occurred when China was weak, poor, and internally torn. So the growing power of today’s China naturally raises legitimate concerns.

Having earlier preached the gospel of its “peaceful rise,” China no longer is shy about showcasing its military capabilities and asserting itself on multiple fronts. With the Chinese Communist Party increasingly dependent on the military to maintain its monopoly on power and ensure domestic order, senior military officers are overtly influencing foreign policy. The result is a growing territorial assertiveness, which has become a source of new friction along China’s land and sea frontiers. That, in turn, has put China at the center of Asia’s political divides.

Several developments this year underscore China’s more muscular foreign policy, from its inclusion of the South China Sea in its “core” national interests – a move that makes its claims to the disputed Spratly Islands non-negotiable – to its reference to the Yellow Sea as a sort of exclusive Chinese military-operations zone. The US and South Korea should, according to Chinese officials, discontinue holding joint naval exercises there, apparently out of respect for China’s new power.

China also has become more insistent in pressing its territorial claims both to India’s northeastern Arunachal Pradesh state and to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, with Chinese warships making more frequent forays into Japanese waters. Indian defense officials have reported a sharp increase in Chinese military incursions across the disputed 4,057-kilometer Himalayan frontier and in aggressive patrolling. China also has started questioning Indian sovereignty over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, one-fifth of which it occupied following the Tibet annexation.

Beijing’s 2004 spat with South Korea over the ancient kingdom of Koguryo – triggered by a revised historical claim posted on the Chinese foreign ministry’s Web site that the empire, founded in the Tongge river basin of northern Korea, was Chinese – was seen as an attempt to hedge China’s options vis-à-vis a potentially unified Korea. By signaling that the present China-North Korea border may not be final, Beijing has raised the specter of potential tensions over frontiers in the future.

Respect for boundaries is a prerequisite to peace and stability on any continent. Europe has built its peace on that principle, with a number of European states learning to live with boundaries that they don’t like. But the Chinese Communist Party still harps on old grievances to reinforce its claim to legitimacy: full restoration of China’s “dignity” after a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers.

Through its overt refusal to accept Asia’s territorial status quo, China only highlights the futility of political negotiations. After all, frontiers are never significantly redrawn at the negotiating table, but only on the battlefield, as China has shown in the past.

Today, whether it is Arunachal Pradesh or Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands or even the Spratlys, China is dangling the threat of force to assert its claims. By picking territorial fights with its neighbors, China is not only reinforcing old rivalries, but is also threatening Asia’s continued economic renaissance – showing that it is not a credible candidate to lead Asia.

It is important for other Asian states and the US – a “resident power” in Asia, in the words of US Defense Secretary Robert Gates – to convey a clear message to China: a peaceful rise and unilateral redrawing of frontiers don’t mix.

Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi and the author of Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan.

A threat to Asian peace and stability

Posted on October 6, 2010 by Chellaney

Why China isn’t fit to lead Asia

Brahma Chellaney

The Globe and Mail, October 4, 2010

Japan may have created the impression that it buckled under China’s pressure by releasing a Chinese fishing boat captain involved in a collision near islands that both countries claim. But the Japanese action has helped move the spotlight back to China, whose rapidly accumulating power has emboldened it to aggressively assert territorial and maritime claims against neighbours stretching from Japan to India.

Having earlier preached the gospel of its “peaceful rise,” China is no longer shy about showcasing its military capabilities. While Chinese leaders may gloat over Tokyo’s back-pedalling, the episode – far from shifting the Asian balance of power in Beijing’s favour – has only shown that China is at the centre of Asia’s political divides.

China’s new stridency in its disputes with its neighbours has helped highlight Asia’s central challenge to come to terms with existing boundaries by getting rid of the baggage of history that weighs down all important interstate relationships. Even as Asia is becoming more interdependent economically, it’s getting more divided politically.

China has been involved in the largest number of military conflicts in Asia since 1950, the year both the Korean War and the annexation of Tibet began. According to a recent Pentagon report, “China’s leaders have claimed military pre-emption as a strategically defensive act. For example, China refers to its intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the ‘war to resist the United States and aid Korea.’ Similarly, authoritative texts refer to border conflicts against India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969) and Vietnam (1979) as ‘self-defence counterattacks.’ ” All these cases of pre-emption occurred when China was weak, poor and internally torn. So, today, China’s growing power naturally raises legitimate concerns.

Several developments this year alone underline Beijing’s more muscular foreign policy – from its inclusion of the South China Sea in its “core” national interests, an action that makes its claims to the disputed Spratly Islands non-negotiable, to its reference to the Yellow Sea as an exclusive Chinese military zone where Washington and Seoul, respecting the new Chinese power, should discontinue joint naval exercises.

China also has become more insistent in pressing its territorial claims to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, with Chinese warships making more frequent forays into Japanese waters, and to India’s northeastern Arunachal Pradesh state, with Indian defence officials reporting a sharp spurt in Chinese incursions across the disputed Himalayan frontier and in aggressive patrolling. Beijing also has started questioning New Delhi’s sovereignty over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, one-fifth of which it occupies.

Against that background, China’s increasingly assertive territorial and maritime claims threaten Asian peace and stability. In fact, the largest piece of real estate China covets is not in the South or East China Seas but in India: Arunachal Pradesh is almost three times larger than Taiwan.

Respect for boundaries is a prerequisite to peace and stability on any continent. Europe has built its peace on that principle, with a number of European states learning to live with borders they don’t like. But the Chinese Communist Party still harps on old grievances to reinforce its claim to legitimacy and monopolize power – that only it can fully restore China’s “dignity” after a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers.

And through its refusal to accept the territorial status quo, Beijing highlights the futility of political negotiations. Whether it’s Arunachal Pradesh or Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands or even the Spratlys, China is dangling the threat of force to assert its claims. In doing so, it’s helping to reinforce the spectre of a threatening China. By picking territorial fights with its neighbours, Beijing is also threatening Asia’s economic renaissance. More important, China is showing that it isn’t a credible candidate to lead Asia.

It’s important for other Asian states and the U.S. – a “resident power” in Asia, in the words of Defence Secretary Robert Gates – to convey a clear message to Beijing: After six long decades, China’s redrawing of frontiers must end.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan.

Changing Asian power equations

Posted on October 1, 2010 by Chellaney

THE ASIAN CENTURY

A New Asian Security Constellation

Brahma Chellaney

PROJECT SYNDICATE 2010-10-01

Leading members of the governments of India and South Korea recently met to begin a new “strategic partnership.” They are not alone in doing so, for across Asia, a new security architecture is being constructed, seemingly piecemeal.

How Asia’s geopolitical landscape will evolve over the coming decades is not easy to foresee. But it is apparent that an increasingly assertive China is unwittingly reinforcing America’s role in Asia, restoring US primacy as the implicit guarantor of security and stability in the region.

There are at least four possible Asian security scenarios for the years and decades ahead. The first is the rise of a Sino-centric Asia. China seeks a multipolar world but a unipolar Asia. By contrast, the US desires a unipolar world but a multipolar Asia.

A second scenario is that the US remains Asia’s principal security anchor, with or without a third possibility: the emergence of a constellation of Asian states with common interests working together to ensure that Asia is not unipolar. Finally, Asia could come to be characterized by several resurgent powers, including Japan, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and a reunified Korea.

Of the four scenarios, the first has caused the greatest unease. China’s neighbors are increasingly anxious about its growing power and assertiveness. While China’s rulers aspire to shape a Sino-centric Asia, their efforts to intimidate smaller neighbors hardly make China a credible candidate for Asian leadership.

After all, genuine leadership cannot come from raw power, but only from other states’ consent or tacit acceptance. If leadership could be built on brute force, schoolyard bullies would be class presidents.

In any event, China’s power may be vast and rapidly growing, but it lacks the ability to compel. In other words, China does not have the capability to rout any rival militarily, let alone enforce its will on Asia.

That fact has, however, done little to allay fears in the region. With its defense spending having grown almost twice as fast as its GDP, China is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident that it has acquired the necessary muscle.

For example, China now includes the South China Sea in its “core” national interests, on a par with Taiwan and Tibet, in order to stake a virtually exclusive claim to military operations there. China also has increasingly questioned India’s sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh, the northeastern Indian state that China’s rulers call “Southern Tibet” and claim largely as their own. Indian defense officials have reported a rising number of Chinese military incursions across the 4,057-kilometer Himalayan border.

As China seeks to translate its economic clout into major geopolitical advantages in Asia, a country that once boasted of “having friends everywhere” finds that its growing power may be inspiring awe, but that its actions are spurring new concerns and fears. Which states will accept China as Asia’s leader? Six decades of ruthless repression has failed to win China acceptance even in Tibet and Xinjiang, as the Tibetan and Uighur revolts of 2008 and 2009 attested.

Leadership entails more than the possession of enormous economic and military power. It demands the power of ideas that can galvanize others. Such power also serves as the moral veneer to the assertiveness often involved in the pursuit of any particular cause or interest.

The US and its allies won the Cold War, for example, not so much by military means as by spreading the ideas of political freedom and market capitalism to other regions. In the words of the strategic analyst Stanley A. Weiss, this “helped suck the lifeblood out of communism’s global appeal,” making it incapable of meeting the widespread yearning for a better and more open life.

China has shown itself adept at assertively promoting its national interests and playing classical balance-of-power geopolitics. But, in order to displace the US and assume the mantle of leadership in Asia, China must do more than pursue its own interests or contain potential rivals. Most fundamentally, what does China represent in terms of values and ideas?

In the absence of an answer to that question, China’s overly assertive policies have proven a diplomatic boon for the US in strengthening and expanding American security arrangements in Asia. South Korea has tightened its military alliance with the US, Japan has backed away from a move to get the US to move its Marine airbase out of Okinawa, and India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, among others, have drawn closer to the US.

In terms of power-projection force capabilities or the range of military bases and security allies in Asia, no power or combination of powers is likely to match the US in the next quarter-century. But, while America’s continued central role in Asia is safe, the long-term viability of its security arrangements boils down to the credibility of its security assurances to allies and partners. America’s readiness to stand by them when the game gets rough will determine the strength and size of its security-alliance system in Asia in the years ahead.

The third and fourth scenarios can unfold even if the US remains the principal security anchor for Asia. A number of Asian countries have already started building mutually beneficial security cooperation on a bilateral basis, thereby laying the groundwork for a potential web of interlocking strategic partnerships. A constellation of Asian states linked by strategic cooperation, in fact, has become critical to help institute power stability in the region.

Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi and the author of Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan.

China divides Asia

Posted on October 1, 2010 by Chellaney

The center of Asia’s divide

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY

The Japan Times, October 1, 2010

Japan may have created the impression of having buckled under China’s pressure by releasing the Chinese fishing trawler captain. But the Japanese action helps move the spotlight back to China, whose rapid accumulation of power has emboldened it to aggressively assert territorial and maritime claims against its neighbors, from Japan to India.

Having earlier preached the gospel of its "peaceful rise," China is no longer shy about showcasing its military capabilities and asserting itself on multiple fronts. While the Chinese leadership may gloat after forcing Tokyo to climb down and release the captain, the episode — far from shifting the Asian balance of power in Beijing’s favor — has only shown that China is at the center of Asia’s political divides.

China’s new stridency in its territorial and maritime disputes with its neighbors has helped highlight Asia’s central challenge to come to terms with existing boundaries by getting rid of the baggage of history that weighs down a number of interstate relationships. Even as Asia is becoming more interdependent economically, it is becoming more divided politically.

While the bloody wars in the first half of the 20th century have made war unthinkable today in Europe, wars in Asia during the second half of the 20th century did not resolve matters and have only accentuated bitter rivalries. A number of interstate wars have been fought in Asia since 1950, the year both the Korean War and the annexation of Tibet started. Those wars, far from settling or ending disputes, have only kept disputes lingering.

China, significantly, has been involved in the largest number of military conflicts. A recent Pentagon report has cited examples of how China carried out military preemption in 1950, 1962, 1969 and 1979 in the name of strategic defense. The report states: "The history of modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which China’s leaders have claimed military preemption as a strategically defensive act.

For example, China refers to its intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the "War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea." Similarly, authoritative texts refer to border conflicts against India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969) and Vietnam (1979) as "self-defense counterattacks." The seizure of Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974 by Chinese forces was another example of offense as defense.

All these cases of preemption occurred when China was weak, poor and internally torn. So today, China’s growing power naturally raises legitimate concerns. A stronger, more prosperous China is already beginning to pursue a more muscular foreign policy vis-a-vis its neighbors, as underscored by several developments this year alone — from its inclusion of the South China Sea in its "core" national interests, an action that makes its claims to the disputed Spratly Islands nonnegotiable, to its reference to the Yellow Sea as a sort of exclusive Chinese military-operations zone where the U.S. and South Korea should discontinue holding joint naval exercises.

China also has become more insistent in pressing its territorial claims to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, with Chinese warships making more frequent forays into Japanese waters.

As if to signal that it is acquiring the military power to enforce its claims, China has since April conducted large-scale naval exercises, first near Japan’s Ryukyu Islands chain — with a Chinese helicopter buzzing a Japanese destroyer — then in the East China Sea and, most recently, in the Yellow Sea.

In Tibet, the official PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Daily has reported several new significant military developments in recent months, including the first-ever major parachute exercise to demonstrate a capability to rapidly insert troops on the world’s highest plateau and an exercise involving "third generation" fighter-jets carrying live ammunition.

In addition, the railroad to Tibet, the world’s highest elevated railway, has now started being used to supply "combat readiness materials for the air force" there. These military developments have to be seen in the context of China’s resurrection since 2006 of its long-dormant claim to India’s northeastern Arunachal Pradesh state and its recent attempts to question Indian sovereignty over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, one-fifth of which it occupies.

Against that background, China’s increasingly assertive territorial and maritime claims threaten Asian peace and stability. In fact, the largest real estate China covets is not in the South or East China Seas but in India: Arunachal Pradesh is almost three times larger than Taiwan. Respect for boundaries is a prerequisite to peace and stability on any continent. Europe has built its peace on that principle, with a number of European states learning to live with boundaries they do not like.

Efforts to redraw territorial and maritime frontiers are an invitation to endemic conflicts in Asia. Through its overt refusal to accept the territorial status quo, Beijing only highlights the futility of political negotiations.

After all, a major redrawing of frontiers has never happened at the negotiating table in world history. Such redrawing can only be achieved on the battlefield, as Beijing has done in the past.

Today, whether it is Arunachal Pradesh or Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands, or even the Spratlys, China is dangling the threat to use force to assert its claims. In doing so, China has helped reinforce the specter of a China threat. By picking territorial fights with its neighbors, China also is threatening Asia’s continued economic renaissance. More significantly, China is showing that it is not a credible candidate to lead Asia.

It is important for other Asian states and the rest of the international community to convey a clear message to Beijing: After six long decades, China’s redrawing of frontiers must now come to an end.

Brahma Chellaney is the author, most recently, of "Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan" (HarperCollins, 2010).

The Japan Times: Friday, Oct. 1, 2010

China bolsters U.S. role in Asia

Posted on September 24, 2010 by Chellaney

CHELLANEY: China undercuts its own goals

Aggressive posture drives smaller powers toward the U.S.

By Brahma Chellaney

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The Washington Times

September 24, 2010

China’s aggressive military moves in recent months have many countries worried about a Sino-centric Asian security future. But such a scenario is unlikely to unfold because the more China flexes its muscles, the more several of its neighbors turn to the United States for help.

China has not disguised its desire for a unipolar Asia but multipolar world. But instead of a Sino-centric Asia, China is unwittingly aiding an opposite scenario: America remaining the principal security anchor for Asia. Through its increasing assertiveness, China is reinforcing America’s role in Asia as the implicit guarantor of security and stability.

There are two other possible scenarios that can unfold even with a continued central security role for the United States in Asia. One prospect is the emergence of a constellation of Asian states with common interests working together to ensure power equilibrium in Asia. The other possibility is of an Asia characterized by several resurgent powers, including Japan, India, Vietnam, Indonesia and a reunified Korea.

Of the four scenarios, the least likely is the first one — a Sino-centric Asia. China’s neighbors increasingly are uneasy about its growing power and assertiveness. China’s actions, in fact, hardly make it a credible candidate for leading Asia.

Raw power cannot buy leadership. After all, leadership can come not from overbearing power, but from other states’ consent or tacit acceptance. In any event, China’s power may be vast and rapidly growing, yet it lacks the capability to militarily rout or compel any rival, let alone enforce its writ on Asia.

Leadership rests not just on material power, but also on normative power. It demands the power of ideas that can galvanize others. Such power also serves as the moral veneer to the assertiveness often involved in the pursuit of any particular cause or interest.

The Cold War, for example, was won by the United States and its allies not so much by military means as by spreading the ideas of political freedom and market capitalism to other regions that undercut communism’s global appeal and made it incapable of meeting the widespread yearning for a better and more open life.

With its defense spending having grown almost twice as fast as its gross domestic product (GDP), China is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident that it has acquired the necessary muscle.

This has been exemplified by several developments — from China’s inclusion of the South China Sea in its "core" national interests to its efforts to present the Yellow Sea as its virtually exclusive military-operation zone. Add to the picture the large-scale Chinese naval exercises in recent months, first off Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, then in the South China Sea and most recently in the Yellow Sea.

China also has increasingly questioned India’s sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh, the northeastern Indian state that Beijing calls "Southern Tibet" and claims largely as its own. Indian defense officials have reported a rising number of Chinese military incursions across the 2,521-mile Himalayan border.

The official PLA Daily has reported several significant military developments in Tibet in recent months, including the first-ever major parachute exercise to demonstrate China’s capability to rapidly insert troops on the world’s highest and largest plateau, Tibet. The new railroad to Tibet is now being used to supply "combat-readiness materials" to the Chinese air force stationed along the Himalayan belt.

China’s actions indeed are proving a strategic boon for Washington in strengthening and expanding U.S. security arrangements in Asia. In terms of power-projection force capabilities or the range of military bases and security allies in Asia, no power or combination of powers is likely to match the United States in the next quarter of a century.

While America’s continued central role in Asia is safe, the long-term viability of its security arrangements boils down to one word: Credibility. The credibility of America’s security assurances to allies and partners, and its readiness to stand by them when it comes to the crunch, will determine the future strength and size of its security-alliance system in Asia.

A combination of the second and third scenarios seems the most plausible prospect. A constellation of Asian states linked by strategic cooperation and with close ties to the United States has become critical to help institute power stability in Asia. But such a security constellation demands forward-looking policies in Washington, Tokyo, New Delhi, Seoul, Hanoi, Jakarta, Canberra and elsewhere.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of "Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan" (HarperCollins, 2010).

China hardly a credible candidate to lead Asia

Posted on September 24, 2010 by Chellaney

The Japan Times, September 22, 2010

A Sino-centric Asia unlikely

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY

How Asia’s geopolitical landscape will evolve over the next couple of decades is not easy to foresee. But it is apparent that an increasingly assertive China is unwittingly reinforcing America’s role in Asia as the implicit guarantor of security and stability.

There are at least four possible Asian security scenarios. The first is the rise of a Sino-centric Asia, as desired by Beijing. China seeks a multipolar world but a unipolar Asia. By contrast, the United States desires a unipolar world but a multipolar Asia. A second scenario is of the U.S. remaining Asia’s principal security anchor. A third possibility is the emergence of a constellation of Asian states with common interests working together to ensure both power equilibrium and an Asia that is not unipolar. A fourth scenario is of an Asia characterized by several resurgent powers, including Japan, India, Vietnam, Indonesia and a reunified Korea.

Of the four scenarios, the least likely is the first one. China’s neighbors increasingly are uneasy about its growing power and assertiveness. While Beijing aspires to shape a Sino-centric Asia, its actions hardly make it a credible candidate for Asian leadership.

Brute power cannot buy leadership. After all, leadership can come not from untrammeled power, but from other states’ consent or tacit acceptance. If leadership could be built on brute force, schoolyard bullies would be class presidents.

In any event, China’s power may be vast and rapidly growing, yet it lacks the power of compulsion. In other words, China does not have the capability to militarily rout or compel any rival, let alone enforce its will on Asia.

As China seeks to translate its economic clout into major geopolitical advantage in Asia, a nation that once boasted of "having friends everywhere" finds that its accumulating power might inspire awe, but its actions are spurring new concerns and fears. Which states will accept China as Asia’s leader? Six decades of ruthless repression has failed to win China acceptance even in Tibet and Xinjiang, as the Tibetan and Uighur revolts of 2008 and 2009 attested.

Leadership involves much more than the possession of enormous economic and military power. It demands the power of ideas that can galvanize others. Such power also serves as the moral veneer to the assertiveness often involved in the pursuit of any particular cause.

The Cold War, for example, was won by the U.S. and its allies not so much by military means as by spreading the ideas of political freedom and market capitalism to other regions that, in the words of strategic thinker Stanley A. Weiss, "helped suck the lifeblood out of communism’s global appeal," making it incapable of meeting the widespread yearning for a better and more-open life.

China has shown itself good at assertive promotion of national interests and in playing classical balance-of-power geopolitics. But to assume the mantle of leadership in Asia by displacing the U.S., it must do more than just pursue its own interests or contain potential peer rivals. The overly assertive policies and actions of a next-door rising power make Asian states look to a distant protector. With its defense spending having grown almost twice as fast as its GDP, China is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident that it has acquired the necessary muscle.

This has been exemplified by several developments — from China’s inclusion of the South China Sea in its "core" national interests on a par with Taiwan and Tibet to its efforts to present the Yellow Sea as its virtually exclusive military-operation zone. Add to the picture large-scale naval exercises in recent months first off Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, then in the South China Sea and most recently in the Yellow Sea.

Through its actions, China indeed has proven a diplomatic boon for Washington in strengthening and expanding U.S. security arrangements in Asia. South Korea has tightened its military alliance with the U.S., Japan has backing away from an effort to get the U.S. to move its marine air base out of Okinawa, and India, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, among others, have drawn closer to the U.S.

In terms of power-projection force capabilities or the range of military bases and security allies in Asia, no power or combination of powers is likely to match the U.S. in the next quarter of a century. While America’s continued central role in Asia is safe, the long-term viability of its security arrangements boils down to one word: Credibility. The credibility of America’s security assurances to allies and partners, and its readiness to stand by them when it comes to the crunch, will determine the strength and size of its security-alliance system in Asia in the years ahead. The third and fourth scenarios can unfold even if the U.S. remains the principal security anchor for Asia. A number of Asian countries have already started building mutually beneficial security cooperation on a bilateral basis, thereby laying the groundwork for a potential web of interlocking strategic partnerships.

A combination of the second and third scenarios is a plausible prospect, but it demands forward-looking policies in Washington, Tokyo, New Delhi, Seoul, Hanoi, Jakarta, Canberra and elsewhere. A constellation of Asian states linked by strategic cooperation and with close ties to the U.S. has become critical to help institute power stability in Asia. America’s continued role as a credible guarantor of Asian security, however, is a function not of its military strength but political will in Washington.

Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research.

Dealing with China’s increasing assertiveness

Posted on September 16, 2010 by Chellaney

Let the facts speak for themselves

India can expect no respite from Chinese strategic pressure, but to adroitly manage its relationship with Beijing, it must let facts speak for themselves, says Brahma Chellaney

The Economic Times

September 17, 2010

The prime minister has underscored concerns over the perceptible hardening in China’s stance towards India. With its defence spending having grown almost twice as fast as its GDP, China is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident that it has acquired the necessary muscle. Rising power is emboldening Beijing to pursue a more muscular foreign policy not just against India, but also in the region extending from the South China Sea to Northeast Asia.

This has been exemplified by several developments — from China’s inclusion of the South China Sea in its “core” national interests, an action that makes its claims to the disputed islands non-negotiable, to its bellicose reaction to the South Korean-US joint anti-submarine exercises in the Sea of Japan. And just the way China has staked its claim to India’s Arunachal Pradesh, it has asserted its sovereignty over Japan’s Senkaku Islands, which were part of Japanese territory all along, even during the US occupation of Japan.

Little surprise China’s neighbours are increasingly uneasy about the implications of its growing power. Beijing aspires to shape a Sino-centric Asia, but its actions hardly make it a good candidate for Asian leadership. Leadership can come not from brute force, but from other states’ consent or tacit acceptance.

China’s belligerence, significantly, poses a greater threat for India than for any other Asian nation for several reasons. One, China is mounting both direct military intimidation (as underlined by the abnormally high level of continuing cross-border incursions) and proxy threats against India, including by shoring by its longstanding strategic nexus with Pakistan. Two, the largest real estate China covets is in India. Arunachal is almost three times bigger than Taiwan. Three, India has no formal security alliance with any other power and thus must depend on its own defence capabilities. And four, by seeking to badger India on multiple fronts, China is signalling that its real, long-term contest is more with India than with the US. The countries around India have become battlegrounds for China’s moves to encircle India. By assiduously courting these countries as proxies in its geopolitical competition with India, China has managed to make deep inroads into India’s strategic backyard — from Sri Lanka to Bangladesh, and Nepal to Burma.

Yet, the world knows more about China’s moves in the South China Sea and East Asia than its actions against India. At international conferences, even some experts on Asia are surprised when told simple facts, such as China’s increasingly assertive claim to an entire Indian state and its cross-border military incursions.

It is now a year since the Indian government put a lid even on the domestic press coverage of the Himalayan border situation. It was in September 2009 that senior government figures, from the PM down, spoke out against the strident Indian media reporting on Chinese border incursions. Since then, sources of information have dried up and newspapers and television networks have carried little news. It is not that the Chinese cross-border forays have ended or even abated. It is just that Indian media organizations have little information to report, even though the incidence of Chinese incursions remains high.

Suppressing news on the border situation serves no interests other China’s. It suits the Chinese agenda that the border situation is kept under wraps.

Even in the pre-1962 period, India had made the same mistake by playing down China’s aggressive moves along the border. In fact, there are important parallels between the situation pre-1962 and the situation now. Border talks have regressed, Chinese claims on Indian territories are becoming publicly assertive and Chinese cross-border incursions are common. In fact, commentaries in military journals suggest that some in China believe that a swift, 1962-style victory in a border war with India is attainable to cut to size a peer rival.

Take another example: It was in June that the Chinese notified their refusal to allow the Indian northern army command chief to visit Beijing. But the Indian side leaked it to the press only in late August. It is still unclear what has been India’s response to the snub. Beijing has said flatly that it “has received no word that India has stopped military exchanges between the two countries.”

In the midst of such developments, the Indian foreign minister gratuitously reiterated on August 21 that Tibet is “part of China.” That the Tibet issue remains at the core of the India-China divide is being underlined by Beijing itself by laying claim to additional Indian territories on the basis of alleged Tibetan ecclesial or tutelary links to them, not any professed Han connection. There is absolutely no need for India to periodically renew its commitment to a “one China” policy when China not only declines to reciprocally make a one-India pledge, but also mocks at India’s territorial integrity openly. Little thought has been given that by bringing India’s Tibet stance in complete alignment with China’s demand, New Delhi has undercut its own leverage while boosting China’s.

Without contributing to the rising tensions with China, India has to gently allow facts to speak for themselves — whether on the border situation, or Tibet’s centrality, or China’s overt refusal to accept the territorial status quo. Facts indeed are an anathema even to schoolyard bullies. By not hiding its intent to further redraw the frontiers, Beijing only highlights the futility of political negotiations. After all, a major redrawing of frontiers has never happened at the negotiating table in world history.

India should learn how Vietnam has managed to turn the diplomatic tables on China by not shying away from spotlighting the latter’s aggressive designs. In the process, China stood isolated at the last ASEAN Regional Forum meeting.

A stable equation with China is more likely to be realized if India puts premium on leveraged diplomacy and avoids a trans-Himalayan military imbalance. More broadly, China’s trajectory will depend on how its neighbours and distant countries like the US manage its growing power. Such management — independently and in partnership — will determine if Chinese power does not slide into arrogance.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of Asian Juggernaut (HarperCollins USA, 2010).