Brahma Chellaney; geoestratega, analista internacional experto en países emergentes

Brahma Chellaney; geoestratega, analista internacional experto en países emergentesVictor-M Amela, Ima Sanchís, Lluís Amiguet
“Los indios queremos ser europeos”
31/01/2011 – 00:14 | Actualizada a las

Dos predicciones
Chellaney es maestro en vislumbrar el futuro en las contradicciones del presente: los europeos tememos a los asiáticos, porque trabajan más que nosotros por mucho menos, pero ellos aspiran no sólo al sueldo; sino también a nuestro sistema de bienestar y libertades. Así que Chellaney predice que nosotros tendremos que esforzarnos más por menos, pero los asiáticos a su vez deberán invertir parte de su crecimiento en crear su Estado del bienestar. La democracia ‘con sus corruptelas’ es válvula de escape salvadora para los conflictos en India, pero es una dictadura la que saca a China de la pobreza. Así que China tendrá que democratizarse para canalizar sus conflictos en alza o estallará.

Aquí les tenemos mucho miedo a los asiáticos, porque trabajan por la mitad de sueldo…
Pues deberían tenerles menos miedo y alegrarse de que prosperen, porque ¿sabe por qué hay hoy menos guerras en el mundo que hace cien años?

¿…?
Porque hay mucha menos gente pobre. La creación de prosperidad es el primer factor para la disminución de las guerras. Porque si usted se está muriendo de hambre: ¿qué interés tiene en mantener la paz?

Más bien poco.
En cambio, si usted se gana la vida y tiene un futuro, se convierte en accionista de la paz mundial y estará interesado en mantenerla en su país. Por eso, hoy hay menos guerras en el planeta que hace un siglo.

Ojalá tenga cada vez más razón.
Además, a esos españoles que tienen tanto miedo de que, para competir con los asiáticos, les obliguen a trabajar más por menos, también les diré otra cosa… ¡Que se animen!

Pues falta nos hace últimamente.
¡Si son ustedes ejemplo del mundo! Los asiáticos y los africanos quieren vivir como ustedes, los ciudadanos de la Unión Europea…

Yo creí que todos querían irse a EE.UU.
La Unión Europea es hoy –mucho más que Estados Unidos– el ejemplo al que les gustaría llegar a los ciudadanos de los países emergentes. Los indios queremos ser como europeos de la Unión Europea. Así que corrijan lo necesario, pero defiendan ustedes su modelo, porque no hay otro mejor.

En España estamos casi en recesión y con más del 20 por ciento de paro.
El desarrollo es mucho más que la cifra del crecimiento del PIB: es la igualdad social, la protección de los más débiles, una cobertura sanitaria universal de calidad, educación superior competitiva, protección del medio ambiente y una administración honesta.

Estamos de acuerdo.
Pues lo han hecho ustedes mejor en todo eso que nadie, incluido EE.UU., y en Asia lo sabemos. Los asiáticos quieren los estándares de bienestar y democracia de la Unión Europea: nadie quiere vivir como los chinos o como los emiratos árabes, por muy ricos que sean. Y si ustedes crecen menos hoy, es porque ya tienen cierto desarrollo…

¿Quién crece mejor: China o India?
China crece algo más, el 10 por ciento, e India, el 9, pero creo que, pese a la enorme corrupción y la triste inoperancia del Estado indio, la democracia hace más estable a India y eso acabará siendo una ventaja definitiva para India incluso a medio plazo.

¿No es más estable una dictadura?
¡Mire a Túnez y ahora Egipto! La democracia es mayor garantía de estabilidad que cualquier autoritarismo. Los indios lo sabemos bien, porque nuestra democracia no es un ideal, es ante todo una necesidad: es la válvula de escape de las inevitables tensiones étnicas, lingüísticas, clasistas y territoriales de un país inmenso. Sin la democracia estaríamos en permanente guerra civil.

Pues la dictadura comunista chinamantiene el orden en el suyo con eficacia.
¿Por cuánto tiempo? Su 10 por ciento de crecimiento económico tiene un inquietante correlato que no se difunde: ¡el número de manifestaciones callejeras también se ha disparado un 10 por ciento!

Pero el PC chino aún lo controla todo.
Al partido le gusta dar la impresión de que la población china es homogénea étnica y socialmente, pero eso es falso. Además de las crecientes desigualdades sociales, fruto del crecimiento, el 60 por ciento de los chinos son de etnias diversas. No podrán resolver esas diferencias sin democracia.

Tienen los tanques.
Los tanques pueden reprimir un día una revuelta, como en Tíbet o Tiananmen, pero no pueden reprimir cada día todas las revueltas. O el régimen encuentra el modo de hacer una transición suave hacia una democracia más o menos abierta, o llegará el día en que una de esas revueltas catalizará todos los malestares hasta otra guerra civil.

Esperemos que encuentren la fórmula.
Más nos vale a todos, porque si China acaba siendo la primera potencia mundial sin ser una democracia, todas las relaciones internacionales y el sentido de la historia cambiarán: la democracia y el respeto a la ley internacional dejarán de ser la aspiración y la norma de los países y serán sustituidos por el equilibrio del terror al poder militar.

¿Qué intuye?
De momento, los militares mandan cada día más en China.

Inquietante.
Tienen más desafíos abiertos: ¿logrará China pasar de una economía de la imitación a otra de la innovación? Si no, se estancará.

Japón lo consiguió a medias.
Japón imitaba en los 70 como imitan los chinos hoy y logró transformarse luego en un país más inventor, pero me temo que China no podrá convertirse en innovadora aún…

¿Por qué?
Porque el autoritarismo impide la innovación, que surge en el libre flujo horizontal de ideas en equipo. Así que sin democracia en una sociedad abierta nadie inventa nada.

¿Tiene pruebas?
Los laboratorios americanos tienen dos grandes grupos de becarios: chinos e indios. Los chinos son mejores en dar escala a innovaciones existentes, pero no inventan nada nuevo; en cambio, los indios son innovadores, porque conviven con la diversidad y sus exigencias desde que nacen.

Speech at Casa Asia, Barcelona

Economía y cooperación > Brahma Chellaney: «El nuevo papel de India en el mundo es el de puente entre Oriente y Occidente»
Brahma Chellaney: «El nuevo papel de India en el mundo es el de puente entre Oriente y Occidente»

02/02/2011

Casa Asia ha organizado la conferencia «El papel de la India en el nuevo orden mundial», con la que el profesor Brahma Chellaney ha inaugurado el ciclo dedicado a la India que ha organizado la institución junto con la Fundación Areces. La ponencia del profesor de estudios estratégicos del Centro de Investigación Política de Nueva Delhi ha proporcionado las claves para entender el papel de su país como potencia emergente en el nuevo orden mundial, en el que destaca el auge económico de Asia en el contexto internacional.

En su nueva faceta como potencia emergente, India ha demostrado que posee tres fuerzas y tres debilidades. Las fuerzas se resumen en el papel de India como puente en el diálogo político internacional (lo que hoy es de una importancia vital, como es en el caso de la lucha contra el cambio climático); la unidad de la diversidad y la capacidad para beneficiarse de ella y, finalmente, la modernización de la democracia por la que ha pasado India en los últimos tiempos (hecho que se contrapone a otros países emergentes, como China).

En cuanto a las debilidades, Brahma Chellaney se ha referido a su situación geoestratégica y sus «difíciles vecinos, que no respetan las normas internacionales» (India se encuentra entre países y zonas en conflicto como Pakistán, Irak, Birmania o Bangladesh): «La paradoja de la proximidad es tal que India tiene mejores relaciones con Estados Unidos o con la Unión Europea que con sus vecinos», ha afirmado. Este hecho tiene como consecuencia una segunda debilidad: el efecto de «derrame» que tiene estar en esta zona de conflicto, por lo que se ha encontrado en el ojo del huracán del terrorismo, por ejemplo. Finalmente, una tercera debilidad han sido sus numerosos gobiernos de coalición y los problemas de gobernabilidad que éstos han provocado.

Pese o gracias a estas debilidades y fuerzas, este país ve hoy en día cómo hay diversos factores que afectan a su perfil internacional: el más importante, su crecimiento económico, que hace que sea necesario, según Chellaney, una reestructuración de las instituciones internacionales. La India ha pasado de ser un país no alienado a «multialienado».

El resurgimiento de Asia en el mundo deja vislumbrar los retos a los que se enfrenta en cuanto a seguridad, desarrollo y recursos (sobre todo agua y energía). En este contexto, la India ve, además de los retos, las oportunidades, sobre todo como puente entre Oriente y Occidente, entre el mundo desarrollado y el mundo en vías de desarrollo. «En estos días en que el mundo redefine su momento histórico, la estabilidad en la India y en Asia es básica para garantizar la seguridad internacional. Es ahí donde India puede dejar claro su nuevo papel como puente», concluyó el que está considerado internacionalmente como uno de los principales intelectuales políticos de India.

Otros enlaces
Conferència: “El paper de l’Índia en el nou ordre mundial”

– En los medios

El Pais interview

ENTREVISTA: BRAHMA CHELLANEY Consejero del Gobierno indio
“La revuelta de la calle se extenderá hasta Pakistán”
GEORGINA HIGUERAS – Madrid – 02/02/2011
Profesor de Estudios Estratégicos en el Centro de Investigación Política de India y colaborador de distintas universidades de EE UU, Brahma Chellanay es consejero del Gobierno indio en cuestiones de seguridad internacional, terrorismo y control de armas.

Profesor de Estudios Estratégicos en el Centro de Investigación Política de India y colaborador de distintas universidades de EE UU, Brahma Chellanay es consejero del Gobierno indio en cuestiones de seguridad internacional, terrorismo y control de armas. En una entrevista realizada durante su reciente estancia en Madrid, Chellanay sostiene que la falta de futuro de los jóvenes árabes “ha llenado las calles de ira” en una protesta que no hay quien pare. Y afirma: “En 10 años, la revuelta de la calle habrá cambiado la faz de los regímenes despóticos contra los que se han levantado”.

Pregunta. ¿Cómo ve lo que está sucediendo en Egipto?

Respuesta. Es una crisis muy fuerte para el mundo árabe y para Estados Unidos. Es la revuelta de la calle -en la que los jóvenes han volcado su frustración y odio- contra los palacios -donde se refugian los tiranos que les gobiernan-. La calle es antiamericana y los palacios los sostiene EE UU. De ahí, las consecuencias que también puede tener en EE UU.

P. ¿Es otro episodio del llamado choque de civilizaciones?

R. No, no es una cuestión de musulmanes contra Occidente. El mundo árabe vive un levantamiento político movido por la ira contra los dirigentes corruptos y por el abismo creado entre esos gobernantes y una juventud sin futuro. Es una protesta legítima nacida en la rabia por creciente hundimiento de la clase media y de sus esperanzas de una vida digna.

El Pais

P. ¿Cree que la revuelta se extenderá más allá de Egipto?

R. El enfrentamiento entre la calle y los palacios se esparcirá por el norte de África y Oriente Próximo hasta llegar a Pakistán. En 10 años, la revuelta habrá cambiado la faz de los regímenes despóticos contra los que se ha levantado. Acabará con la mayoría de estos, incluida la monarquía saudí.

P. ¿Considera que el efecto dominó barrerá las dinastías del Golfo?

R. Esos países son incluso más frágiles que el norte de África por la enorme cantidad de extranjeros que viven en ellos y porque son naciones que encierran contradicciones étnicas o sociales. Por ejemplo, la monarquía de Bahrein y sus principales autoridades son suníes cuando la mayoría de la población es chií.

P. ¿Ve como uno de los detonantes de la revuelta la decisión de Mubarak de entronizar a su hijo Gamal para dirigir Egipto?

R. Las dinastías tienen pocas posibilidades de supervivencia en esta situación volcánica. El despotismo es una olla a presión sin válvula de seguridad, cuando su interior comienza a hervir estalla sin control. No hay escape. La democracia, por el contrario, sí que tiene válvula de seguridad por la que se puede canalizar la rabia.

P. La gente no grita contra EE UU ¿Por qué le va a afectar?

R. Hay un sentimiento de que los dictadores son corruptos y déspotas porque tienen el apoyo de EE UU. Su actuación se seguirá muy de cerca.

P. ¿Será positiva la retirada de las tropas de Afganistán?

R. La retirada será positiva para EE UU que ha librado dos guerras sin sentido, aunque si abandonan Afganistán no se librarán del terror en sus ciudades. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista de la estabilidad regional es negativa, porque los talibanes no podrán controlar todo Afganistán y el país se romperá en base a la división étnica. Con ello, se expandirá la inestabilidad a toda Asia Central cuyas fronteras se han trazado precisamente dividiendo las etnias.

China’s challenges in the Year of the Rabbit

Brahma Chellaney
The Economic Times, February 4, 2011

The Lunar New Year couldn’t have begun on a more edgy note for China’s rulers, who have been quick to add words like “Cairo” and “Egypt” to their list of words banned on the Internet. Haunted by the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, China’s leaders are nervously watching the rise of people’s power against some Arab dictatorships. If Egyptians could rise up, despite enjoying a per-capita income three times higher than the Chinese, China certainly risks the same contagion.

China actually lived up to the Year of the Tiger that 2010 represented in its astrology by roaring at its neighbours and picking territorial fights with them. Now in the Year of the Rabbit which started on Thursday, will China emulate that burrowing animal? Will it mean more tunnels being burrowed in the Himalayas for river diversion and other strategic projects? And “carrots” (rabbit’s favourite) being demanded from neighbours and the rest of the world for eschewing irascible behaviour?

If the Chinese leadership were forward-looking, it would utilize the Year of the Rabbit to loosen its political reign and make up for the diplomatic imprudence of 2010 that left an isolated China counting only the problems states of North Korea, Pakistan and Myanmar as its allies. But the military’s growing political clout and the sharpening power struggle in the run-up to the major leadership changes scheduled to take place from next year raise concerns that the world will likely see more of what made 2010 a particularly tiger-like year when China frontally discarded Deng Xiaoping’s dictum, tao guang yang hui (conceal ambitions and hide claws).

A tiger’s claws are retractable, but China has taken pride more in baring them than in drawing them in. While manipulating patriotic sentiment, it has pursued hardline policies at home, tightening its controls on the Internet and media and stepping up repression in Tibet and Xinjiang. On a host of issues — from diplomacy and territorial claims to trade and currency — China spent 2010 staking out a more-muscular role that only helped heighten international concerns about its rapidly accumulating power and unbridled ambition.

But nothing fanned international unease and alarm more than Beijing’s disproportionate response to the Japanese detention of a fishing-trawler captain last September. While Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s standing at home took a beating for his meek capitulation to Chinese coercive pressure, the real loser was China, in spite of having speedily secured the captain’s release.

Japan’s passivity in the face of belligerence helped magnify Beijing’s hysterical and menacing reaction. In the process, China not only undercut its international interests by presenting itself as a bully, but it also precipitately exposed the cards it is likely to bring into play when faced with a diplomatic or military crisis next — from employing its trade muscle to help inflict commercial pain to exploiting its monopoly on the global production of a vital resource, rare-earth minerals.

Its resort to economic warfare, even in the face of an insignificant provocation, has given other major states advance notice to find ways to offset its leverage, including by avoiding any commercial dependency and reducing their reliance on imports of Chinese rare earths.

At issue is not China’s rise but its selective acceptance of norms and rules, as well as its efforts to protect or enlarge unfair advantage in trade, resource, security, currency and other issues.

The gap between its words and actualities is also widening. For example, China persisted with its unannounced rare-earth embargo against Japan for weeks while continuing to blithely claim the opposite in public — that no export restriction had been imposed. Like its denials last year on two other subjects — the deployment of Chinese troops in Pakistan-held Kashmir to build strategic projects and its use of Chinese convicts as labourers on projects in some countries too poor and weak to protest — China has demonstrated a troubling propensity to obscure the truth.

Despite the battering to its international image — which has sunk to its lowest point since after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy protestors — there is little prospect of 2011becoming a course-correction year for Beijing. The high turnover of leaders scheduled to occur at different levels in China during 2012-13 has set in motion within the Communist Party an intense jockeying for promotion, with senior functionaries engaged in competitive pandering to nationalistic sentiment.

But with the party increasingly dependent on the military to maintain its monopoly on power and ensure domestic order, senior military officers are overtly influencing foreign policy. Is China becoming a militaristic state where the government’s oversight over the armed forces exists only in name?

In truth, the more overtly China has embraced capitalism, the more indigenized it has become ideologically. By gradually turning its back on Marxist dogma — imported from the West — the country’s oligarchy has made Chinese nationalism the legitimating credo of its hold on power. The new crop of leaders, including President Hu Jintao’s putative successor, Xi Jinping, will bear a distinct nationalistic imprint.

As the present leadership prepares for the 18th party congress next year, it may find it difficult to resist flaunting the country’s newfound power, in a bid to play to the public gallery at home. A reminder of the domestic challenges was a recent viral video produced by a Beijing animation firm that showed the masses, portrayed as rabbits, rising up in anger against corruption and repression and killing party cadres.

The challenges could prompt China to go for the home run in 2012, the Year of the Dragon — the monster that has been universal since before biblical times. As the 50th year of China’s military attack on India, 2012 will be especially important in Asia, because the declared intent of that war — “to teach a lesson” — was repeated in the 1979 Chinese aggression against Vietnam and appeared to guide Beijing’s top-heavy response in the more-recent boat incident with Japan.

(c) The Economic Times, 2011

Rebalancing India’s diplomacy

Behind the geopolitical hugs

 

Instead of being content with doling out multibillion-dollar contracts to other powers, India must learn the art of aggressively pushing commercial interests as a central driver of diplomacy, says Brahma Chellaney

 

Brahma Chellaney

The Economic Times, January 7, 2011 http://j.mp/eVPNaH

 

In a recent span of five months, the head of government or state from each of the five powers with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council visited India. Accompanied by a delegation of business leaders, each came with a similar objective — to secure billions of dollars in new Indian contracts. New Delhi was more than happy to oblige. Each left flaunting the new export contracts.

 

The summit hugs actually point to a worrying trend: India seems to measure success of its diplomacy by how many billions of dollars of business it gives to a visiting foreign dignitary. In a world in which trade still follows the flag, India functions as if imports can help hoist its flag.

 

Foreign governments have been aggressively courting India to try to get a slice of its rapidly growing market. With Western and Japanese markets racked by economic troubles, other powers’ export machines avariciously seek a larger market share in India, the world’s second fastest-growing economy currently. Also, with India now the world’s second-largest arms buyer, wooing New Delhi as a defence and strategic partner has become necessary to sell military wares. The $150 billion worth of potential contracts opened up by the nuclear deal are yet another magnet.

 

The beeline to New Delhi began when Prime Minister David Cameroon arrived with Britain’s largest-ever trade delegation. He also hawked defence wares, managing to clinch one weapon deal worth over $1 billion. US exports to India have expanded five-fold in the past decade, yet President Barack Obama marketed his Indian tour as primarily a mission to create American jobs. He left India mightily pleased, with some $15 billion worth of export deals in his bag and assured of new arms contracts.  

 

To help France win India’s first contract under the nuclear deal, the environmental clearance of the Jaitapur plant site was rushed through in record 80 days. French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s visit yielded $13 billion worth of deals for him. Besides agreeing to buy high-priced Areva reactors of unproven design and safety, India has promised France a contract to upgrade its 52 Mirage fighters — an upgrade for which Paris has quoted a ridiculous price of $2.6 billion, which is as good as the cost of new warplanes of equivalent capability from Russia. Sarkozy’s take-home goodies also included an agreement-in-principle on coproduction of a short-range surface-to-air French missile system, to be called “Maitri.”

 

Just as Chinese President Hu Jintao came to New Delhi in 2006 after Beijing resurrected the Arunachal Pradesh card, Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent stopover on his way to Pakistan followed China’s unsheathing of a new instrument of leverage against India — Kashmir. In fact, Wen arrived after his standing at home had been weakened in the twilight of his political career, with the state-run national press censoring on three separate occasions his remarks on political reforms. Yet he came with some 400 businessmen to fortify an asymmetrical trade relationship that has turned India into the raw-material appendage of a neocolonial Chinese economy. While conserving its own natural resources, China is sourcing primary commodities from Africa and India and exporting refined goods to them in return. While its foreign direct investment in India remains minuscule ($52 million in the past decade) and it continues to impede Indian corporations from entering its market, China is undercutting Indian manufacturing through large-scale dumping.

 

As long as China can continue to strengthen such lopsided economic ties and reap a ballooning trade surplus, it will have little incentive to bridge the yawning political divide. Wen, in fact, did not even seek to address any of India’s security concerns. Yet he wrapped up his visit with a bagful of contracts worth some $23 billion.

 

At the year-end, when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev came calling, India signed a number of economic and defence agreements worth billions of dollars to shore up its relationship with an old ally. In a changing world, sticking with an old, “tried and tested” friend makes a lot of sense for India.

 

India, though, needs to recognize that reciprocity and leverage are the twin pillars on which sound diplomacy is founded. Dispensing contracts without reciprocity is a path neither to leverage building nor to developing comprehensive national power. Even when the prime minister travels overseas, he awards contracts to his hosts, instead of returning home with lucrative contracts. Little surprise India is the only major global economy that is import-dependent, not export-oriented. India relies predominantly on domestic consumption to fuel its economic growth.

 

High import dependency, however, puts an undue burden on the domestic consumer and taxpayer and acts as the main impediment to building comprehensive national power. It also lubricates big-bucks corruption because import deals often offer alluring kickbacks, usually routed directly to offshore bank accounts. More fundamentally, doling out multibillion-dollar contracts as a tool of diplomacy — even as India has gained notoriety for the scale of its stolen national wealth stashed in international financial safe havens — only undermines India’s rising strength.

 

The import dependency in various sectors has created strong business lobbies seeking to influence foreign-policy options so as to safeguard practices that threaten to pauperize the Indian economy. Such entrenched interests, for example, wish to perpetuate the inequitable trade with China, including the stripping of Indian resources. Also illustrative is defence spending, which India has doubled over the past six years, ploughing more and more funds into arms imports, but without an appraisal of the country’s long-term deterrent requirements. The more arms India has imported, the more it appears to lack the capability to decisively win a war thrust upon it by even the smaller of its two regional adversaries.

 

India must learn the way foreign leaders aggressively push commercial interests as a central driver of their diplomacy. Promoting exports has to become a key part of Indian foreign policy. Without meaningful political support, Indian industry will remain at a serious disadvantage to its Western and Chinese competitors.  And the country will stay mired in debilitating import dependencies. The next time the PM goes abroad, he should strive to come back with contracts for Indian industry.

 

(c) The Economic Times, 2011.

Greater turbulence in the Sino-Indian relationship

Japan Times, Dec. 29, 2010 http://bit.ly/dHlDnD

 

Troubling China-India Ties

 

A Tibetan woman in traditional costume

A Tibetan woman in traditional costume

The already fraught China-India relationship appears headed for more turbulent times as a result of the two giants’ failure to make progress on resolving any of the issues that divide them. Earlier this month, during the first visit in more than four years of a Chinese leader to India, the two sides decided to kick all contentious issues down the road. Instead, Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to expand bilateral trade by two-thirds over the next five years.

But the trade relationship is anything but flattering for India, which is largely exporting primary commodities to China and importing finished products, as if it were the raw-material appendage of a neocolonial Chinese economy. To make matters worse, India confronts a ballooning trade deficit with China and the dumping of Chinese goods that is systematically killing local manufacturing.

The focus on trade even as political disputes fester only plays into the Chinese agenda to gain bigger commercial benefits in India while being free to inflict greater strategic wounds on that country.

India-China relations have entered a particularly frosty spell, with New Delhi’s warming relationship with Washington emboldening Beijing to up the ante through border provocations, resurrection of its long-dormant claim to the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, and diplomatic needling. After initially seeking greater cooperation to help dissuade New Delhi from moving closer to the U.S., Beijing shifted to a more-coercive approach following the mid-2005 U.S.-India defense framework agreement and nuclear deal.

Last year relations sank to their lowest political point in more than two decades when Beijing unleashed a psychological war, employing its state-run media and nationalistic Web sites to warn of another armed conflict. The coarse rhetoric of the period leading up to the 1962 Chinese military attack also returned, with the Chinese Communist Party’s broadsheet, People’s Daily, for example, berating India for “recklessness and arrogance” and asking it to weigh “the consequences of a potential confrontation with China.”

Since then, Beijing has picked territorial fights with other neighbors as well, kindling fears of an expansionist China across Asia.

The only area where India-China relations have thrived is commerce. But the rapidly growing trade, far from helping to turn the page on old rifts, has been accompanied by greater Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry and military tensions, resulting in India beefing up defenses. Tibet remains at the core of the Sino-Indian divide. While Chinese damming of international rivers has helped link water with land disputes, the 30-year-long negotiations to settle territorial feuds have hit a wall and gone off on a tangent.

Little surprise a 20-fold increase in trade in the past decade to $60 billion has yielded a more muscular Chinese policy. In fact, the more China’s trade surplus with India has swelled — jumping from $2 billion in 2002 to almost $20 billion this year — the greater has been its condescension toward India.

Trade in today’s market-driven world is not constrained by political disputes or even strained ties, unless artificial political barriers have been erected, such as through sanctions. The China-India relations actually demonstrate that booming trade is no guarantee of moderation or restraint between states. Unless estranged neighbors fix their political relations, economics alone will not be enough to create good will or stabilize their relationship.

Yet ignoring that lesson, China and India have left their political rows to future diplomacy to clear up, with Wen bluntly stating that sorting out the border disputes “will take a fairly long period of time.” On the eve of his visit, Zhang Yan, the Chinese ambassador to India, publicly acknowledged that, “China-India relations are very fragile and very easy to be damaged and very difficult to repair.”

Even as old rifts remain, new issues are roiling relations, including Chinese strategic projects and military presence in Pakistani-held Kashmir and a new policy by China (which occupies one-fifth of the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir) to depict the Indian-administered portion of that state as de facto independent. It thus has been issuing visas to residents there on a separate leaf, not on their Indian passport. It also has stopped counting its 1,600-km border with Indian Kashmir as part of the frontier it shares with India.

In less than five years, China has gone from reviving the Arunachal Pradesh card to honing the Kashmir card against India. Thanks to China’s growing strategic footprint in Pakistani-held Kashmir, India now faces Chinese troops on both flanks of its portion of Kashmir. Indeed, the deepening China-Pakistan nexus presents India with a two-front theater in the event of a war with either country.

China is unwilling to accept the territorial status quo, or enter into a river waters-sharing treaty as India has done with downriver Bangladesh and Pakistan. Yet it wants to focus relations increasingly on commerce, even pushing for a free-trade agreement. With the Western and Japanese markets racked by economic troubles, the Chinese export juggernaut needs a larger market share in India, the world’s second fastest-growing economy.

But the current lopsided trade pattern — presenting a rising India as an African-style raw material source — is just not sustainable. China’s proven iron-ore deposits, according to various international estimates, are more than 2 1/2 times that of India. Yet China is conserving its own reserves and importing iron ore in a major way from India, to which, in return, it exports value-added steel products. As India ramps up its own steel-producing capacity over the next five years, China will have dwindling access to Indian iron ore.

At present, China maintains nontrade barriers and other mechanisms that keep out higher-value Indian exports, such as information technology and pharmaceutical products; it exports to India double of what it imports in value; it continues to blithely undercut Indian manufacturing despite a record number of antidumping cases against it by India in the World Trade Organization; and its foreign direct investment in India is so minuscule ($52 million in the past decade) as to be undetectable. Such ties amount to lose-lose for India and win-win for China.

As if to underline that such unequal commerce cannot override political concerns, India has refused to reaffirm its support for Beijing’s sovereignty over Tibet and Taiwan. India had been periodically renewing its commitment to a “one China” policy, even as Beijing not only declined to make a reciprocal one-India pledge. But in a sign of the growing strains in ties, Wen left for his country’s “all-weather” ally, Pakistan, with a joint communique in which India’s one-China commitment was conspicuously missing.

Growing Chinese provocations have left New Delhi with little choice but to play hardball with Beijing.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of “Asian Juggernaut” (HarperCollins USA, 2010).

 The Japan Times: Wednesday, Dec. 29, 2010

(C) All rights reserved

China’s new squeeze-India strategy

India’s faint attempt at playing Chinese checkers

A bully goes only after the timid: the more feckless and fearful a policy, the more pressure it will invite

 

Brahma Chellaney

Mint, December 28, 2010

http://bit.ly/fMJGEB

 

With the political clout of its military growing, China has displayed increasing assertiveness with its neighbors. But no neighbor is feeling the heat more than India. China’s more muscular policy has injected greater turbulence in the already-fraught bilateral ties.

 

In recent years, the New Delhi visit of any major Chinese leader has been ominously preceded by a new instrument of leverage being unsheathed against India. On the eve of President Hu Jintao’s 2006 visit, China resurrected its long-dormant claim to Arunachal Pradesh, nearly three times larger than Taiwan.  Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent visit was preceded by China fashioning a sharp-edged Kashmir card against India.

 

Having raked up the Arunachal issue, Beijing has embarked on a three-pronged strategy to build pressure on India over Kashmir. First, it has sought to challenge Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir both by excluding the western sector from the length of the border it claims to share with India and by stapling a separate paper visa for any J&K resident applying to travel to China. Second, shrinking the length of the Sino-Indian frontier paves the way for Beijing to limit the territorial dispute to what it claims (Arunachal), while what it occupies (the Switzerland-sized Aksai Chin) would be taken up only after an Indo-Pakistan Kashmir settlement — the very formulation China applies to the dispute over Pakistan’s 1963 ceding of a trans-Karakoram tract to it. And three, China’s deployment of military troops in Pakistan-held Kashmir, ostensibly to build strategic projects, means that India now faces Chinese troops on both flanks of J&K.

 

During his visit, Wen cynically sought to harness China’s new squeeze-India strategy as a source of leverage. He proactively suggested that Chinese and Indian officials begin “in-depth discussions” to sort out one aspect of this strategy — the stapled-visa matter. While the proposal, on the face of it, may seem reasonable, it actually demands that India negotiate with the stick wielder. Since negotiations cannot be one-sided, it also means the Chinese intend to discard this new stick only on the basis of give-and-take. Wen’s stress on the adjective “in-depth” indeed signals that the Chinese will drive a hard bargain.

 

Yet New Delhi, unable to grasp the full implications of China’s Machiavellian new strategy, has risen to the Chinese bait. Having publicly said that “the ball is now in China’s court” — meaning Beijing must, on its own, “unstaple” an issue it created — New Delhi in private agreed to the opposite. According to the Chinese foreign ministry, “There was an understanding that officials will meet and this would be appropriately resolved.”

This is just the latest example of how Chinese diplomacy is able to run rings round India, successfully deflecting attention from the core issues to the new issues it creates. It is also an example of Indian diplomacy compounding its own challenges. Instead of simply repaying China in the same coin by issuing visas on a separate leaf to the Han migrants that now dominate the Tibetan plateau, Indian officials have begged China to give up its visa policy. Beijing knew the Indians would come running. And that it would then be able to extract some concession on an unconnected matter. Will India also enter into give-and-take to escape the other sticks China now brandishes, from purging the western sector to stepping up cross-border military incursions in this very sector?

 

Wen came to New Delhi empty-handed, yet he left for his country’s all-weather ally Pakistan with $23 billion worth of Indian economic contracts. Such was his nimble diplomacy that Wen first agreed to a joint communiqué incorporating a “firm commitment” to resolve the border issue “at an early date.” He then delivered a public speech effectively asking that the issue be left to future generations because sorting it out “will take a fairly long period of time.”  

 

While India did well not to reiterate its usual ritualistic commitment to a one-China policy, it has pegged that move not to China’s refusal to accept the territorial status quo but to the lowest possible threshold — the stapled-visa issue. The implication is that if China abandons that small stick even while continuing to wave bigger sticks, India will happily go back to openly declaring that Tibet and Taiwan are part of China. In fact, despite the absence of a direct reference to “one China,” the latest joint communiqué affirms a commitment to “abide by the basic principles” enshrined in the 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2008 joint statements — all of which contain India’s pledge to a “one China” without a reciprocal Chinese commitment to a “one India.”

 

China’s hardening approach has unfolded at a time when sinologists are in charge of Indian policy. The national security adviser and foreign secretary have both served as ambassador to China. In truth, sinologists since before the1962 war have been the weak link in India’s China policy — too absorbed in narrow, arcane issues and unable to dispassionately assess China, or India’s options, in a larger strategic context.

 

Make no mistake: A bully goes only after the timid. The more feckless and fearful a policy, the more pressures it will invite on the country. Over caution and pusillanimity actually can make the bully more brazen. China’s new squeeze strategy is a reminder India must avoid that trap.

 

Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi.

Comment at views@livemint.com

A bully goes only after the timid

Delhi Trades While Kashmir Burns

Increased trade is no panacea for sharpening geopolitical rivalry

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY

Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2010

 

The summit last week between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was a disappointment that signals more turbulence ahead in relations between the two Asian giants. True, the meeting resulted in the usual platitudes about friendship and cooperation. But it’s telling that the two neighbors were unable to make progress on resolving any of their current disputes.

 

During the first visit of a major Chinese leader to India in more than four years, some easing of political tensions should have been accomplished. Instead the two sides decided to kick all contentious issues down the road and expand bilateral trade by two-thirds over the next five years. However, increased trade is no panacea for the sharpening geopolitical rivalry.

 

First of all, while trade may benefit both sides, the perception in India is that China gains more. India’s trade deficit with China is ballooning, and it largely exports raw materials to China and imports finished products. The focus on trade, even as political disputes fester, plays into the Chinese agenda to secure new markets in India while continuing with a strategy to regionally contain that country.

 

In the last decade, bilateral trade has risen 20-fold, making it the only area where relations have thrived. But far from helping to turn the page on old rifts, this commerce has been accompanied by greater Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry and military tensions.

 

India-China relations have been going through an exceptionally frosty spell in recent years, with New Delhi’s warming relationship with Washington emboldening Beijing to up the ante through border provocations, resurrection of its long-dormant claim to the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (which it has been calling "southern Tibet" since 2006), and other diplomatic needling. Beijing had initially sought to improve ties with New Delhi so that it could dissuade it from moving closer to Washington. But after the two democracies cemented a civilian nuclear deal in mid-2005, China turned more coercive toward its southern neighbor.

 

In 2009, relations sank to their lowest political point in more than two decades when Beijing unleashed a psychological war upon New Delhi, employing its state-run media and nationalistic Web sites to warn of another armed conflict. It was a throwback to the coarse rhetoric China had used in the buildup to the 32-day war in 1962. The Chinese Communist Party’s main mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, berated India for "recklessness and arrogance" and asked it to weigh "the consequences of a potential confrontation with China."

 

Ignoring the lesson that booming trade by itself is no guarantee of moderation or restraint between states, China and India have left their political rows to future generations to clear up, with Mr. Wen bluntly stating that sorting out the Himalayan border disputes "will take a fairly long period of time."

 

Even as these old rifts remain, new problems have arisen, roiling relations further. China (which occupies one-fifth of the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir) has started a troubling three-pronged policy to build pressure on New Delhi over Kashmir, where the disputed borders of India, Pakistan and China converge. It has sought to enlarge its footprint in Pakistani-held Kashmir through new strategic projects; it has attempted to question India’s sovereignty over the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir by issuing visas on a separate leaf to Kashmiri residents holding Indian passports; and it has officially shortened the length of the Himalayan border it shares with India by purging the 1,597-kilometer line separating Indian Kashmir from Chinese-held Kashmir.

 

Chinese strategic projects around India, including ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan and new transportation links with Burma, Nepal and Pakistan, have been seriously unnerving India. The recently reported Chinese military presence in Pakistani-held Kashmir means that India faces Chinese troops on both flanks of its portion of Kashmir. The deepening China-Pakistan nexus—Mr. Wen’s next stop after India was to his country’s "all-weather" ally Pakistan—presents India with a two-front theater in the event of a war with either country.

 

The deterioration in China-India relations clearly demonstrates that rapidly expanding trade is no measure of progress in bilateral relations. Unless estranged neighbors fix their political relations, economics alone will not be enough to create goodwill or stabilize their relationship.

 

Clearly, China is unwilling to accept the territorial status quo. Yet it pushes for a free-trade agreement. With Western and Japanese markets racked by economic troubles, the Chinese export juggernaut needs a larger market share in India, the world’s second fastest-growing economy.

 

India must recognize the difference between being cautious and being meek: The former helps avert problems, while the latter symbolizes weakness and invites more pressure. To its credit, New Delhi last week refused to reaffirm its support for Beijing’s sovereignty over Tibet and Taiwan, hopefully bringing an end to a futile diplomatic giveaway: India had since the late 1980s been periodically renewing its commitment to a "one China" policy, even as Beijing not only declined to make a reciprocal one-India pledge, but also openly scoffed at India’s territorial integrity. New Delhi needs more such gumption.

 

Mr. Chellaney is the author, most recently, of "Asian Juggernaut" (HarperCollins, 2010).

 

Copyright 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved 

Russia remains critical to Indian security interests

Vodka  Cocktails  Again

 

Brahma Chellaney

The Economic Times, December 19, 2010

 

The heads of government of the UN Security Council’s permanent members have made a beeline to India in recent months, with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev being the latest. From British Prime Minister David Cameron to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, each signed multibillion-dollar deals during his India visit. Medvedev will be no exception. Foreign governments have been courting India to try to get a piece of its lucrative, fast-growing market. But Indian diplomacy, oddly, does not lay emphasis on securing foreign contracts for domestic industry.

 

Russia, however, is the only P-5 state with which India has enjoyed a close, stable, enduring and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Unlike the vicissitudes that have characterized Indo-US ties, the Indo-Russia relationship has been relatively steady. The interests of the US and India may converge on larger Asian issues but they diverge on regional matters, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Myanmar. The vaunted Indo-US strategic partnership has turned into an opportunity for Washington to win major commercial and defence contracts and co-opt India into strategic arrangements, without a concomitant obligation to be on India’s side.  By contrast, there is a greater congruence of Russian and Indian national-security objectives.

 

Which power is willing to sell critical military technologies, not just weapons, to India? Which power is transferring a nuclear-powered submarine on a 10-year lease to India? Which country sells India an aircraft carrier, even if an old one? Which arms supplier to New Delhi does not offer matching weapons to India’s adversaries? Russia is the common answer to all these questions. Little surprise that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, calling Russia a “tried and tested friend” of India, admitted in 2007: “Although there has been a sea-change in the international situation during the last decade, Russia remains indispensable to the core of India’s foreign-policy interests”.

 

For Russia, India is a force of stability in a region where Moscow, as the WikiLeaks’ disclosures have underlined, is deeply concerned about jihadists within the Pakistani establishment gaining control of weapons of mass destruction. With the US and its NATO partners now announcing plans to start within months to gradually withdraw forces from Afghanistan so as to end all combat operations by 2014, Russia and India need to work together and with countries like Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to frustrate Pakistan’s aim to reinstall the Afghan Taliban in power.

 

However, even as Moscow tries to restore its influence in the former Soviet republics, its humiliating military retreat from Afghanistan in the late 1980s still weighs heavily on the Russian psyche. Moscow thus seems reluctant to get directly involved in Afghanistan again, with the focus of its concerns centred more on the flow of illicit drugs to Russia, where drug addiction has emerged as a major public-health problem. But with the US now set to make its own military retreat from Afghanistan, Russia and India will have little choice but to work together to avert a destabilizing power vacuum there. Otherwise, India in particular and Russia to a lesser extent will bear the brunt of the terrorism blowback from the Af-Pak belt.

 

In the larger Asian theatre, Russia shares a common strategic objective with India (and America) for a stable power balance in a continent that China wants to dominate. Sparsely populated Russia, the world’s wealthiest country in natural resources, and densely populated, resource-hungry China are anything but natural allies, with Han influx into the Russian Far East stoking visceral historical Russian fears of a Chinese demographic invasion. With Russia and China seemingly reverting to their traditional suspicion and competition, their two-decade-old honeymoon may now be ending.

 

Russia’s future, however, remains clouded by major challenges, including an excessive reliance on hydrocarbon exports to power its economy and the looming threat of depopulation. Still, it should not be forgotten that Russia remains a nuclear and missile superpower. Geopolitically, Russia is one of the most important “swing” states in the world. For example, there can be no hope of Asian power equilibrium without Russia working with India and other likeminded states.

 

In the Russia-US-China-India-Japan strategic pentagon in Asia, if Russia, India and Japan were to work closely together, with the US lending a helping hand, China would find itself boxed in from virtually all sides. That would not only extinguish any prospect of a Sino-centric Asia, but would create the ultimate strategic nightmare for China. After all, as the geographical hub of Asia, China is vulnerable to the same geopolitical game it plays against India — strategic encirclement. But fortunately for Beijing, recent developments have highlighted that a Russian-Japanese rapprochement remains distant.

However, the China factor that led to the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty is gaining greater salience, given the present spectre of Asian power disequilibrium.

The US and India are now strategic buddies. But Indira Gandhi entered into the friendship treaty containing a mutual-security assistance clause because she was fearful that the US and China would make serious trouble if India intervened to help East Pakistan become Bangladesh. Her fears proved right: The US responded not only by dispatching the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal, but also (as the declassified Nixon-Kissinger transcripts later attested) by egging on China to attack India.

Indeed, former US President Richard Nixon candidly wrote in 1985: “There were three other instances [besides Vietnam] when I considered using nuclear weapons … there was 1971, the Indo-Pak war. After Mrs. Gandhi completed the decimation of East Pakistan, she wanted to gobble up West Pakistan. At least that’s the way I read it. The Chinese were climbing the walls. We were concerned that the Chinese might intervene to stop India. We didn’t learn till later that they didn’t have that kind of conventional capability. But if they did step in, and the Soviets reacted, what would we do? There was no question what we would have done”.

Today Russia, with its vantage location in Eurasia, remains a key country for India’s long-term strategic interests. In fact, Medvedev’s visit, just nine months after Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s New Delhi trip, is part of the new tradition of an annual summit meeting — a symbol of the continuing India-Russia closeness, despite the shrinkage of economic ties.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of a 2010 international bestseller, Asian Juggernaut (HarperCollins USA).

From nation-building to militia-building

Obama’s review risks Afghan partition

 

By Brahma Chellaney

Financial Times

Published: December 16, 2010

 

US plan is degenerating into militia-building, writes Brahma Chellaney

 

Since coming to office US president Barack Obama has pursued an Afghan strategy summed up in three words: surge, bribe and run. It was translated into a military plan at Nato’s Lisbon summit in November, and confirmed by Thursday’s release of the administration’s Afghan review, which claims “our strategy in Afghanistan is setting the conditions to begin the responsible reduction of US forces in July 2011”. But it is a plan that will only increase the turmoil next year – and, in effect, result in the partition of Afghanistan, at great cost to India in particular.

As the US and other coalition partners gradually draw down their combat role from next year, their place is to be taken by Afghan security forces, whose strength is to be boosted to 300,000 through crash training of recruits. But it is unlikely such local forces will be able to hold Afghanistan together. So the US plan to wind down combat operations by 2014 will lead to a serious increase in terrorism within the Afghanistan-Pakistan belt and create a destabilising Afghan power vacuum.

In fact, despite a big increase in US troop levels since 2009, coalition forces are increasingly relying on local militias and warlords, not on the regular Afghan army and police. In the face of a faltering war effort, the US has been funding or creating local militias in as many Afghan provinces as possible.

A new array of US-backed provincial warlords has emerged across Afghanistan, receiving millions of dollars to provide highway security and run missions with US special forces.

Against that background, the transition optimistically outlined in today’s review will only intensify the Afghan power struggle. The most likely post-war scenario is now the partition of Afghanistan along ethnic lines. That means that while the Taliban will call the shots in the Pashtun-dominated south and east, the non-Pashtun northern and western regions will retain their present de facto autonomy.

If a resurgent Afghan Taliban is now on the offensive and unwilling to cut a peace deal, it is largely because of the fillip it got from the US search for a face-saving exit; and the sustenance it still draws from Pakistan’s military. Militarily, the US has erred by not removing the Afghan Taliban leadership, located in Pakistan’s Quetta and Karachi areas.

The ongoing plan to retreat will only embolden jihadists to stage more daring attacks, leaving India in particular on the front line. Indeed, the approach outlined today formalises a vital (but so far unstated) shift in the war strategy: to contain terrorism regionally rather than to defeat it.

Even if distant America and Europe can afford this, India will suffer the consequences. India has felt most of the blowback from past failed US policies in the region. With today’s announcement showing the US preparing to end another intervention, while showering billions of dollars on the Pakistani military, history is again coming full circle.

The writer is professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research and author, most recently, of Asian Juggernaut

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010.