By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

A succession of American presidents since Richard Nixon aided China’s rise, inadvertently spawning the greatest strategic adversary the U.S. has ever faced.

It was President Trump who, in his first term, reversed the 45-year U.S. rapprochement with Beijing by identifying China in his national security strategy as an adversary and initiating a trade war with it by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods. This marked a significant shift towards a more confrontational approach.

But does Trump now risk playing into China’s hands by freezing much of U.S. foreign aid and upending decades-old alliances?

Trump’s critics argue that his assertive unilateralism on trade and foreign policy erodes American influence while potentially opening the door for Beijing to strengthen ties with nations traditionally in Washington’s orbit. The White House’s tariff plans against key trading partners, possibly raising duties to levels unseen in decades, could also weaken crucial alliances. Additionally, Trump’s freeze on foreign aid creates a vacuum for China to expand its international footprint, particularly in Africa.

At the same time, Trump’s policies are increasingly focused on countering China. The new rounds of tariffs imposed since February reflect this shift, as does the president’s emphasis on ending the Ukraine war to shift U.S. strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific.

Over the years, various U.S. policies that aided China’s rise were initially driven by strategic interests but ultimately produced unintended consequences. By coopting China in an informal anti-Soviet alliance during the latter half of the Cold War, Washington created a two-against-one competition that contributed to Soviet imperial overstretch and ultimately to the USSR’s collapse.

But in breaking China’s isolation and granting it access to Western markets and technology, often by outsourcing manufacturing, Washington also facilitated China’s rise as an economic and military powerhouse.

Instead of spurring political liberalization, as many American policymakers had hoped, China’s integration into the global economy spawned a more repressive state system. The Chinese Communist Party used economic growth to tighten political control and expand its military capabilities, turning economic strength into strategic leverage.

Since the 1990s, U.S. sanctions against other countries have frequently played into China’s hands, as Beijing has adeptly exploited opportunities arising from the isolation of sanctioned states. American-led sanctions, for instance, have pushed resource-rich Myanmar and Iran into China’s arms. China has become the almost exclusive buyer of Iranian oil at steep discounts, while also emerging as Iran’s top investor and security partner, and U.S. sanctions are compelling Myanmar to deepen ties with Beijing.

The Biden presidency illustrated how overuse of sanctions can accelerate China’s global expansion. Unprecedented American-led Western sanctions against Moscow after the invasion of Ukraine, including the weaponization of international finance, have turned Beijing into Russia’s de facto banker. China has capitalized on this shift by expanding the international use of the yuan, with Russia generating much of its export earnings in Chinese currency and keeping the proceeds largely within China.

By forcing Russia to pivot to China, Biden’s sanctions inadvertently helped solidify a strategic Sino-Russian alliance against America. Trade between China and Russia surged from $108 billion in 2020 to $245 billion last year. In return for giving Russia an economic lifeline, Beijing has gained access to some of Moscow’s most advanced military technologies, previously sold only to India.

American policymakers now face the urgent task of driving a wedge between China and Russia, whose historically complex relationship has oscillated between cooperation and conflict.

More broadly, the global order is undergoing a profound transition, shifting away from the post-World War II, U.S.-led system toward an uncertain new reality. Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya recently described the current period as a “turning point in history” while hosting trilateral discussions with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts. The very fact that two close U.S. allies — Japan and South Korea — are engaging in strategic dialogues with China underscores how nations are adopting hedging strategies amid geopolitical uncertainty.

Against this backdrop, the unintended consequences of the Trump administration’s policies — particularly its war on multilateralism — risk strengthening China’s hand. China’s ability to act as the world’s largest and most unforgiving government lender, combined with its aggressive “carrots and sticks” diplomacy, continues to expand its global influence.

To counter China’s accumulation of power, the Trump administration must adopt a multifaceted approach that blends economic, diplomatic, military and technological strategies.

Leveraging tariffs and trade policies to disrupt China’s export-driven economy could compel Beijing to negotiate on fairer terms or risk shrinking market access. The administration could also incentivize American companies to reshore manufacturing through tax breaks or subsidies, further weakening China’s role as the world’s factory.

Tightening controls on technology and capital flows to China could hinder Beijing’s ability to innovate in key industries. Increased scrutiny of Chinese investments in U.S. technology sectors would limit its access to American intellectual property.

Strengthening alliances in the Indo-Pacific — particularly through closer ties with democracies such as Japan, India and Australia (key players in “the Quad”) — would create a formidable counterbalance to Chinese expansion through geopolitical encirclement.

Furthermore, expanded deployment of U.S. troops and advanced weaponry in the Indo-Pacific would strengthen deterrence against China. The recent American deployment of the 1,200-mile, land-based Typhon missile system in the northern Philippines exemplifies this approach by putting key Chinese military and commercial centers within striking range.

The administration must ensure that short-term dealmaking does not undermine long-term American objectives. A coherent, sustained strategy — rather than erratic policy shifts — is critical to slowing China’s rise without triggering a major conflict. Trump must resist transactional diplomacy and instead prioritize long-term strategic goals so that the U.S. can more effectively counterbalance China’s growing influence while reinforcing its own global preeminence.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

There are two ways for a powerful nation to contain an adversary that is increasingly challenging its core interests. One is to contain the foe by seeking to isolate and squeeze it, including bringing its economy and security under pressure through sanctions and strategic alliances. The other way is to seek discreet containment while maintaining normal relations in trade and diplomacy.

President Trump’s pivot to rein in an expansionist China is just beginning, but it is already apparent that his approach — in a significant departure from Cold War-era overt antagonism or former President Joe Biden’s Russia policy — is likely to embrace the second path. Trump’s approach will seek to limit the influence and power of China without resorting to open hostility.

Trump has sought early on in his term to halt what he has called the “senseless war” in Ukraine, largely because the conflict has diverted American attention from pressing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and made China the big winner. A Russia-Ukraine ceasefire would allow the U.S. to shift strategic focus and military resources from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, a pivotal region in shaping the new global order.

This was underscored by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s Feb. 12 warning to Europe that “the U.S. will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency” and that Europe must take “responsibility for its own security” by leading “from the front” so that America can prioritize “deterring war with China” in the Indo-Pacific.

America’s 80-year run as the world’s preeminent power is under increasing challenge not from Russia, whose revanchist ambitions are largely confined to what it calls its “near abroad,” but from a globally ascendant China. In fact, with Russia preoccupied with Ukraine, China — despite its “no limits” partnership with Moscow — is quietly chipping away at traditional Russian spheres of influence, including drawing Central Asia’s former Soviet republics into its orbit. And in the Indo-Pacific, China is increasingly flexing its muscles, as shown by its recent military drills off Australia, Vietnam and Taiwan.

The Trump administration is working toward clamping down on China’s access to advanced U.S. technology as well as on Chinese investments in critical American infrastructure. A recent White House memorandum to departments and agencies sought to remake the economic relationship with Beijing through a series of proposed restrictions, including thwarting the use of U.S. capital to modernize the Chinese military and blocking Chinese investment strategies to secure “cutting-edge technologies, intellectual property and leverage in strategic industries.”

The memorandum also called for new or expanded restrictions on American investments in China in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum, biotechnology, hypersonics, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, directed energy and other areas important to Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy.

Trump views himself as a dealmaker, and he appears open to cutting deals with Beijing that help reduce China’s huge trade surplus with America. Blending flattery with hardball tactics, Trump has periodically lavished praise on Chinese leader Xi Jinping, including calling him “a brilliant man.”

But Trump has already escalated his tariff war. An extra 10 percent duty on Chinese goods this month is on top of a 10 percent tariff slapped by Trump in early February. And this combined 20 percent duty adds to tariffs of up to 25 percent on Chinese imports that Trump imposed in his first term.

One reason for Trump’s hardline approach toward Canada and Mexico is that these countries serve as back doors for low-cost Chinese goods to enter America duty-free. The concern over origins of goods also may explain why Trump’s suspension of his 25 percent tariffs on Canadian and Mexican products applies just to goods covered under the 2020 North American trade accord, thus leaving a lot of products still subject to the new high duties. The 2020 agreement’s rules permit duty-free entry of goods into the U.S. only if the products have been largely made with North American components.

The China angle is also apparent from Trump’s recent 25 percent tariffs on foreign steel and aluminum. These tariffs, while penalizing U.S. allies, seek to target China. Faced with a slowing economy, including stubborn disinflationary pressure and a deepening real estate crisis, China has dumped much of its excess steel and aluminum output in the markets of American allies and partners, which, in turn, have exported large shares of their own more-expensive production to the U.S.

More fundamentally, Trump’s early moves appear designed to beat back the Chinese export tsunami. In an untenable situation, China produces 31 percent of the world’s manufactured goods but accounts for just 13 percent of global consumption. A U.S.-led pushback against China’s increasing reliance on exports for growth could deepen its current economic woes, slowing down its rapid military buildup and crimping its debt-trap diplomacy.

As part of an apparent strategy for “containment with a smile,” Trump will continue to express the importance of “getting along with China,” as he did soon after returning to the White House. But we can expect his administration to pursue economic engagement with strategic restraints, including limiting Beijing’s access to critical technologies, rigorously screening Chinese investments and prodding American businesses to step up efforts to diversify supply chains away from China.

Deploying targeted economic restrictions rather than broad sanctions will permit continued engagement in less sensitive areas while still applying pressure where needed.

The U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific, for its part, is likely to be defined by deterrence. While shunning provocative actions that could escalate tensions, the Trump administration is expected to strengthen deterrence to prevent aggression, including against an increasingly vulnerable Taiwan.

The strategy will likely seek to ensure that the adversary feels the walls closing in — without feeling the punch.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

Disagreement about how to end the Ukraine War is upending the transatlantic relationship, transforming Europe’s approach to its own security, and deepening divisions between the Global South and the West. With the conflict having reached a stalemate, a realistic approach to peace negotiations is essential.

Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

At a time of rising geopolitical tensions and deepening global fragmentation, the Ukraine war has proved particularly divisive. From the start, the battle lines were clearly drawn: Russia on one side, Ukraine and the West on the other, and much of the Global South hoping only for the conflict to end. Now, however, alignments are shifting. Whether this will advance efforts to resolve the conflict and strengthen global stability remains to be seen.

After more than three years, Europe – including the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Norway – remains largely steadfast in its support of Ukraine. The largest armed conflict in its neighborhood since World War II has deeply affected the European psyche, as it has challenged basic assumptions about continental security and revived the specter of nuclear annihilation that loomed over Europe throughout the Cold War. The prevailing view has always been that a Russian “victory” – including a peace deal that ceded some Ukrainian territory to Russia – would amount to an “existential threat.”

The United States, however, has decided that it no longer wants to “pour billions of dollars” into what Secretary of State Marco Rubio calls a “bloody stalemate, a meat-grinder-type war.” So, US President Donald Trump is seeking to negotiate a peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin. To press Ukraine to accept the concessions such an agreement will undoubtedly entail, the Trump administration suspended and later resumed military aid and intelligence support.

This is not about ending a “savage conflict” for “the good of the world,” as Trump claims. While years of sanctions were supposed to drain Russia, economically and militarily, to America’s benefit, they bolstered an unholy Sino-Russian alliance against the West, while sustaining a conflict that kept US attention and resources in Europe. With his push for a peace deal in Ukraine, Trump is seeking to cut America’s losses and shift its strategic focus and military resources toward the Indo-Pacific – the home of America’s real enemy: China.

As Trump’s predecessor Joe Biden recognized, only China has the resolve and capability to surpass the US as the foremost world power. Yet the US still has more than 100,000 troops stationed in Europe. That is why US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently warned that the US can “no longer tolerate” an “imbalanced” transatlantic relationship that “encourages dependency.” Europe must take “responsibility for its own security,” Hegseth said, so that the US can focus on “deterring war with China.”

The question is whether Europe is capable of managing its own security. The answer probably should be yes. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently pointed out, Europe does not lack economic strength. Nor does it lack people: there are “500 million Europeans begging 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians.” What is missing is the European Union’s belief that it is a “global power.” The result is a rudderless Europe.

When it comes to supporting Ukraine, Europe has another critical shortcoming. As NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has noted, Europe lacks the necessary military-industrial base to provide sufficient arms support to Ukraine. That is why some, including Rutte, want to make a deal with the US: you keep supplying Ukraine with weapons, and we will foot the bill. Unless the Trump administration accepts such an arrangement, the British-French plan to build a “coalition of the willing” to do the “heavy lifting” on Ukrainian security will face powerful headwinds.

Meanwhile, the Global South is still struggling to cope with the Ukraine war’s economic fallout, especially sharply higher food and energy prices, which have had particularly devastating consequences for small and vulnerable developing countries with limited foreign reserves. Sri Lanka is a case in point. In the months that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, skyrocketing global prices drained its reserves, leading to fuel, food, medicine, and electricity shortages. The resulting economic meltdown pushed a frustrated population over the edge, triggering widespread protests that toppled a political dynasty.

This explains why developing countries remain largely unified in advocating an early negotiated end to the war, even if that means leaving a sizable chunk of Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation. If anything, calls for a peace agreement have grown since 2023, with even NATO member Turkey and close US ally Israel charting more independent stances on the conflict. It does not help that, for many countries in the Global South, the West’s contrasting responses to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza reek of hypocrisy.

For now, Ukraine and Europe remain committed to seeking peace through strength. But as admirable as Ukraine’s resistance has been, and as important as it is to defend the international legal principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that Russia has flagrantly violated, the fact is that the conflict has reached a stalemate, while the international fallout continues to grow. Rather than repeat the mistakes of the 1950-53 Korean War – in which an armistice agreement was reached only after two years of military deadlock – all parties should adopt a realistic approach to ending the war and negotiate accordingly.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2025.