Despite the risks of tit-for-tat retaliation, India, as the stronger side, could escalate or de-escalate the conflict to its advantage. However, the threat India faces is not coming from Pakistan alone. China provides strategic and diplomatic cover for Pakistan’s export of terrorism.
NEW DELHI – Last month, Islamist gunmen – two of whom have been identified as Pakistani nationals – slaughtered 26 civilians in the Indian-administered part of divided Kashmir. It was a brutal attack, in which Hindu tourists, including one from Nepal, were singled out for slaughter. And yet, it was not surprising: terrorist groups have long operated freely from Pakistani soil, with the tacit or explicit support of Pakistan’s powerful military.
What might be different this time is that India may have finally found a way to push back, including through military strikes on Pakistani terror camps – strikes that Indian officials claimed were “measured, responsible, and designed to be non-escalatory in nature.” Despite the risks of tit-for-tat retaliation, India, as the stronger side, could escalate or de-escalate the conflict to its advantage.
The threat India faces, however, is not coming from Pakistan alone. China has consistently provided diplomatic and strategic cover for India’s terrorism-sponsoring neighbor. For example, China’s government has repeatedly blocked United Nations sanctions against top Pakistani terrorists. After the latest attack, it praised Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts, calling the country an “all-weather” strategic partner. The enemy of China’s enemy is its “ironclad friend.”
That leaves India wedged between two closely aligned nuclear powers, both of which claim sizable swaths of Indian territory. Recent crises – from brutal Pakistani terror attacks to brazen Chinese land grabs in the Doklam and Ladakh regions – have highlighted just how acute a threat the Sino-Pakistani strategic axis poses to India.
During his 11 years in power, however, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi largely maintained a reactive security posture toward both China and Pakistan, with little strategic deterrence to be seen. The Sino-Indian military standoff that was triggered in 2020 by Chinese encroachments on India’s Ladakh borderlands still has not been fully resolved.
But this time, Modi has offered a calibrated and impactful response, pausing the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), the world’s most-generous water-sharing pact, which grants downstream Pakistan access to over 80% of the Indus Basin waters. Brokered in 1960 by the World Bank, the IWT has long been hailed as a model of cross-border cooperation – one that China has not emulated. (Though its 1951 annexation of the water-rich Tibetan Plateau gave it control over the headwaters of Asia’s major rivers, China has refused to enter into a water-sharing treaty with any of its 18 downstream neighbors.)
But treaties are built on mutual trust and good faith – or, as the IWT’s preamble puts it, “a spirit of goodwill and friendship.” And while India has steadfastly adhered to the treaty for 65 years – even when it meant compromising development in its water-stressed regions – Pakistan has consistently acted in bad faith. For example, it has used the treaty’s dispute-resolution mechanisms to drag India repeatedly into international arbitration over minor engineering differences and obstruct India’s ability to use its rightful share of water. Last year, when India formally sought to update the IWT – to account for unanticipated factors like climate change, groundwater depletion, and population growth – Pakistan refused to negotiate.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has waged what is effectively a proxy war by terrorism against India. The 2008 Mumbai massacre, in particular, is still etched in India’s national memory. In fact, the latest killings occurred shortly after the United States extradited a key Mumbai plotter to India. Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, recently fanned the flames of conflict by urging Pakistanis to teach their children that Muslims are “different from Hindus in every possible way.”
International law is clear: when a treaty’s fundamental conditions collapse, or one party persistently violates them, the other party has the right to suspend or withdraw from the agreement. For now, India has stopped short of blowing up the IWT, instead placing the treaty “in abeyance,” a term undefined in international law. Modi has thus retained strategic ambiguity, while sending a resolute message: resource-sharing comes with conditions. This is a warning, not a rupture.
To be sure, Pakistan claims that suspending the IWT amounts to an “act of war,” and has retaliated by suspending all bilateral agreements, including the 1972 Simla treaty, which governs peaceful dispute resolution. But this response not only ignores the reasons for India’s decision; it also misrepresents the impact.
India is halting data sharing, design approvals, and inspections under the IWT, while opening the way for actions that Pakistani objections have obstructed, such as reservoir flushing and the desilting of riverbeds. But it is not disrupting current water flows. In fact, India does not have the infrastructure to divert the major rivers flowing to Pakistan, and its storage capacity on those rivers is negligible. So, while India is imposing costs on Pakistan, in an attempt to hold its leaders accountable for state-sponsored terrorism, it is not punishing the Pakistani people.
The six rivers of the Indus Basin have sustained local civilizations for millennia, and they can continue to do so. But no country can be expected to uphold a peacetime treaty while suffering the consequences of an undeclared war. If Pakistan does not want India to turn off its taps by building new hydrological infrastructure, it must demonstrate a verifiable commitment to peace, arrest terrorist leaders, shut down terrorist-training camps, and end its support for cross-border violence.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.
When the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed in 1960, it was an act of extraordinary generosity on India’s part. Despite being the upper riparian state, India reserved for Pakistan over 80% of the Indus Basin waters. Almost 65 years later, IWT remains the world’s most generous water-sharing treaty.
The treaty was a bet on peace — on the hope that India’s water largesse would help usher in subcontinental stability and collaboration. Pakistan, however, has repaid India’s generosity not with gratitude, but with grenades and guns.
From the 2001 attack on Parliament to the 2008 horrific Mumbai massacre, and from the 2016 Uri raid to the 2019 Pulwama bombing — the pattern of Pakistan-scripted terrorism has been unmistakable. The pattern underscores a strategic doctrine of asymmetric warfare, relying on terrorist proxies. And yet, even as Pakistan kept on repaying water munificence with blood, India continued to honour the treaty.
But now the national anger over the latest terrorist massacre in Pahalgam, where Hindu tourists were singled out and slaughtered, has compelled Prime Minister Narendra Modi to take a legal step — putting the IWT “in abeyance”. This is not about water alone. It is about principle, sovereignty and the right to protect one’s people. International law is clear: when a treaty’s foundational conditions collapse — or when one party persistently breaches it — the other party has the right to suspend or withdraw.
A country that repeatedly enables attacks on innocent civilians should forfeit the benefits of a legal arrangement designed for peaceful cooperation. The IWT is not a river-sharing agreement in isolation; it is a mechanism of trust, and trust has been systemically dismantled.
Moreover, the world is not unfamiliar with treaty withdrawals. The US unilaterally exited the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019 — citing national security threats both times. Sovereign states are entitled to defend themselves when cooperation becomes a cover for aggression. Why should India be any different?
Even within the bounds of the IWT, Pakistan has not acted in good faith. In fact, it has weaponized the IWT itself, abusing the treaty’s mechanisms to delay or sabotage Indian infrastructure projects and prevent India from utilising its legitimate share of the waters by repeatedly escalating minor engineering issues to international arbitration or adjudication. And still, India waited.
Now, India is signalling that endless patience should not be mistaken for weakness. Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) permits a state to suspend or withdraw from a treaty in the event of a material breach by the other party. International law also provides for a fundamental change in circumstances as a valid reason for treaty withdrawal, as laid out in Article 62 of the VCLT. India is not a party but the VCLT is reflective of customary international law.
However, India, despite citing both a fundamental change of circumstances and Pakistan’s material breach, has chosen neither to suspend nor withdraw from the IWT, deciding instead to place the treaty “in abeyance”, a term not formally defined in international law. The tentative step may suggest that the govt is seeking to deliver a strategic warning to compel behaviour change without burning diplomatic bridges just yet.
India has neither the intent nor the hydro-infrastructure to disrupt downstream flows. Its adversary is the Pakistani deep state, not the Pakistani people. India has thus made clear it will act responsibly, ensuring no humanitarian crisis is triggered.
Contrast India’s restraint and caution with China’s aggressive unilateralism. China has refused to negotiate a water-sharing treaty with any of its downstream neighbours. On the Brahmaputra, it is building a super-dam, the largest ever conceived, near the seismically active border with India, potentially creating a ticking water bomb.
Although India dwarfs Pakistan in terms of economic output, military spending and other material measures, successive Indian governments have allowed Pakistan to gore India with impunity by not pursuing a consistent Pakistan policy. Even today, after the Pakistani army chief’s recent call for civilizational war with India implied mortal combat, some policy-makers believe that India can compel a neighbour consumed by hatred to change behaviour. It is thus no wonder that — the latest horrific massacre notwithstanding — India appears loath to exit a treaty that hangs like the proverbial albatross from its neck.
India should offer an alternative water-sharing framework that is conditional on peace and verifiable conduct. The IWT model, based on unconditional trust, with India left to bear the burdens without any benefits, has failed.
More fundamentally, without India mustering the political will to impose sustained and multifaceted costs, Pakistan will remain Ground Zero for the international terrorist threat. India’s restraint has been historic. Now, history demands resolve.
U.S. Vice President JD Vance talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a meeting in New Delhi, India, Monday, April 21, 2025. (AP)
President Trump’s return to the White House is reshaping America’s foreign policy with a nationalist, protectionist edge. While this shift has frayed relationships with some traditional allies — especially in Europe, whose importance for U.S. policy appears to be eroding — the dynamics in Asia tell a different story.
American ties with key Asian partners like Japan and South Korea remain steady. And Washington is rebuilding a once-strained relationship with India, the world’s largest democracy and an increasingly pivotal power in the Indo-Pacific.
President Joe Biden failed to grasp the long-term strategic significance of the U.S.-India partnership. His administration prioritized outreach to China, resumed indulgence of Pakistan, welcomed the overthrow of an India-friendly government in Bangladesh and stayed largely silent on Chinese encroachments on Indian borderlands, which triggered a tense Sino-Indian military standoff that has still not been fully resolved. These moves, coupled with ideological posturing, brought bilateral ties to a low point.
The change in administration, however, has opened the door for a course correction. Both nations are now working to reestablish mutual respect and trust. Vice President JD Vance’s visit to India this week — accompanied by Second Lady Usha Vance, their children and senior administration officials — signals a new chapter in the relationship.
In a sign of renewed counterterrorism cooperation, the FBI last week arrested a Sikh militant accused of involvement in multiple terrorist attacks in India. Meanwhile, India, one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, has committed to liberalizing trade with the U.S., following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s White House visit in February. Modi, notably, was among the first world leaders to meet Trump after his return to office.
India’s appeal to American businesses is rising, especially as China’s economy falters and its demographic decline deepens. Long before the U.S. rekindled its trade war with Beijing, India’s massive consumer market was emerging as a vital alternative.
During Modi’s visit, he and Trump set an ambitious goal: more than doubling bilateral trade to $500 billion. The first phase of a U.S.-India trade agreement, expected to be finalized before Trump’s visit to India in the fall for the Quad grouping summit, is likely to see India slash tariffs on a wide range of American imports.
The Biden-era drift is clearly being reversed. Washington has cast Vance’s India trip as a key diplomatic mission aimed at strengthening strategic and economic ties with a nation that, like the U.S., views China as its principal adversary.
A robust India is key to maintaining a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, where China seeks regional hegemony. The first Trump administration recognized India’s central role by giving the country pride of place in its “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy.
Indeed, U.S.-India relations flourished in Trump’s first term. In 2019, Trump joined Modi at a massive rally in Houston attended by 50,000 Indian Americans and numerous U.S. lawmakers. The following year, Trump addressed more than 100,000 people at a rally in Ahmedabad, India — still the largest audience for any American president, at home or abroad. “America loves India, America respects India and America will always be faithful and loyal friends to the Indian people,” Trump declared.
The personal rapport between Trump and Modi — both unapologetic nationalists — has proven durable. That relationship is now instrumental not only in restoring bilateral ties but also in nudging India to reduce its relatively high tariffs. Although India cut some tariffs ahead of Modi’s February visit, Trump responded with a 27 percent tariff hike on Indian goods earlier this month as part of his global tariff campaign, before announcing a 90-day pause on all “reciprocal tariffs” to allow negotiations to proceed.
Trade remains a flashpoint. Trump’s “America First” agenda often collides with Modi’s “Make in India” initiative. At their joint White House news conference, Modi even borrowed from Trump’s own slogan, vowing to “Make India Great Again.”
Still, tensions that flared under Biden are beginning to ease. The arrest of the Sikh militant followed a Trump-Modi joint statement pledging “decisive action” against elements that “threaten public and diplomatic safety and security, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both nations.”
For the U.S. and India to coordinate effectively to keep the Indo-Pacific “free and open,” they must reconcile their policies toward India’s neighborhood. The divergence was stark under Biden, whose administration aided military-backed regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh while trying to oust Myanmar’s junta — moves that undercut regional stability. The Trump administration is now reviewing these policies with an eye toward coherence and consistency.
Vance’s visit, following a similar trip by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, underscores that the U.S.-India relationship is already bouncing back. Vance’s discussions with Modi are expected to deepen cooperation in areas ranging from strategic technology to defense interoperability, with both sides welcoming the “significant progress” toward a trade deal.
There is also a personal dimension to Vance’s diplomacy. Usha Vance, the first Hindu second lady in American history, is the daughter of Indian immigrants. The Indian American community — one of the fastest-growing and most prosperous immigrant groups in the U.S. — commands outsized influence, boasting the highest median household income among all ethnic groups.
Looking ahead, a potential Trump-brokered end to the Ukraine war would allow the U.S. to shift focus toward the Indo-Pacific, further energizing its partnership with India. This pivot would accelerate U.S.-India collaboration on critical and emerging technologies and enhance interoperability between the two countries’ armed forces, especially in naval and air operations.
Trump’s return to power is not merely restoring the U.S.-India relationship — it is revitalizing it with fresh urgency, grounded in mutual interests and shared concerns. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the epicenter of global power competition, the world’s oldest and largest democracies are once again aligning their strategies and rediscovering their common cause.
A succession of U.S. presidents pursued global expansion, resulting in about 750 American military bases today in at least 80 countries. Even Biden reportedly sought to acquire a Bangladeshi island in the Bay of Bengal. But Trump is unique in articulating his expansionist goals openly.
Painting by Clyde De Land of the birth of the Monroe Doctrine
President Trump’s second term is proving even more disruptive than his first, especially for the world order.
In under 100 days, he has upended international norms, challenged key alliances and reasserted American power with blunt confidence. The emerging pattern reveals something deeper: a revival and global extension of the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine.
First declared in 1823 by President James Monroe, the Monroe Doctrine sought to prevent European powers from meddling in the Americas. Its premise was simple: The Western Hemisphere was a U.S. sphere of influence.
Under Trump, this idea is being reinterpreted, expanded and aggressively enforced — not just in the Americas but across the broader Western world.
Trump first cited the Monroe Doctrine in a 2018 speech at the United Nations, calling it “the formal policy of our country.” Now in his second term, he has moved from rhetoric to implementation. His administration has not only reasserted U.S. dominance in Latin America but is also reshaping relations with Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, Canada and Arctic territories in ways that suggest a new, hemispherically-unbound version of American primacy.
Nowhere is this shift more evident than in Trump’s trade policy. He has weaponized tariffs — not just as bargaining tools, but as permanent instruments of economic nationalism. The Trump administration views protectionism not as a temporary phase but as a structural pillar of American renewal. Tariffs, in this framework, are both revenue generators and geopolitical levers, including against allies.
Trump’s ambitions extend well beyond trade. He has flirted openly with territorial expansion, expressing interest in acquiring Greenland, taking over the Panama Canal and even calling the U.S.-Canada border “an artificial line of separation.” He has also floated the idea of permanently resettling the entire population of Gaza, some 2 million people, in nearby Muslim countries so that the U.S. could take over the Strip and develop it into “the Riviera of the Middle East.”
Such proposals echo the Manifest Destiny ethos of the 19th century — a belief in America’s God-given right to expand its control and reach across land and sea.
In his inaugural address, Trump explicitly evoked Manifest Destiny, framing American expansion as a natural and noble pursuit. “The U.S. will once again consider itself a growing nation — one that increases our wealth, expands our territory, builds our cities, raises our expectations, and carries our flag into new and beautiful horizons,” Trump declared. He cited President William McKinley, who annexed the Philippines and Puerto Rico, as a model for coupling tariffs with U.S. expansion.
The message is clear: Trump sees America not just as a global power, but as an entitled hegemon.
To be sure, Trump is not the first post-World War II U.S. president pursuing American expansion. It was because of his predecessors’ global expansion that there are about 750 U.S. military bases today in at least 80 countries. Even the Biden administration reportedly sought to acquire from Bangladesh a strategic island in the Bay of Bengal — an effort that then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina claimed contributed to her overthrow last August.
But Trump is unique in his openness. He articulates his expansionist goals without diplomatic euphemism, often with provocative bluntness that shocks allies and adversaries alike.
One of the starkest expressions of this worldview is Trump’s treatment of America’s traditional alliances. He sees allies free-riding on American security and exploiting U.S. generosity, regarding them as leeches on the American economy. He views NATO not as a mutual defense pact but as a burdensome arrangement whereby the U.S. foots the bill for ungrateful allies.
Nowhere is the transatlantic divergence more visible than in the Ukraine war. While Europe remains fixated on the Russian threat, Trump wants to end what he calls the “savage conflict” and reset relations with Moscow. China is significantly stronger than Russia in economic output, military spending and other strategic metrics, and the Trump administration’s leaked defense guidance calls China “the sole pacing threat.”
Trump’s pivot from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region will represent a major reallocation of American attention and resources. The goal is to free up bandwidth for countering China’s aggressive rise — even if that means leaving Europe to manage Russia largely on its own. This marks the first time since 1945 that the U.S. has considered pulling back from its European security commitments to focus elsewhere.
But perhaps most revealing is how Trump’s foreign policy now resembles an updated Monroe Doctrine extended to the entire Western world. His bid to buy Greenland, a NATO territory under Danish control, symbolizes this shift. Greenland is far from the Americas, but its Arctic position makes it a strategic asset — and a candidate, in Trump’s eyes, for U.S. acquisition.
In this reimagined doctrine, the West is no longer a community of shared values, but a zone of expected compliance under American leadership.
This ideological shift reframes the Monroe Doctrine from a hemispheric defense policy to a global framework of dominance. Trump is not merely reviving an old doctrine — he is globalizing it. Under “Monroe 2.0,” the Western world is to be managed, not merely defended, by Washington. This is set to transform all of America’s long-standing alliances.
As the “Trump Revolution” unfolds, allies and rivals alike are being forced to recalibrate. If this new doctrine persists, the world could face not just a reassertion of American power but a redefinition of the West itself, with the U.S. as both guardian and gatekeeper.
Since the Myanmar military’s overthrow of a civilian government in 2021, the US has taken a punitive approach to the country, emphasizing broad-based sanctions and aid to rebel groups. But far from promoting a democratic transition, this approach has perpetuated violence and suffering, while strengthening China’s strategic foothold.
Myanmar needs help. After more than four years of brutal civil war, the country has been hit by a 7.7-magnitude earthquake, the strongest it has suffered since 1946. The resulting humanitarian crisis is dire, and continues to escalate, but despite an extraordinary appeal for international aid from Myanmar’s military ruler, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the United States has largely failed to deliver.
To be sure, President Donald Trump has said that the US is “going to be helping” with the crisis response. But while China, India, and Russiamoved swiftly to provide emergency relief, including deploying rescuers and medical teams, the US has fallen far short. The Trump administration’s gutting of foreign-assistance programs – including mass firings and contract terminations at the US Agency for International Development (USAID) – is one reason why. A more important reason is that stringent US sanctions against Myanmar remain in place.
Even before the recent USAID cuts, the US was poorly positioned to deliver emergency aid to Myanmar. Since the military’s overthrow of a civilian government in February 2021, the US has taken a punitive approach to Myanmar. Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, implemented increasingly harsh sanctions, while providing “non-lethal” military aid to rebels seeking to overthrow the junta – policies that the Trump administration has so far upheld. Now several Democratic senators have urged sanctions waivers to allow quake relief to go to Myanmar.
In recent years, USAID assistance essentially has been channeled to rebel-controlled areas, where it has been used largely to establish local governance structures and provide emergency relief for internally displaced civilians. But the regions hardest hit by the earthquake remain under government control. America’s refusal to engage constructively with the junta has thus directly hampered efforts to deliver assistance where it is needed most.
More broadly, US policy toward Myanmar has done nothing to promote stability, let alone a democratic transition. On the contrary, while sanctions have done little damage to the military rulers, they have contributed to rampant lawlessness, enabling warlords, human traffickers, drug syndicates, arms dealers, and poachers to thrive. Myanmar has now surpassed Afghanistan as the world’s leading opium producer, and according to the Global Organized Crime Index, it has emerged as the “biggest nexus of organized crime,” with destabilizing spillover effects on neighboring Bangladesh, India, and Thailand.
US support for Myanmar’s fragmented resistance has compounded the human-rights catastrophe. Tellingly, the latest wave of Rohingya refugees are fleeing not from the military, which has historically committed all manner of atrocities against the minority, but from an anti-junta rebel group, the Arakan Army. So brutal are the rebels’ attacks that Rohingya militias now work with their former oppressors, the county’s armed forces.
Meanwhile, China’s strategic foothold in Myanmar is becoming stronger. Strangled by broad-based US-led economic sanctions, Myanmar’s leadership has had little choice but to allow China to exploit its vast natural resources, from natural gas and mineral ores to precious stones and gems like rubies and jade.
The US has made this mistake before. During Myanmar’s previous military dictatorship, the US pursued a punitive, isolating, sanctions-based policy for more than 20 years – and nothing changed (other than China gaining influence). It was only when then-President Barack Obama embraced strategic engagement, encouraging democratic reform with the easing of sanctions, that the tide began to turn. In 2015, three years after Obama became the first US president to visit the country, Myanmar elected its first civilian-led government in more than 50 years.
The US applied this lesson in Thailand, where, as in Myanmar, the military has traditionally been the dominant political force, having seized power 12 times in the past 90 years. When Thailand’s army chief staged a coup in 2014, the US pursued diplomatic engagement with the regime – an approach that ultimately helped facilitate a return to civilian rule in 2023.
The Trump administration should embrace a similar approach toward Myanmar today. This means, for starters, leveraging the earthquake as an opportunity to initiate limited engagement with the regime. Such engagement could allow for greater humanitarian access, improved de-escalation efforts, and enhanced security, particularly along Myanmar’s eastern border, where Chinese criminal networks operate cyber-scam centers that have stolen billions of dollars from overseas retirees and others (including in the US).
Moreover, the US should replace broad-based economic restrictions with targeted sanctions against individuals and entities directly responsible for human-rights violations. It should also roll back its military support for insurgents, which perpetuates violence, and increase direct humanitarian aid to foster stability. And it should work with ASEAN and other key regional actors, such as India and Japan, to advance a diplomatic conclusion of the civil war, guided by the recognition that a sustainable peace can be achieved only through engagement with all relevant parties – starting with Myanmar’s military.
Treating regime change in Myanmar as a moral crusade can end only one way: with the country spiraling further into chaos, to the benefit of transnational crime syndicates, narcotics traffickers, and America’s geopolitical adversaries. With a more pragmatic policy approach, however, the Trump administration can mitigate Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis, facilitate dialogue between the junta and opposition forces, and counter China’s growing influence in a strategically important country. The choice could not be clearer.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.
The US president has forced America’s friends and foes alike to reassess their strategic and economic options
US President Donald Trump holds up the executive order he signed imposing tariffs on imported goods at the Rose Garden of the White House, April 2, 2025
Since his return to the White House, US President Donald Trump has unleashed a blitz of policy actions that has shocked the Washington establishment and roiled international relations, including sending stock markets swinging sharply worldwide. Trump is playing tariff roulette and threatening to take control of the Panama Canal, Greenland, Gaza and even Canada, whose border with the US, he says, constitutes an “artificial line of separation.”
At home, the ‘deep state’ hobbled Trump’s first presidency and then concealed the cognitive impairment of his successor Joe Biden until it burst into public view with a ruinous debate performance. Trump’s second-term barrage of domestic policy actions has targeted ‘deep state’ institutions, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Justice, USAID, and the National Intelligence Program.
More fundamentally, Trump is seeking a seismic shift in American governance, including by downsizing the federal bureaucracy to cut waste and fraud. And by introducing significant shifts in US trade policies and foreign relations, he has sought to revitalise America’s economic and military security and arrest its relative decline. As part of that effort, he is seeking to end American entanglement in the armed conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.
The speed and scale of the changes introduced by Trump—from freezing foreign aid to imposing tariffs on US allies after calling them leeches on the US economy—is unprecedented in American modern history.
In less than 100 days in office, Trump has upended international rules and the post-World War II, US-led global system, as he seeks to remake patterns of international trade and cooperation, as well as rejigger the world order. He has left the world reeling from his actions, often referred to as the “Trump Revolution”.
Trump’s approach to the world is vividly different from the one he pursued in the first term. His new administration is more nationalistic, more protectionist and more clear-headed about what it seeks to achieve in its second term.
For example, tariffs are front and centre on Trump’s agenda as he seeks to revamp the global trading regime in an effort to secure American advantage.
To be sure, Trump is not the first American president to deploy tariffs as a weapon against trading partners. His predecessors, including Biden, also employed tariffs as a handy tool. Indeed, in the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, high tariffs were an American norm with trading partners.
Trump is seeking a seismic shift in American governance, including by downsizing the federal bureaucracy to cut waste and fraud. And by introducing shifts in US trade policies and foreign relations, he has sought to revitalise America’s economic and military security and arrest its relative decline
Through tariffs, Trump is seeking to reverse US deindustrialisation, which resulted from outsourcing manufacturing to China and other countries, devastating America’s industrial heartland. Today, China continues to rapidly accumulate economic and military power as an industrial powerhouse.
Trump’s tariffs seek to beat back the flood of imports and force American companies to invest in domestic production capacity and bring supply chains back to the US. Also, he is deploying tariffs as a negotiating instrument to extract concessions from trading partners. And some of the trading partners have already wilted under his pressure or threats.
Trump’s tariff-related actions are in keeping with what he promised in his inaugural speech. “I will immediately begin the overhaul of our trade system… we will tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich our citizens. For this purpose, we are establishing the External Revenue Service to collect all tariffs, duties and revenues,” he declared, adding that “nothing will stand in our way.”
While some of his tariffs are designed to be a negotiating tool, other tariffs are expected to stay in place as a regular source of revenue for the US—to help cut the trade deficit and balance the budget.
REMAKING THE WORLD
With its profound international impacts, Trump’s second term is reshaping global dynamics. A new world is being ushered in, with little prospect of a return to the world we had before. The policy shifts in Washington are compelling other countries to make necessary adjustments.
A key component of Trump’s agenda is to reshape global trade patterns by punitively employing the tariff instrument. The aim is to reduce reliance on foreign goods and bring manufacturing back to the US. While his administration asserts that the tariffs and other economic measures will encourage domestic investment, American households face potential price increases and income reductions.
While some countries, from India to Britain, have sought to cut trade deals with Washington, other affected nations are responding with retaliatory measures. All this indicates that global economic uncertainty will likely linger.
The fact is that the Trump administration’s focus on what it calls “fair trade” and “reciprocity” has resulted in several developments. One is increased trade tensions and potential tariff wars, threatening to disrupt global supply chains. There is also some movement away from free trade agreements (FTAs) by embracing more protectionist policies. As part of readjustment, some countries are seeking alternative trade partnerships or to strengthen regional trade blocs.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney (Photo: AFP)
Tensions between the US and Canada following Trump’s threats to annex Canada have altered the Canadian political landscape, including reviving the fortunes of the Liberal Party and helping Mark Carney to succeed Justin Trudeau as Prime Minister
Britain and the European Union (EU), for example, have stepped up efforts to clinch FTAs with India, one of the world’s largest markets and fast-growing economies. The outreach to India explains how Europe is attempting to establish stronger trade ties with the non-Western regions of the world.
The significant impacts from Trump’s policies are forcing Europe to make economic and defence readjustments.
US Vice President JD Vance shocked European leaders by questioning European values and then warning that Europe was at risk of “civilizational suicide”. Europe also received a jarring wake-up call in February from US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who warned that “the US will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency” and that Europe must take “responsibility for its own security” by leading “from the front” so that America prioritises “deterring war with China” in the Indo-Pacific region.
Alluding to the paradox that Europe today confronts, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said recently, “500 million Europeans [are] begging 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians,” adding that Europe today lacks not economic power but the conviction to be truly a global force.
However, the blunt warning from Washington to cut reliance on the US for European security is forcing Europe’s hand. The EU is encouraging member states to increase their military budgets and issue debt for defence purposes. This shift towards stepped-up militarisation is likely to stimulate European economies, with European defence stocks already surging. For example, two German armament companies, Rheinmetall AG and Thyssenkrupp AG, have seen their share prices double in the first quarter of this year.
Meanwhile, tensions between the US and Canada following Trump’s veiled threats to annex Canada as America’s “51st state” have altered the Canadian political landscape, including reviving the sagging fortunes of the Liberal Party and helping Mark Carney to succeed Justin Trudeau as prime minister. The economic woes from Trump’s protectionist policies, including the new tariffs, have pushed Canada towards political and economic recalibration, underscoring the broader impacts of the “Trump Revolution”.
Trump has also upended US energy policies and international environmental agreements.
Just hours after he was inaugurated, Trump signed an executive order—titled ‘Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements’—that directed immediate US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and other international climate commitments. And Trump’s new mantra of “drill, baby, drill” demands that more oil and gas be extracted in the US, thus keeping the world hooked on planet-warming fossil fuels. The US withdrawal from combating climate change has heightened concerns about the future among low-lying developing countries that are vulnerable to climate-related disasters.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance after Hegseth took his oath of office, January 25, 2025 (Photo: AP)
US Vice President JD Vance said Europe was at risk of ‘civilizational suicide’. Europe received a wake-up call in February from us Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who warned that ‘the US will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency’
Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s scepticism towards multilateralism, by impinging on the ability of nations to work together on global issues, could affect efforts to address transnational challenges, provide humanitarian aid and enforce international norms.
Trump’s unilateralism also risks weakening American soft power and diminishing the attractiveness of the US as a global leader. The perception of the US as a reliable partner and defender of international norms has already eroded.
It is apparent that Trump and his team are reviving the interventionist Monroe Doctrine in US relations with the Western Hemisphere. The 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, unveiled by then-President James Monroe, declared the Western Hemisphere a US sphere of influence to the exclusion of other powers. In a first-term speech at the United Nations in 2018, Trump had called the Monroe Doctrine “the formal policy of our country”.
Trump’s ‘Monroe Doctrine 2.0’ today may explain his expansionist itch, including taking back the Panama Canal and buying Greenland from Denmark or just seizing that resource-rich, semi-autonomous territory, located strategically near Arctic waters used by Russia and China.
Asked days before his inauguration whether he would rule out employing coercion to achieve his expansionist goals in Greenland or Canada, Trump had said, “I’m not going to commit to that,” adding, “You might have to do something.” Trudeau, before leaving office, said that Trump was seeking “a total collapse of the Canadian economy because that will make it easier to annex us.”
In his inaugural speech, Trump invoked the notion of “Manifest Destiny” which drove America’s 19th‑century territorial expansion as a God-given right. “The US will once again consider itself a growing nation—one that increases our wealth, expands our territory, builds our cities, raises our expectations, and carries our flag into new and beautiful horizons,” Trump declared in the speech. Trump also praised William McKinley, the president who grabbed the Philippines in the Spanish-American War, saying “McKinley made our country very rich through tariffs and through talent.”
To be sure, Trump is not the first post-World War II US president to pursue American expansion. Almost a quarter million American troops are presently stationed in at least 172 countries and territories because of the global expansion undertaken by his predecessors since the second half of the 1940s. The Biden administration, seeking a military base in the Bay of Bengal, reportedly sought to acquire St Martin’s Island from Bangladesh, a factor that Sheikh Hasina claims contributed to her ouster from power.
CDU leader and Germany’s incoming chancellor Friedrich Merz at the Bundestag, Berlin, March 18, 2025 (Photo: AFP)
The erosion of trust between the US and its allies has been dramatic. For example, Carney, Canada’s new Prime Minister, has declared that ‘the old relationship we had with the United States’ is now ‘over’, while Friedrich Merz, the incoming German Chancellor, has said that his government would seek ‘independence from the USA’
The difference is that, unlike his predecessors, Trump has publicly outlined his expansionist agenda. Trump isn’t scripted, as his freewheeling speeches and news conferences underscore, with his complex personality blending refreshing candour with deliberate combativeness and braggadocio.
Today, the Trump administration is clearly reviving the “spheres of influence” concept, at least in relation to America’s dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
More fundamentally, Trump’s preoccupation with the problem of allies free-riding on American security and exploiting US generosity is having wide-ranging impacts. It is transforming the Transatlantic, Trans-Pacific and US-Canadian Alliances, which have been built on trade interdependencies and close security ties, including American nuclear umbrella protection.
The erosion of trust between the US and its allies has been dramatic. For example, Carney, Canada’s new prime minister, has declared that “the old relationship we had with the United States” is now “over”, while Friedrich Merz, the incoming German chancellor, has said that his government would seek “independence from the USA.” French President Emmanuel Macron, meanwhile, has signalled that France could extend its small nuclear umbrella over Europe because the US may no longer be relied upon. Trump, for his part, has said that the EU was formed “to screw” the US.
The split in the Western camp has been reinforced by fundamental differences between the Trump administration and many European states over the Ukraine war, especially Washington’s efforts to normalise relations with Russia in an effort to end the US-Russian proxy war in Ukraine.
The present divergence in the official US and European perspectives on the war is rooted partly in the fact that, for America, China is the main threat while much of Europe views adjacent Russia, not distant China, as its primary threat. Seen through the European lens, the Chinese threat is somewhat alleviated by Russia’s location between Europe and China. (The majority of Russians actually live in the European part of Russia that makes up almost one-quarter of the country’s total area.)
Biden, while deepening US involvement in the Ukraine war, acknowledged in his national security strategy that China, with its resolve and capability to surpass the US as the foremost world power, is America’s primary challenger. Trump, meanwhile, has portrayed his effort to end “the savage conflict in Ukraine” in altruistic terms—for the good of the world—but, in reality, he is seeking to cut America’s losses and prioritise the China challenge.
CHINA IS THE MAIN TARGET
Trump’s administration is seeking to shift US strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, the world’s economic and geopolitical hub where America’s global pre-eminence is at stake. Ending the Ukraine war would free US military resources for the Indo-Pacific, particularly from Europe, where over 100,000 American troops remain stationed. The war, far from advancing the US objective to degrade Russia’s military power and derail its economy through unprecedented sanctions and military aid to Ukraine, is distracting Washington from more pressing challenges and promoting an unholy Sino-Russian alliance against America.
America’s status as the world’s preeminent power is under increasing challenge not from Russia, whose revanchist ambitions are largely confined to what it calls its “near abroad” (or the former Soviet space), but from a globally ascendant China. In this light, extricating the US from the Ukraine war and prioritising deterrence against Beijing makes strategic sense.
Today, the Trump administration is working to reorient the US military architecture towards the Indo-Pacific to prepare for and win a potential war with China, including deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan, according to the leaked ‘Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance’ signed by Hegseth.
“China is the [Defense] Department’s sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese <fait accompli> seizure of Taiwan—while simultaneously defending the U.S. homeland is the Department’s sole pacing scenario,” Hegseth wrote in the guidance. In planning contingencies for a major power war, the US, according to the guidance, will consider conflict only with China, while leaving the Russia threat largely to European allies to address.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing, May 16, 2024 (Photo: Reuters)
America’s status as the world’s preeminent power is under increasing challenge not from Russia, whose revanchist ambitions are largely confined to what it calls its ‘near abroad’, but from a globally ascendant China. In this light, extricating the US from the Ukraine war and prioritising deterrence against Beijing makes strategic sense
Trump, in his first term, reversed the 45-year US rapprochement with Beijing by identifying China in his national security strategy as an adversary and initiating a trade war with it by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods. This marked a significant shift towards a more confrontational approach.
Now, in his second term, Trump’s policies are increasingly focused on countering China. The new rounds of tariffs imposed since February reflect this shift, as does his emphasis on ending the Ukraine war in order for the US to pivot to the Indo-Pacific.
A recent Trump-signed memorandum on America’s investment policy was more about the China threat than about anything else. Singling out the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a foreign adversary directing investments in American companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies, it said that “PRC-affiliated investors are targeting the crown jewels of US technology, food supplies, farmland, minerals, natural resources, ports and shipping terminals.” The memorandum has proposed imposing several economic restrictions—from stopping US companies and investors from investing in industries that advance Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy to preventing “PRC-affiliated persons from buying up critical American businesses and assets.”
Trump has repeatedly described himself as a dealmaker, and he appears open to cutting deals with Beijing that would help reduce China’s huge trade surplus with America. His approach to China will be very different from Biden’s Cold War-style Russia policy. Trump is likely to seek to limit the influence and power of China without resorting to open hostility.
Instead of broad sanctions, Trump will likely deploy targeted economic restrictions, thus permitting continued engagement with Beijing in less sensitive areas while still applying pressure where needed.
Leveraging tariffs and trade policies to disrupt China’s export-driven economy could compel Beijing to negotiate on fairer terms or risk shrinking market access. Trump could also incentivise American companies to reshore manufacturing through tax breaks or subsidies, further weakening China’s role as the world’s factory.
The Trump administration has begun tightening controls on technology and capital flows to China. Such curbs could hinder Beijing’s ability to innovate in key industries. Washington has also proposed greater scrutiny of Chinese investments in US technology sectors to limit China’s access to American intellectual property.
The American military posture in the Indo-Pacific, for its part, is likely to be defined by deterrence, not provocation. Strengthening US alliances in the Indo-Pacific, especially with India, Japan and Australia, would create a formidable counterbalance to Chinese expansion through geopolitical encirclement.
In conclusion, the consequences of the ‘Trump Revolution’ are still unfolding, but many countries are beginning to reassess their strategic and economic positions.
Trump’s dramatic reorientation of US foreign policy, with its maelstrom of actions and responses, including recriminations and alienation, is having significant international impacts. This is apparent from the emerging shifts in global trade, geopolitical alignments, defence strategies, and environmental commitments. The impacts are being accentuated by Trump’s rejection of both the logic of multilateralism and any self-restraints on the exercise of American power.
Nations worldwide today are navigating the developments unleashed by the ‘Trump Revolution’, seeking to readjust their policies and strategies in response to the changing geopolitical and geo-economic landscape.
Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of two award-winning books.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, bottom left, stands to applause as he attends the closing ceremony of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Monday, March 10, 2025. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan)
A succession of American presidents since Richard Nixon aided China’s rise, inadvertently spawning the greatest strategic adversary the U.S. has ever faced.
It was President Trump who, in his first term, reversed the 45-year U.S. rapprochement with Beijing by identifying China in his national security strategy as an adversary and initiating a trade war with it by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods. This marked a significant shift towards a more confrontational approach.
But does Trump now risk playing into China’s hands by freezing much of U.S. foreign aid and upending decades-old alliances?
Trump’s critics argue that his assertive unilateralism on trade and foreign policy erodes American influence while potentially opening the door for Beijing to strengthen ties with nations traditionally in Washington’s orbit. The White House’s tariff plans against key trading partners, possibly raising duties to levels unseen in decades, could also weaken crucial alliances. Additionally, Trump’s freeze on foreign aid creates a vacuum for China to expand its international footprint, particularly in Africa.
At the same time, Trump’s policies are increasingly focused on countering China. The new rounds of tariffs imposed since February reflect this shift, as does the president’s emphasis on ending the Ukraine war to shift U.S. strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific.
Over the years, various U.S. policies that aided China’s rise were initially driven by strategic interests but ultimately produced unintended consequences. By coopting China in an informal anti-Soviet alliance during the latter half of the Cold War, Washington created a two-against-one competition that contributed to Soviet imperial overstretch and ultimately to the USSR’s collapse.
But in breaking China’s isolation and granting it access to Western markets and technology, often by outsourcing manufacturing, Washington also facilitated China’s rise as an economic and military powerhouse.
Instead of spurring political liberalization, as many American policymakers had hoped, China’s integration into the global economy spawned a more repressive state system. The Chinese Communist Party used economic growth to tighten political control and expand its military capabilities, turning economic strength into strategic leverage.
Since the 1990s, U.S. sanctions against other countries have frequently played into China’s hands, as Beijing has adeptly exploited opportunities arising from the isolation of sanctioned states. American-led sanctions, for instance, have pushed resource-rich Myanmar and Iran into China’s arms. China has become the almost exclusive buyer of Iranian oil at steep discounts, while also emerging as Iran’s top investor and security partner, and U.S. sanctions are compelling Myanmar to deepen ties with Beijing.
The Biden presidency illustrated how overuse of sanctions can accelerate China’s global expansion. Unprecedented American-led Western sanctions against Moscow after the invasion of Ukraine, including the weaponization of international finance, have turned Beijing into Russia’s de facto banker. China has capitalized on this shift by expanding the international use of the yuan, with Russia generating much of its export earnings in Chinese currency and keeping the proceeds largely within China.
By forcing Russia to pivot to China, Biden’s sanctions inadvertently helped solidify a strategic Sino-Russian alliance against America. Trade between China and Russia surged from $108 billion in 2020 to $245 billion last year. In return for giving Russia an economic lifeline, Beijing has gained access to some of Moscow’s most advanced military technologies, previously sold only to India.
American policymakers now face the urgent task of driving a wedge between China and Russia, whose historically complex relationship has oscillated between cooperation and conflict.
More broadly, the global order is undergoing a profound transition, shifting away from the post-World War II, U.S.-led system toward an uncertain new reality. Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya recently described the current period as a “turning point in history” while hosting trilateral discussions with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts. The very fact that two close U.S. allies — Japan and South Korea — are engaging in strategic dialogues with China underscores how nations are adopting hedging strategies amid geopolitical uncertainty.
Against this backdrop, the unintended consequences of the Trump administration’s policies — particularly its war on multilateralism — risk strengthening China’s hand. China’s ability to act as the world’s largest and most unforgiving government lender, combined with its aggressive “carrots and sticks” diplomacy, continues to expand its global influence.
To counter China’s accumulation of power, the Trump administration must adopt a multifaceted approach that blends economic, diplomatic, military and technological strategies.
Leveraging tariffs and trade policies to disrupt China’s export-driven economy could compel Beijing to negotiate on fairer terms or risk shrinking market access. The administration could also incentivize American companies to reshore manufacturing through tax breaks or subsidies, further weakening China’s role as the world’s factory.
Tightening controls on technology and capital flows to China could hinder Beijing’s ability to innovate in key industries. Increased scrutiny of Chinese investments in U.S. technology sectors would limit its access to American intellectual property.
Strengthening alliances in the Indo-Pacific — particularly through closer ties with democracies such as Japan, India and Australia (key players in “the Quad”) — would create a formidable counterbalance to Chinese expansion through geopolitical encirclement.
Furthermore, expanded deployment of U.S. troops and advanced weaponry in the Indo-Pacific would strengthen deterrence against China. The recent American deployment of the 1,200-mile, land-based Typhon missile system in the northern Philippines exemplifies this approach by putting key Chinese military and commercial centers within striking range.
The administration must ensure that short-term dealmaking does not undermine long-term American objectives. A coherent, sustained strategy — rather than erratic policy shifts — is critical to slowing China’s rise without triggering a major conflict. Trump must resist transactional diplomacy and instead prioritize long-term strategic goals so that the U.S. can more effectively counterbalance China’s growing influence while reinforcing its own global preeminence.
Early signs suggest that US President Donald Trump’s policy on Taiwan is set to move in a more resolute direction, as his administration begins to take a tougher approach toward America’s main challenger at the global level, China. Despite its deepening economic woes, China continues to flex its muscles, including conducting provocative military drills off Taiwan, Australia and Vietnam recently.
A recent Trump-signed memorandum on America’s investment policy was more about the China threat than about anything else. Singling out the People’s Republic of China as a foreign adversary directing investments in American companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies, it said that “PRC-affiliated investors are targeting the crown jewels of US technology, food supplies, farmland, minerals, natural resources, ports and shipping terminals.”
The memorandum has proposed imposing several economic restrictions — from stopping US companies and investors from investing in industries that advance Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy to preventing “PRC-affiliated persons from buying up critical American businesses and assets.”
More broadly, in seeking to end the Ukraine war, Trump has made clear his administration’s intent to shift the US strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, a pivotal region that is likely to shape the new world order. As US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it, Europe must take “responsibility for its own security” so that the US prioritizes “deterring war with China in the Pacific.”
The White House’s blunt message is that Europe, reliant on the US for its security, must shape up before many of the more than 100,000 American troops stationed there begin to be shipped out for likely deployment in the Indo-Pacific. Referring to China, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said, “In the Indo-Pacific, they are trying to drive us out.”
Meanwhile, a recent subtle but potentially significant change in the state department fact-sheet on Taiwan has attracted much attention, with Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung welcoming the “support and positive stance on US-Taiwan relations demonstrated in the relevant” document.
The state department dropped a highly symbolic phrase from its updated Taiwan fact-sheet. The fact-sheet from the previous administration of President Joe Biden had stated, “We do not support Taiwan independence.” This sentence was removed. And in another tweak to the previous US position, the new administration, while cautioning against “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side,” stated that it advocates a resolution of the Sino-Taiwan issue by “peaceful means, free from coercion.”
Rubio later said in a TV interview that, “We are against any forced, compelled, coercive change in the status of Taiwan.” Asked how the US under Trump would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Rubio stated, “America has existing commitments that it has made to prevent that from happening and to react to it, and that would be executed on.”
Against this backdrop, the US under Trump is less likely to stand idly by if China were to invade Taiwan. Unlike his predecessor Biden, who projected weakness partly because of his frail health, Trump claims to be a strong leader. Indeed, he has repeatedly asserted that, had he been the president in 2022, Russia would not have invaded Ukraine.
Effective deterrence, however, requires a credible US threat, backed up by requisite military deployments, of imposing significant costs on China if it attacks Taiwan.
A comprehensive strategy involving military, diplomatic, economic and information-warfare measures is necessary to deter Chinese aggression and maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. If deterrence were to fail, forcing the US to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the resulting war between the US and a near-peer adversary, as Rubio admitted, “would be a terrible thing for the world, and it would be a bad thing for China too.”
A multifaceted US-led strategy to deter a Chinese attack should include stepped-up arms sales to Taipei, building greater military interoperability with Taiwanese forces, strengthening Taiwan’s cybersecurity defenses and helping Taiwan to develop asymmetric warfare capabilities against China, while America increases the frequency and visibility of its military patrols in the Taiwan Strait and the wider region.
Strategic clarity to put China on notice should include clear and unambiguous statements that the US will defend Taiwan in the event of an attack, as well as high-level diplomatic visits to Taipei to demonstrate American support and commitment. The US must also help counter Chinese disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining Taiwan’s democracy and eroding support for Taipei in the international community.
According to a recent Chinese foreign ministry statement, “Gaza belongs to the Palestinians and is an integral part of the Palestinian territory.” But likewise Taiwan belongs to the Taiwanese and is integral to their territorial rights, distinct identity and democratic freedoms.
Biden’s troubled legacy left the Trump administration a mess in Ukraine and difficult policy choices on China’s aggressive expansionism. The only real winner from the Ukraine war has been China, which dwarfs Russia in terms of economic output, military spending and other material measures.
The last thing Trump would want is his legacy to be defined by failure to deter an overt Chinese aggression against Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not only shatter Trump’s image as a strong leader but also undermine his “Make America Great Again” movement. In this light, extricating the US from the Ukraine war and prioritizing deterrence against China make strategic sense.
Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).
Chinese hostesses hold national flags having a light moment on Tiananmen Square as delelates attend the closing ceremony of the National People’s Congress held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Tuesday, March 11, 2025. (AP Photo/Andy Wong)
There are two ways for a powerful nation to contain an adversary that is increasingly challenging its core interests. One is to contain the foe by seeking to isolate and squeeze it, including bringing its economy and security under pressure through sanctions and strategic alliances. The other way is to seek discreet containment while maintaining normal relations in trade and diplomacy.
President Trump’s pivot to rein in an expansionist China is just beginning, but it is already apparent that his approach — in a significant departure from Cold War-era overt antagonism or former President Joe Biden’s Russia policy — is likely to embrace the second path. Trump’s approach will seek to limit the influence and power of China without resorting to open hostility.
Trump has sought early on in his term to halt what he has called the “senseless war” in Ukraine, largely because the conflict has diverted American attention from pressing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and made China the big winner. A Russia-Ukraine ceasefire would allow the U.S. to shift strategic focus and military resources from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, a pivotal region in shaping the new global order.
This was underscored by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s Feb. 12 warning to Europe that “the U.S. will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency” and that Europe must take “responsibility for its own security” by leading “from the front” so that America can prioritize “deterring war with China” in the Indo-Pacific.
America’s 80-year run as the world’s preeminent power is under increasing challenge not from Russia, whose revanchist ambitions are largely confined to what it calls its “near abroad,” but from a globally ascendant China. In fact, with Russia preoccupied with Ukraine, China — despite its “no limits” partnership with Moscow — is quietly chipping away at traditional Russian spheres of influence, including drawing Central Asia’s former Soviet republics into its orbit. And in the Indo-Pacific, China is increasingly flexing its muscles, as shown by its recent military drills off Australia, Vietnam and Taiwan.
The Trump administration is working toward clamping down on China’s access to advanced U.S. technology as well as on Chinese investments in critical American infrastructure. A recent White House memorandum to departments and agencies sought to remake the economic relationship with Beijing through a series of proposed restrictions, including thwarting the use of U.S. capital to modernize the Chinese military and blocking Chinese investment strategies to secure “cutting-edge technologies, intellectual property and leverage in strategic industries.”
The memorandum also called for new or expanded restrictions on American investments in China in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum, biotechnology, hypersonics, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, directed energy and other areas important to Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy.
Trump views himself as a dealmaker, and he appears open to cutting deals with Beijing that help reduce China’s huge trade surplus with America. Blending flattery with hardball tactics, Trump has periodically lavished praise on Chinese leader Xi Jinping, including calling him “a brilliant man.”
But Trump has already escalated his tariff war. An extra 10 percent duty on Chinese goods this month is on top of a 10 percent tariff slapped by Trump in early February. And this combined 20 percent duty adds to tariffs of up to 25 percent on Chinese imports that Trump imposed in his first term.
One reason for Trump’s hardline approach toward Canada and Mexico is that these countries serve as back doors for low-cost Chinese goods to enter America duty-free. The concern over origins of goods also may explain why Trump’s suspension of his 25 percent tariffs on Canadian and Mexican products applies just to goods covered under the 2020 North American trade accord, thus leaving a lot of products still subject to the new high duties. The 2020 agreement’s rules permit duty-free entry of goods into the U.S. only if the products have been largely made with North American components.
The China angle is also apparent from Trump’s recent 25 percent tariffs on foreign steel and aluminum. These tariffs, while penalizing U.S. allies, seek to target China. Faced with a slowing economy, including stubborn disinflationary pressure and a deepening real estate crisis, China has dumped much of its excess steel and aluminum output in the markets of American allies and partners, which, in turn, have exported large shares of their own more-expensive production to the U.S.
More fundamentally, Trump’s early moves appear designed to beat back the Chinese export tsunami. In an untenable situation, China produces 31 percent of the world’s manufactured goods but accounts for just 13 percent of global consumption. A U.S.-led pushback against China’s increasing reliance on exports for growth could deepen its current economic woes, slowing down its rapid military buildup and crimping its debt-trap diplomacy.
As part of an apparent strategy for “containment with a smile,” Trump will continue to express the importance of “getting along with China,” as he did soon after returning to the White House. But we can expect his administration to pursue economic engagement with strategic restraints, including limiting Beijing’s access to critical technologies, rigorously screening Chinese investments and prodding American businesses to step up efforts to diversify supply chains away from China.
Deploying targeted economic restrictions rather than broad sanctions will permit continued engagement in less sensitive areas while still applying pressure where needed.
The U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific, for its part, is likely to be defined by deterrence. While shunning provocative actions that could escalate tensions, the Trump administration is expected to strengthen deterrence to prevent aggression, including against an increasingly vulnerable Taiwan.
The strategy will likely seek to ensure that the adversary feels the walls closing in — without feeling the punch.
Disagreement about how to end the Ukraine War is upending the transatlantic relationship, transforming Europe’s approach to its own security, and deepening divisions between the Global South and the West. With the conflict having reached a stalemate, a realistic approach to peace negotiations is essential.
At a time of rising geopolitical tensions and deepening global fragmentation, the Ukraine war has proved particularly divisive. From the start, the battle lines were clearly drawn: Russia on one side, Ukraine and the West on the other, and much of the Global South hoping only for the conflict to end. Now, however, alignments are shifting. Whether this will advance efforts to resolve the conflict and strengthen global stability remains to be seen.
After more than three years, Europe – including the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Norway – remains largely steadfast in its support of Ukraine. The largest armed conflict in its neighborhood since World War II has deeply affected the European psyche, as it has challenged basic assumptions about continental security and revived the specter of nuclear annihilation that loomed over Europe throughout the Cold War. The prevailing view has always been that a Russian “victory” – including a peace deal that ceded some Ukrainian territory to Russia – would amount to an “existential threat.”
The United States, however, has decided that it no longer wants to “pour billions of dollars” into what Secretary of State Marco Rubio calls a “bloody stalemate, a meat-grinder-type war.” So, US President Donald Trump is seeking to negotiate a peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin. To press Ukraine to accept the concessions such an agreement will undoubtedly entail, the Trump administration suspended and later resumed military aid and intelligence support.
This is not about ending a “savage conflict” for “the good of the world,” as Trump claims. While years of sanctions were supposed to drain Russia, economically and militarily, to America’s benefit, they bolstered an unholy Sino-Russian alliance against the West, while sustaining a conflict that kept US attention and resources in Europe. With his push for a peace deal in Ukraine, Trump is seeking to cut America’s losses and shift its strategic focus and military resources toward the Indo-Pacific – the home of America’s real enemy: China.
As Trump’s predecessor Joe Biden recognized, only China has the resolve and capability to surpass the US as the foremost world power. Yet the US still has more than 100,000 troops stationed in Europe. That is why US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently warned that the US can “no longer tolerate” an “imbalanced” transatlantic relationship that “encourages dependency.” Europe must take “responsibility for its own security,” Hegseth said, so that the US can focus on “deterring war with China.”
The question is whether Europe is capable of managing its own security. The answer probably should be yes. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently pointed out, Europe does not lack economic strength. Nor does it lack people: there are “500 million Europeans begging 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians.” What is missing is the European Union’s belief that it is a “global power.” The result is a rudderless Europe.
When it comes to supporting Ukraine, Europe has another critical shortcoming. As NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has noted, Europe lacks the necessary military-industrial base to provide sufficient arms support to Ukraine. That is why some, including Rutte, want to make a deal with the US: you keep supplying Ukraine with weapons, and we will foot the bill. Unless the Trump administration accepts such an arrangement, the British-French plan to build a “coalition of the willing” to do the “heavy lifting” on Ukrainian security will face powerful headwinds.
Meanwhile, the Global South is still struggling to cope with the Ukraine war’s economic fallout, especially sharply higher food and energy prices, which have had particularly devastating consequences for small and vulnerable developing countries with limited foreign reserves. Sri Lanka is a case in point. In the months that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, skyrocketing global prices drained its reserves, leading to fuel, food, medicine, and electricity shortages. The resulting economic meltdown pushed a frustrated population over the edge, triggering widespread protests that toppled a political dynasty.
This explains why developing countries remain largely unified in advocating an early negotiated end to the war, even if that means leaving a sizable chunk of Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation. If anything, calls for a peace agreement have grown since 2023, with even NATO member Turkey and close US ally Israel charting more independent stances on the conflict. It does not help that, for many countries in the Global South, the West’s contrasting responses to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza reek of hypocrisy.
For now, Ukraine and Europe remain committed to seeking peace through strength. But as admirable as Ukraine’s resistance has been, and as important as it is to defend the international legal principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that Russia has flagrantly violated, the fact is that the conflict has reached a stalemate, while the international fallout continues to grow. Rather than repeat the mistakes of the 1950-53 Korean War – in which an armistice agreement was reached only after two years of military deadlock – all parties should adopt a realistic approach to ending the war and negotiate accordingly.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.
Stagecraft and Statecraft 
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