The Warming Challenge

© Asian Age, May 5, 2007

The Climate is Insecure

Brahma Chellaney

The new
spotlight on climate change has helped move the subject into
the international mainstream. There is now growing
recognition that climate security needs to be an important component of international security, yet the global debate on rising greenhouse-gas emissions has still to move beyond
platitudes to agreed counteraction.

         The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report,
released on Friday, underscores the link
between energy and climate change but, other than emphasizing energy-efficiency measures and championing renewable energy, falls short of offering the world a politically workable mitigation
plan. Titled “Mitigation and Climate Change,” this summary report follows the
release of two other IPCC assessments earlier this year — one on “Physical
Science Basis” in February, and the
second on “Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability” last month.

         Climate change is a real and serious
problem, and its effects could stress vulnerable
nations and spur civil and political unrest. Yet the creeping politicization of the subject will only make it
harder to build international
consensus and cooperation on a concrete plan of action. One way politicization is
happening is by seeking to “securitize” the risks of climate change. Take the insistence of some to add climate security to the
agenda of the United Nations Security Council.

         The Security Council, at the instance of Britain,
held its first-ever debate on the security dimensions of climate change on April
17, with a number of delegates raising
doubts whether the Council was the proper forum to discuss the issue. In 2005,
as president of both the Group of Eight and European Union, British Prime Minister Tony Blair elevated global warming to the top of their agendas, and then the following year moved Secretary Margaret Beckett from the
environment to foreign portfolio. While London
needs to be commended for its new foreign-policy focus on climate change, its
effort to put the subject on the Security Council agenda could do more harm
than good to the cause it now fervently espouses.

No doubt there
is an ominous link between global warming
and security, given the spectre of resource conflicts, failed states, large-scale
migrations and higher frequency and intensity
of extreme weather events, such as cyclones, flooding
and droughts. Some developments would demand intervention
by the armed forces. Yet climate change, despite its potential to engender
greater intrastate and interstate conflict, can be tackled only through a
consensual international approach.

“Securitizing” climate change in
the context of global geopolitics may be a way to turn the issue from one
limited to eco-warriors to a subject of major international
concern. It may also be a way to facilitate the heavy-lifting needed to give the problem the urgency and financial resources it deserves. But having succeeded in
highlighting climate change as a
core international challenge, the
emphasis now has to shift to building
consensus on counteraction.

If climate
change were to become part of the agenda of the Security Council — a hotbed of
big-power politics — it would actually undercut such consensus building. With five unelected, yet permanent, members dictating the terms of the debate, we would get international divisiveness when the need is for enduring consensus on a global response to climate
change.

          In
today’s world, no international
mission can succeed unless it enjoys international
coherence and consensus. In fact, this is the key lesson one can learn from the
way the global war on terror now stands derailed, even as the scourge of
transnational terrorism has spread deeper and wider in
the world.

It is not a
surprise that Britain’s
attempt during its last month’s Security
Council presidency to put climate change on the Council agenda received a
frosty response from the Group of 77 developing
countries, China
and Russia.
Even the United States
wasn’t enthused by the idea. The G-77 protested over the “ever-increasing
encroachment by the Security Council” on the role of other UN bodies, including
the General Assembly, the Commission on Sustainable
Development and the UN Environment Programme.

Another invidious way politicization is happening is through exaggeration and embellishment of the
technical evidence on global warming.
Take the reports of the IPCC, a joint
body of the World Meteorological Organization and UN Environment Programme.
Ever since the IPCC in 1990 began releasing
its assessments every five or six years, the panel has become gradually wiser,
with its projected ocean-level increases
due to global warming on a continuing downward
slide.

From projecting in
the 1990s a 67-centimetre rise in
sea levels by the year 2100, the IPCC has progressively whittled down that
projection by nearly half to 38.5 centimetres now. Should the world be worried
by the potential rise of the oceans by 38.5 centimetres within the next 100 years? You bet. We need to slow down
such a rise. But if a rise of 38.5 centimetres does occur, will it mean catastrophe?
Not really.

If the world
didn’t even notice a nearly 20-centimetre rise of sea levels in the past century, a slow 38.5-centimetre ascent of
the oceans cannot be worse than the tsunami that struck the Indian
Ocean region in late
2004. Yet the climate-change scaremongering
has picked up steam — “the Maldives
would be wiped out,” “the Netherlands
would be under water,” “millions would have to flee Shanghai.”

Politicizing technical data only distorts reality. It also
makes it harder to work out a realistic response to a serious challenge. This
is especially so as the world has swung from one extreme to the other over
global warming: from indifference, if not neglect, to such unease among
some that conjuring up worst-case
scenarios has become a rage. Even as dire predictions proliferate, the IPCC’s
own 2007 estimates of the likely temperature increases
and heat waves owing to climate
change have changed little from its previous calculations in 2001.

Yet another facet
of the current geopolitics is that the term, climate change, is being stretched to embrace environmental degradation
unrelated to the effects of the build-up of greenhouse gases and aerosol concentrations in the atmosphere. What has climate change to do
with reckless land use, overgrazing,
contamination of water resources, overuse
of groundwater, inefficient or
environmentally unsustainable
irrigation systems, waste mismanagement or the destruction of forests,
mangroves and other natural habitats? Some of these actions, of course, may
contribute to climate variation but they do not arise from global warming.

Climate
change is being turned into a convenient, blame-all phenomenon. As if to
exculpate governments for reckless development and feign helplessness, all
environmental degradation is being
expediently hitched to climate change.

There
is danger that like the once-fashionable concept of human security, climate
change could become too diffused in
its meaning and thereby deflect international focus from tackling
growing fossil-fuel combustion, the
main source of man-made greenhouse
gases. Just as Britain
is now pushing the climate-change issue,
Canada
put human security on the Security Council agenda during
its Council presidency in February
1999. But by the time that concept was fleshed out by the UNDP, Human Security
Commission and UN Secretary-General in
succession, human security had become so broad and inclusive
as to loose its focus.

There is need
for greater clarity not only on the human causation of climate change, but also
on what we mean by “green.” There are countries that environmentally protect
their national territories in a good
way, only to treat the atmosphere as a municipal dump. In fact, states that
boast of high environmental standards, sadly, tend also to be high per-capita
emitters of greenhouse gases. Environmental-protection standards have to include respect for the atmosphere.

          Jumping on the
green bandwagon may be becoming
politically chic, but often it entails little more than lip service to climate
security. Even the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), set up under the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, has accomplished little more than providing
a greener reputation to some states and their greenhouse gases-spewing enterprises.

Under this mechanism, rich countries install
climate-friendly technology in poor
countries in return for securing carbon credits to exceed their own emission
targets. Such credits are traded in
an open cross-border secondary market where polluting
industries can buy them to offset
their emission levels or sell them when prices move up. The result has been the
emergence of a network transferring
to rich countries the emission rights of poor states in
a system of carbon colonialism.

Environmental grandstanding in the form of “cap and trade” only belittles the grim
challenge of climate change. What is needed is not a CDM-style re-jiggering of emission rights, but an across-the-board global
reduction in carbon-dioxide emissions.

If counteraction, however, is turned into
a burden-sharing drill among states,
we will fail because distributing
“burden” is a doomed exercise. Neither citizens in
rich states are going to lower their
living standards by cutting energy use, nor will poor nations sacrifice
economic growth, especially because their per-capita C0² emissions
are still just one-fifth the level of the developed world.

Instead of expending
political capital to securitize climate change, we need to find ways to address the energy dilemma. Given that global
warming is a natural corollary to
how we produce or use energy, climate change is actually the wrong end of the
problem to look at. About 80 per cent of the world’s energy still comes from
fossil fuels.

What is needed is a new political dynamic that is not about burden-sharing but about opportunity centred on radically
different energy policies. This means not only a focus on renewable energy and
greater efficiency, but also a more-urgent programme of research and
development on alternative fuels and carbon-sequestration
technologies. Technology may offer salvation.

© Asian Age, 2007

Climate Change and Security in Southern Asia: Understanding the National Security Implications

By Brahma Chellaney

RUSI Journal, April 2007, Vol. 152, No. 2

Encompassing the area from Afghanistan to the Indo-Burma frontiers and from Tibet to Sri Lanka, southern Asia is home to more than one-fifth of the human race, many of whom reside in low-lying areas. Three broad conclusions can be drawn: water issues are likely to aggravate intra- and inter-state tensions; rising sea levels are likely to spur intra- and inter-state migration; and human security is likely to be a casualty of climate change.

The world is headed towards greater climate change during the twenty-first century unless greenhouse gas emissions decrease substantially from present levels of increase and unless the general environmental degradation decelerates significantly. The degree and pace of future climate change flowing from human causation will naturally hinge on:

(i)                  The extent of the increase of greenhouse gases and aerosol concentrations;

(ii)                The impact of deforestation, land use, animal agriculture and other anthropogenic or human-driven factors on climate variation;

(iii)               The impact of natural influences (including from volcanic activity and changes in the sun’s intensity) on climate variation; and

(iv)              The extent to which temperature, precipitation, sea level and other climatic features react to changes in greenhouse-gas emissions, aerosol concentrations and other elements in the atmosphere.

Climate change is a worldwide phenomenon, and its ramifications cannot be analyzed in isolation in the context of any one region. Climate change, however, will carry varied security implications for different regions, depending on their geography, population density and state capacity, as well as the extent to which environmental degradation has occurred. It is in this context that the security-related implications of climate change for southern Asia are sought to be examined.

Climate Change in Southern Asia

Encompassing the area from Afghanistan to the Indo-Burma frontiers and from Tibet to Sri Lanka, southern Asia is home to more than one-fifth of the human race. Not only is it one of the most densely-populated regions of the world, but it also has low-lying countries like Bangladesh and the Maldives, whose survival could be threatened by a rise in sea levels resulting from an increase in the Earth’s average temperature. It faces scorching summer heat, and a rise of even two degrees Celsius average temperature could cause environmental harm to human, plant and animal habitat.

            The smallest country in Asia in terms of population, the Maldives, has the distinction of being the flattest state in the world – except where the level has been raised through construction, the ground level in the Maldives rises up to only 2.3 metres above sea level. When the Christmas of 2004 brought the tsunami to the Indian Ocean region, unfolding a disaster of epic proportions, the Maldives, although located far from the epicentre, suffered extensive damage. Many of its twenty-six atolls were savagely pummelled by the tsunami, which inundated parts of the archipelago. The tsunami altered the contours of some of the 1,192 Maldivian islets, less than a tenth of which are populated. Actually, the Maldives had already lost some territory over the past century earlier due to the slow increase in sea levels by as much as twenty centimetres.

In sharp contrast to the Maldives in southern Asia is the large, densely-populated Bangladesh, still struggling on the margins of globalization.  Bangladesh is double the size of Germany in terms of population. In fact, it has overtaken Russia as the seventh most populous state in the world.  Excluding island nations and city states, Bangladesh ranks as the world’s most densely-peopled country. Even in terms of its landmass, Bangladesh, with its 144,000-square-kilometre area, is anything but a small country.  Essentially a delta state through which two of Asia’s great rivers — the Ganges and Brahmaputra — flow into the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh is ravaged every year by monsoon floods and, from time to time, by cyclones.  

There are also other parts of southern Asia that are low-lying. They include coastal Sri Lanka, the Andaman and Nicobar Island chain of India and parts of the southern Indian coast. Next-door Indonesia has hundreds of vulnerable, low-lying islands.            

             Environmental degradation has continued unchecked in southern Asia, creating major problems relating to water resources, for example. Coupled with rapid urbanization, such degradation has already contributed to raising summer temperatures in major cities. While the magnitude of future climatic changes is difficult to predict, higher greenhouse gas concentrations are likely to influence precipitation and temperature patterns in southern Asia, as well as potentially raise sea levels.

             The challenges that confront southern Asia mirror the larger environmental issues that face Asia as a whole. Other than Japan, Asian states in general are doing poorly in reconciling development with environmental protection. In China, for example, ever-rising sand squalls not only blanket Beijing and other northern Chinese cities, but also threaten to speed up the spread of barren wasteland to the heartland. The desert’s advance from the arid northwest has been aided by government-led irrigated farming that has diverted water resources from the region’s ecological lifeline — the Shiyang River and its offshoots — and thereby left other land open to desertification. Respect for the environment and better management of natural resources are notions still not embraced actively by governments in Asia.

Asia is already facing a fresh-water crisis, with several hundred million Asians lacking ready access to drinking water. The geopolitical importance of Tibet, whose forcible absorption brought the new Chinese state to the borders of India, can be seen from the fact that most of the great Asian rivers originate there. If the demand for water in Asia continues to grow at the current rate, the inter-state and intra-state disputes over water resources could potentially turn into conflicts in the years ahead.

Deforestation, overgrazing, poor management of river basins and inefficient irrigation systems have aggravated fresh-water scarcity, with contamination also limiting access to clean water. To fight poverty, disease and pollution, southern Asia needs both to augment its water supplies through better distribution and management of resources and to improve its sanitation services. After all, clean water is the key to good health. However, the growing use of subterranean supplies of groundwater in southern and south-eastern Asia as well as China, due to inadequate availability of surface water, threatens to accelerate environmental degradation.

Large rapidly-developing economies like India and China, with their growing demands for resources, including energy and water, are bound to add pressure to the global ecosystems. Their growth trajectories will impact on efforts to slow down environmental degradation and global climate change. According to a 2005 estimate by China’s State Environment Protection Agency, 70 per cent of the water in five of the country’s seven major river systems is too contaminated for human use. Pollution of rivers is also a major problem in India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. Drinking-water supply in major southern Asian cities tends to be unfit for human consumption. Additionally, most cities report scarcity of water supply.

One key anthropogenic factor in Asia altering the environment and causing climate change is the increase in carbon dioxide levels due to emissions from fossil-fuel combustion. Coal will remain for the foreseeable future the dominant fuel for generating electricity in India and China. That is no different from the United States, which already has more than 600 coal-fired electric plants in operation and another 140 under planned or actual construction. Coal makes up 64 per cent of China’s primary energy consumption, with that country being the largest producer and consumer of coal in the world. In India, coal accounts for nearly 50 per cent of primary energy consumption.

China, which is currently completing one new coal-fired electric plant every month, has already emerged as the world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, after the United States. China, however, remains far behind America, which, with just over 4.5 per cent of the world’s population, discharges nearly a quarter — 24 per cent — of all emissions of carbon dioxide, according to the World Bank’s Little Green Data Book 2006.[1] According to the US Environmental Protection Agency, about 6.6 metric tonnes of greenhouse gases are emitted per person in America, placing that country number one in the world in terms of per capita emissions.

China and India at present rank much lower as per capita emitters of greenhouse gases. Yet such is their growing fossil-fu combustion that the International Energy Agency reported in November 2006 that China could surpass the United States as the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide by 2009, more than a full decade earlier than anticipated. Despite the emerging accent on renewable sources of energy as well as on commercial nuclear power, there is little prospect, however, of the world coming out of the fossil-fuel age.

A pressing imperative in southern Asia and China is to raise environmental standards through state support and enforcement. The environmental problems have been underscored by the growing air pollution, contamination of water, waste mismanagement, and the destruction of forests, mangroves and other natural habitats. Tellingly, the tsunami wreaked destruction with a vengeance on beaches that had been cleared of mangroves for development.

The November 2006 Stern report, commissioned by the British government, has rightly pointed to the need for the rapidly developing countries, such as China and India, to be part of a global effort to tackle the problem of climate change, even though the main responsibility (as it admits) lies with rich nations that must act now to start reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Researchers from the US Department of Energy have reported in the Geophysical Research Letters that China’s skies have darkened over the past fifty years, possibly due to haze resulting from a nine-fold increase in fossil-fuel emissions, and that the amount of solar radiation measured at more than 500 stations in China actually fell between 1954 and 2001, despite a decrease in cloud cover.[2]

The magnitude of future climate change, however, is uncertain and is likely to vary from area to area, and from coastal region to the hinterland. That makes it difficult to reach general conclusions on climate changes and their likely security implications in southern Asia. For example, several studies on the regional impact of climate change have shown that warming will be the least in the islands and coastal areas of the Indian subcontinent and the greatest in the inland continental areas of the subcontinent, except during the June to August monsoon period when reduced warming is likely to occur in the hinterland. The table below illustrates such a scenario:

In examining rainfall scenarios, the impact of climate change has to be assessed on the two main rainfall seasons — the South-West Monsoon in the summer and the North-East Monsoon in the winter. Several studies, including by the Climate Impact Group (1992) and R. Suppiah (1994), report the likelihood that global warming could actually strengthen monsoon circulation and bring increased rainfall in both monsoon seasons.[3] Changes in non-monsoon, or dry-season, rainfall have been more difficult to assess.

Projections of regionally averaged changes in rainfall for the years 2010 and 2070 are given in this table:  

The impact of climate change, however, can already be seen today. Winter 2006-07, for instance, was unusually mild in Tibet, ‘the roof of the world’, raising concerns about the accelerated melting of glaciers in the Himalayan region. Most major rivers of Asia originate in Tibet, including the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Yangtze, the Yellow, the Mekong, the Salween, the Karnali and the Sutlej. China’s state press reported record high temperatures in Tibet in early January 2007. For example, in the Amdo area, in the north-east of traditional Tibet, the temperature on 5 January 2007 reached 21.8°C – 1.7 degrees higher than the record set for the same day in 1996. Meteorological data in Tibet began to be collected only in 1970.

 The Tibetan plateau, seen as a barometer of climate conditions in southern and central Asia and in China, is experiencing, according to a January 2007 scientific survey quoted by the state-run People’s Daily, faster glacial melt and other ecological change. The survey, conducted by the Remote Sensing Department of the China Aero Geophysical Survey, warned that the Himalayan glaciers could be reduced by nearly a third by 2050 and up to half by 2090 at the current rate. The glacial melt, the survey reportedly went on to caution, would further deplete Tibet’s water resources — a lifeline for the peoples of southern Asia and China. 

Climate Change and Security in Southern Asia: Understanding the National Security Implications

Part II of paper published in

RUSI Journal, April 2007, Vol. 152, No. 2

Larger Security Implications

Despite its grave long-term implications, climate change has aroused more international political passion than a concrete global response to meet the threat it poses. Whatever the form and content of the Kyoto Protocol’s successor, climate change needs to be tackled at multiple levels — international, regional and national. However, no region, in whatever way defined, can constitute a sufficient unit to tackle climate change. For example, given Tibet’s role as the central water source for southern Asia and China, the destinies of the Indian subcontinent and the People’s Republic are inextricably linked.

The potential impact of climate change on the availability of water resources is a critical component of the challenge that stares at Asia, which, as a whole, has less fresh water — 3,920 cubic metres per person — than any other continent outside of Antarctica, according to a 2006 United Nations report.[4] This report states, when the estimated reserves of lakes, rivers and groundwater are added up, Asia has marginally less water per person than Europe or Africa, one-quarter that of North America, nearly one-tenth that of South America and twenty times less than Australia and Pacific islands. Yet Asia is home to more than half of the human population.

The Himalayan glaciers that feed Asia’s largest rivers — the Ganges, Indus, Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsampo), Mekong, Yangtze, Yellow and Sutlej — are clearly beginning to melt at a faster pace due to global warming. Glaciers are a natural storage system, releasing maximum water when it is most required — the hot summer months. The shrinking ice sheets, however, could threaten to seriously aggravate water imbalances and shortages in southern Asia and China. Additionally, as the melting accelerates, this phenomenon also threatens to cause extensive flooding in India and Bangladesh, followed by a reduction in river flows.

In southern Asia, climate changes are likely to bring about important shifts in temperature and rainfall patterns, a rise in sea levels, and a rise in the frequency and intensity of anomalous weather events, such as cyclones, flooding and droughts. These trends, cumulatively, would play havoc with agriculture (on which a majority of the national populations subsist) and also impact on hydropower generation and conservation strategies. The weaker the economic and social base and higher the reliance on natural resources, the more a community will be adversely affected by climate change. In other words, the poorer parts of southern Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal and Indian states like Assam and Bihar, are likely to bear the brunt.

While it is scientifically not possible to predict future events with any degree of certainty, a linear projection of ongoing climate changes can help us to draw some reasonable conclusions, with the aim of controlling anthropogenic factors contributing to climate change and to examine possible new practices and strategies whereby communities could be helped to adapt to the changes in ways that minimize the impact of climate change. In southern Asia, three broad conclusions can be drawn on the security implications of climate change:

(1)                          Given the region’s heavy dependence both on the glacially sourced water reserves of the Himalayas and on monsoon precipitation, climate changes are likely to intensify inter-state and intra-state conflicts in southern Asia over water issues. That, in turn, could exacerbate or re-open disputes over territories that are either the original source of water or through which major rivers flow, such as Tibet and Jammu and Kashmir.

(2)                          Sea-level rise and frequency of extreme weather events like hurricanes, droughts and monsoonal or cyclonic flooding are likely to spur greater inter-state and intra-state migration — especially of the poor and the vulnerable — from delta and coastal regions to the hinterland. Such an influx of outsiders would socially swamp inland areas, upsetting the existing fragile ethnic balance and provoking a backlash that strains internal and regional security. For example, India, officially home to sixteen million illegal Bangladeshi settlers, could see an influx of tens of millions of more Bangladeshis crossing over an international border too porous to patrol effectively. More broadly, the political stability and internal cohesion of nations could be undermined.  

(3)                          Human security probably would be the main casualty of climate change. Social and economic disparities are likely to intensify within the nation states of southern Asia as climatic change delivers a bigger blow to certain sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, and to low-lying coastal and delta areas. That will make the tasks of good governance and sustainable development more onerous.

Conflicts over Water Resources

Hundreds of millions of people in southern and south-eastern Asia and China are without access to safe drinking water. This situation would aggravate markedly if current projections of climate change come true. Loss of meltwater from rapidly thawing glaciers could drive, for example, large numbers of subsistence farmers into Indian and Chinese cities.

Inter-state and intra-state disputes over water resources are already an observable fact in southern Asia. While the Baglihar Dam epitomizes the latest India-Pakistan river water-sharing disagreement — which resulted in World Bank arbitration and the appointment of a neutral expert, who gave his final report in February 2007 largely in New Delhi’s favour — the intra-state disputes are illustrated by the row within Pakistan over Punjab’s appropriation of water resources to the detriment of downstream Sindh and Baluchistan, and by the various wrangles in India — between the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, Punjab and Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.

Southern Asia’s vulnerability to climate changes has been highlighted by its heavy dependence on the precipitation of an unpredictable monsoon and on river waters sourced from the glacier thaw in the mighty Himalayas. Climate change is bound to impact both on monsoon precipitation and on the availability of Himalayan water resources. As a result, profound socio-economic changes are likely to be triggered, for which the region is ill-prepared.

            If water becomes both an underlying factor in inter-state tensions and increasingly a scarce and precious commodity domestically, water wars will inevitably follow in southern Asia. Pakistan depends on rivers flowing in from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, although none originate there. Today, India controls only 45 per cent of the original state of Jammu and Kashmir, with Pakistan holding 35 per cent of it and China the remaining 20 per cent. But the part India holds has the Indus and its tributaries flowing into Pakistani-administered territories. Hard-line forces in Pakistan — the Islamists and the ruling military — have sought to keep the Kashmir issue alive by linking Islamabad’s desire to change the territorial status quo to the control of rivers that are the lifeblood of Pakistan.

The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty — a generous pact on India’s part — reserves 56 per cent of the catchment flow for Pakistan, with India getting the remainder flow. The treaty gives India the right to build hydroelectric plants on the three rivers reserved for Pakistan so long as they do not change the water flow downstream into Pakistan. The treaty has not only survived wars and crises, but also has enabled both countries to build extensive canal systems for irrigation.  Although the treaty is open-ended, India could be tempted to seek its re-negotiation on less generous terms, if climate changes exacerbate its own water and power shortages. Unilateral abrogation, of course, would trigger political turmoil.

Water resources also remain the crux of the spotlight on Tibet. China has created unease in India over persistent reports that it plans to divert the fast-flowing Brahmaputra River northwards to feed the arid areas in the Chinese heartland and to generate power. Beijing, however, has acknowledged that it is damming the Sutlej River in Tibet, but claimed that the dam is intended not to divert water northwards but to generate electricity. The Chinese project has been blamed for causing flash floods downstream in India’s Himachal Pradesh state.  

               The Tibetan plateau’s geopolitical importance is evident from the fact that Tibet, in the shape and size it existed independently up to 1950, comprises approximately one fourth of China’s land mass today, and has given Han China, for the first time in history, a contiguous border with Burma, India, Bhutan, Nepal and Kashmir. Just twelve years after the Sino-Indian military frontiers met for the first time in history, China invaded India after consolidating its hold over the Tibetan plateau.

            Tibet’s annexation also gave China access to the vast mineral wealth and water resources there. As China’s hunger for primary commodities has grown, so too has its exploitation of Tibet’s resources. The $6.2 billion China-Tibet railway from Gormu to Lhasa, while making more vulnerable the fragile ecology of Tibet, aids the mineral exploitation of the Tibetan plateau, besides strengthening China’s hold on Tibet. With more Han settlers coming into Tibet, the trend towards Tibet’s Sinicization and the economic marginalization of its native people has only accelerated. Yet China has failed to win over the Tibetan people, whose struggle for self-rule remains a model non-violent resistance movement. Climate change will only add to Tibet’s geopolitical weight, and help focus more international attention on that high plateau where the average altitude is more than 13,000 feet.

            The water resource-related changes in southern Asia will necessitate the region’s adaptation to alternatives based on newer technologies and methods. Given that the region will inescapably have to reduce its reliance on the natural bounty of the Himalayas as temperatures rise and the glacier melt accelerates, efficient rain-water harvesting will have to be embraced. The silver lining for the region is that the rise in temperatures under enhanced greenhouse conditions will actually bring more rainfall through the South-West and South-East Monsoon in the summer and the North-East Monsoon in the winter. The monsoonal bounty thus would need to be tapped through cost-effective technologies to provide a practical answer to the challenges arising from dwindling Himalayan river waters.

The Potential Threat from Mass Migration

The economically disruptive effects of sea-level rise and extreme weather events are likely to lead to stepped-up inter-state and intra-state migration, as those displaced are forced to relocate inland. The rise of temperature, coupled with potential greater water scarcity in the non-monsoonal seasons, would hit agriculture, irrespective of the farmland’s proximity to or distance from the sea. Given that the agricultural sector is the major source of employment, jobs in the countryside will not be easy to come by for migrants who are compelled to move into the hinterland due to loss of their agricultural land and production. That might only encourage mass influx into the already-crowded cities in southern Asia.

            The threat to Bangladesh’s survival that climate change poses has serious implications for India’s security. After all, India’s own well-being depends on Bangladesh’s well-being.  If Bangladeshis are compelled to migrate in increasingly larger numbers to India, the latter’s national security will take a severe beating. Existing refugee flows from an ever-more Islamized and radicalized Bangladesh are already beginning to seriously undermine social stability in India, making it more difficult for the government to consolidate internal cohesion and safeguard security.

Not many outsiders realize that Bangladesh, without expanding its political borders, has expanded ethnically. As brought out by the 2001 Indian census figures, the Indian districts all round Bangladesh have become Bangladeshi-majority areas. The demographic and social features of the entire western part of India’s Assam state, for example, have changed as a consequence of the influx of Bengali-speaking, predominantly Muslim refugees from Bangladesh. It is perhaps the first time in modern history that a country has expanded its ethnic frontiers without expanding its political borders. In contrast, Han China’s demographic onslaught on Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet was a consequence of the expansion of its political frontiers.

For India, the ethnic expansion of Bangladesh beyond its political borders not only sets up enduring trans-border links, but also makes New Delhi’s already-complex task of border management more burdensome at a time when Bangladesh is emerging as a haven for jihadist groups. Given the artificial borders between India and Bangladesh, even half a million Indian troops deployed along those frontiers cannot plug every porous line bringing refugees or terrorists into India. Now, with ethnically and even religiously similar populations on both sides of the borders, it has become more arduous for border troops to stop the illicit smuggling of human beings, narcotics, etc. 

As a country surrounded by the Indian landmass on three sides, Bangladesh has a unique geography. To help advance its own interests, India needs to become a major stakeholder in Bangladesh’s economic well-being and security.  This imperative has been underlined by the way Islamist forces and extremist groups have continued to gain ground in Bangladesh. The growth of extremism in Bangladesh is a complex phenomenon, and a dysfunctional democracy made matters worse.  India cannot shape developments within Bangladesh, but it can try to be a positive influence. India has to deal with the situation in Bangladesh in strategic terms, with a long-term approach.

If Bangladesh’s radicalization and political turmoil were to continue, India’s security will be very seriously undermined by hostile elements operating out of Bangladesh.  A Bangladesh that sinks deeper in extremism and fundamentalism will be a serious geopolitical headache for India. But a Bangladesh from where the refugee flows become a torrent will be a geopolitical nightmare for India.

Intra-state migration in India resulting from climate change could itself weaken internal cohesion and undermine security.

Human Insecurity Arising from Climate Change

The biggest threat from climate change is to human security, with the poorest being the most vulnerable. The national security of no state can endure growing human insecurity. The impact of climate variability on society will mean change in the social-economic-political environments on which the security of individuals, communities and states rest. Climate change thus needs to be elevated beyond the scientific discourse to a national security issue in India and the other states of southern Asia.

As it is, disparities are widening in southern Asia, despite high GDP growth rates. The growing inequity in southern Asia, and Asia as a whole, has been shown by the United Nations Development Programme’s annual Human Development Report. The report measures inequality on the basis of the ‘gini index’ instead of the ‘gini coefficient’. A gini-index value of 0 represents perfect equality and a value of 100 perfect inequality.

What the report brings out is that, with perhaps the sole exception of Japan, Asian states are becoming increasingly inequitable in terms of distribution of income. Such states even include the three Asian nations still under communist rule — China, Vietnam and Laos. These three one-party states, where income inequalities were narrow not long ago, now measure 44.7, 37.0 and 37.0 respectively on the gini index. With a score of 32.5, India, surprisingly, comes out better than all the three communist-ruled states and even Singapore.[5]  

Yet the spreading Maoist rural insurgency in the poorest districts of India at a time when the country is economically booming is a testament to the costs of growing inequalities. The ragtag bands of rebels wish to supplant Indian parliamentary democracy with a proletariat dictatorship inspired by Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book. In fact, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has gone to the extent of declaring Maoist violence as the ‘single biggest security challenge ever faced by our country’. The high incidence of malnutrition among children in some Indian states, particularly Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, illustrates why India needs to focus on inclusive growth. 

A nation can ignore the need for inclusive growth only at its own peril, given the likely climate change scenarios. Climate change will impact on human vulnerability, and thus on human security. Disruption arising from climate change will seriously intensify human security challenges and affect broader national security. Therefore, postponing difficult choices to a more difficult future is not prudent policy.

States and communities will need to innovate and manage under a new, climate change driven paradigm. Building greater institutional and organizational capacity will become necessary, along with developing efficient water-resource management in the dry seasons, early warning systems and preparedness, and new farm varieties.

Concluding Observation

Rising sea levels, increasing weather extremes, change in rainfall pattern, disruption of safe-drinking water sources and water scarcities in non-monsoonal months pose serious risks to social and political harmony in southern Asia. Such trends are also likely to influence the vector of disease control and potentially create major public health challenges in this region and beyond. But, as even hurricane Katrina highlighted in New Orleans, it will be the poor who will be the hit the hardest. Furthermore, the impact of climate change will extend beyond human civilization to southern Asia’s exceptionally rich plant and animal world. Today’s endangered species could become extinct tomorrow.

Meeting the challenges posed by climate change, therefore, demands that sustained efforts begin now. That, in turn, means switching to a more climate-friendly path in development and energy needs. The only sure path to energy security, in any event, lies through renewable sources of energy. Renewables also offer clean energy.

For the foreseeable future, however, coal will continue to play a major role in meeting the electricity needs in southern Asia and China. However, India, China and other states need to embrace cleaner technologies, like coal gasification, that hold immense promise to cut down emissions of carbon dioxide and other pollutants contributing to acid rain, smog and respiratory illness. These newer technologies focus on carbon-capture methods, whether in pulverized coal plants (which grind coal into a dust before burning it to make electricity) or in ‘integrated gasification combined cycle’, or IGCC, plants (which convert coal into a gas that is burned to produce energy). High oil and gas prices are also making the clean coal-to-liquids (CTL) technology attractive.

The clean-coal technologies raise the possibility of Asia satisfying its growing energy needs without accelerating climate change. The newer technologies, of course, are more expensive than conventional coal-burning methods. However, as companies adopt the clean-coal technologies, these newer methods will mature and their economics will cease to be an inhibiting factor for commercialization. Improved techniques will also make carbon sequestration commercially viable.

Given that at best it can be slowed but not stopped, climate change needs to be embraced as a national security issue — but not in the way the Pentagon has toyed with the development of weather-modification technologies for military applications. Large states like India and China need to start seriously looking at ways they can innovate and get along in a climate change-driven paradigm. It will become imperative to build greater institutional and organizational capacity, along with efficient water management, early warning systems and new farm varieties.

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