Pressure-cooker Pakistan needs a safety valve

Military is the problem

Steaming Pakistan needs a democratic safety valve

Brahma Chellaney

Times of India, January 3, 2008

After having fretted over a rising pro-democracy tide, Pakistan’s ruling military can expect to be the main gainer from Benazir Bhutto’s killing at the very public park where the 1951 assassination of the country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, paved the way for the military to step into politics. Just as Pakistan become increasingly Islamized following the 1979 execution of Bhutto’s father by the general who deposed him, the daughter’s assassination will help reinforce Islamist radicalization under continued military rule. In fact, she met her violent end three kilometres from where her father was hanged.

With Pakistan’s politics teetering on a knife’s edge, the main loser will be Musharraf, who did too little to protect Bhutto or to rein in the jihadists, some with continuing cosy ties to his establishment. Given that authorities identified the two December 2003 assassination attempts on him as an inside job by charging four junior army officers and six air force men, suspicion is bound to linger that regime-linked elements bumped off Bhutto, the most likely agent of political change in a country tired of its ruler. Just days before her murder, Bhutto said in a Washington Post interview that she was concerned that “some of the people around him [Musharraf] have sympathy for the militants” and “shocked to see how embedded” the state support for extremists is.

Musharraf’s credibility was in tatters even before the murder, but now his days in power appear more numbered than ever. In its 60-year history, Pakistan has already had four military takeovers and four Constitutions. With the assassination dimming the possibility of a democratic transition in a country where governments have always been booted out but never been voted out, a new military face could easily take over power on the pretext of saving an imploding state. Such a takeover will become certain if violent protests persist, the two main political parties shun Musharraf, and the US (a key party in Pakistani politics) moves away from the dictator it has propped up for long.

The likely perpetuation of military rule is not good news for international or regional security or for Pakistan’s own future, given how the country has sunk deeper in fundamentalism, extremism and militarism since the last coup. While the military will continue to defend its holding the reins of power as a necessary evil in the service of a greater good, its political role will only keep Pakistan on the boil. For more than eight years, Musharraf has justified his dictatorship as vital to bring stability to Pakistan even as his rule has taken it to the brink. Today, a nuclear-armed, terror-exporting Pakistan has become a problem not just regionally but globally.

Make no mistake: It is the military that created and nurtured the forces of jihad and helped Islamist groups gain political space at the expense of mainstream parties. Musharraf’s record is glaring: He welcomed with open arms the three extremists India freed to end the hijacking of Flight IC-814, helping one to form the terrorist Jaish-e-Mohammed and harbouring another until he kidnapped and murdered reporter Daniel Pearl. Musharraf has filled Pakistani jails more with democracy activists than with jihadists.

Without the military’s iron grip on power being broken and the rogue ISI being tamed, Pakistan will continue to menace regional and international security. What steaming Pakistan needs is a safety valve in the form of democratic empowerment of its restive masses. But what military rule has created is a pressure-cooker society congenial to the growth of extremism.

Getting the military to return to the barracks, admittedly, has become more difficult. The spoils of power have fattened the military, which now controls fields as varied as agriculture and education and runs businesses ranging from banks to bakeries. Add to that the new draconian powers that have been retained despite Musharraf’s lifting of the six-week emergency rule — declared to engineer his “re-election” as president. Yet another factor is US aid, which is so munificent that the Pakistan military — the world’s fifth largest — now relies on Washington for a quarter of its entire budget.

US policy, sadly, remains wedded to the Pakistan military. That needs to end, along with Bush’s misbegotten effort to help put a civilian mask on Musharraf, before a disastrous Pakistan policy starts to match the Iraq folly. Bhutto’s murder is a horrific reminder that unravelling Pakistan’s jihad culture won’t be easy but is essential. The battle against international terrorism cannot be won without demilitarizing Pakistan’s blood-soaked polity and de-radicalizing its society, or else Pakistan — Jinnah’s “moth-eaten travesty” — could itself unravel.

Musharraf once boasted that he is like a cat with nine lives. But given that he has already survived nine assassination attempts, he may be living on borrowed time. Before yet another general makes a power-grab, the international community under US leadership needs to step in to get the present ruler to cede power to an all-party government that inspires public trust and can hold free and fair elections. Musharraf is terminally unpopular and highly vulnerable at this juncture, and to let go of this opportunity would be to allow Pakistan to slip into a vortex of endless violence and terrorism. Having exiled others in the past, Musharraf should now be made to go into exile himself.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Opinion/LEADER_ARTICLE_Military_Is_The_Problem/articleshow/2670132.cms

Climate security as a new factor in international relations

CLIMATE CHANGE: A NEW FACTOR IN

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY?

Brahma Chellaney

Strategy (December 2007), Global Forces 2007

Australian Strategic Policy Institute

 

What we face today is a climate crisis that has arisen due to the relentless build‑up of

planet‑warming greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The ocean-atmosphere system that

controls the world’s climate has become vulnerable to adverse change. For long, global

warming had not been taken seriously, and even the few who did see its threat potential,

viewed the matter as simply an environmental or economic issue. Climate security is a new

concept, which acknowledges that global warming carries international and national security

implications. The most severe effects of climate change are likely to occur where states are

too poor or fragile to respond or to adapt adequately. If the world is to control or minimise

the likely major geopolitical and human-security consequences, climate change needs to be

elevated beyond scientific discourse to a strategic challenge requiring concrete counteraction

on the basis of a broad international consensus.

Intra-state and inter-state crises over water and food shortages, inundation of low-lying

areas, or recurrent droughts, hurricanes or flooding may lead to large displacements of

citizens and mass migrations, besides exacerbating ethnic or economic divides in societies.

It is thus important to examine the risks of global warming, including potential situations

in which climatic variations could be a catalyst for conflict within or between states. What

climate-change effects, for example, could destabilise the geopolitical environment and

trigger resource-related disputes or wars? Would resource-rich states seek to build virtual

fortresses around their national boundaries to preserve their advantage and insulate

themselves from the competition and conflict elsewhere? How would climate change

impinge on military operations?

Risk assessment is an essential component of strategic planning. Such assessment can help

focus attention on the key elements of climate security in order to evolve appropriate policy

responses to safeguard broader national security.

 

The broader context

Despite extensive research since the early 1990s, the extent of future climate change remains

uncertain and difficult to project. To some, global warming, far from causing gradual,

centuries-spanning change, may be beginning to push the climate to a tipping point. There

is no scientific evidence yet that the global climatic system is close to a critical threshold.

But there is ample evidence of accelerated global warming and the potential for adverse

security‑related effects resulting from unwelcome changes in climate.

The degree and pace of future climate change will depend on four factors:

(i) the extent of the energy- and development-related increase of greenhouse gases and

aerosol concentrations in the atmosphere

(ii) the impact of deforestation, land use, animal agriculture and other anthropogenic factors

on climate variation

(iii) the impact of natural influences (including from volcanic activity and changes in the

intensity of the sun) on climate variation

(iv) the extent to which temperature, precipitation, ocean level and other climatic features

react to changes in greenhouse-gas emissions, aerosol concentrations and other

elements in the atmosphere.

For example, clouds of aerosol particles from biomass burning and fossil-fuel consumption

are contributing to the accelerated thawing of glaciers. While aerosol particles play a

cooling role by reflecting sunlight back into space, they also absorb solar radiation and

thus contribute to global warming. According to a study by Veerabhadran Ramanathan

et al, which employed general circulation model simulations, the vertically extended

atmospheric brown clouds observed over the Indian Ocean and Asia, along with the increase

in anthropogenic greenhouse gases, ‘may be sufficient to account for the observed retreat of

the Himalayan glaciers’.1

The climate crisis is a consequence of the rapid pace of change in the contemporary world.

Technological forces are playing a greater role in shaping geopolitics than at any other

time in history. Political and economic change has also been fast-paced. Not only are new

economic powers emerging, but the face of the global geopolitical landscape has changed

fundamentally in the past two decades. As new actors emerge on the international stage,

the traditional dominance of the West is beginning to erode.

Such rapid change has contributed since the end of the Cold War to the rise of

unconventional challenges, including the phenomenon of failing states, growing

intrastate conflicts, transnational terrorism, maritime-security threats, and threats to

space-based assets. Climate change, although not a new phenomenon, belongs to this list

of unconventional challenges. As Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller has rightly put it,

‘In contrast to traditional foreign policy and security threats, climate change is not caused by

“hostile” enemies. It is different from terrorism, which we can fight, and weapons of mass

destruction, which we can destroy. This time it is not about political values. It is about our

production and consumption patterns’.2

The challenge of climate change is really the challenge of sustainable development. In the

continuing scramble to build economic security, energy security, food security, water security

and military-related security—all on a national basis—the world now is beginning to face

the harsh truth that one nation’s security cannot be in isolation of others. In fact, the rapid

pace of economic, political and technological change in the world is itself a consequence

of nations competing fiercely for relative advantage in an international system based

largely on national security. Climate change is a legacy of such assertive promotion of

national interests.

The climate crisis, of course, has been accentuated by rapid economic development in

Asia, which today boasts the world’s fastest-growing economies, besides the fastest-rising

military expenditures and the most dangerous hot spots. Asia, through its dynamism and

fluidity and as home to more than half of the world’s population, is set to shape the future

of globalisation. It also has a critical role in the fight against climate change, as underscored

by a recent Dutch report that China has now overtaken America as the world’s biggest

greenhouse-gas emitter on a national, rather than a per capita, basis.

It is true that a US resident is currently responsible, on an average, for about six times more

greenhouse-gas emissions than the typical Chinese, and as much as eighteen times more

than the average Indian. But it is also true that if Asians continue to increase their output of

greenhouse gases at the present rate, climate change would be seriously accelerated.

We should not forget, however, that Asia is only bouncing back from a 150-year decline,

and is now seeking to regain economic pre-eminence in the world. According to an Asian

Development Bank study, Asia, after making up three-fifths of the world’s GDP at the

beginning of the industrial age in 1820, saw its stake decline to one-fifth in 1945, before

dramatic economy recovery has helped bring it up to two-fifths today. In keeping with its

emerging centrality in international relations and relatively young demographics, Asia serves

as a reminder that the ongoing power shifts foreshadow a very different kind of world.

Like other unconventional challenges, the challenge thrown up by global warming can only

be tackled effectively by building and maintaining a broad international consensus. Indeed,

the ongoing power shifts in the world have made such consensus building a sine qua non

for the success of any international undertaking. With greater distribution of power, the

traditional America-centric and Euro-centric world is also changing. The old divides (like the

East-West and North-South) are giving way to new divides. Even though world economic

growth is at a thirty-year high, with global income now totalling $51 trillion annually, the

consensus on globalisation is beginning to fracture.

 

Strategic implications

Combating climate change is an international imperative, not merely a choice. The new

global spotlight on climate change has helped move the subject into the international

mainstream. There is now growing recognition that climate security needs to be an

important component of international security, as evidenced by the 2007 special debates on

climate change in both the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.

There is an ominous link between global warming and security, given the spectre of resource

conflicts, failed states, large-scale migrations and higher frequency and intensity of extreme

weather events, such as cyclones, flooding and droughts. Some developments would

demand intervention by the armed forces. Climate change has been correctly characterised

as a ‘threat multiplier’.

In terms of long-term geopolitical implications, climate stress could induce perennial

competition and conflict that would represent a much bigger challenge than any the world

faces today, including the fight against the al‑Qaeda or the proliferation of dual‑use nuclear

technologies among the so-called ‘rogue’ states. After all, climate stress, and the attendant

cropland degradation and scarcity of fresh water, are likely to intensify competition over

scarce resources and engender civil strife.

Such are its far-reaching strategic implications that climate change could also foster or

intensify conditions that lead to failed states—the breeding grounds for extremism,

fundamentalism and terrorism. Although an unconventional challenge by itself, climate

change is likely to heighten low-intensity military threats that today’s conventional forces

are already finding difficult to defeat—transnational terrorism, guerrilla movements

and insurgencies.

Furthermore, climate change could increase the severity, duration and the collateral impact

of a conflict, besides triggering mass dislocation. For example, the South Pacific islands, as

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said in the second of four reports

in 2007, are likely to be hit by an increased frequency of tropical storms and be battered by

rising sea levels, forcing the likely migration of many residents to Australia and New Zealand.

Besides worsening droughts and increasing fires and flooding in Australia and New Zealand,

global warming could threaten ecologically rich sites like the Great Barrier Reef and the

sub-Antarctic islands.

That is why climate change ought to be on the national and global security agenda.

Securitising the risks of climate change also helps to turn the issue from one limited to

eco-warriors to a subject of major international concern. That in turn may help facilitate the

heavy-lifting needed to give the problem the urgency and financial resources it deserves.

Having succeeded in highlighting climate change as an international challenge, however,

the emphasis now has to shift to building consensus on combating climate change.

Most importantly, the international community needs to move beyond platitudes to

agreed counteraction.

The security-related challenges posed by climate change can be effectively dealt with only

through a cooperative international framework. No international mission today can hope

to achieve tangible results unless it comes with five Cs: coherence, consistency, credibility,

commitment and consensus. Indeed, this is the key lesson one can learn from the way the

global war on terror now stands derailed, even as the scourge of transnational terrorism has

spread deeper and wider in the world.

Climate change is a real and serious problem, and its effects could stress vulnerable nations

and spur civil and political unrest. Yet the creeping politicisation of the subject will only make

it harder to build international consensus and cooperation on a concrete plan of action. Take

the insistence of some to add climate security to the agenda of the United Nations Security

Council. If climate change were to become part of the agenda of the Security Council—a

hotbed of big-power politics—it would actually undercut such consensus building. With

five unelected, yet permanent, members dictating the terms of the debate, we would get

international divisiveness when the need is for enduring consensus on a global response to

climate change.

Politics has also come in the way of reaching an agreement, even in principle, on defining

what is popularly known as the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ of the developed

and developing states. At the Group of Eight (G‑8) Outreach Summit in mid-2007 in

Germany, for instance, leaders of the G‑8 powers and the new Group of Five (G‑5) comprising

the five emerging economies—China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa—talked

past each other. The G‑8, in its declaration, asked ‘notably the emerging economies to

address the increase in their emissions by reducing the carbon intensity of their economic

development’. And the G‑5 retorted by placing the onus of dealing with climate change on

the developed nations, asking them to make significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions

first. ‘Greenhouse-gas mitigation in developed countries is the key to address climate change

given their responsibilities in causing it’, noted a G‑5 policy paper presented to the leaders of

the G‑8. This to-and-fro cannot hide the imperative for an equitable sharing of responsibility.

While being on the green bandwagon has become politically trendy, the action often

involves little more than lip service to climate security. Sometimes the political action makes

the situation only worse. Take the Bush Administration’s embrace of corn-derived ethanol.

The move does little to fight climate change or reduce US dependence on imported oil.

But it does a lot to create a windfall for the farm lobby by boosting grain prices. It began

as a promise of a free lunch—to encourage farmers to grow more corn so that ethanol

companies could use it to reduce America’s dependence on imported oil without affecting

US consumers. Instead it has shown that there can be no free lunch. The ripples from the

ethanol boom have already meant higher prices for corn, wheat, fertilizer and the food on

our table—and rising US dependence on imported fertilizers.

Generous subsidies are at the core of the Bush Administration’s goal of replacing over the

next decade 15% of domestic gasoline use with biofuels (corn ethanol and biodiesel). This

target is sought to be propped up through a subsidy of 51 cents a gallon for blending ethanol

into gasoline, and a import tariff of 54 cents a gallon to help keep out cheap sugarcane-based

ethanol from Brazil. To achieve that 15% target would require the entire current US corn crop,

which represents 40% of the global corn supply.

Having unleashed the incentives to divert corn from food to fuel, the United States is now

reaping higher food prices. The price of corn has nearly doubled since 2006. At the beginning

of 2006, corn was a little over $2 a bushel. Now in the futures markets, corn for December

2007 delivery is selling at $3.85 a bushel, despite projections of a record 12.5 billion-bushel

corn harvest in the United States this year. With corn so profitable to plant, farmers are

shifting acreage from wheat, soybeans and other grains, putting further upward pressure on

food prices. The losers are the poor. As of June 2007, a bushel of soybeans was up 36% from a

year earlier. The price of wheat is projected to rise 50% by the end of 2007.

With the European Union also jumping on the ethanol bandwagon, a fundamental issue

has been raised—how can ethanol be produced and delivered in keeping with the needs of

sustainable development? The political claim that corn-derived ethanol is environmentally

friendly has to be seen against the fact that, compared to either biodiesel or ethanol from

rice straw and switchgrass, corn has a far lower energy yield relative to the energy used to

produce it. It should also not be forgotten that growing corn demands high use of nitrogen-based

fertilizers—produced from natural gas. The 16% increase since 2006 in US corn

cultivation has resulted in a big surge in US fertilizer demand—as much as an extra 1 million

metric tons in 2007. There are two other factors that should not be overlooked—(i) because

ethanol yields 30% less energy per gallon than gasoline, the fall in mileage is significant; and

(ii) adding ethanol raises the price of blended fuel over unblended gasoline because of the

extra handling and transportation costs.

The craze for ethanol is also encouraging the felling of tropical forests in a number of

countries to make way for corn, sugar and palm-oil plantations to fuel the world’s growing

thirst for ethanol. That is senseless: to fight climate change, the world needs forests more

than ethanol. Forests breathe in carbon dioxide and breathe out oxygen every day, helping

to keep our planet cool. Besides storing carbon and reducing the effects of greenhouse-gas

emissions, forests filter pollution and yield clean water.

It is important to know that despite the justifiable attention on China’s rapidly growing

industrial pollution, the destruction of the world’s tropical forests contributes more to

global warming every year than the carbon-dioxide emissions from Chinese coal‑fired power

plants, cement and other manufacturing factories, and vehicles. Fortunately, the massive

enthusiasm over biofuels is now finally beginning to give way to realism and even concern

that biofuels pose a threat to global food security and biodiversity.

Another invidious way climate change is being politicised is through embellishment of the

technical evidence on global warming. Take the reports of the IPCC, a joint body of the World

Meteorological Organization and UN Environment Programme. Ever since the IPCC in 1990

began releasing its assessments every five or six years, the panel has become gradually wiser,

with its projected ocean-level increases due to global warming on a continuing downward

slide. As a body, the IPCC remains on a learning curve.

From projecting in the 1990s a 67-centimetre rise in sea levels by the year 2100, the IPCC has

progressively whittled down that projection by nearly half—first to 48.5 centimetres in 2001

and then to 38.5 centimetres in 2007. Should the world be worried by the potential rise of the

oceans by 38.5 centimetres within the next 100 years? You bet. We need to slow down such a

rise. But if a rise of 38.5 centimetres does occur, will it mean catastrophe? Not really.

If the world didn’t even notice a nearly 20-centimetre rise in sea levels in the past century, a

slow 38.5-centimetre ascent of the oceans over the next 100 years cannot mean a calamity

of epic proportions. Yet the scaremongering has picked up steam—‘the Netherlands would

be under water’, ‘millions would have to flee Shanghai’, ‘Bangladesh’s very existence would

be imperilled’.

Climate change is a serious challenge with grave security implications, but it doesn’t

mean we are doomed. It is important to see things in a balanced way. There can be

genuine differences in assessing the likely impact of global warming. The Stern Report,

for example, seems more alarmed over potential climate-change implications than the

IPCC.3 Such differences among experts are understandable. What is unconscionable is the

scaremongering. Doomsday ayatollahs should not be allowed to dictate the debate.

Yet another facet of the current climate-change geopolitics is that the term, global warming,

is being stretched to embrace environmental degradation unrelated to the effects of the

build-up of greenhouse gases and aerosol concentrations in the atmosphere. What has

climate change to do with reckless land use, overgrazing, contamination of water resources,

overuse of groundwater, inefficient or environmentally unsustainable irrigation systems,

waste mismanagement or the destruction of forests, mangroves and other natural habitats?

Some of these actions, of course, may contribute to climate variation but they do not arise

from global warming.

Climate change cannot be turned into a convenient, blame-all phenomenon. If man-made

environmental degradation is expediently hitched to climate change, it would exculpate

governments for reckless development and allow them to feign helplessness. In such a

situation, like the once-fashionable concept of human security, climate change could become

too diffused in its meaning and thereby deflect international focus from tackling growing

fossil-fuel combustion, the main source of man-made greenhouse gases.

It is important to distinguish between climate change and environmental change. Hurricane

Katrina and perennial flooding in Bangladesh, for instance, are not climate-change

occurrences but result from environmental degradation. Frequent flooding in Bangladesh

is tied to upstream and downstream deforestation and other activities resulting from

increased population intensity. Climate change, certainly, could exacerbate such flooding.

Given its serious long-term strategic implications, climate change calls for concerted

international action. But if counteraction were to be turned into a burden-sharing drill

among states, it would fail because distributing ‘burden’ is a doomed exercise. Neither

citizens in rich states are going to lower their living standards by cutting energy use, nor will

poor nations sacrifice economic growth, especially because their per-capita CO2 emissions

are still just one-fifth the level of the developed world.

What is needed is a new political dynamic that is not about burden-sharing but about

opportunity centred on radically different energy and development policies. This means not

only a focus on renewable energy and greater efficiency, but also a more-urgent programme

of research and development on alternative fuels and carbon-sequestration technologies.

CO2 is not dangerous to human beings by itself. But too much CO2 in the atmosphere is

dangerous for climate stability because it changes the heat balance between Earth and the

Sun. Yet CO2 emissions account for 80% of the planet-warming greenhouse gases. The other

20% share is made up of potent gases like methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride

(SF6). The man-made SF-6 is used to create light, foam-based soles to cushion joggers’ feet.

The European Union, with effect from June-end 2007, has rightly prohibited the sale of

such footwear. Methane, on the other hand, is released in coalmining, gas extraction, and

from landfill, cattle and various other sources. Methane capture, however, holds attractive

commercial value: it is the main ingredient of natural gas.

Given that the world has either developed or attempted to build common international

norms on trade, labour practices, human rights, nuclear non‑proliferation, etc., fashioning

common global standards on CO2 emissions is necessary. To help control excess carbon

intensity in the manufacture of goods, such standards could be made to apply to trade

practices, too. In the same way that we seek to ensure that imports are not the products of

child labour or other unfair labour practices, objective and quantifiable standards could be

developed to regulate trade in goods contaminated by carbon intensity.

That would help to put on notice countries that do not seem to care about the carbon

intensity of their manufacturing. Cheap imports, for example, from China—the world’s

back factory—would become subject to such standards, putting pressure on both large

importers like Wal‑Mart and Beijing itself to move towards more environmentally friendly

manufacturing. In the wake of the multiple scandals in 2007 over tainted Chinese food

and drug exports, such an exercise would be part and parcel of efforts to raise industry

standards and promote public-health and environmental safety. It could also help to instil

accountability: the importer of goods ought to be no less culpable in the emission of CO2

than the exporter.

If CO2 and non‑CO2 levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are not controlled, the

higher average temperatures in the world could adversely upset the climate balance on

which human civilisation and other species depend. Development and climate protection

have to be in alignment with each other, because it cannot be an ‘either or’ proposition.

Against this background, it is becoming apparent to most that the costs of inaction

outweigh the costs of action. The issue is not about horse-trade or burden. It is about

sharing opportunity to create a better future. The opportunity is also about promoting

green-technology developments. Ultimately, technology may offer salvation, given the

power and role of technological forces today. Even if geo-engineering options to fix climate

change are seen to belong to the realm of science fiction today, they still need to be pursued.

As the history of the past century shows, scientific discoveries that seemed improbable at

a given moment became a reality within years. Albert Einstein in 1932, for example, judged

the potential of nuclear energy as a mirage. But 13 years later, the cities of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki lay in nuclear ruins.

Likely security-related effects

The actual national security-related effects of climate change are likely to vary from region

to region. For example, Australia’s size, resources, small population and geographical location

position it better to cope with the effects of climate change. The same is the case with

Canada. Japan, an insulated island chain with rugged terrain, could rely on its impressive

social cohesion to induce resource conservation and other societal adaptation to climate

change. But some parts of the world are likely to be severely hit by climate change and suffer

debilitating security effects.

By and large, warming is expected to be the least in the islands and coastal areas, and the

greatest in the inland continental areas. Several studies have shown that global warming

is likely to actually strengthen monsoon circulation and bring increased rainfall in the

monsoonal seasons.4 Changes in non‑monsoon, or dry-season, rainfall have been more

difficult to assess. The likely increased rainfall suggests that climate change is not going

to be an unmitigated disaster. Rather, adaptation to climate change would demand the

development of new techniques.

Climate change is also likely to bring about important shifts in temperature patterns, a rise

in sea levels, and an increase in the frequency and intensity of anomalous weather events,

such as cyclones, flooding and droughts. These trends, cumulatively, could play havoc with

agriculture and also impact on conservation strategies. The weaker the economic and social

base and higher the reliance on natural resources, the more a community is likely to be

adversely affected by climate change.

While it is scientifically not possible to predict future events with any degree of certainty,

it is possible to draw some reasonable but broad conclusions, with the aim of controlling

anthropogenic factors contributing to climate change. The likely security-related effects of

climate change can be put in three separate categories:

1. Climate change is likely to intensify inter-state and intra-state competition over natural

resources, especially water, in several parts of the world. That in turn could trigger

resource conflicts within and between states, and open new or exacerbate existing

political disputes.

2. Increased frequency of extreme weather events like hurricanes, droughts and flooding,

as well as the rise of ocean levels, are likely to spur greater inter-state and intra-state

migration—especially of the poor and the vulnerable—from delta and coastal regions to

the hinterland. Such an influx of outsiders would socially swamp inland areas, upsetting

the existing fragile ethnic balance and provoking a backlash that strains internal and

regional security. Through such large-scale migration, the political stability and internal

cohesion of some nations could be undermined. In some cases, this could even foster or

strengthen conditions that could make the state dysfunctional.

3. The main casualty of climate change, clearly, is expected to be human security. Social

and economic disparities would intensify within a number of states, as climatic change

delivers a major blow to vulnerable sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, and to

low-lying coastal and delta areas. In an increasingly climate change-driven paradigm, the

tasks of good governance and sustainable development would become more onerous

and challenging.

The economically disruptive effects of ocean-level rise and frequently occurring extreme

weather events are likely to lead to create major national challenges, as those displaced are

forced to relocate inland. Jobs in the countryside, however, will not be easy to come by for

migrants who are compelled to move into the hinterland due to loss of their agricultural land

and production. That might only encourage mass influx into the already-crowded cities in the

developing world.

The impact of climate variability on society will mean change in the social‑economic-political

environments on which the security of individuals, communities and states rest. Such

variability would affect crop yields and the availability of water, energy and food, including

seafood. The case for angst over the security implications of climate change has been

underlined by an unclassified 2003 Pentagon study, which warned of large population

movements and contended that diplomatic action would be needed to control likely conflict

over resources in the most impacted areas, especially in the Caribbean and Asia. According

to the report,5 climate change would affect Australia’s position as a major food exporter,

while the food, energy and water situation in densely populated China would come under

severe strain by a decreased reliability of the monsoon rains and by colder winters and hotter

summers. It paints one possible scenario in these words: ‘Widespread famine causes chaos

and internal struggles as a cold and hungry China peers jealously across the Russian and

western borders at energy resources’.

The report hypothesised massive Bangladeshi refugee exodus to India and elsewhere, as

recurrent hurricanes and higher ocean level make ‘much of Bangladesh nearly uninhabitable’.

Other scenarios discussed in the report include the possibility of the United Stated building

a fortress around itself to shield its resources, besides getting locked in political tensions

with Mexico through actions such as a cut-off of water flow from the Colorado River into

lower‑riparian Mexico in breach of a 1944 treaty.

In general, according to the report, ‘Learning how to manage those populations, border

tensions that arise and the resulting refugees will be critical. New forms of security

agreements dealing specifically with energy, food and water will also be needed. In short,

while the US itself will be relatively better off and with more adaptive capacity, it will find

itself in a world where Europe will be struggling internally, [with] large number [of] refugees

washing up on its shores, and Asia in serious crisis over food and water. Disruption and

conflict will be endemic features of life’.

It should not be forgotten that in some situations, the effects of climate change are likely to

foster or intensify conditions that lead to failed or failing states. That in turn would adversely

impact regional and international security. In such cases, the more resource-secure countries

would have to either aid such states or face the security-related consequences from the

growing lawlessness and extremism there.

Notwithstanding the game of chicken currently being played between the North and the

South, it is the developing world that is likely to bear the brunt of climate change because it

has a larger concentration of hot and low-lying regions and lesser resources to technologically

adapt to climate change. The poorer a country, the less it would be able to defend its people

against the climate-change effects, which would potentially include more‑severe storms,

the flooding of tropical islands and coastlines, higher incidence of drought inland, resources

becoming scarcer, and a threat to the survival of at least one‑fourth of the world’s species.

While the overriding interest of developing countries is still economic growth and poverty

eradication, climate change can actually accentuate poverty. In fact, when rural economies

get weakened, livelihoods are disrupted and unemployment soars, frustrations and anger

would be unleashed, fostering greater conflict within and between societies.

 

Potential water wars

Two major effects of climate change are beyond dispute: (i) declining crop yields putting

a strain on food availability and prices: and (ii) decreased availability and quality of fresh

water owing to accelerated glacial thaw, flooding and droughts. The second factor can only

compound the first. In fact, water, food and energy constraints can be managed in inter‑state

or intra-state context through political or economic means only up to a point, beyond which

conflict becomes likely.

The likely impact on the availability of water resources is a critical component of the

security‑related challenges posed by climate change. Hundreds of millions of people in the

world are already without access to safe drinking water. This situation would aggravate

markedly if current projections of climate change come true. Accelerated snow melt from

mountains and faster glacier thaw could deplete river-water resources and potentially drive

large numbers of subsistence farmers into cities.

No region better illustrates the danger of water wars than Asia, which has less fresh water—

3,920 cubic metres per person—than any other continent outside of Antarctica, according to

a 2006 United Nations report.6 This report states that when the estimated reserves of lakes,

rivers and groundwater are added up, Asia has marginally less water per person than Europe

or Africa, one-quarter that of North America, nearly one-tenth that of South America and

twenty times less than Australia and Pacific islands. Yet Asia is home to 60% of the world’s

population. The sharpening Asian competition over energy resources, driven in part by high

GDP growth rates and in part by mercantilist attempts to lock up supplies, has obscured

another danger: water shortages in much of Asia are becoming a threat to rapid economic

modernisation, prompting the building of upstream projects on international rivers. If water

geopolitics were to spur interstate tensions through reduced water flows to neighbouring

states, the Asian renaissance could stall.

As Asia’s population booms and economic development gathers speed, water is becoming

a prized commodity and a potential source of conflict. Climate change threatens supplies

of this limited natural resource, with some Asian nations either jockeying to control

water sources or demanding a say in the building of hydro projects on inter-state rivers.

Competition over water is likely to increase political tensions and the potential for conflict.

Water, therefore, has emerged as a key issue that would determine if Asia is headed

toward mutually beneficial cooperation or deleterious interstate competition. No country

would influence that direction more than China, which controls the aqua-rich Tibetan

plateau—the source of most major rivers of Asia.

Tibet’s vast glaciers and high altitude have endowed it with the world’s greatest river

systems. Its river waters are a lifeline to the world’s two most-populous states—China and

India—as well as to Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand

and Vietnam. These countries make up 47% of the global population.

Yet Asia is a water-deficient continent. The looming struggle over water resources in Asia has

been underscored by the spread of irrigated farming, water-intensive industries (from steel

to paper making) and a growing middle class seeking high water-consuming comforts like

dishwashers and washing machines. Household water consumption in Asia is rising rapidly,

according to the UN report, but such is the water paucity that not many Asians can aspire

for the lifestyle of Americans, who daily use 400 litres per person, or more than 2.5 times the

average in Asia.

The spectre of water wars in Asia is also being highlighted both by climate change and by

man-made environmental degradation in the form of shrinking forests and swamps that

foster a cycle of chronic flooding and droughts through the depletion of nature’s water

storage and absorption cover. The Himalayan snow melt that feeds Asia’s great rivers could

be damagingly accelerated by global warming.

While intra-state water-sharing disputes have become rife in several Asian countries—from

India and Pakistan to Southeast Asia and China—it is the potential inter-state conflict over

river-water resources that should be of greater concern. This concern arises from Chinese

attempts to dam or redirect the southward flow of river waters from the Tibetan plateau,

where major rivers originate, including the Indus, the Mekong, the Yangtze, the Yellow, the

Salween, the Brahmaputra, the Karnali and the Sutlej. Among Asia’s mighty rivers, only the

Ganges starts from the Indian side of the Himalayas.

The lopsided availability of water within some nations (abundant in some areas but

deficient in others) has given rise to grand ideas—from linking rivers in India to diverting

the fast‑flowing Brahmaputra northward to feed the arid areas in the Chinese heartland.

Inter‑state conflict, however, will surface only when an idea is translated into action to

benefit oneself at the expense of a neighbouring nation.

As water woes have aggravated in its north owing to environmentally unsustainable

intensive farming, China has increasingly turned its attention to the bounteous water

reserves that the Tibetan plateau holds. It has dammed rivers, not just to produce

hydropower but also to channel the waters for irrigation and other purposes, and is

presently toying with massive inter-basin and inter-river water transfer projects.

Chinese hydro projects on the Tibetan plateau are increasingly a source of concern to

neighbouring states. For example, after building two dams upstream on the Mekong, China

is building at least three more on that river, inflaming passions downstream in Vietnam,

Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Several Chinese projects in west-central Tibet have a bearing

on river-water flows into India, but Beijing is loath to share information. After flash floods in

India’s northern Himachal Pradesh state, however, China agreed in 2005 to supply New Delhi

data on any abnormal rise or fall in the upstream level of the Sutlej River, on which it has

built a barrage. Discussions are still on to persuade it to share flood-control data during the

monsoonal season on two Brahmaputra tributaries, Lohit and Parlung Zangbo, as it already

does since 2002 on the Brahmaputra River, which it has dammed at several places upstream.

The ten major watersheds formed by the Himalayas and Tibetan highlands spread out

river waters far and wide in Asia. Control over the 2.5 million-square-kilometre Tibetan

plateau gives China tremendous leverage, besides access to vast natural resources. Having

extensively contaminated its own major rivers through unbridled industrialisation, China

now threatens the ecological viability of river systems tied to South and Southeast Asia in its

bid to meet its thirst for water and energy.

Tibet, in the shape and size it existed independently up to 1950, comprises approximately

one-fourth of China’s land mass today, having given Han society, for the first time in history,

a contiguous frontier with India, Burma, Bhutan and Nepal. Tibet traditionally encompassed

the regions of Ü-Tsang (the central plateau), Kham and Amdo. After annexing Tibet, China

separated Amdo (the present Dalai Lama’s birthplace) as the new Qinghai province, made

Ü-Tsang and western Kham the Tibet Autonomous Region, and merged remainder parts of

Tibet in its provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu.

The traditional Tibet is not just a distinct cultural entity but also the natural plateau, the

future of whose water reserves is tied to ecological conservation. As China’s hunger for

primary commodities has grown, so too has its exploitation of Tibet’s resources. And as

water woes have intensified in several major Chinese cities, a group of ex-officials in China

have championed the northward rerouting of the waters of the Brahmaputra River in a book

self-enlighteningly titled, Tibet’s Waters Will Save China.

Large hydro projects and reckless exploitation of mineral resources already threaten Tibet’s

fragile ecosystems, with ore tailings beginning to contaminate water sources. Unmindful of

the environmental impact of such activities in pristine areas, China has now embarked on

constructing a 108-kilometer paved road to Mount Everest, located along the Tibet-Nepal

frontier. This highway is part of China’s plan to reinforce its claims on Tibet by taking the

Olympic torch to the peak of the world’s tallest mountain before the 2008 Beijing Games.

As in the past, no country is going to be more affected by Chinese plans and projects in

Tibet than India. The new $6.2-billion Gormu-Lhasa railway, for example, has significantly

augmented China’s rapid military-deployment capability against India just when Beijing

is becoming increasingly assertive in its claims on Indian territories. This hardline stance,

in the midst of intense negotiations to resolve the 4,057-kilometer Indo-Tibetan border,

is no less incongruous than Beijing’s disinclination to set up what it had agreed to during

its president’s state visit to New Delhi last November—a joint expert-level mechanism on

interstate river waters.

Contrast China’s reluctance to establish a mechanism intended for mere ‘interaction and

cooperation’ on hydrological data with New Delhi’s consideration towards downstream

Pakistan, reflected both in the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (which generously reserves 56% of

the catchment flow for Pakistan) and the more-recent acceptance of World Bank

arbitration over the Baglihar Dam project in Indian Kashmir. No Indian project has sought to

reroute or diminish trans-border water flows, yet Pakistan insists on a say in the structural

design of projects upstream in India. New Delhi gladly permits Pakistani officials to inspect

such projects. By contrast, Beijing drags its feet on setting up an innocuous interaction

mechanism. Would China, under any arrangement, allow Indian officials to inspect its

projects in Tibet or accept, if any dispute arose, third-party adjudication?

If anything, China seems intent on aggressively pursuing projects and employing water as

a weapon. The idea of a Great South-North Water Transfer Project diverting river waters

cascading from the Tibetan highlands has the backing of President Hu Jintao, a hydrologist

who made his name through a brutal martial‑law crackdown in Tibet in 1989. In crushing

protestors at Tiananmen Square two months later, Deng Xiaoping actually took a page out of

Hu’s Tibet playbook.

The Chinese ambition to channel the Brahmaputra waters to the parched Yellow River has

been whetted by what Beijing touts as its engineering feat in building the giant, $25-billion

Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze—a project that has displaced a staggering 1.4 million

citizens. The Three Gorges Dam is just an initial step in a much-wider water strategy centred

on the Great South-North Water Transfer Project. While China’s water resources minister told

a Hong Kong University meeting in October 2006 that, in his personal opinion, the idea to

divert waters from the Tibetan highlands northwards seems not viable, the director of the

Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee said publicly that the mega-plan enjoys official

sanction and may begin by 2010.

The Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo to Tibetans) originates near Mount Kailash and,

before entering India, flows eastward in Tibet for 2,200 kilometres at an average height

of 4,000 meters, making it the world’s highest major river. When two other tributaries

merge with it, the Brahmaputra becomes as wide as 10 kilometres in India before flowing

into Bangladesh.

The first phase of China’s South-North Project calls for building 300 kilometres of tunnels

and channels to draw waters from the Jinsha, Yalong and Dadu rivers, on the eastern

rim of the Tibetan plateau. Only in the second phase would the Brahmaputra waters be

directed northwards. In fact, Beijing has identified the bend where the Brahmaputra forms

the world’s longest and deepest canyon just before entering India as holding the largest

untapped reserves for meeting its water and energy needs. As publicly sketched by the chief

planner of the Academy of Engineering Physics, Professor Chen Chuanyu, the Chinese plan

would reportedly involve using nuclear explosives to blast a 15-kilometre-long tunnel through

the Himalayas to divert the river flow and build a dam that could generate twice the power

of the Three Gorges Dam.

While some doubts do persist in Beijing over the economic feasibility of channelling Tibetan

waters northwards, the mammoth diversion of the Brahmaputra could begin as water

shortages become more acute in the Chinese mainland and China’s current $1.2 trillion

foreign-exchange hoard brims over. The mega-rerouting would constitute the declaration of

a water war on lower-riparian India and Bangladesh.

It is patently obvious that if water were to become an underlying factor in inter-state

tensions in Asia, and increasingly a scarce and precious commodity domestically, water wars

would inevitably follow. The water-related challenges also underscore the necessity for Asia

to adapt alternatives based on newer technologies and methods. Given that several Asian

states will inescapably have to reduce their reliance on the natural bounty of the Himalayas

and Tibetan highlands as temperatures rise and the glacier and snow melt accelerates,

efficient rain-water harvesting will have to be embraced. The silver lining for the continent is

that the rise in temperatures under enhanced greenhouse conditions is likely to bring more

rainfall through the South-West and South-East Monsoon in the summer and the North-East

Monsoon in the winter. The abundant monsoonal supply thus would need to be tapped

through cost-effective technologies to provide a practical answer to the challenges arising

from dwindling river waters.

 

Concluding observations

Climate change is not just a matter of science but also a matter of geopolitics. Without

improved geopolitics, there can be no real fight against climate change. The growing

talk on climate change is not being matched by action, not even modest action. Even as

some countries have succeeded in shining the international spotlight on climate change,

international diplomacy has yet to develop necessary traction to deal with the challenges of

global warming.

At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro,

189 countries, including the United States, China, India and all the European nations, signed

the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreeing to stabilise greenhouse gases

at a low enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate

system. Yet, fifteen years later, no country has done that. US per capita greenhouse-gas

emissions, already the highest of any major nation, continue to soar. A leaked Bush

Administration report in March 2007 indicated that US emissions were likely to rise almost

as fast over the next decade as they did during the previous decade. Now, renewed global

efforts are on to reach yet-another agreement to do what the international community had

promised to carry out fifteen years ago.

The Group of Eight (G‑8) agreed in June 2007 to try and clinch a new global UN-sponsored

climate change deal (to succeed or extend the Kyoto Protocol from 2013), but failed to agree

on a timetable for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, which went into

affect in February 2005, expires in 2012. But while the G‑8 leaders agreed to seek ‘substantial’

cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions and to give ‘serious consideration’ to the goal of halving

such emissions by 2050, this is still at the level of just talk.

The important point to remember is that about twenty countries produce 80% of global

CO2 emissions. So you don’t need all the 191 UN members on board to combat climate

change. One way to build international consensus on this issue is to engage states whose

CO2 emissions share is 1% or more.

It is also important to note that CO2 emissions are not exactly a function of the level of

development. The United States, for example, belches twice as much CO2 per capita as Japan,

although the two countries have fairly similar per-capita incomes. The US Environmental

Protection Agency admits that about 6.6 metric tonnes of greenhouse gases are emitted

per person in America, easily placing that country No. 1 in the world in per-capita emissions.

Take the case within the United States: California has held its per capita energy consumption

essentially constant since 1974, while per capita energy use for the United States overall

during the same period has jumped 50%. Through a mix of mandates, regulations and high

prices, California has managed to cut CO2 emissions and yet maintain economic growth. Now

it is seeking to reduce automobile pollution, promote solar energy and cap its CO2 emissions.

Yet another point to note is that a global climate policy alone will not solve the current

climate crisis. Climate change indeed may be the wrong end of the problem to look at. Given

that nearly two-thirds of the greenhouse-gas emissions are due to the way we produce and

use energy, we need to focus more on alternate energy policies.

Unless we address energy issues, we won’t be able to address climate change. Energy use,

however, sustains economic growth, which in turn buttresses political and social stability.

Today four-fifths of the world’s energy comes from fossil fuels—coal, oil, natural gas. Until

we can either replace fossil fuels with cost-effective alternatives or find practical ways to

capture CO2 emissions, the world would remain wedded to the fossil-fuel age. According

to projections by the Paris-based International Energy Agency, total energy demand in the

world is to rise 68% by 2030, with most of the increases occurring in developing countries.

Reliance on fossil fuels would marginally rise from 80% in 2002 to 82% in 2030. Given this

scenario, all states need to endeavour to reduce their energy intensity—the ratio of energy

consumption to economic output.

The harsh reality is that the global competition over energy resources has become

intertwined with geopolitics. This competition now is overtly influencing strategic thinking

and military planning in a number of key states. China, for example, cites energy interests

to rationalise its ‘string-of-pearls’ strategy, which aims to hold sway over vital sea lanes

between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through a chain of bases, naval facilities and military

ties. But if energy security has become a foreign-policy challenge, whether in Europe or in

Asia or elsewhere, why shouldn’t climate security similarly be made a foreign-policy issue?

If there is any good news on the climate-change front, it is the ongoing attitudinal shift in

the world—from the United States to Australia, and from China to Brazil. A prerequisite to

any policy shift is an attitudinal shift. In the coming years, the world hopefully will see policy

shifting both at the national and international levels to help build climate security.

It should not be forgotten that the human mind is innovative. History is a testament to

human civilisation successfully overcoming dire situations and warnings. It has averted, for

example, the ‘Malthusian catastrophe’, put forward by Thomas Malthus in a 1798 essay. The

thesis contended that population growth would outstrip the Earth’s agricultural production,

leading to famine and a return to subsistence-level conditions. Actually, with a lesser and

lesser percentage of human society engaged in agriculture, the world is producing more

and more food. If people are still going hungry, it is because of poverty. Another catastrophe

was predicted by a 1972 Club of Rome study, titled, Limits to Growth, which examined the

consequences on economic growth of a rapidly growing world population and finite resource

supplies. Indeed, since the study was released, global economic growth, far from showing

any limits, has continued to boom.

As a real and serious problem, climate change should be seen as challenging human ability

to innovate and live in harmony with nature. In the past, the international community

has indeed reached agreements on environmental challenges, such as the control of

trans-boundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes (the Basel Convention)7

and the phasing out of chlorofluorocarbons (the Montreal Protocol). The CFCs and other

chlorine- and bromine-containing compounds have been implicated in the accelerated

depletion of ozone in the Earth’s stratosphere. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That

Deplete the Ozone Layer, along with national‑policy decisions, compelled industry and the

scientific community to collaborate and develop safe alternatives to CFCs. That should inspire

hope for international action on controlling greenhouse gases as part of a public-private

partnership to create a Planet Inc. To propel such action and encourage industry to invest in

alternate technologies, a mix of economic incentives and regulations are vital.

 

Endnotes

1 Veerabhadran Ramanathan et al, ‘Warming Trends in Asia Amplified by Brown Cloud

Solar Absorption’, Nature, Volume 448, Number 7153 (2007).

2 Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller of Denmark, Speech at Chatham House, London, June 26,

2007. Official text released by the Danish foreign ministry.

3 The British government-commissioned report by Nicholas Stern, released in November

2006, contended that a temperature increase in the range of 5 degrees Celsius would

over time cause a sea-level rise enough to threaten the world’s top cities like London,

Shanghai, New York, Tokyo and Hong Kong. The Stern report also pointed to the need for

rapidly developing countries like China and India to be part of a global effort to tackle the

problem of climate change, even though the main responsibility (as the report admitted)

lies with rich nations that must act now to start reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.

4 P. Whetton, A.B. Pittock and R. Suppiah, ‘Implications of Climate Change for Water

Resources in South and Southeast Asia’, in Climate Change in Asia: Thematic Overview

(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1994); Robert T. Watson, Marufu C. Zinyowera Richard

H. Moss, David J. Dokken (Eds.), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special

Report on The Regional Impacts of Climate Change An Assessment of Vulnerability (1997);

R. Suppiah, ‘The Asian Monsoons: Simulations From Four GCMs and Likely Changes Under

Enhanced Greenhouse Conditions’, A.J. Jakeman and B. Pittock (eds.) Climate Impact

Assessment Methods for Asia and the Pacific, Proceedings of a regional symposium,

organised by ANUTECH Pty. Ltd. on behalf of the Australian International Development

Assistance Bureau 10–12 March 1993, Canberra, Australia (1994); Climate Impact

Group, Climate Change Scenarios for South and Southeast Asia (Aspendale, Australia:

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, 1992).

5 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its

Implications for National Security Scenario (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,

October 2003).

6 United Nations, The State of the Environment in Asia and the Pacific (New York:

United Nations, October 2006).

7 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and

their Disposal. Details at: http://www.basel.int/

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2007

2007 was a year of Chinese muscle-flexing

China puts muscle to policy

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY

Japan Times 

NEW DELHI — Rising economic and military power is emboldening Beijing to pursue a more muscular foreign policy. Having earlier preached the gospel of its "peaceful rise," China is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident of the muscle it has acquired.

From provocatively seeking to assert its jurisdiction over islets claimed by Vietnam in the South China Sea to whipping up diplomatic spats with Germany, Canada and the United States over their hospitality to the Dalai Lama, Beijing has shown an increasing propensity to flex its muscles.

Other such recent instances include China’s demolition of a few unmanned Indian forward posts at the Tibet-Bhutan-Sikkim tri-junction, its large-scale war game in the South and East China Seas, its public showcasing of new military hardware like the Jin-class, nuclear-capable submarine, its strategic moves around India, and its last-minute cancellation of a long-planned Hong Kong visit by the U.S. carrier, Kitty Hawk. Beijing also refused to let two American minesweepers enter Hong Kong harbor for shelter during a Pacific storm.

Ever since it surprised the world by successfully carrying out an anti-satellite weapon test last January, China’s communist leadership has been less coy about projecting national power. The apparent aim is to fashion a Beijing-oriented Asia. It seems unconcerned that its assertive stance has triggered anti-China demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and spurred unease in other neighboring states.

It is against this background that the heads of government of Asia’s other two major powers — Japan and India — are paying official visits to China. While Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s tour begins Thursday, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is scheduled to make a New Year visit two weeks later, as part of an agreement reached during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s November 2006 New Delhi visit "to hold regular summit-level meetings."

Little progress, however, can be expected during these visits toward resolving the territorial or maritime disputes that divide Japan and China, and India and China. Yet, if the China-India-Japan strategic triangle is to become stable, a settlement of those disputes is necessary. A first step to a settlement of any dispute is clarity on a line of control or appreciation of the "no go" areas so that provocative or unfriendly actions can be eschewed.

The best way for China and Japan to explore for hydrocarbons in the East China Sea is through joint development of fields, given the intricate, difficult-to-resolve claims and legal ambiguities. But China’s gunboat diplomacy across the median line in the East China Sea and unilateral drilling moves have impeded such progress.

The world’s two most populous nations, China and India, have been scowling at each other across a 4,057-km disputed Indo-Tibetan frontier. Protracted negotiations over the past 26 years have failed to remove even the ambiguities plaguing this long line of control. Beijing, seeking to keep India under strategic pressure, has been loath to clearly define the front line.

Singh’s visit is to follow more than a year of assertive Chinese moves that have run counter to declared efforts to build a stable Sino-Indian relationship based on equilibrium and forward thinking.

Two things have happened. One, China has hardened its stance on territorial disputes with India. And two, as the Dalai Lama pointed out in a recent address in Rome, Beijing is taking an increasing harsh position on Tibet, pretending there is no Tibetan issue to resolve.

The Tibet issue is at the core of the India-China divide, and without Beijing beginning a process of reconciliation and healing in Tibet and coming to terms with history, there is little prospect of Sino-Indian differences being bridged.

Beijing itself highlights the centrality of the Tibet issue by laying claim to Indian territories on the basis of alleged Tibetan ecclesial or tutelary links to them, not any professed Han connection.

With the Dalai Lama having publicly repudiated such claims, a discomfitted Beijing has sought to persuade the Tibetan government-in-exile to support China’s position that India’s northeastern Arunachal Pradesh state is part of traditional Tibet. The fact is that with China’s own claim to Tibet being historically dubious, its claims to Indian territories are doubly suspect, underlining its attempts at incremental annexation.

The uncompromising Chinese approach contrasts sharply with the forbearing positions of the Indian government and the Dalai Lama. New Delhi, for instance, has bent over backward to play down recent aggressive Chinese military moves along the ill-defined line of control.

The Dalai Lama, for his part, is beginning to face muted criticism from restive Tibetans for having secured nothing from Beijing two decades after changing the struggle for liberation from Chinese imperial conquest to a struggle for autonomy within the framework of the People’s Republic. As the Dalai Lama himself admitted in Rome, "Our right hand has always reached out to the Chinese government. That hand has remained empty."

Examples of China’s increasing hardline stance on India range from the Chinese ambassador’s Beijing-supported bellicose public statement on Arunachal Pradesh on the eve of Hu’s visit, to the Chinese foreign minister’s May 2007 message to his Indian counterpart that China no longer felt bound by a 2005 agreement that any border-related settlement should not disturb settled populations. Add to that the October admission by the chief of India’s Indo-Tibetan Border Police that there had been 141 Chinese military incursions in the preceding 12-month period alone.

Beijing’s strategy is to interminably drag out its separate negotiating processes with India and the Dalai Lama’s envoys in order to wheedle out more and more concessions.

In line with that, China’s negotiators have been in full foot-dragging mode, seeking to keep the discussions merely at the level of enunciating principles, positions and frameworks — something they have done splendidly in negotiations with India since 1981 and with the Dalai Lama’s envoys since 2002.

As several Chinese scholars have acknowledged, Beijing is not as keen as New Delhi to resolve the territorial disputes. Having got what it wanted either by military aggression or furtive encroachment, Beijing values its claims on additional Indian territories as vital leverage.

Similarly, not content with the Dalai Lama’s abandonment of the demand for independence, Beijing continues to publicly vilify him and portray his envoys’ visits for negotiations as personal trips. It has further tightened its vise on Tibet by ordering that all lama reincarnations must get its approval, renewing political repression, and encouraging the "Go West" Han-migration campaign.

It is not accidental that China’s hardline approach has followed its infrastructure advances on the Tibetan plateau, including the opening of a new railway, airfields and highways. The railway, by arming Beijing with a rapid military-deployment capability against India, is transforming the trans-Himalayan military equations.

How the China-Japan, China-India and Japan-India equations evolve in the coming years will have a critical bearing on Asian security. But through its growing assertiveness, China is already showing that its rise is dividing, not uniting, Asia.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is a regular contributor to The Japan Times.

The Japan Times: Wednesday, Dec. 26, 2007

(C) All rights reserved

Get the Nuclear Deal Facts Straight

Please check your facts, Mr. Minister

Asian Age, December 22, 2007

In his reply in the two Houses of Parliament to the recent nuclear debate, India’s external affairs minister displayed a woeful ignorance of basic facts.

Brahma Chellaney

No issue continues to divide India more than the nuclear deal with the United States. Yet the first debate of 2007 in Parliament on the subject — which showed the deal backers in an abject minority — took place recently without the prime minister caring to reply to the concerns expressed by lawmakers. Manmohan Singh also had not responded to the previous debate in December 2006 after the conditions-laden Hyde Act was passed by the US Congress. But at least then he had a reason to proffer: “a throat problem.”

As on that occasion, the external affairs minister was entrusted to reply to the latest debate. Speaking first in the Lok Sabha on November 29 after the opposition had walked out to protest the PM’s refusal to reply and then in the Rajya Sabha on December 5 — a speech that triggered the Left to stage a walkout with the entire opposition — Pranab Mukherjee distinguished himself for a meandering response short on specifics but long on hyberbole.

Mukherjee had it all: From self-deprecating remarks (“I am a small fry”, and “I am a small man, sir, of less than average intelligence”); to mocking the opposition (“Why are these people making noise? What type of people they are?”); and to open defiance of the majority will of Parliament (“Sir, in respect of the sense of the House, we have never said that we will take the sense of the House”).

But whenever he dared to go into specifics, he displayed a woeful ignorance of basic facts or even naïveté. Consider the following samples from the transcript of his speeches posted on the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha websites:

►“As per the 1954 Atomic Energy Act of USA — which has been subsequently amended — the US cannot enter into any civilian nuclear cooperation with any country which is not a signatory to the NPT. Therefore, the administration does not have the authority. A waiver is required under that Act…” (Rajya Sabha)

In the 568-page voluminous text of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEC), the word “NPT” or its full official form, “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” does not appear even once. By spreading such a fallacy — that US law prohibits “civilian nuclear cooperation with any country which is not a signatory to the NPT”— the minister is only lending credence to the widely disseminated myth that by entering into a deal with India, America is rewarding a country that has not signed the NPT.

The fact is that the NPT does not prohibit civilian nuclear assistance to a non-signatory provided such transfers are subject to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In fact, the NPT encourages nuclear technology’s peaceful use and interstate civilian cooperation. If there is any restriction on civilian nuclear cooperation, it is outside the framework of international law and the United Nations, in the form of a US-led cartel — the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, which has episodically changed its guidelines since it was secretly formed in response to India’s 1974 test. Even the NSG, however, conditions civil nuclear exports today not to NPT membership but to the recipient state’s opening of all its nuclear facilities to external inspection.

As far as US law is concerned, civil nuclear cooperation with any country or group of nations requires a bilateral accord (the so-called 123 agreement). But out of the nine conditions (none related to NPT) under the AEC Section 123 applicable to such cooperation, the US Congress has waived only one for India — the requirement for comprehensive IAEA inspections on all facilities.

The government will “enter into an India-specific safeguard arrangement with IAEA, which is the supreme international body to supervise all matters related to international atomic energy. India is one of the founders of this body in the early 1950s and has contributed in its own way in strengthening this most important and vital regulatory body of international atomic energy” (Lok Sabha).

The IAEA was set up only in 1957, so India could not have been “one of the founders of this body in the early 1950s.” The idea to set up such an agency, and its structure and statute, were conceived by an eight-nation group comprising the US, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Belgium and Portugal. As the official IAEA history states, “The structure that the eight-nation group foresaw for the IAEA and several other provisions of the draft that emerged from its discussions were quite close to the final (1957) text of the IAEA’s statute.” It was the need to bring in the Soviet Union that forced the group’s expansion to 12 in 1956, with the USSR and Czechoslovakia brought in to represent the socialist bloc and India and Brazil the developing world.

During 1956-57, India tried hard to impede the IAEA’s establishment, and although eventually it joined the agency, it continued its fight from within to prevent a discriminatory system of inspections (safeguards) that would divide the world between nuclear haves and have-nots. Homi Bhabha publicly contended that a safeguards regime would only widen the gap between the developed and developing nations.

Ironically, the first country asked by the US to accept IAEA inspections was India — through a 123 agreement signed in 1963. So reluctant was India to accept even safeguards at one facility — Tarapur — that it persuaded the US to insert several riders into that 123 Agreement: (i) the IAEA’s safeguards role will “not be implemented until the station has reached reliable full-power operation;” (ii) if New Delhi later declined to accept IAEA inspections, the US will not exercise its right to terminate the agreement “unless there has been widespread acceptance, by those nations with whom it has bilateral agreements, of the implementation of safeguards by the Agency or of provisions similar to those contained” in the accord with India; and (iii) the Tarapur safeguards are a quid pro quo for an exclusive fuel-supply arrangement, with the US required to provide fuel “as needed” by India. Yet in 1978 America broke its 1963 agreement with India by enacting a new domestic law that retroactively rewrote the terms of that bilateral accord.

Today, an economically rising, nuclear-armed India has initialled a new 123 agreement with built-in discrimination. The accord provides for IAEA safeguards of a type applicable only to non-nuclear states — permanent and legally irrevocable — with the inspections to extend not just to prospective facilities with foreign components or materials, but also to eight indigenous power reactors and a host of other locally built heavy-water and fuel-fabrication plants. With the longstanding critic of the safeguards regime now becoming its cheerleader, Bhabha must be turning in his grave.

“Yes, as per the Hyde Act, there will be a requirement of presidential determination. To have the presidential determination, the president will have to report to Congress. But, most respectfully, I would like to submit through you, sir, that this is one-time” (Rajya Sabha).

The Hyde Act splits the presidential-determination requirement into two parts. Under Section 104(b), the US president is to certify to Congress that all the listed preconditions have been met to begin nuclear cooperation with India, including that New Delhi has with the IAEA “concluded all legal steps required prior to signature.”

Once the 123 Agreement takes effect, the Hyde Act requires the president to certify cyclically that India is meeting all the good-behaviour conditions post-implementation. As the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Act states, such presidential “certification” has been designed to enforce “India’s continued implementation” of prescribed obligations. In fact, within 180 days of the Agreement’s entry-into-force, the president has to submit a comprehensive “implementation and compliance report” detailing India’s nuclear military activities and its observance of the post-implementation conditions, including on Iran.

“We are not bound by the Hyde Act” (Rajya Sabha).How can it be binding on us? As a law passed by the Indian Parliament is not binding (on) US congressmen, similarly a law passed by US congressmen may be binding on the US administration but not on India” (Lok Sabha).

The Hyde Act cannot bind India but it surely obligates the US government to enforce the legislative conditions. By affecting the terms (and fate) of cooperation with India, it impinges on Indian leeway and interests. Equally important is that Congress, in denying the president the authority he sought to permanently waive relevant sections of the AEC in relation to India, has carved out a conditional waiver authority subject to congressional oversight.

The US has 24 separate 123 agreements today, but only the one with India is governed by such a country-specific law. The Indian national security adviser indeed is on record as saying that the Indo-US 123 Agreement was negotiated keeping in mind the Hyde Act. “As far as we are concerned, we haven’t breached the Hyde Act … We have seen to [it] that no law is broken,” M.K. Narayanan said.

Nothing better illustrates how India has deferred to the primacy of the Hyde Act than the 123 Agreement itself, which does not incorporate the principle that neither party will invoke its internal law as justification for a failure to honour the accord, or provide for an international arbitral tribunal in case of any dispute. Further, to help Washington enforce Indian compliance with the Hyde Act’s conditions, it empowers the US to suspend all cooperation forthwith, without having to assign any reason or bring in an alternative supplier.

Washington’s consistent legal position has been that a 123 agreement with any state is a requirement under American law and that such an accord lacks treaty status under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the US hasn’t even ratified. Against this background, the 123 Agreement stands out for India securing the right to worthless “consultations” in return for putting itself at the mercy of the supplier.

The minister shied away from answering troubling questions even about the 123 Agreement, including the lack of an enforceable link between perpetual international inspections and perpetual fuel supply or why America granted Japan and EURATOM the actual right to reprocess upfront but India is to negotiate a separate accord on reprocessing in the years ahead under Section 131 of AEC. The minister’s refrain was: “I am not an expert, I am a layman like you;” and “I am not a practising lawyer, I am a humble teacher.”

The more one hears the official defence of the deal, the more it sounds like the tale of the blind men examining an elephant. Mukherjee indeed showed he is a cut above the rest: He neatly demolished the PM’s raison d’être for pushing the deal — nuclear energy. “Yes, it is proved, everybody admits that the nuclear energy (from) reactors is definitely costly … nuclear energy if it appears to be too costly today, perhaps, it will not appear that costly tomorrow,” he declared.

With the elephant still being scrutinized, “these men of Indostan” will continue to:

“Rail on in utter ignorance
“Of what each other mean,
“And prate about an Elephant
“Not one of them has seen!”
(John Godfrey Saxe)
 
These old men of "Indostan" are certainly not blind, but as the Bible says:
"None is so blind as he who refuses to see."

U.S. and the Pakistani Nuclear Ring: The One-Eyed Cop

REVIEW

The One-Eyed Cop

How dubious US decisions made Pakistan a nuclear rogue and a tangled web of combustible forces

Brahma Chellaney on Deception: Pakistan, The United States And The Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy by Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott-Clark (Penguin, 2007)

Outlook, November 19, 2007

The worst proliferation scandal in world history, involving the sale of nuclear secrets across frontiers, was in Pakistan —today the main sanctuary of transnational terrorists. This well-researched book is not so much about that nuclear-smuggling ring as about the scandal behind that scandal: “How 30 years of parochial and sometimes criminal policy of the US enabled Pakistan to betray the West, build a vast nuclear arsenal with US aid, and sell the technology to countries hostile to the West, while giving shelter to the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda”.

But what is left unsaid is that the brunt of politically expedient US policies toward Pakistan has been borne not by the West but by India, a major victim of terrorism which now finds itself on the frontline of nuclear dangers. As the book concludes, the US has yet to learn from its past mistakes. With Pakistan sinking rapidly, the US today is courting India as a potential ally. But it continues to sell India-directed weapons to Pakistan, making that state the world’s largest arms importer. Much of the nearly $11 billion in US aid to Pakistan since 2001 has been in military hardware and cash support for that country’s operating budget.

Levy and Scott-Clark shatter the 21st-century fable of an A.Q. Khan-run nuclear supermarket busted by US intelligence. The main actors in that ring were Pakistani military and intelligence, with Washington in the know. To shield the principal players, the entire blame was pinned, as part of a US deal with Gen Pervez Musharraf, on a group of "greedy" scientists led by Khan, and then these very men have been kept away from international investigators.

Long before Khan turned from a national icon to a national scapegoat, he had been protected by the Central Intelligence Agency. Washington turned a blind eye to the covert Pakistani bomb programme since the 1970s for the same reason that China aided Islamabad’s nuclear and missile ambitions — as a counterweight to India. The authors show how the CIA shielded Khan from arrest and prosecution in Europe in 1975 and 1986. The Dutch government did not take Khan into custody at the request of the CIA. “The U.S. was not interested in successful prosecutions that highlighted Pakistan’s duplicity”, they claim.

In more recent years, the US has helped whitewash Islamabad’s official complicity in the sale of nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea. In fact, the Pakistan military — which has always controlled the nuclear programme — claimed that it wasn’t aware of nuclear secrets being sold until Libya and Iran began spilling the beans. The main reason why Washington joined hands with Islamabad in that charade is because it still sees the Pakistan military as a key instrument to advance its regional interests. Just as it helped keep the jihad-spewing General Zia ul-Haq in power to take on Soviet forces in Afghanistan, it needs a pliant ruler in Islamabad today because it employs Pakistan as a gateway to military operations in Afghanistan, a base for clandestine missions into Iran and a vehicle for other geopolitical objectives.

After the Pakistani illicit supply network was uncovered, the UN Security Council passed a US-inspired resolution with no reference to Pakistan or even to the ring, but instead urged the world to share the responsibility. Resolution 1540 obligated all states to legislate and implement tight domestic controls on materials related to weapons of mass destruction so as to ensure that non-state actors do not get hold of them. In contrast, the US has taken such a tough line against neighbouring Iran that it got the Security Council to issue an excessively harsh diktat to Tehran to cease doing what the latter insists is its lawful right — pursue low-grade uranium enrichment under international inspection.

While the U.S. is pushing for tougher UN sanctions against Iran even though the International Atomic Energy Agency has yet to find evidence of a covert weapons programme there, it has gone to great lengths to ensure Pakistan is not penalized for its admitted nuclear transfers to Tehran and others. The exporting state has been allowed to escape international scrutiny and censure so that, as the authors point out, the importing state could paradoxically be put in the doghouse as part of a US policy to target Iran. The book warns that the various links in the elaborate Pakistani nuclear-supply chain have still not been unplugged, even as terror-exporting Pakistan has emerged “at the epicentre of world destabilization”.

Japan’s leading foreign affairs journal interviews Brahma Chellaney

Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Peace and Stability

Brahma Chellaney and Horimoto Takenori

© Gaiko Forum, Fall 2007, Volume 7, Number 2

A top Indian strategic thinker sees the Japan-India relationship as one of the key factors that will determine Asia’s future dynamics, even as China continues its rise to international prominence. With an eye on how the United States, Russia, and other countries fit into the picture, we asked him about India’s view on Japan and Asia in terms of its thinking on establishing long-term mechanisms for strategic cooperation.

Horimoto Takenori: First of all, could you tell us what kind of policies India is developing in the areas of foreign affairs and security, particularly in regard to the situation in the region at this time?

Brahma Chellaney: The situation around India at the moment is posing increasing challenges to its security. The area to the west, between India and Israel, is volatile and constitutes a contiguous arc of extremism and fundamentalism. Then to India’s east we have Bangladesh and Myanmar, both undergoing domestic tumult, and to the north the Central Asian states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are internally troubled. Also to the north we have Tibet, where resistance to Chinese rule has continued and where China is actually doing a lot of development that is strategic in orientation and therefore affects India’s security. So in general, India’s neighborhood has become far more difficult and threatening to Indian security than in the past.

In response, India has to have, first of all, a clear strategy to deal with this deteriorating external environment. Second, it needs to have more vigorous engagement with various actors in its neighborhood. India’s foreign policy has to be dynamic and focused on engagement not just with the governments in power in those countries but also with various important elements of civil society in those states, so that India can work with as many key actors as possible. And the third element in this approach is that India has to exercise its “soft power.” These three points are crucial to developing a long-term response.

Horimoto: How would you evaluate Indian foreign policy so far in terms of those three points?

Chellaney: Indian foreign policy has been good on points two and three — engagement with civil society in the neighborhood and projecting soft power. India is currently providing $700 million to Afghanistan for reconstruction, and it provides a lot of other development aid to countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and now even Myanmar. But foreign policy in terms of the first point I mentioned—devising a long-term strategy—is wanting. India still tends to be quite reactive and ad hoc in its responses.

Equal Footing with the United States

Horimoto: I see. Next, I’d like to ask you about the issue of nuclear power, which ties in with the large strides India is taking toward closer relations with the United States. We see that the efforts to finalize and put into force the U.S.-India deal on civil nuclear cooperation have gotten bogged down.

Chellaney: No strategic issue has proven more divisive in India in modern times than this nuclear deal with the United States. The problem is that the two countries entered into this agreement with different expectations of what it will deliver. India hopes the deal will bring about the removal of all sanctions it faces on the import of advanced technologies. Since 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear test, the United States has strictly regulated the flow of advanced technology to India through export controls. The irony is that communist China now has greater access to U.S. high technology than democratic India. So India’s aim is the removal of not only civil nuclear sanctions but also other technology sanctions, including export controls on space technology and on high technology in general. India would like the deal to open the way to such export controls being gradually relaxed and eventually lifted altogether.

America’s aim, on the other hand, is to rope in India as its new strategy ally in Asia. After having penalized New Delhi for its 1974 nuclear test through stringent technology controls, Washington is now ready to promote India’s “normalization” as a nuclear power through this deal, but at a price: India is to bind its interests to America’s. The future of the Indo-U.S. relationship hinges on the resolution of a key issue: will India be a Japan to the U.S. (in other words, an ally), or will it be a strategic partner? An ally has to follow the alliance leader, while in a partnership there is at least the semblance of equality. India would prefer to stay a strategic partner of the U.S. and not get into a Japan-style security dependency on Washington.

Horimoto: Specifically, there are three points on which the nuclear deal has proven controversial in India: no nuclear testing, the issue of reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and permanent international inspections (safeguards). Regarding the first of these, you said in a recent article in the American press, in the Wall Street Journal, that this amounts to an attempt to bring India into the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) via the back door.

Chellaney: Well, the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in December 2006, already has an explicit ban on India testing, and says that if India were to conduct a nuclear test, then all cooperation would cease. But to incorporate that into the bilateral agreement would have been from India’s standpoint, almost a de jure acceptance of the CTBT. In the agreed text of the bilateral agreement, while there is no explicit reference to nuclear testing, a test prohibition against India has been unequivocally built into its provisions through the incorporation of the U.S. right to demand the return of all supplied materials and items if Washington held New Delhi to be in violation of the accord’s terms.

Of India’s 22 commercial nuclear power reactors, 14 are going to be made subject to permanent international inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in return for which they are supposed to get permanent fuel supply from overseas. In reality, however, there is no enforceable link between perpetual international inspections and perpetual fuel supply, because the U.S. has an open-ended right in the bilateral agreement to suspend supplies forthwith while issuing a one-year termination notice by citing any reason it wishes.

The next issue is reprocessing. As a country poor in uranium but rich in thorium deposits, India is working to eventually establish a thorium-based fuel cycle as the mainstay of its nuclear power policy, and the second and third phases of its development program depend on reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. This reprocessing will take place under IAEA safeguards, so India is not seeking exemption from international monitoring, but it does want the operational right upfront to carry out reprocessing. In part, India does not want to repeat its past mistake. In the 1960s, when America built India’s first nuclear power plant at Tarapur under the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement of 1963, America said that India can reprocess after joint determination with America that the reprocessing facility is adequately safeguarded, but to date no such joint determination has been carried out. Yet, in the latest agreement, the U.S. has granted India only a theoretical to reprocess, with the actual right to be negotiated later.

The nuclear deal the U.S. signed with China is so liberal that the agreement states in one of its provisions that “bilateral safeguards are not required.” To placate Congress over the absence of IAEA or U.S. inspections, the Clinton administration worked out a loose arrangement with Beijing for nominal on-site safeguards. In India’s case, the U.S. is to have its own end-use inspections, in addition to IAEA inspections.

Horimoto: So why did the Indian government accept such terms?

Chellaney: It shows how naive Indian negotiators have been. This deal has been a real foreign policy success for the Bush administration’s second term, but in India it has become the cause of a lot of misgivings, triggering a political crisis.

Horimoto: Under the agreement, India’s uranium imports will increase. Some experts are saying that if India uses that imported uranium for electric power stations, this would enable it to divert its own uranium resources to nuclear weapons.

Chellaney: India will still have eight existing nuclear power plants that will not be subject to IAEA inspections, plus new ones that are still under construction. India’s natural uranium will have to be used for these other reactors, not for nuclear weapons. For weapons, furthermore, India uses plutonium, not uranium. There are only two facilities in India for plutonium production, the Dhruva reactor and the CIRUS reactor, and CIRUS is going to be closed down by 2010 as part of this U.S.-India accord. So, in three years’ time India will lose one-third of its plutonium production capability, and therefore one-third of its ability to make more nuclear weapons.

Horimoto: Japan is being asked by both the United States and India to accept and accommodate this 123 Agreement, but so far it has avoided giving a definite answer. This is basically because, although the Japanese government wants to be accommodating for the sake of good relations with both countries, as the only nation to have suffered atomic attack it must also heed the predominantly anti-nuclear sentiment of the Japanese people.

Chellaney: This nuclear deal still has several stages to cross. After the bilateral agreement between India and the United States, New Delhi has to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, after which will come the deliberations by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) for granting India an exemption from its export controls. If the deal does get that far, Japan will have to make up its mind because it won’t be able to still sit on the fence and hedge its bets.

Horimoto: At the moment the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, are expressing concerns about the plan.

Chellaney: Also resisting it are Ireland, Italy . . .

Horimoto: And China also. But what do you think China’s true attitude toward this Indian nuclear deal is?

Chellaney: I think China will come on board, eventually. The United States has been keeping China in the loop on this nuclear deal with India, and U.S. Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns has said that in the final decision China will come on board. China has no reason to oppose an agreement that puts some fetters on India’s nuclear weapons program. China, however, may prefer that instead of an India-specific exemption, the NSG makes a criteria-based exemption that Beijing can use to work out similar cooperation with Pakistan.

Balancing vis-à-vis China

Horimoto: Former Beijing bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times James Mann has published a new book titled The China Fantasy (Viking, 2007), in which he says that China’s economic development will not necessarily bring democratization, that China might retain its communist regime for long, and that this could become a major problem for the United States.

Chellaney: China is a real wild card in Asia. I think it’s very important to ensure that China rises in a way that is not destabilizing for Asia or the wider world. If China becomes more high-handed or assertive, then obviously this would create disequilibrium throughout the world. China is politically autocratic but economically open, and even though that is a contradiction, China has been able to manage the contradiction rather well. If it continues to do that, then it will reap the benefits from both ends, which means that by the middle of this century, China will emerge as a truly great power. Under the Hu Jintao government, we see that growing economic prosperity has not created more political openness. On the contrary, the state has become more sophisticated in repressing dissent, as seen from the new curbs on media and scholars, Internet censorship, and so on. So I am concerned about what kind of China we will see 25 years from now. If it continues on the present path, then I think in Asia we will have a power imbalance, and globally we will have an international system in which China will try to change the rules to its advantage, creating a lot of fluidity.

Horimoto: How should India try to cope with that situation?

Chellaney: India needs to bear in mind that China is using classical balance-of-power strategies against it, and India, too, has to take strategic steps to balance China’s rise so that its power does not become high-handed. The only way that balance can be maintained is if India cooperates in building a constellation of democracies in the Asia-Pacific region—a group that would include countries like Japan, India, Australia, the United States, Russia . . .

Horimoto: Russia also?

Chellaney: I think so, because if you leave out Russia you will not get a true counterbalance to China. The most effective approach on China would be a three-way partnership among India, Russia and Japan, although for that there needs to be an improvement in the Japan-Russia relationship. Russia has the same kinds of concerns about China that India and Japan have. And if you look at it geographically, with Japan to the east, Russia to the north, and India in the south, a Japan-Russia-India three-way partnership would effectively contain China from all sides. So, in addition to the quadrilateral partnership involving Australia, Japan, the United States, and India, we need to work on this very innovative and strategic triangle involving Russia, Japan and India. And we need to strengthen the Japan-India bilateral relationship as an important pillar of power equilibrium in Asia. Japan-India strategic collaboration is pivotal to the future makeup of Asia.

Horimoto: A kind of composite approach. But doesn’t that contradict what you said in your book Asian Juggernaut (HarperCollins, 2006), where you stressed the need mainly for cooperation between Japan, India, and China? And also, how do you think China will react to such a multipronged approach?

Chellaney: As my book points out, China is already developing various levers to contain India and Japan. India hasn’t done anything in relation to China, but China is already building the Irrawaddy Corridor down to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar; they’re building the Trans-Karakoram Corridor down to Gwadar in Pakistan; they’re building an east-west corridor in Tibet, right along India’s northern borders; and then they’re also trying to enter the Indian Ocean region. So, basically, they’re trying to squeeze India from all sides.

To deal with China’s rise, we also need a system of institutionalized cooperation among Japan, India, and China. On issues of trade, international finance, monetary policy, and so on, Japan, China, and India are virtually on the same side and can cooperate productively. Without good relations between Japan and China and also between India and China, we will not be able to understand what China is up to.

India’s Focus on the Seas

Horimoto: You mentioned the Indian Ocean. Sea-lane security is becoming an important issue in Asia, not only for defense but for economic development as well.

Chellaney: In Asia today, the issues of energy and security are inseparable. In fact, Asia faces the specter of a twenty-first-century, energy-focused version of the Great Game, the nineteenth-century rivalry between the British Indian Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia. Mercantilist efforts to assert control over oil and natural gas supplies and transport routes certainly risk fueling tension and discord. That is why sea-lane security has become more important than ever.

With Japan, China, and India dependent on energy imports by sea, multinational cooperation on the security of sea-lanes has become essential to avert strategic friction in Asia. Asia needs to build a shared interest in viable energy policies, secure sea-lanes, and a stable energy environment. However, such a shared interest can be developed only on the basis of expanded political and security cooperation, as well as increased transparency in military expenditures.

Furthermore, to forestall the passions aroused by maritime boundary disputes, Asia needs an agreed code of conduct on naval and energy exploration activities. For example, the answer to the long-running battle between Japan and China over disputed oil and gas fields in the East China Sea cannot be unilateral drilling or production by either side.

Horimoto: India has been strengthening its navy and expanding the navy’s field of activity beyond the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca, and recently even to the Pacific, through its joint naval exercises with the United States, Japan, and Russia.

Chellaney: It should not be forgotten that India is a peninsular country with a long coastline and a vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that measures more than 2 million square kilometers. The fact that 95 percent of India’s external trade moves by sea makes India especially vulnerable to maritime contingencies. Particularly important is the Persian Gulf region, the source of 85 percent of India’s oil and gas imports.

Strategically, this makes the security of sea-lanes vital to India’s economic and security interests, and India’s published maritime doctrine emphasizes the centrality of the Indian Ocean to national security. The Indian Navy, furthermore, has to protect not only sea-lanes but also the country’s large energy infrastructure of onshore and offshore oil and gas wells, liquefied natural gas terminals, refineries, pipeline grids, and oil exploration work within its EEZ. India neglected to modernize its navy for more than 15 years, but in the last few years it has been sharply increasing its naval spending.

The greater Indian emphasis on the seas also springs from China’s incremental efforts to create a network of forward listening posts, naval access agreements, and Chinese-built harbors along the Indian Ocean rim—a network stretching from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean rim now extends even as far as the Seychelles.

As I mentioned before, Beijing has been fashioning two vertical strategic corridors, one to the west and another to east of India. The former is the Trans-Karakoram Corridor stretching from western China all the way down to Gwadar at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s oil passes. The newly opened, Chinese-built deepwater port at Gwadar represents China’s first strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea.

The latter is the Irrawaddy Corridor from Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal, which involves road, river, and rail links through Myanmar, including to the Chinese-built harbors at Kyaukypu and Thilawa. Then there is China’s agreement with Sri Lanka to build a port in the Hambantota District, China’s provision of aid to the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong, and its interest in a strategic anchor in the Maldives. All this underscores an emerging Chinese challenge to India’s traditional dominance in the Indian Ocean region.

One component of China’s plan is to make the Gwadar port-cum-naval base a major hub for transporting Persian Gulf and African oil by pipeline to the Chinese heartland via the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This plan to pipe the oil in would not only cut freight costs and supply time but also lower China’s reliance on U.S.-policed shipping lanes through the Malacca and Taiwan Straits.

Besides augmenting its naval capabilities, India is building up its strategic partnerships—in the form of trade accords, military exercises, energy cooperation, and strategic dialogue—with key littoral states in the Indian Ocean region as well as with outside players like the United States, Japan, and Australia. Such cooperation is principally aimed at safeguarding the various “gates” to the Indian Ocean, and so its primary focus is on states adjacent to such chokepoints as the Strait of Hormuz (Iran), the Strait of Malacca (Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia), the Bab el Mandeb (Djibouti and Eritrea), the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) and the Mozambique Channel (Mozambique). India’s defense ties with Iran, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Singapore, and Thailand—all countries lying along those key sea lanes—reflect India’s new emphasis on strengthening its position in the Indian Ocean.

India’s efforts to play an expanded naval role in its extended neighborhood have been illustrated in recent years by two events. The first was India’s provision of naval escorts to commercial ships passing through the vulnerable, piracy-wracked Strait of Malacca in 2003. The second was the dispatch of the Indian Navy for relief efforts and aid diplomacy after the tsunami that struck southern Asia on 26 December 2004. This was the largest humanitarian relief operation the Indian Navy has ever conducted outside India’s territorial waters.

For India, the maritime arc stretching from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca to the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan constitutes the “new Silk Road.” Building maritime security in this arc demands cooperation and strategic partnership among countries sharing common interests and values. One of several such initiatives currently being developed is the India-Japan-U.S.-Australia quadrilateral initiative. It is significant that Tokyo pushed for India’s inclusion into this group, turning the existing Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral security arrangements into a quadrilateral tie-up. Even before becoming Japan’s prime minister, Abe Shinzo wrote in his book Utsukushii kuni e [Towards a Beautiful Country] (Bungei Shunju, 2006)* that it was of “crucial importance to Japan’s national interest that it further strengthen ties with India, and that it would not be a surprise if in another 10 years Japan-India relations overtook Japan-U.S. and Japan-China relations.”

Next Three Years Crucial for Japan-India Relations

Horimoto: To what extent can Japan and India cooperate in the area of sea-lane security?

Chellaney: Given the fact that, of all the major powers in the world, India and Japan are the most vulnerable to any disruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region, they need to build close strategic cooperation centered on maritime security. India and Japan are already developing joint exercises between the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy, as well as military exchanges and high-level defense dialogue, and it is no surprise that they are exploring various kinds of cooperation in this area. India-Japan strategic cooperation can only contribute to strategic stability in Asia.

At the same time, India and Japan have to build adequate military capabilities to help maintain a stable power equilibrium in Asia. This is why, among other things, India has purchased the 40,000-ton Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. If India does not guard the various gates to the Indian Ocean by strengthening both its own naval power and its strategic partnerships with key players like Japan, it could find itself facing the Chinese navy in its backyard before long.

Such cooperation doesn’t mean that India and Japan intend to jointly counter China. A stable, mutually beneficial relationship with China remains critical to the national interests of both our countries. But China’s growing power puts Delhi and Tokyo at a disadvantage when they deal with Beijing strictly at the bilateral level. So, broader security arrangements or initiatives are attractive for India and Japan to ensure that the rising Chinese power will not slide into arrogance.

Horimoto: The United States is also keen to remain an active player in Asia.

Chellaney: Trying to exclude the United States would only raise other problems, so we need to have initiatives that involve it as well. But we must remember that the United States is pursuing its own interests in Asia, which are to retain its geopolitical preeminence in the Asia-Pacific region, to ensure that no Asian power overtly challenges its interests in the region, and to maintain a balance of power in light of the fact that Asia is becoming increasingly important to the American economy and security. But I think that the U.S. role in Asia is going to decline over the next 50 years because of the rise of China and India and also because of the political rise of Japan, which in my view is the most under-noticed development in the world.

Horimoto: Finally, I’d like to ask you about Japan-India relations. Their economic relationship will no doubt continue to expand, but what kind of developments might they aim for in their political relations?

Chellaney: India and Japan are Asia’s largest and most-developed democracies, and the ties between them constitute the most important relationship in Asia today because it will shape the future strategic landscape of the region. Normally, the best diplomatic relationships are built on the bedrock of security ties. Japan and India have recently been stepping up their military exchanges and visits, and I don’t think there’s been any time since after World War II when the Japanese prime minister and foreign minister have publicly placed India on as high a priority as we see now. I think the next three years are going to be an important opportunity for the two countries to lay the foundation for long-term strategic cooperation. In an Asia characterized by a qualitative reordering of power, the direction of the India-Japan relationship is set towards closer engagement.

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*Forthcoming in October in English under the title Towards a Beautiful Country: My Vision for Japan (Vision, 2007)

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プロフィール [bio]

Brahma Chellaney

Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, a private think tank based in New Delhi. A specialist in international security and arms control issues, Chellaney has been an adviser to the Indian government for many years, and is currently a member of the Policy Advisory Group headed by the Indian foreign minister. He is active as a columnist for leading Indian and overseas newspapers and as a television commentator. His recent works include Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan (HarperCollins, 2006).

Horimoto Takenori

Professor, Shobi University. A graduate of the Chuo University faculty of law, Horimoto received his master’s degree in political science from the University of Delhi. He took up his current position after serving as director general of the Research and Legislative Reference Bureau, National Diet Library. A specialist in international relations in South Asia and U.S. policy on Asia, he is the author of Indo gendai seijishi [A Political History of Modern India], Tosui Shobo, 1997, and Indo: Gurobaruka suru kyozo [India: The Elephant Globalizes], Iwanami Shoten, 2007, among other works. He also translated Stephen P. Cohen’s India: Emerging Power (Brookings Institution Press, 2001) for its Japanese-language publication as Amerika wa naze Indo ni chumoku suru no ka? [Why the United States is Watching India], Akashi Shoten, 2003.

_________

Translated by Dean Robson from “Indo kara mita Nihon, Ajia,” originally published in the Japanese edition of Gaiko Forum September 2007 issue on the theme “ASEAN Turns Forty.” Some parts have been updated with the interviewee’s consent.

© Gaiko Forum

Why is the U.S. so anxious to save the nuclear deal with India?

An Air of Desperation

 

Brahma Chellaney

Asian Age, November 3, 2007

 

In its frantic efforts to salvage the nuclear deal, the United States is sending out a politically incorrect message — that the deal matters more to it than the very survival of the Manmohan Singh government. The deal has not only divided India like no other strategic issue since independence, but also plunged the world’s largest democracy into a political crisis, with the threat of a mid-term election looming large. Yet the unrelenting U.S. pressure on India to proceed with the deal has only intensified.

 

            An obvious question begging an answer is: What are the compelling interests America aims to advance through this deal that are prompting it to give high priority to getting this arrangement through, even if it results in Singh’s political downfall? Is the venerable Singh so dispensable for the U.S.?

 

The Congress Party, holding only 27.5 per cent of the Lok Sabha seats, needs allies to survive in power or to return to office in a new election. With not a single party today willing to help shore up the deal, the Congress does not wish to stake its future on that dicey, divisive issue.

 

Yet, from the time Sonia Gandhi and the prime minister last month pulled back from the political-precipice edge, the U.S. has piled up pressure on New Delhi, leaving no stone unturned to rescue the deal. Remember how President George W. Bush anxiously sought to reach the PM by telephone while the latter was travelling in Africa? This week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to convey the same message — in the words of her spokesperson, “to urge the Indian government to move forward with this deal.”

 

To personally lobby Indian leaders, the White House sent Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in recent days. And as if India were a Pakistan, where Washington brokered a Pervez Musharraf-Benazir Bhutto deal to help keep its pet dictator in power, the U.S. is trying to cut a deal between the Congress Party and Bharatiya Janata Party, so as to save another deal dear to it. 

 

            By pulling out all the stops, the signs of desperation have become unmistakeable. In fact, since that famous Bush call to Singh, no day has passed without some senior U.S. official, diplomat or congressman telling India why it should seize the deal as a golden opportunity not to be missed. The U.S. ambassador to India, for his part, has seemingly returned to his old marketing job, hawking the deal door-to-door — from South Block offices to the homes of important politicians in town.

 

It is as if a vibrant India is really a dumb India that doesn’t know what is in its own interest and needs counsel from the other party in the deal. Besides prolonging India’s political crisis and keeping alive the spectre of a snap poll, such meddling, along with its unremitting advice, has become increasingly clamorous.

 

            Paulson, for example, counselled his host nation “to implement the agreement as soon as possible,” acknowledging that the U.S. has been “encouraging it to go forward as quickly as possible.” Kissinger weighed in with his ominous hints about the effect of the deal’s collapse on India’s credibility. The smooth-talking Nicholas Burns, now making almost a daily statement on the deal, declared from Washington: “We, and many other governments, believe that India should grab this opportunity and enter a new era of relations with the U.S.”

 

            Make no mistake: It is the U.S. which sees the deal as an irresistible opportunity, which, if taken advantage of, would bring lasting strategic benefits. There is thus dismay that Indian politics has stalled what the Bush administration had been savouring as a major foreign-policy accomplishment.

 

The U.S. got the deal largely on its terms. In addition to the 41 pages of India-specific conditions in the Hyde Act (passed with bipartisan support after closed-door briefings), the U.S. has concluded a so-called 123 agreement without permitting India upfront to reprocess, or providing for a dispute mechanism (like the arbitral tribunal found in the 123 accord with Tokyo), or explicitly linking perpetual international inspections to perpetual fuel supply. Of all the 123 agreements the U.S. currently has with partner-states, the one with India stands out for conferring enforceable rights only on the supplier-state.

That is why, as the state department reiterated this week, the U.S. will not accept renegotiation of the deal. Washington indeed wants New Delhi to speedily conclude a safeguards pact with the International Atomic Energy Agency because from then on, India would become a mere spectator, watching what additional conditions the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and the U.S. Congress may attach to the final deal.

America’s commercial interests in the deal are evident: The tens of billions of dollars worth of arms and reactor contracts it is likely to reap. Not so obvious is its huge strategic stake, which is two-fold.

First, the deal would open the path to rope in India more than just as a strategic partner. In a 21st-century world in which the concept of alliance is giving way to nations pursuing multiple partnerships to pursue a variety of interests with different players in diverse settings, the U.S. still fancies bringing in India as a new Japan or Britain — an ally that would faithfully follow the alliance leader.

Burns makes no bones about America’s intent. “I think Americans might be able to say 20 years from now, India is one of our two or three most important partners in the world. That will be a tremendous strategic change for us… You need friends, you need allies,” he said in an October 3 interview. At the Council on Foreign Relations on October 23, he amplified: “Twenty or 30 years from now, many Americans would say India is one of the two or three most important global partners — the way Japan and the European Union are today.”

Second, the deal is the means to achieve a central U.S. goal since the 1998 Indian tests — to prevent India’s rise as a full-fledged nuclear-weapons state and bring it into the U.S.-led non-proliferation regime (or, what Burns calls, the “non-proliferation mainstream”). Having failed to stop India from going overtly nuclear, the U.S. wants India’s capabilities to stay regionally confined (like Pakistan’s), even if that strategically disadvantages New Delhi vis-à-vis Beijing.

The first and second objectives are linked because, if this deal goes through, India would be saddled with a rudimentary and inadequate deterrent capability that would promote security dependency on the U.S., including for missile defence. Fostering security dependency is the key to winning and maintaining an ally.

In his 2004 book, Engaging India, Strobe Talbott wrote: “If there is a deal to be done with India, my guess is that it will be a version of the one offered by the Clinton administration and rejected by the BJP-led government. The four U.S.-proposed non-proliferation benchmarks put forward in 1998 — joining the CTBT, making progress on a fissile material treaty, exercising strategic restraint (by that or some other name), and meeting the highest standard of export controls… should remain the basis of the American policy into the future. That means the U.S. government should persist until the four areas of restraint become the basis of the Indian policy.”

That is exactly the line U.S. policy has followed. In the Bush deal with India, the second and fourth Clinton-prescribed benchmarks (progress on fissile material treaty and “comprehensive” export controls) find explicit mention in the original July 18, 2005, deal. The other two benchmarks are reflected in the enabling legislation, the Hyde Act, which seeks both to compel India to exercise strategic restraint and to drag it through the backdoor into an international pact rejected by the Senate — the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The test ban also is built into the 123 agreement implicitly through the incorporation of the U.S. “right of return.”

            The Bush team indeed managed to secure more: While the Vajpayee government was willing to open two indigenous power reactors at the most to international inspections as part of a deal, the Singh government has agreed to put 35 nuclear facilities, including eight existing indigenous power reactors, under IAEA safeguards of a kind applicable only to non-nuclear states — perpetual and legally irrevocable.

In addition, it has agreed gratuitously to shut down the Cirus research reactor by 2010, an action that would significantly affect India’s rate of production of weapons-grade plutonium. Given that fuel burn-up in power reactors produces plutonium of a quality less desirable for weapons and that the use of power stations for such purposes, in any case, makes little economic sense, India has relied on its Cirus and Dhruva research reactors to derive supergrade plutonium. And given that Dhruva, commissioned in 1985, faced major startup problems that took a long time to rectify, most of India’s cumulative historic production of weapons-grade plutonium has come from Cirus — a point noted by Paul Nelson et al in a 2006 paper funded by the U.S. Department of Energy.

In asking New Delhi to dismantle Cirus, the U.S. has sought to crimp India’s nuclear-deterrent plans. As Undersecretary Robert G. Joseph had asserted, deal-related measures “must contribute to our non-proliferation goals.”

India could build a replacement reactor. But the long lead time needed to construct and commission such a reactor is bound to leave a major production shortfall. Yet, no explanation has been offered to the Indian public thus far as to why New Delhi, disregarding the advice of its Department of Atomic Energy, agreed to shut down the 40-MWth Cirus, which had been refurbished at a cost of millions of dollars and reopened only in 2004.

With all the U.S. benchmarks met, is it any surprise that Talbott now has turned from a critic to a proponent of the present deal, joining the “this-has-got-to-happen-soon” chorus and attacking the Singh government for “a very shortsighted calculation” in putting its survival ahead of the deal?

            The key point is that if this U.S.-dictated deal falls apart, it will not only deny America the handle it seeks on Indian policy and deterrent posture, but also its one-sidedly magnanimous terms are unlikely to be replicated in any future agreement. That is why Washington today is feverishly delivering the same two-word message: “Hurry up.”

Let’s be clear: Time is on India’s side. The real test the deal has to pass is whether it can survive a change of government both in New Delhi and Washington. And the test for Singh, given the upcoming Parliament session, is whether the deal can withstand what he has so far sought to thwart but now ought to allow — close legislative scrutiny.

After all, India should enter into the arrangement, not as a good deed for the U.S., but for its own good. Every right-thinking Indian would want U.S.-inspired technology controls against his country to go, but that can hardly justify “a deal at any cost” approach or the use of rose-coloured vision to sell Indians a fantasy. The present deal does not cover high-technology and civilian space controls against India and indeed leaves intact even restrictions on civil enrichment and reprocessing equipment transfers.

The current hold on the deal, forced by domestic political circumstances, underscores the vitality of Indian democracy. It can only help enhance India’s international stature and safeguard national interests.

© Asian Age, 2007

India, China and Tibet

Delhi’s Tibetan glitch
India’s subdued stance on Beijing’s unjustified territorial claims has basically harmed Tibet. And to add insult to injury, then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee virtually gave up on Tibet pretending that China was willing to accept Sikkim as part of India.


Vol 6 Issue 5
September – October 2007

Brahma Chellaney

he Sino-Indian spat over Arunachal Pradesh triggered by Beijing ‘s new hardline stance on territorial disputes has brought home the truth that at the core of the India-China divide remains Tibet and that unless that issue is resolved, the chasm between the two demographic titans will not be bridged. After all, Beijing’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh or more specifically to a slice of it, Tawang, flows from Tibet ‘s putative historical or ecclesiastical ties with Arunachal.
Tibet thus lies at the heart of the disputes. To focus on Arunachal or even Tawang is not only to miss the wood for the trees, but also to play in to the hands of China, which has sought to practise incremental territorial annexation. Having gobbled up Tibet, the historical buffer between the Indian and Chinese civilisations, Beijing now lays claim to Indian territories on the basis of not any purported Han connection to them but supposed Tibetan Buddhist ecclesiastical influence. A good analogy to China’s expansionist territorial demands was Saddam Hussein’s claim, following his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, to areas in Saudi Arabia on the basis of alleged Kuwaiti links to them.
Another reminder that Tibet remains the central issue was the September 2006 shooting by Chinese border guards of unarmed Tibetans fleeing to India via Nepal through the 5,800-metre-high Nangpa-la Pass. There have been instances in the past of Tibetans being shot at by the paramilitary People’s Armed Police or the People’s Liberation Army at border crossings, but this was the first such incident captured on film and shown across the world on television. The 41 survivors of that event who escaped gunfire and capture by Chinese troops on ice-covered Himalayan terrain recounted in Dharamsala how the guards opened fire without warning on some 77 Tibetans, a majority of them teenage boys and girls seeking to pursue Tibetan Buddhist studies in schools run by the Dalai Lama.
Beijing, having wrung the concessions it wanted out of India on Tibet, now is calculatedly signalling that Arunachal is its next priority. By publicly presenting Arunachal as an outstanding issue that demands "give and take," it is cleverly putting the onus on India for achieving progress in the border negotiations. Lest the message be missed, New Delhi is being openly exhorted to make concessions on Arunachal, especially on strategic Tawang – a critical corridor between Lhasa and the Assam Valley of immense military import.
The choice before India now is stark: either to retreat to a defensive, unviable negotiating position where it has to fob off Chinese territorial demands centred on Arunachal or to take the Chinese bull by the horns and question the very legitimacy of Beijing’s right to make territorial jurisdiction claims ecclesiastically on behalf of Tibetan Buddhism when China has still to make peace with the Tibetans.
Either way it does not augur well for the border talks, already the longest between any two nations in modern world history. After a quarter-century of continuing negotiations, the border diplomacy has yielded no concrete progress on an overall settlement nor removed even the ambiguities plaguing the 4,057-kilometre frontline. Beijing has been so loath to clearly define the frontline with India that it broke its 2001 promise to exchange maps of the eastern and western sectors by the end of 2002.
Gently shining the diplomatic spotlight on the Tibet question will help India turn the tables on Beijing, whose aggressive territorial demands have drawn strength from New Delhi’s self-injurious and gratuitous acceptance of Tibet as part of China.
At a time when China is threatening to divert the waters of river Brahmaputra, the subtle and measured revival of Tibet as an unresolved issue will arm India with leverage and international say on any Chinese effort to dam the Brahmaputra and reroute its waters. With water likely to emerge as a major security-related issue in southern Asia in the years ahead, India can hardly ignore the fact that the Indus, Sutlej and Brahmaputra originate in occupied Tibet.
Tibet is the means by which India could coop up the bull in its own China shop. Beijing ‘s new hardline focus on Arunachal/Tawang is apparent not only from its refusal to grant visa to any official from Arunachal Pradesh, but also from its aggressive patrolling of the still-fuzzy Himalayan frontier. Through its forcefulness on Arunachal, China is signalling that the ongoing negotiations with India cannot centre merely on border demarcation, even if both sides still call them "border talks".

Beijing, having wrung the concessions it wanted out of India on Tibet, now is calculatedly signalling that Arunachal is its next priority. By publicly presenting Arunachal as an outstanding issue that demands "give and take," it is cleverly putting the onus on India for achieving progress in the border negotiations

Imperceptive or tactless actions can hardly advance any country’s interests. But China, being a closed system, does not seem to understand that. That is the reason why communist China has a tradition of acting in ways unfavourable to its own long-term interests. One recent example of that is the way it helped rekindle Japanese nationalism by scripting anti-Japan mob protests in April 2005. Tokyo is now more determined than ever not to allow Beijing to call the shots in East Asia.
What is new is not China ‘s claim to Tawang or to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh but its brassy assertiveness in laying out in public its territorial demands. What makes such forcefulness doubly astonishing is that its net effect will only be to reinforce India ‘s resolve not to cede further ground to China. Indian officials take an oath of office pledging to "uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India," and it is unthinkable any Indian government would gift Tawang to China. As Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee has already put it, "Every inch of Arunachal is part of India."
That Tawang is a Monba, not Tibetan, area is a conclusion that British surveyors Bailey and Moreshead painstakingly reached, leading Henry McMahon to draw his famous redline on the Survey of India map-sheets to Tawang’s north. Earlier at Shimla in October 1913, the British Indian government and Tibet, represented by McMahon and Lonchen Shatra respectively, reached agreement on defining the frontier at that meeting, to which the Chinese delegate at the Shimla Conference was not invited because all parties at that time, including China, recognised Tibet ‘s sovereign authority to negotiate its boundary with India. Even Ivan Chen’s map presented at the Shimla Conference clearly showed Tawang as part of India.
An ecclesiastical relationship cannot by itself signify political control of one territory over another. However, in the two regions – Amdo (the birthplace of the present Dalai Lama) and Kham – where Tibet exercised undisputed ecclesiastical jurisdiction and political control, the occupying power has forcibly incorporated those areas in the Han provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan. Before claiming Tawang to be part of Tibet, China should be told plainly to first restore Amdo and Kham to Tibet.
Yet, a disturbing pattern of Chinese statements is emerging without cause. A diplomat-cum-senior researcher at a Chinese foreign ministry-run think-tank suggested that India kick out the Dalai Lama if it wished to build ‘real and sustainable’ relations with Beijing. In an interview with an Indian newspaper, Zheng Ruixiang said: "The Tibet problem is a major obstacle in the normalisation of relations between India and China. India made a mistake in the 1950s by welcoming the Dalai Lama when he fled Tibet. It is now time for correcting the past mistake and building a real and sustainable relationship with China."
The pattern suggests that under President Hu Jintao, who made his name in the Chinese Communist Party by ruthlessly quelling the 1989 anti-China protests in Lhasa as the martial-law administrator, Beijing may be striving to adopt a more forthright stance vis-à-vis India, including on the border disputes and the presence of the Dalai Lama and his government – in – exile in Dharamsala. Having consolidated his hold on power in the past year to emerge as China’s unchallenged ruler, Hu has begun suppressing dissent at home, strengthening the military and shaping a more nationalistic foreign policy. Hu may believe his regime can exert more strategic pressure on India, now that the railway to Tibet has been built and Pakistan ‘s Chinese-funded Gwadar port-cum-naval base is likely to be opened during his stop in Islamabad next week.

Tibet is the means by which India could coop up the bull in its own China shop. Beijing ‘s new hardline focus on Arunachal/Tawang is apparent not only from its refusal to grant visa to any official from Arunachal Pradesh, but also from its aggressive patrolling of the still-fuzzy Himalayan frontier

Given autocratic China’s penchant to act counterproductively, India should welcome the Chinese resurrection of the past and highlighting of bilateral disputes in public. What all this brings out is that Beijing is unwilling to settle the border disputes on the basis of the status quo. Not satisfied with the Indian territories it has occupied, either by conquest or by furtive encroachment, China wishes to further redraw the frontiers with India, even as it keeps up the charade of border negotiations.
The new Chinese brashness helps create the necessary leeway for India to re-evaluate its policy and approach and add more subtlety and litheness to its stance unilaterally accommodating China on Tibet and other issues.
India needs to first grasp the damage to its China policy caused by Atal Bihari Vajpayee as prime minister. Both on Tibet and the border talks, he acquiesced to Chinese demands. He signed on to a document formally recognising Tibet to be "part of the People’s Republic of China" and, by agreeing to a new framework of border talks focused on an elusive "package" settlement, he rewarded Beijing for its breach of promise to fully define the frontline through an exchange of maps.
China may have ceased its cartographic aggression on Sikkim through its maps, but the important point, often overlooked, is that it has yet to expressly acknowledge that Sikkim is part of India. While it now makes India accept in every bilateral communiqué the Vajpayee formulation that Tibet is "part of the People’s Republic of China," Beijing till date has declined to affirm in a joint statement with New Delhi or even unilaterally that Sikkim is part of the Republic of India.
Sikkim was never an issue in Sino-Indian relations until Vajpayee made it one. He then ingeniously flaunted the Chinese "concession" on Sikkim as a cover to justify his kowtow on Tibet.
Tibet is India ‘s trump card, yet Vajpayee capriciously surrendered it to gain a dubious concession on Sikkim, over which China has never claimed sovereignty. All that China was doing was to depict Sikkim as an in dependent kingdom in its official maps. But such action made little difference to India. The world had accepted Sikkim’s 1975 merger with India, and it made little sense for New Delhi to surrender its Tibet card just to persuade Beijing to stop ploughing a lonely furrow – that too over a territory over which China had staked no claim. If an Indian concession on Tibet can ever be justified, it can only be in the context of making Beijing give up its claims on Indian territories, formalise the present borders and reach a deal with the Dalai Lama to bring him home from exile.

Tibet is India ‘s trump card, yet Vajpayee capriciously surrendered it to gain a dubious concession on Sikkim, over which China has never claimed sovereignty. All that China was doing was to depict Sikkim as an in dependent kingdom in its official maps

For India, the Dalai Lama is a powerful ally. When China annexed Tibet, India surrendered not only its extra-territorial rights over that buffer, but it also signed a pact in 1954 – the in famous ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ – accepting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet without seeking any quid pro quo, not even the Chinese recognition of the then existing Indo-Tibetan border. That monumental folly stripped India of leverage and encouraged the Chinese to lay claims to Indian territories on the basis of Tibet ‘s alleged historical links with those areas.
The Panchsheel accord recorded India’s agreement both to fully withdraw within six months its ‘military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse’ in the ‘Tibet Region of China’ as well as ‘to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in Tibet Region of China.’
If India still has any card against Beijing, it is the Dalai Lama. As long as he remains based in Dharamsala, it is a great strategic asset for India. The Tibetans in Tibet will neither side with China against India nor accept Chinese rule over their homeland. If after the death of the present 71-year-old Dalai Lama, the institution of the Dalai Lama were to get captured by Beijing (like the way it has anointed its own Panchen Lama), India will be poorer by several army divisions against China.
It is not late for India to repair the damage done through blunders by Nehru and the closet-Nehruvian Vajpayee. The only way India can build counter-leverage against Beijing is to quietly reopen the issue of China ‘s annexation of Tibet and its subsequent failure to grant autonomy to the Tibetans, despite an express pledge contained in the 17-point agreement it imposed on Tibet in 1951.
This can be done by India in a way that is neither provocative nor confrontational. Building a mutually beneficial relationship with China does not demand appeasement on India ‘s part. And the alternative to appeasement is not provocation. Between appeasement and aggravation lie a hundred different options.
India can start diplomatically making the point that China ‘s own security and well-being will be enhanced if it reaches out to Tibetans and grants genuine autonomy to Tibet through a deal that brings back the Dalai Lama from his exile in Dharamsala. If the Chinese ambassador to India can publicly demand "mutual compromises" on Arunachal – a statement portrayed by the Indian press as an attempt by him to "play down" his unabashed claim on Arunachal – is it too much to expect the Indian ambassador in Beijing to genially appeal to China’s own self-interest and suggest it pursue "mutual compromises" with the Tibetans on Tibet?

The writer is Professor of strategic studies,
Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

When India made Pakistan a joint partner against terror

Is joint anti-terror mechanism working?
An indefensible blunder by India
 
Brahma Chellaney
Strategic Affairs Expert
 
The Economic Times, October 26, 2007
 
Remember the shock in India when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on the fifth anniversary of 9/11, turned Indian policy on its head and embraced Pakistan as fellow victim of and joint partner against terror?

The prime minister’s bizarre logic was that since India had tried in vain to contain growing trans-border terrorism, it should employ a joint mechanism to persuade the terrorist sponsor to correct its course. What he overlooked was that Pakistan’s ruling military establishment still values terrorist groups as useful proxies to bleed India.

The ill-conceived and ill-timed joint mechanism was the product not of institutional thinking but of personal caprice. It put India out of sync with the growing international focus on Pakistan’s rise as the fount of transnational terrorism.

Just when the rest of the world was beginning to goad Pakistan to rein in its terrorist elements, New Delhi eased its own pressure. Today, with the joint mechanism stuck and a new trail of terror attacks occurring from Ajmer to Hyderabad, India’s policy reversal stands out as an indefensible blunder.

New Delhi should have known that Islamabad would not allow this mechanism to become an instrument to put Pakistan in the dock. At the mechanism’s very first meeting, the Pakistani side sought to turn the tables by presenting a "dossier" on alleged Indian involvement in the Baluchi insurrection — a charge it again repeated in the second recent New Delhi meeting. The mechanism, rather than help corner Pakistan, has turned out to be a platform allowing Islamabad to place India’s alleged terrorism on the bilateral agenda.

To makes matters worse, Pakistan has stuck to two things from the outset: that Kashmiri terrorists are to remain out of the mechanism’s purview because they are "freedom fighters"; and that New Delhi ought not to insist that Pakistan help trace those on India’s most-wanted list because, in the words of Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid M. Kasuri, "the past has to be forgotten".

 
Is it thus any surprise that the mechanism has become a frivolous exercise in bureaucratic one-upmanship?
 
Copyright: The Economic Times, 2007.

Letting Democracy Down

No two ways about it
Specious distinctions between good and bad autocrats on the basis of international politics have blighted the spread of democracy, writes Brahma Chellaney.
 
The Hindustan Times
 
October 24, 2007
 
Last month’s ruthless suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations by Burma’s junta fittingly drew international outrage. But the indignation and new wave of US-led sanctions also obscure an inconvenient truth: promotion of freedom has become a diplomatic weapon to target weak, unpopular, isolated nations, not a China hewing to a totalitarian political system or a Russia sliding away from democracy. Look at the paradox: the principle that engagement is better than coercion or punitive action to help change state behaviour is applied only to powerful autocratic countries, while sanctions are a favoured tool to try and tame the weak.

In India’s neighbourhood, the diametrically opposite Western approaches toward military-ruled Pakistan and Burma are as jarring as the assiduous courting of the world’s biggest human-rights abuser, China. Such double standards put undue pressure on India, as exemplified by the unwarranted calls that it suspend all ties with Burma (renamed Myanmar by the junta). Should the world’s most populous democracy have one freedom-related standard in foreign policy or a different one for each of its four large autocratically governed neighbours — Bangladesh, Burma, China and Pakistan?

Having depleted their leverage against the Burmese junta, distant powers now advise Burma’s immediate neighbours like India and Thailand to follow their failed sanctions policy. Yet they persist with their own two-facedness on democracy. What stinging sanctions have been slapped on the Thai military council and its leaders for overthrowing Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra last year and for recently extending martial law in parts of Thailand? Which major democracies have winked at emergency rule in Bangladesh and played host last week to its army chief, Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed?

From the one-party, self-styled meritocracy in Singapore to the absolute monocracy in oil-rich Kazakhstan, some Asian states have faced little pressure to build genuine democratic norms and practices by making themselves useful to Western economic and political interests. As a result, we know why a marketplace of goods and services does not necessarily lead to a marketplace of political ideas.

Sanctions, however, are a blunt instrument to promote political freedom. By ignoring humanitarian concerns, they may actually help a regime to instill a sense of victimhood and shore up domestic support. International sanctions after 1988 did drive an isolated Burma into China’s strategic lap. And in more recent years, they have helped fortify the junta’s determination to stand up to Western pressure.

In fact, the more you punish and isolate a weak scofflaw state, the more the big bad countries gain. Nothing better illustrates this than the way Beijing has signed up tens of billions of dollars worth of energy and arms contracts in recent years with pariah regimes stretching from Burma and Iran to Sudan and Venezuela. With its predator-style hunt for opportunities, China eagerly awaits the international isolation of any regime. It then uses its status as a UN Security Council permanent member to provide political protection in return for strategic and commercial favours. Today, the world’s despotic regimes, from Harare to Pyongyang, have one thing in common: they are all defended by China’s UN veto power.

International calls, as on Burma, that urge Beijing to join in on the pressure are ironic. The world’s largest autocracy is exhorted to help promote democracy or, at least, help check political suppression in another state. Is state repression greater in Burma or in China?

China still executes more people every year than all other nations combined, despite its adoption of new rules requiring review of death sentences. When the Burmese regime killed at least 10 demonstrators last month, the outside world could watch some images of brutality, thanks to citizen reporters using the Internet. But China employs tens of thousands of cyberpolice to censor websites, patrol cybercafes, monitor text and video messages from cellular phones, and hunt down Internet activists.

International pressure after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators did not last long in the face of the argument that trade sanctions punished ordinary Chinese. So why should we today turn a blind eye to how sanctions are hurting impoverished Burmese? Even the opening provided by the 2008 Beijing Olympics is not being seized upon to gently warn China to improve its human-rights record or face an international boycott of the Games.

If democracy is to become a truly global norm, greater consistency in approach is not only desirable but also vital. Drawing a specious distinction between good autocrats and bad autocrats on the basis of international politics can hardly advance the cause of democracy.

At the same time as the Burmese junta was quelling demonstrations, another military regime in southern Asia was battling pro-democracy protestors on the streets of Pakistan. But the approach of the world’s most powerful democracy, the US, was one of stark contrast: breathing fire at the generals in Burma while going along with an overtly sham poll to re-elect General Pervez Musharraf as president for another five-year term.

Does Pakistan or Burma pose a greater challenge to international peace and security? In the eight years that the US has helped prop up an increasingly unpopular general in power, Pakistan has sunk deeper into fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism. Yet the US still seeks to retain Musharraf through a power-sharing deal with Benazir Bhutto. Indeed, by selling increasing quantities of lethal, India-directed weapons to Pakistan, it has helped a quasi-failed state to emerge as the world’s largest arms importer.

The result of such contrasting approaches has been to undermine the credibility of democratic values by turning them into a vehicle to promote narrow geopolitical interests. In fact, nothing has blighted the spread of freedom more than America’s invasion and botched occupation of Iraq, where spreading democracy became a convenient raison d’être after the failure to find the promised weapons of mass destruction.

Is it thus any surprise that in the contiguous arc from Jordan to Singapore, India stands out as the only flourishing democracy? With Bangladesh’s tacit addition to the list of ‘good’ autocracies, the retreat of freedom from India’s neighbourhood appears nearing completion. It is as if some powers are determined to repeat their Pakistan mistakes in Bangladesh — and let India bear the brunt yet again. They now also goad India to make its own mistakes on Burma.

Fortunately, New Delhi has no intent to oblige them, having learned a sobering lesson from years of foreign-policy activism on Burma post-1988. Today, with a rapidly rising China to the north, a China-allied Pakistan on the west, a Chinese-influenced Burma to the east, and increasing Chinese naval interest in the Indian Ocean, India does not wish to get encircled by handing Burma on a platter to Beijing and becoming security-dependent on the US. Home to a majority of exiled Burmese dissidents, India correctly believes that engagement, not severance of ties, is the way to promote political reconciliation in Burma, where its sympathies lie with the iconic Aung San Suu Kyi and her democracy movement.

If freedom is to bloom in more countries, it is imperative to fashion a more principled, coherent, forward-looking international approach that relies less on sanctions and more on allowing outside actors to actively influence developments within.

Copyright: Hindustan Times, 2007.