Southern Asia: A unique nuclear triangle

Brahma Chellaney

Politics and Strategy: The Survival Editors’ Blog

In the two decades since I published an essay in Survival on South Asian nuclearization, one of my conclusions has been proven right, but another wrong. The South Asian nuclear genie remains uncontrolled, as I anticipated. But contrary to my doubt then, India and Pakistan have completed the transition from covert to overt capabilities by conducting nuclear-explosive tests, adopting a nuclear doctrine and deploying nuclear weapons. More strangely, Pakistan now boasts the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. Indeed, according to several international estimates, its arsenal of nuclear warheads is larger than that of India, which, with China to its north, faces two closely aligned nuclear-armed neighbours.

India’s recent test launch of the Agni V ballistic missile, which can reach Beijing, served as a fresh reminder that the Indian nuclear-deterrence programme is primarily focused on China, with Pakistan remaining subordinate in nuclear planning. To be sure, it was the Sino-Pakistani nuclear nexus — cemented by transfers of Chinese nuclear and missile technology to Islamabad — that propelled India to shed its posture of nuclear ambiguity and go overtly nuclear in 1998. Since then, China’s rapidly accumulating military and economic power, and its increasing assertiveness on territorial disputes, have increased the importance of the nuclear deterrent for India. Given its retaliation-only posture, India has focused its attention in the past decade on erecting a triad of land-based, air-deliverable and submarine-based nuclear capabilities that can survive an enemy first strike.

Strikingly, neither India’s economic rise nor its graduated action to put in place a ‘small but credible’ nuclear force is seen internationally as a threat, unlike the deep concerns that China’s ascent continues to generate. A 2008 civilian nuclear deal between the United States and India, in fact, has come to symbolise their new strategic partnership. International proliferation-related concern instead has focused on Pakistan’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal that has put it on a path to overtake Britain as the world’s fifth-largest nuclear-weapons power. Unstable Pakistan is heavily dependent on foreign aid, yet it has ramped up production of bomb-grade materials.

Nuclear weapons have not prevented Pakistan’s slide into a jihadist dungeon. Given its military’s sponsorship of jihad under the nuclear umbrella and the jihadist infiltration of the armed forces, the biggest international concern relates to the safety of Pakistani nuclear warheads and fissile materials. Compounding this concern is the fact that Pakistan’s military, intelligence and nuclear establishments remain outside civilian oversight. Such concern, along with major gaps in American intelligence about Pakistan’s weapons of mass destruction, has made that country a principal target of US ‘black budget’ surveillance, according to recent revelations. Yet the only plausible scenario of Pakistani nukes falling into Islamist hands is an intra-military struggle in which the jihadists within the armed forces gain ascendancy.

Southern Asia remains the only region in the world where three contiguous neighbours, sharing disputed land frontiers, form a nuclear triangle that pits two of them against the third party. The regional intersection of nuclear issues, terrorism, territorial disputes, competition over natural resources and nationalism creates complex and dangerous challenges. This region will continue to serve as a reminder that any progress in an inter-state context on nuclear issues, including nuclear confidence-building measures, cannot happen independently of the broader geopolitics.

Brahma Chellaney is a Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research. His article,‘The Challenge of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia’, appeared in Survival, 35:3 (1993).

Chemical Weapons: Fact and Fiction

Chemical arms, a poor nation’s deterrent, are far less effective than modern conventional weapons

Brahma Chellaney, The Japan Times, September 13, 2013

U.S. President Barack Obama’s plan to bomb Syria for alleged use of poison gas has raised two questions that remain pertinent despite the proposed international monitoring and eventual destruction of that country’s chemical-weapon arsenal: Is gassing people more inhumane or reprehensible than killing with Tomahawk missiles, drones and other conventional weapons? And are chemical weapons inherently prohibited in international law, just like genocide and slavery?

These questions are also important because Obama’s request to Congress for authorization to attack Syria was not about any specific threat to U.S. or international security. Rather, the planned attack was intended for retribution to save the president’s credibility that he believed was on the line.

Let’s be clear: Chemical weapons — including choking agents like chlorine gas, blister agents such as mustard gas, arsenic- or cyanide-based blood agents, and nerve agents like sarin — are far less effective than modern conventional weapons, which kill with greater precision and lethality.

Technological advances, in fact, have made conventional weapons capable of leaving a greater trail of death than any poison gas. They kill, maim and terrorize in ways not much different than chemical weapons. Some conventional explosives and napalm (a petrochemical incendiary whose use against military targets remains lawful despite the notoriety it gained during the Vietnam War) indeed can cause lingering, painful death.

Chemical weapons have a low kill ratio, which makes them scarcely effective on the battlefield. If anything, they are more effective off the battlefield than on the battlefield. Moreover, their employment often demands favorable weather and geographic conditions. If the military intent were to incapacitate enemy army units without killing them, chemical weapons potentially make for more humane warfare than conventional weapons.

But because they are cheap, easy to manufacture, and serve as a poor nation’s deterrent, chemical arms have fallen out of favor with the powerful, who portray them as “immoral weapons.” To protect their advantage in conventional weapons, great powers have promoted a taboo against chemical-weapon use.

To be sure, chemical arms can become weapons of terror in the hands of extremists, as exemplified by the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway that killed 13 commuters.

Chemical arms have been used by combatants since ancient times, with the oldest archeological evidence of chemical warfare being found, ironically, in modern-day Syria. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons came to be regarded as weapons of mass destruction. Their extensive use in World War I, especially in the form of mustard or chlorine gas, created revulsion and fear of future chemical attacks. However, the use made little difference to the military outcome.

A corpse from the napalm attack on Tokyo

In fact, the total fatalities from the chemical-weapon strikes accounted for much less than one percent of the World War I deaths, and were lower than the toll from a single U.S. napalm attack on Tokyo on March 10, 1945. At least 100,000 Japanese died on that day when some 300 B-29 bombers dropped 1,700 tons of incendiary bombs — the deadliest air raid of World War II.

Against this background, why do the hundreds allegedly killed by the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in an August 21 sarin attack count for more than the estimated 100,000 slain in Syria’s grinding civil war, including many killed by insurgents aided by the U.S. and its repressive Islamist allies, such as the rulers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey? Why is it any worse to be killed by sarin than to be decapitated by insurgents, a growing number of whom hew to al-Qaeda ideology?

The Obama administration’s visceral, bomb-Syria stand has obscured such questions.

International efforts since the late 19th century to outlaw chemical weapons have been hampered by repeated national breaches of legal obligations. The 1899 Hague Convention prohibited the use of projectiles with the “sole object” of diffusing “asphyxiating or deleterious gases” — a ban that was openly flouted in World War I. The violations spawned the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of poison gas as a weapon — a still-binding prohibition breached with impunity by several parties.

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) went further and outlawed the production, stockpile, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Some countries have not signed or ratified it, including Syria, Israel, North Korea, Egypt and Myanmar. Some parties strongly suspected of possessing chemical weapons, including China and Pakistan, did not declare any stockpile. By declaring former production facilities, China, however, tacitly admitted that it had built chemical weapons and destroyed them before ratifying the CWC.

Of the seven declared possessor states under the CWC, the largest arsenals are held by the U.S. and Russia, which have both missed the convention’s final extended deadline of 2012 for the destruction of all stockpiles. What impact will this contravention have on the CWC’s integrity?

Only India, South Korea and Albania among the seven declared possessor states verifiably eliminated their stockpiles by the initial deadline of March 2009. The U.S. says its stockpile destruction will not finish before 2023, more than a decade after the extended cut-off date.

When the U.S. sprayed 76 million liters of Agent Orange, a toxic defoliant, during the Vietnam War, it was not a party to the Geneva Protocol, which it embraced soon after that war ended.

But America’s use of white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon and direct tool of warfare during the 2004 siege of Falluja city in occupied Iraq raised a troubling question about its compliance with international obligations. Studies have reported a sharp rise in cancer, leukemia and congenital birth defects in Fallujah in the years since.

White phosphorous, like other chemicals not listed in the CWC schedules, can be legally employed for noncombat purposes (for example, as a flare to illuminate the battlefield or to produce smoke to disguise troop movements) but not “as a method of warfare” relying on its “toxic properties.”

Before Iraqi President Saddam Hussein fell out of favor with Washington, the Reagan administration acquiesced in his regime’s gassing of Iranian troops during the protracted Iraq-Iran war.

Declassified CIA papers and interviews with former officials, as highlighted by the journal Foreign Policy recently, confirm what has long been known — that Washington not only turned a blind eye to Iraq’s repeated use of sarin and mustard gas from 1983 to 1988, but also facilitated the gassing of Iranian troops by providing Saddam Hussein with satellite reconnaissance data on location of Iranian units.

It is against this backdrop that Obama — facing both international isolation and congressional defeat — sought to build a legal case to bomb Syria. His task was made uphill by factors extending beyond the varied and often-shifting justifications proffered by his team and his decision to bypass the United Nations.

First, Syria is not a party to the CWC, whose enforcement, in any event, vests with the Security Council. Syria in 1968 did sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol, yet that protocol provides no basis for use of force because it relates to interstate war, not intrastate conflict. Second, in a world in which national stockpiles of chemical arms still exist, few can argue that such weapons are inherently prohibited in international law, regardless of treaties. The “norm” against their use indeed has repeatedly been violated since 1925.

Allegations and counter-allegations of chemical-weapon use in the Syrian civil war have been rife since last year. Several instances of alleged use were reported in the spring of this year, eventually prompting the United Nations to send a team of investigators to Syria in August.

While the inspectors were probing those cases, another instance of alleged use in suburban Damascus on August 21 made international headlines because of a rebel video. Even as the UN inspectors turned to investigating the newest incident, Obama peremptorily declared his intent to punitively bomb Syria.

Why did Obama zoom in on the August 21 incident and ignore the earlier instances? One plausible explanation is that while some of the earlier incidents appeared to point to chemical-weapon use by insurgents, with Syrian army soldiers among the victims, the August 21 victims were all civilians in a rebel-held neighborhood.

Carla del Ponte, a leading member of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, told Swiss TV in May that there were “strong, concrete suspicions but not yet incontrovertible proof” that rebels had used sarin. Ms. Del Ponte, a former Swiss attorney-general and prosecutor with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, said: “I was a little bit stupefied by the first indications we got… they were about the use of nerve gas by the opposition.” The comments prompted the commission to issue a statement that stressed — without denying Ms. Del Ponte’s remarks — that it had “not reached conclusive findings.”

Contrast that with the August 21 incident claims, which have been ratcheted up progressively. The British reported “at least 350” civilians were killed in that attack; the Americans then released a much higher but incredulously precise fatality toll of 1,429; immediately thereafter, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry thundered that the world cannot allow Assad to gas “thousands” of his people. The French followed up by claiming the attack involved “massive” use of sarin — an assertion picked up by the White House.

The full truth on the various incidents may never be known. Still, it cannot be discounted that the rebels probably were the first to carry out a chemical-weapon attack in the civil war.

In this light, the Russian proposal to make Syria sign the CWC and have monitors take control of its chemical-weapon armory opens a possible diplomatic solution, including reducing poison-gas-related risks in that country.

It could also bail out an isolated Obama from a predicament of his own making — his insistence that he will break international law to punish Syria for breaching a fanciful international legal tradition.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author, most recently, of “Water, Peace, and War” (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013). 

(c) The Japan Times, 2013.

U.S. export-control liberalization: The reality

Controlling technology flows

 

The U.S. has only committed to incremental easing of its export-control regime depending on Indian concessions

 

Brahma Chellaney

Mint, November 16, 2010

 

The nuclear deal was sold to the Indian public as a means to liberate the country from U.S.-imposed technology controls. In fact, once all the steps in the tortuous process of nuclear dealmaking were complete, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh triumphantly announced on September 6, 2008, that, “It marks the end of … the technology-denial regime.” Yet Dr. Singh came full circle by unilaterally declaring during his joint news conference with visiting President Barack Obama that, “We welcome the decision by the U.S. to lift controls on export of high-technology items and technologies to India.”

 

Obama, while silent on this issue during the news conference, earlier told business executives in Mumbai that he would make “fundamental reforms” to the U.S. export controls that constrict trade between the two countries. There is, however, a large gap between reforming and lifting export controls. So, did Dr. Singh jump the gun again? The answer, unfortunately, is yes.

 

The Americans have committed themselves only to a step-by-step easing commensurate with further Indian actions and concessions. The caveats and other riders introduced by the U.S. side — as on the issue of backing India’s candidacy for a UN Security Council permanent seat — have been lost in the euphoria over the Obama-visit announcements.

 

Hours after the joint news conference, Obama clarified the U.S. position in his address to the Indian Parliament. His key words — “we’ll work to reform our controls on exports” — merely echoed the 2005 assurance in the nuclear deal. In the joint statement released at the end of his visit, the U.S. also said it “intends to support India’s full membership” in four multilateral technology-control cartels “in a phased manner.”

 

The key point is that the U.S. has offered no commitment, let alone a timetable, to lift technology controls. It has only “committed to a strengthened and expanded dialogue on export-control issues through fora such as the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG).” Constituted in 2003, HTCG has sought to loosen U.S. export controls in four specific areas — information technology, including trade in advanced electronics and software, high-performance computers and encryption; biotechnology; nanotechnology, especially its commercial applications in public health, energy and water treatment; and defence and strategic trade.

 

The Obama administration actually has initiated a broader export-control review with the aim of spurring U.S. economic growth through stepped-up technology exports to all emerging economies, not just to India. The archaic technology-control system is widely considered a serious hindrance to such exports. Washington is particularly keen to use export-control liberalization to help increase U.S. share of the Chinese market and thereby reduce the yawning, $262-billion trade deficit with Beijing. The potential Indian market for U.S. high-tech exports is not only smaller than China’s, but the U.S.-erected barriers also have been higher because of India’s NPT-outlier status.

 

Given the range and extent of export controls currently in place against India in both civilian and military spheres, a significant lowering of such national and multilateral barriers — not their full dismantlement — can be New Delhi’s best hope. In that context, the Obama-visit announcements represent modest progress toward such lowering of controls.

 

India’s admission to the four cartels — Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement — is expected to be a lengthy process, dependent on building consensus and the “evolution” of new “membership criteria.” More importantly, these cartels are aimed at controlling technologies, not at sharing technologies. Membership in any cartel will not automatically qualify "outlier" India to the free flow of technologies. India is already a “unilateral adherent” of the NSG and the MTCR, as part of the nuclear deal-related conditions imposed by America’s Hyde Act. In fact, President George W. Bush formally certified to Congress in 2008 that India had become NSG- and MTCR-compliant.

 

The other announcement during the Obama visit related to the removal of some more Indian enterprises from the U.S. blacklist, the “Entity List.” Inclusion of an entity on that list subjects it to a virtual U.S. export embargo. But removal of an entity does not consequentially make it eligible to import U.S. high technology freely because of the India-specific export licensing requirements that are in place.

 

The Obama-visit announcements hopefully will accelerate the process of lowering of technology-trade barriers that began with the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The growth in controlled dual-use trade, even if fairly small, attests to the ongoing export-control liberalization. A lot more liberalization, however, has to happen before India’s technology access begins to match that of America’s close allies.

 

The Obama visit actually signalled that the U.S. will continue with its incremental approach to export-control liberalization, calibrating its actions to Indian concessions extending beyond non-proliferation. America’s primary interest is to boost its technology exports while simultaneously gaining a foothold in India’s strategic sectors. At the same time, a major U.S. objective still is to curtail nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia — a goal that runs counter to a more-open flow of technology to India. Thus far, India has kept its nuclear and missile capabilities at the substrategic level. The launch of an ICBM programme, for example, will surely bring it under renewed technology-control pressures.

 

(c) Mint, 2010.

NPT’s challenges now come from within its regime

Saturday, Aug. 7, 2010  The Japan Times

The NPT’s uncertain future

 
This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s coming into force. Despite its central role in shaping the global nuclear order, the NPT’s future looks anything but promising.

The main challenges the NPT now faces come from within its regime, not from the nonparties. The nations outside the NPT fold that wanted to go nuclear have done so. And having acquired nuclear weapons, those states are in no position to join a treaty that essentially is rigidly structured and is thus not amendable.

It has been widely forgotten that the NPT originally was intended to prevent countries like Japan, West Germany and Italy from acquiring nuclear weapons. Japan, did not ratify the treaty until 1976 — eight years after the NPT was concluded, and six years after the pact took effect. Over the years, however, the challenges to the NPT have come from outside the list of its original targets.

It is remarkable that the NPT has survived for so long and that it was extended indefinitely in 1995. As a result of the 1995 action, the treaty — originally conceived as a 25-year bargain between nuclear-weapons states and nonnuclear-weapons states — has become permanent.

For the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons, with their unparalleled destructive capacity, are likely to remain at the center of international power and force capacity. Nuclear weapons, as the 2002 U.S. nuclear posture review stated, will continue to play a "critical role" because they possess "unique properties."

Some 95 percent of all nuclear weapons are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. The U.S. has announced recently that it has 5,113 nuclear weapons in its arsenal, plus "several thousand" more waiting to be dismantled. Russia is believed to have a fairly similar number of nuclear weapons in deployment.

Although their arsenals have declined, both Russia and the U.S. still maintain "overkill" capabilities — that is, either can destroy the entire world several times over. There can be no justification for maintaining such large arsenals today, and the reductions proposed by the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the U.S. and Russia will not change the overkill capacities of the two sides.

The latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) incorporates a welcome shift by proclaiming that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear-weapons state or in response to a nonnuclear attack. Yet that assurance is hedged with caveats — the nonnuclear-weapons states have to be fully "in compliance" with their nonproliferation obligations; and given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons, the U.S. reserves the right to respond with nukes against a biological attack.

It would have been better had the posture review made clear — without any qualification — that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. Instead, the NPR declares such a sole purpose as a long-term goal. With the burden of the Nobel Peace Prize weighing heavily on U.S. President Barack Obama’s mind, the caveat-ridden NPR comes across as being more posture than review.

Given the fact that every nuclear- weapons state, by definition, is a proliferator, the varying standards still being applied on proliferation underscore the nonproliferation challenges. Geopolitical interests, rather than objective criteria, usually determine a response to any proliferation problem. Also, who is a legitimate nuclear-weapons state or who is not has remained a subject of controversy. The NPT recognizes as nuclear powers only those countries that tested a nuclear device before 1967. But it is hardly a good advertisement for the NPT regime that some nuclear-weapons states remain outside its fold.

Actually, the real "success" of the NPT has been in reinforcing the system of extended deterrence by giving countries such as those in NATO and others like Japan, Australia and South Korea little choice other than to continue to rely on the U.S. for nuclear-umbrella protection. Minus the NPT, these countries would have been the most-likely candidates to go nuclear because they also happen to be the most-capable states technologically. So, the effect of the NPT has been to either strengthen extended deterrence or to drive nuclear programs underground, as was symbolized by North Korea.

A few technologically capable countries, like Sweden and Switzerland, of course, voluntarily relinquished their nuclear-weapons option even while staying out of any alliance system. Their decision was based on a careful judgment that their security would be better protected without nuclearization.

Today, a key question that arises is whether any of the countries ensconced under the U.S. nuclear umbrella would be willing to forgo the benefits of extended deterrence in order to help lower the utility of nuclear weapons and give a boost to the cause of nuclear disarmament.

Today, the world has a treaty (although not in force) that bans all nuclear testing but no treaty to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, those that are party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are prohibited from testing a nuclear weapon at home but are legally unencumbered to test the weapon by dropping it over some other state. That anomaly must be removed.

Brahma Chellaney is the author of the 2010 international best-seller, "Asian Juggernaut" (HarperCollins).

The Japan Times: Saturday, Aug. 7, 2010
(C) All rights reserved

Chemical Weapons: India’s Forgotten Armaments

Haste Makes Waste

India’s chemical-weapons record holds key lessons

 

Brahma Chellaney The Times of India December 24, 2009

 

The Hague: At the annual meeting of state-parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), US officials disclosed that their country’s stockpile destruction will not finish before 2021, missing the treaty’s final extended deadline of 2012 by a long shot. In fact, two new US chemical-demilitarization plants will not be ready until nine years from now — an unusually long timeframe for construction. With the US making plain its intention to allow domestic considerations to trump international obligations, Russia has little incentive to meet the final deadline.

 

More than 12 years after the CWC entered into force, this regime faces several challenges that extend beyond the still-existing stockpiles of chemical weapons (CWs) in the US, Russia, Libya and Iraq. Of the seven declared possessor states, only India, South Korea and Albania have fully eliminated their stockpiles.

 

Some states strongly suspected of holding CWs, including China and Pakistan, did not declare any arsenal. China was the assumed source of Albania’s stockpile of chemical-warfare agents. It also aided Pakistani and Iranian CW programmes. By declaring former production facilities, China, however, tacitly admitted it built and destroyed CWs before joining the treaty, although the US has accused it of still holding “an inventory of traditional CW agents” and maintaining an “advanced R&D programme”.

 

One CWC challenge is the lack of universality, with seven key players still not parties to the treaty, including North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Syria and Myanmar. A second challenge is that more than half of the present 188 parties have yet to implement their obligations by enacting enabling legislation and setting up a National Authority. Yet another challenge is that although CWs are the least-important weapons of mass destruction (WMD), they are the most likely to be used by terrorists. Containing that challenge demands effective and full CWC implementation.

 

CWC has long been seen as a model pact that applies, unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), similar standards to all. But today it faces gnawing uncertainties. For example, how will the anticipated failure of its most-powerful parties, America and Russia, to meet the final 2012 deadline affect the regime’s integrity and authority?  The US, for its part, is now emphasizing non-proliferation and intrusive, more-frequent inspections of national chemical industries. But the word “non-proliferation” doesn’t exist in the CWC text.

 

Against this background, India’s surprise declaration of its CWs, followed by their rushed destruction, stands out. When it signed the CWC in 1993, India stated it had no CWs or production facilities. But three years later, it stunned everyone, including its own military, by declaring it possessed a CW stockpile — one of only three countries (the others being the US and Russia) to make such a disclosure by the CWC’s June 1996 cut-off date for original signatories. India had secretly built CWs, mostly mustard-gas shells, without integrating the small arsenal with its defence strategy and overall military operations.

 

Rather than first eliminate its puny, militarily insignificant CW stocks before becoming party to the CWC, India’s penchant to take the moral high ground, whatever the price, found expression in its ratifying the treaty ahead of its regional adversaries, and then rushing to meet the pact’s 10-year deadline for stockpile destruction. It incinerated most of its CWs by the 2007 deadline, even as the other possessor states had set protracted timeframes for stockpile destruction. While the US and Russia sought and got five-year deadline extensions in 2007, India asked for only two years’ more time, fully completing its dismantlement in March 2009. Meeting deadlines took precedence over guaranteeing environmentally safe and sound destruction, with secrecy the leitmotif even in dismantlement. The government’s fiat to the DRDO was to meet the deadlines, come what may.

 

But India hasn’t earned international respect from such faithful, speedy compliance. Indeed, like in the nuclear realm, India has been left to blow its own trumpet about its “impeccable” credentials. Far from gaining any reward, India has little clout in The Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), where no Indian has yet held a top-management position. Worse still, Indian taxpayers have had to pick up the tab for international verification of stockpile destruction, with the obliteration bill surpassing the CW production expenses several fold. Pakistan and China, by contrast, have come out better.

 

The lack of any public discussion in India over its CW experience is unfortunate, given the lessons it holds for its other WMD capabilities and for Indian policy on the whole. Just as it built CWs of little military utility, India continues to lag far behind its credible minimal nuclear deterrent needs, as underscored by the recent failed nighttime test of Agni-2 and the weaponization of only the diminutive 25-kiloton fission prototype warhead. Open debate is indispensable if India is to learn from its record.

 

The writer is professor, Centre for Policy Research.

Why India must build a credible nuclear deterrent

India: Nuclear diffidence,
not deterrence

More than a decade after Pokhran II, India lacks even minimal nuclear-deterrent capability against China.

Brahma Chellaney  India Abroad  September 11, 2009

By
certifying that the 1998 thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb test was a success,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh can hardly defuse the renewed national
controversy over that issue. After all, Dr. Singh, while in the opposition, had
not hidden his anti-nuclear sentiment. 

In
fact, he had
warned that the 1998 nuclear tests would seriously impair the national
economy. But
India’s
foreign-exchange reserves actually multiplied five times within seven years and
its GDP growth accelerated sharply. Who had looked at
India as a
rising power before 1998?

Even
former President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam’s certificate cannot squelch questions over
the thermonuclear test. From the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal to the
hydrogen bomb, Kalam has been ever ready to defend official claims, but the
missile program he headed still staggers. In the long years he spent in the
missile program, Kalam could not give
India the basic missile capability
for self-defense.  

India‘s nuclear strategic program has always been shielded
from parliamentary scrutiny and CAG audit. So, it is hard to reliably determine
whether
India‘s
sole thermonuclear test fizzled out quickly or was a success, as officially
claimed. But some facts speak for themselves.

One telling fact is that more than 11 years later,
India
has still not weaponized the thermonuclear technology, even though the test in
1998 was supposed to have catapulted the country into the big-power league. The
thermonuclear test, obviously, was not intended merely as a technology
demonstrator. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask: What has been the security
benefit for the country from that test?

Even more glaring is another fact: More than 35
years after Pokhran I,
India
stands out as a reluctant and tentative
 nuclear power,
still lacking even a barely minimal deterrent capability against
China. Given
the growing military asymmetry with
China, a proven and weaponized
Indian thermonuclear capability, backed by long-range missiles, is critical to
deter the assertive and ambitious northern neighbor. But today,
India does not
have a single Beijing-reachable missile in deployment.

Had India
developed and deployed a minimal but credible
 nuclear-weapons
capability,
China
would not have dared to mess with it. But the increasing Chinese bellicosity,
reflected in rising border incursions and the hardening of
Beijing‘s
stance on territorial disputes, suggests
China
is only getting emboldened against a weaker
India.

Consider yet another unpalatable fact: No country
has struggled longer to build a minimal deterrent or paid heavier international
costs for its
 nuclear program than India
The history of
India’s
 nuclear-weapons program is
actually a record of how it helped establish multilateral technology controls. Pokhran
I, for example, impelled the secret formation of the
 Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG).
India’s
space program
 helped give birth to the Missile Technology Control
Regime.

Yet, before it has built a credible minimal
deterrent,
India came full
circle when it entered into a civilian
 nuclear deal with the US and secured an exemption from
the NSG last year to import high-priced commercial
 nuclear power
reactors and fuel. In doing so, it had to accept nonproliferation conditions
that aim to stunt its
 nuclear-deterrent development.

Through this deal, India is seeking to replicate in
the energy sector the very mistake it has made on armaments. Now the world’s
largest arms importer,
India
spends more than $6 billion every year on importing conventional weapons, some
of dubious value, while it neglects to build its own armament-production base.

Conventional weapons simply cannot deter a nuclear adversary.
Deterrence against a
 nuclear foe can only be built on nuclear capability,
especially a second-strike capability that can survive the enemy’s first strike
to inflict massive retaliation.

The key point to note is that with a credible nuclear deterrent,
India would be
under less pressure to keep on spending more than $6 billion annually on arms
imports. Put simply, a small but effective nuclear deterrent can help the
country save money.

Another important point to remember is that
conventional weapons are very expensive in comparison to nukes.
India’s annual
bill for arms imports is far higher than its total annual budget for the
nuclear, missile and space programmes put together. 

Any cost-benefit analysis would show that a credible
nuclear deterrent would be both a cost saver and a security guarantor. It will
deter any open cross-border aggression as well as provide the savings to be ploughed
into civilian modernization.

World history attests that rapid economic power can be
accumulated only through secure national borders. Take Communist
China: Before strongman Deng Xiaoping launched
the economic-modernization program,
Beijing
already had developed its first
intercontinental-range
ballistic missile (ICBM) with nuclear-warhead capability. With the security
provided by such capability, it began building economic power, generating in
the process lots of additional resources for acquiring military muscle. But
India, in the
21st century, does not have an ICBM even on the design board.

More
broadly, Indian policymakers have yet to recognize that no nation can be a
major power without three attributes: A high level of autonomous and innovative
technological capability; a capacity to meet basic defense needs indigenously;
and a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through
intercontinental-range weaponry.
India is deficient in all the three
areas.

It is not an accident that all the countries armed
with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are permanent members of
the UN Security Council. But rather than aim for a technological leap through a
crash ICBM
 program, India
remains interminably stuck in the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
stage. It is still trying to master a missile-strike range of 3,000 kilometers.

In
fact, in
an action that ominously harks back to the 1991-95 period when Manmohan
Singh as finance minister starved the nuclear programme of necessary funds for
expansion, the government’s 2008-09 budget slashed the Department of Atomic
Energy’s funding by $529 million. No explanation was offered to the nation.
Under the nuclear deal, the government has agreed to voluntarily shut down by
next year one of the country’s two bomb-grade plutonium-production reactors,
the Cirus, although current international estimates of India’s weapons-grade
fissile material stockpile put its quantity just marginally higher than
Pakistan’s.

More than a decade after Pokhran II, India doesn’t
have much to celebrate. Nuclear diffidence continues to hold it down. It still
doesn’t have minimal, let alone, credible deterrence. Its military asymmetry
with China has grown to the extent that many in its policymaking community seem
to be losing faith in the country’s ability to defend itself with its own
means.

Against this background, the latest claim that the
1998 thermonuclear test performed well under par can only further damage the
credibility of India’s
 nuclear posture. The controversy over the thermonuclear test,
however, is nothing new. No sooner had the test been conducted than a former
head of the Indian
 nuclear program, P.K. Iyengar, questioned official claims of
success.

In such a setting — with critics within and
outside the country questioning the success of the test — India must be ready
to convincingly re-demonstrate its thermonuclear capability, should a
propitious international opportunity arise from a
 nuclear test
conducted by another power.
 Nuclear deterrence, after all, is like beauty: It lies in the
eyes of the beholder. It is not what India’s
 nuclear establishment
claims but what outsiders, especially regional adversaries, believe that
constitutes deterrence (or the lack of it).

Brahma Chellaney is one of India’s leading nuclear and
strategic affairs experts.

(c) India Abroad, 2009.

Renewed controversy: India’s thermonuclear test

Make nuclear programme accountable

By Brahma Chellaney
The Economic Times, August 28, 2009


India’s cosseted nuclear programme has been shielded from parliamentary scrutiny and CAG audit. So, it is hard to reliably determine whether India’s sole thermonuclear test fizzled out quickly or was a success, however modest. But some facts speak for themselves.

One telling fact is that more than 11 years later, India has still not weaponized the thermonuclear technology, even though the test in 1998 was supposed to have catapulted the country into the big-power league. The thermonuclear test, obviously, was not intended merely as a technology demonstrator. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask: What has been the security benefit for the country from that test?

Even more glaring is another fact: More than 35 years after Pokharan I, India stands out as a reluctant and tentative nuclear power, still lacking even a barely minimal deterrent capability against China. Given the growing military asymmetry with China, a proven and weaponized Indian thermonuclear capability, backed by long-range missiles, is critical to deter the assertive and ambitious northern neighbour. But today, India does not have a single Beijing-reachable missile in deployment.

Had India developed and deployed a minimal but credible nuclear-weapons capability, China would not have dared to mess with it. But the increasing Chinese bellicosity, reflected in rising border incursions and the hardening of Beijing’s stance on territorial disputes, suggests China is only getting emboldened against a weaker India.

Consider yet another unpalatable fact: No country has struggled longer to build a minimal deterrent or paid heavier international costs for its nuclear programme than India.  The history of India’s nuclear-weapons programme is actually a record of how it helped establish multilateral technology controls. Pokharan I, for example, impelled the secret formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India’s space programme helped give birth to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Yet, before it has built a credible minimal deterrent, India came full circle when it entered into a civilian nuclear deal with the US and secured an exemption from the NSG last year to import high-priced commercial nuclear power reactors and fuel. In doing so, it had to accept nonproliferation conditions that aim to stunt its nuclear-deterrent development.

Through this deal, India is seeking to replicate in the energy sector the very mistake it has made on armaments. Now the world’s largest arms importer, India spends more than $6 billion every year on importing conventional weapons, some  of dubious value, while it neglects to build its own armament-production base.

Conventional weapons simply cannot deter a nuclear adversary. Deterrence against a nuclear foe can only be built on nuclear capability, especially a second-strike capability that can survive the enemy’s first strike to inflict massive retaliation.

More broadly, Indian policymakers have yet to recognize that no nation can be a major power without three attributes: A high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; a capacity to meet basic defence needs indigenously; and a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through intercontinental-range weaponry. India is deficient in all the three areas.

It is not an accident that all the countries armed with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are permanent members of the UN Security Council. But rather than aim for a technological leap through a crash ICBM programme, India remains interminably stuck in the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) stage.

Against this background, the latest claim that the 1998 thermonuclear test performed well under par can only further damage the credibility of India’s nuclear posture. The controversy over the thermonuclear test, however, is nothing new. No sooner had the test been conducted than a former head of the Indian nuclear programme, P.K. Iyengar, questioned official claims of success.

In such a setting — with critics within and outside the country questioning the success of the test — India must be ready to convincingly re-demonstrate its thermonuclear capability, should a propitious international opportunity arise from a nuclear test conducted by another power. Nuclear deterrence, after all, is like beauty: It lies in the eyes of the beholder. It is not what India’s nuclear establishment claims but what outsiders, especially regional adversaries, believe that constitutes deterrence (or the lack of it).


Brahma Chellaney is a nuclear and strategic affairs expert.


Boastful India

Substandard Capabilities

 

Brahma Chellaney

The Times of India, July 29, 2009

 

In India, no technological advance is too small to be celebrated nationally. The launch of a nuclear-powered submarine for underwater trials is an important step forward in India’s quest for a minimal but credible nuclear deterrent. But India still has a long way to go. After all, it will be some years before India can deploy its first nuclear sub armed with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Yet the mere flooding of the dry dock to begin the harbour trials of INS Arihant became an occasion for national jubilation, with the prime minister present at the event to hail it as “a historic milestone in the country’s defence preparedness.” It is as if India already has joined the club of nations with nuclear subs.

 

To be sure, nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines (known in American argot as SSBNs) can help India bridge the yawning gap in its deterrent against China. Moreover, only such subs can underpin India’s no-first use (NFU) posture. For an NFU to be credible, the country needs a second-strike capability. If a country does not have the capability to retaliate after surviving an enemy’s first strike on its nuclear assets, a NFU would make no sense. Nuclear-propelled subs, with their high endurance, serve as a stealthy, least-vulnerable and cost-effective launch-pad for nuclear weapons. Deterrence can be achieved with a lesser number of missiles at sea than if they are land-based.

 

Still, some harsh facts stick out. India has paid a tremendous international price for its nuclear programme without reaping the kind of security benefits it should have. And the gaps in its deterrent posture remain glaring. Indeed, among nuclear-armed states, India stands out as the country with the slowest-rate of progress in deterrent development. Can it be forgotten that India’s nuclear programme is the oldest in Asia and that its first nuclear test happened more than 35 years ago? Yet, India’s “credible minimal deterrent,” far from being credible, has yet to deliver minimalist capabilities against China. India still does not have a single deployed missile of any type that can reach Beijing.

 

Let’s face it: No country in history has struggled longer to build a minimal deterrent than India. There are multiple reasons for that, including the absence of a resolute political leadership, the country’s accountability-at-a-discount culture, Western technology sanctions, the non-existence of independent oversight or audit, creeping politicization of topmost scientists and the bureaucratization of strategic establishments. Also, unlike Britain, China, Israel and Pakistan, India received no assistance from another nuclear power and has had to develop everything indigenously while facing a rising tide of technology controls.

 

In the absence of a reliable nuclear deterrent, India remains irredeemably dependent on imports of conventional weapons, spending more than $5 billion annually on such purchases, some of questionable utility. Among important states, India is the only one that relies on imports to meet basic-defence needs, to the extent that it has become the world’s top arms buyer.

 

Yet that record has not stopped India from being boastful. The start of Arihant’s underwater trials ought to have been a quiet affair, not a national event. After all, 11 years after a thermonuclear test, that technology is yet to be weaponized. Take another example. The Agni 3 has still to be deployed, yet the DRDO chief held a news conference earlier this year to brag about the likely first test next year of the Agni 5, which is still at the design stage. The press then went totally gaga, portraying the Agni 5, with a maximum range of 5,000 kilometres, as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) when, in reality, it is just another intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in India’s agonizingly incremental missile-development path.

 

Which other country in the world advertises every technological move or brags about a missile still on the drawing board? To the contrary, the long-standing tradition in the nuclear world is to quietly develop and deploy capabilities. India is the lone exception to that tradition.

 

Instead of launching a crash ICBM project drawing on the intercontinental-range capabilities of the space programme, India remains stuck in the IRBM arena, where its frog-like paces have taken it — two decades after the first Agni test — to Agni-3, a non-strategic system. In fact, if everything goes well, India’s first SSBN will be deployed with a non-strategic weapon — a 700-kilometer SLBM under development. That would further underpin the regional and stunted character of India’s deterrent.

 

Of the three technologies — nuclear propulsion, SLBM and ICBM — the most complex are the first two. Developing a nuclear-weapon-strike capability from under water is far more difficult than firing missiles from the ground. Yet, while seeking to develop an SLBM-armed nuclear sub, India still does not have an ICBM project, even on the drawing board. India wants to go down in world history as the first nation to deploy an SSBN without having developed an ICBM. “Incredible India” indeed.

 

The writer is professor, Centre for Policy Research.

 

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/OPINION/Edit-Page/Top-Article-Substandard-Capabilities/articleshow/4830783.cms

Safeguarding Pakistan’s WMD from jihadists within

Insider threat to Pakistan’s ‘crown jewels’

Brahma Chellaney
The Hindu newspaper, May 25, 2009 

The real threat of an Islamist takeover of Pakistan’s weapons of mass destruction comes from jihadists within the military, intelligence and nuclear establishments, not from the Taliban.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently warned of the “unthinkable” in Pakistan: Islamists getting “the keys to the nuclear arsenal.” So, does the United States have a contingency plan to forestall that and, if so, can the plan work, given the record of American policy on Pakistan thus far?

Pakistan’s nuclear-stockpile security is handled by the so-called Strategic Plans Division, with a special, 1,000-troop unit. But as Ms Clinton acknowledged, the Pakistani nukes are “widely dispersed,” with the storage sites extending beyond the Punjab heartland to the Sind and Baluchistan provinces. Add to that America’s admittedly limited knowledge on the location of these sites. The U.S. may thus have few good options to pre-emptively seize the nuclear arms before an Islamist takeover of Pakistan.

To be sure, the Strategic Plans Division — the keeper of the country’s nuclear secrets — is headed by a U.S.-backed general, Khalid Kidwai, who was held in India as a prisoner of the 1971 war and released following the 1972 Shimla Agreement. Mr. Kidwai has headed the SPD ever since it was created after the 1998 nuclear tests.

It was on Mr. Kidwai’s watch that the infamous A.Q. Khan-led nuclear-smuggling ring remained in operation. How reassuring is that fact? Indeed, it was Mr. Kidwai whom military ruler Pervez Musharraf used to extract a tutored confession from Khan so that the entire blame for the illicit nuclear ring could fall on a single individual, sparing the military establishment — a charade the Bush administration readily went along with.

To tamp down growing international concerns over the safety of Pakistan’s “crown jewels” and to win congressional passage of his record-level aid package for Pakistan, U.S. President Barack Obama said on April 29: “I’m confident we can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands.” Mr. Obama’s confidence is rooted unbelievably in his belief that the jihadist-penetrated Pakistani army is taking cognizance of such perils. In fact, he suggested Washington still trusts the Pakistani army with custodial control of nuclear assets, thereby compounding the simultaneous insult he hurled at President Asif Ali Zardari’s elected government in calling it “very fragile,” ineffectual and unable “to gain the support and loyalty” of the Pakistani people.

Mr. Obama’s comments, made just before he received Mr. Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai for a trilateral meeting, drew attention to the long-standing U.S. policy partiality for Pakistani generals at a time when the real Islamist-takeover threat comes from jihadists within the increasingly radicalized Pakistani military. Rather than help build robust civilian institutions, Washington for five decades propped up military rulers and still continues to pamper the Pakistani military establishment, best illustrated by the fresh $3-billion military aid package and new joint cooperation between the CIA and the rogue Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.

Pakistan’s descent into a jihadist dungeon tellingly occurred not under civilian rule but under military rule. Also, before Musharraf’s nearly nine-year dictatorship, few in the world looked at Pakistan as a failing state.

Today, how can Pakistan become a “normal” state if its military, intelligence and nuclear establishments remain outside civilian oversight, with the decisive power still with the army? Yet when the new civilian government ordered the ISI last July to report to the Interior Ministry, it did not receive support from Washington, allowing the army to quickly frustrate the move. The command and control over Pakistan’s nuclear assets vests with the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, with Mr. Zardari just the titular chair of the National Command Authority, dominated by military and intelligence leaders.

In such an aberrant setting, can the U.S. really hope to prevent jihadist control of Pakistan’s arsenal of nuclear and biological weapons, including pathogens no less dangerous than (as Senator Richard Lugar pointed out) the H1N1 virus? Bountiful U.S. aid indeed permits Pakistan to plough more of its domestic resources into weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as exemplified by the two new plutonium-production reactors under construction at Khushab. Existing WMD in a country teaming with jihadists are a matter of deep global concern; an expanding arsenal makes the scenario nightmarish.

Let’s just say it: The U.S. first allowed Pakistan to acquire the nuclear bomb by turning a blind eye to its illicit procurement of blueprints and items during the 1970s and 1980s. Then, when the clandestine nuclear importers morphed into covert nuclear exporters, the U.S. admittedly failed to detect their proliferation activities for 16 long years. Worse still, as shown by A.Q. Khan’s release from house arrest and the collapse of international investigations, Washington has not been interested in fully investigating that ring or in bringing its ringleaders to justice.

Khan’s discharge followed Switzerland’s release of the two Tinner brothers who, along with their father, were important conduits in the Pakistani ring. One of the brothers, Urs Tinner, has acknowledged working undercover for the CIA. In fact, the CIA shielded A.Q. Khan for long. As the former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers has revealed, the CIA protected Khan from arrest and prosecution in Europe in 1975 and 1986.

Today, with Pakistani officials doggedly deflecting U.S. requests for details, CIA director Leon Panetta has acknowledged that America lacks “the intelligence to know” where all of Pakistan’s nuclear-storage sites are located. Although the U.S. has provided some $100 million worth of technical assistance to Islamabad under its International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation programme, American personnel have been denied access to most Pakistani nuclear sites.

Although it has refused to sell “Permissive Action Links” (PALs) — primary electronic locks embedded in weapon design — America has helped Pakistan design a system of controls, barriers and sensors, including improvised secondary-locking devices added to already-built weapons. But rather than let Americans enter its sites, Pakistan sent its personnel for on-site training in America. Put simply, the U.S. has not been allowed to see how its money has been used in practice.

Modern security and accounting systems, in any event, can be of little value in the face of insider threats. The real threat of an Islamist takeover of Pakistan’s WMD comes not from jihadists outside, but from jihadists within the system — specifically, from the jihadist-infiltrated military, intelligence and nuclear establishments. Yet, with the Obama administration hyping the Pakistani Taliban threat to win early congressional passage of record-level aid for Islamabad, international concerns have centred on outsider threats. The Taliban, either in Pakistan or Afghanistan, has not been active outside the Pashtun regions, and there is no evidence of any nuclear assets being present in the troubled Pakistani Pashtun areas.

Actually, Pakistan has emulated India’s example in storing nukes in disassembled form, with the warheads and delivery vehicles stowed in separate facilities. For outsiders to acquire even one complete bomb, capture of at least two facilities would be necessary, along with the expertise to mate the fissile “core” and trigger with the delivery vehicle. This is unlikely to happen without military generals and other senior insiders actively colluding with the outsiders.

Insider threats indeed have repeatedly been exposed — from the ring that sold centrifuge technology and bomb designs to the jihadist charity set up by two senior nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed. Mahmood, who once served as A.Q. Khan’s boss and designed the first Khushab reactor, advocated that the Pakistani nukes were the property of the whole ummah and, therefore, Pakistan had a duty to share nuclear technology with other Muslim states. Weeks before 9/11, “Mahmood and Majeed met with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan,” then CIA chief George Tenet writes in his memoirs, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. “There, around a campfire, they discussed how Al-Qaeda should go about building a nuclear device.”

Pakistan serves as a reminder that programmes to screen and monitor personnel can mean little when jihad-spouting personnel abound in the military and nuclear establishments. Such personnel are potential sleepers for extremist groups.

Safeguarding WMD demands a stable, moderate Pakistan. That, in turn, calls for sustained international political investment in building and strengthening civilian institutions. But is that possible without a clear break from politically expedient U.S. policies that continue to prop up a meddling army, fatten the ISI and encourage the military, intelligence and nuclear establishments to stay not accountable to the elected government? Even Secretary Clinton was constrained to admit that “our policy toward Pakistan over the last 30 years has been incoherent.” The most likely scenario of Pakistani WMD falling into Islamist hands is an intra-military struggle in which the jihadists gain ascendancy.

© Copyright 2000 – 2009 The Hindu

Insider threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Military insiders threaten Pakistan’s nuclear assets

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY

The Japan Times

Without naming the United States as his source, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said recently: "We have been assured that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are in safe hands as of now. And I have no reason to disbelieve the assurance."

To his acute embarrassment, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, soon thereafter, said the "unthinkable" could happen in Pakistan: Islamists could get "the keys to the nuclear arsenal." Which raises the question: Does America have a contingency plan to avert an Islamist takeover of Pakistan’s "crown jewels" and, if so, can it work?

Pakistan’s nuclear-stockpile security is handled by the Strategic Plans Division, which has under its command a special unit of about 1,000 troops. But as Clinton acknowledged, the Pakistani nukes are "widely dispersed," with storage sites extending beyond the Punjab heartland to Sind and Baluchistan provinces.

The U.S. appears to have few good options to pre-emptively seize the nuclear arms if a national meltdown is imminent.

To be sure, the Strategic Plans Division — the keeper of the country’s nuclear keys — is headed by a U.S.-backed general, Khalid Kidwai, who was held in India as a prisoner of the 1971 war and released after the 1972 Simla Agreement on normalizing India-Pakistan relations. Kidwai has headed the SPD ever since it was created after the 1998 nuclear tests. In other words, it was on Kidwai’s watch that the infamous A.Q. Khan-led nuclear-smuggling ring remained in operation.

Yet for Washington, Kidwai is a trusted man. It was Kidwai whom military ruler Pervez Musharraf used to extract a tutored confession from Khan so that the entire blame for the illicit nuclear ring could fall on a single individual, sparing the military establishment — a charade the Bush administration readily went along with.

To tamp down growing international concerns over the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, U.S. President Barack Obama said on April 29: "I’m confident we can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani Army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands."

Obama’s confidence, amazingly, is rooted in his belief that the jihadist-infiltrated Pakistani Army is taking cognizance of such perils. Indeed, by suggesting that Washington continued to trust the Pakistani Army with custodial control of nuclear assets, Obama only compounded the insult he simultaneously hurled at President Asif Ali Zardari’s elected government in calling it "very fragile," ineffectual and unable "to gain the support and loyalty" of the Pakistani people.

Obama’s comments, made just before he received Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai for a trilateral meeting, highlighted a long-standing U.S. policy partiality for Pakistani military generals, even though the real Islamist-takeover threat today comes from within the increasingly radicalized Pakistani Army.

Rather than help build robust civilian institutions, Washington propped up military rulers for five decades and still continues to pamper the Pakistani military establishment, best illustrated by the proposed $3 billion in fresh military aid over the next five years and the setting up of new cooperation between the CIA and the rogue Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.

The choice in Pakistan is not between Islamists and U.S.-sponsored generals, who actually reared the forces of jihad and still nurture many jihadists. Both are a threat to international peace and security. But even as Obama is making Pakistan the biggest recipient of U.S. aid in the world, his harsh criticism of Zardari — in office for just eight months — risks undermining a fledgling civilian government and emboldening the military. Zardari is right in saying that a military coup in Pakistan, as in the past, can occur only with U.S. support, however tacit.

Pakistan’s descent into a jihadist dungeon tellingly occurred not under civilian rule but under military rule. While one military dictator, General Zia ul-Haq, let loose the jihadists he reared, another dictator, Musharraf, pushed Pakistan to the very edge of the precipice. Before Musharraf’s nearly nine-year rule, few in the world looked at Pakistan as a failing state. How can Pakistan become a "normal" state if its military, intelligence and nuclear establishments remain outside civilian oversight?

Yet when the new civilian government ordered the ISI last July to report to the Interior Ministry, it did not receive support from Washington, allowing the army to quickly frustrate the move. The command and control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons rest with the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, as Zardari is just the titular chair of the National Command Authority dominated by military and intelligence leaders. In such an anomalous setting, can the U.S. really prevent jihadist control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal?

The U.S. first allowed Pakistan to acquire the nuclear bomb by turning a blind eye to its illicit procurement of blueprints and items from overseas. Then, when the clandestine nuclear importers in Pakistan morphed into covert nuclear exporters, the U.S. failed to detect their proliferation activities for 16 long years. Worse still, Washington has not been interested in fully investigating the very network it helped uncover or in bringing its ringleaders to justice. As a result, international investigations into that ring have collapsed and even A.Q. Khan has been freed from house arrest.

Khan’s discharge followed Switzerland’s release of the two Tinner brothers, who along with their father were important conduits in the Pakistani ring. One of the brothers, Urs Tinner, has acknowledged working undercover for the CIA. In fact, the CIA shielded A.Q. Khan for a long time. As former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers has revealed, the CIA protected Khan from arrest and prosecution in Europe in 1975 and 1986.

Today, even as Obama seeks to assure the world about Pakistani-nuclear security, his aides admit Washington does not know where all of Pakistan’s storage sites are located. Pakistani officials have doggedly deflected U.S. requests for these details.

Although the U.S. has provided some $100 million worth of technical assistance to Islamabad under its International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program, American personnel have been denied access to most Pakistani nuclear sites, even when they have made a case for on-site installation and training.

The U.S. has been loath to sell Pakistan "Permissive Action Links" (PALs) — electronic locks embedded in weapon design that have special access codes. But it has helped Pakistan design a system of controls, barriers and sensors, including improvised electronic-locking devices added to already-built weapons. But rather than let Americans enter its sites, Pakistan sent its personnel for on-site training in the U.S. on intrusion detectors, portal monitors, locks and material-accounting equipment. Put simply, the U.S. has not been allowed to see how its money has been spent.

In any event, modern security and accounting systems can be of little value in the face of insider threats. The real threat of an Islamist takeover of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal comes not from jihadists outside, but from jihadists within the system — specifically, from the jihadist-penetrated military, intelligence and nuclear establishments.

Yet, with the Obama administration hyping the Pakistani Taliban threat to win early congressional passage of record-level aid for Islamabad, international concerns have centered on outsider threats. The Taliban, either in Pakistan or Afghanistan, have not been active outside Pashtun areas, and there is no evidence of any nuclear assets being present in the troubled Pashtun parts.

Pakistan has emulated India’s example in storing nukes in disassembled form, with the warheads and delivery vehicles stowed in separate facilities. For outsiders to acquire even one complete bomb, capture of at least two facilities would be necessary, along with the expertise to mate the fissile "core" and trigger with the delivery vehicle. This is unlikely to happen without military generals and other senior insiders actively colluding with the outsiders.

Insider threats indeed have repeatedly been exposed — from the ring that sold centrifuge technology and bomb designs to the jihadist charity set up by two senior nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed. Mahmood, who once served as A.Q. Khan’s boss and designed the Khushab reactor, advocated that the Pakistani nukes were the property of the whole ummah, or Islamic world, and Pakistan had a duty to share nuclear technology with other Muslim states.

Then CIA chief George Tenet writes in his 2007 book, "At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA," that President George W. Bush was so concerned by the charity’s activities that he directed him to fly to Islamabad. The charity was shut down and Mahmood detained.

Programs to screen and monitor personnel can achieve little when jihad-spouting personnel abound in the Pakistani military and nuclear establishments. Such personnel can serve as sleepers for extremist groups.

Safeguarding Pakistani nuclear assets from jihadists demands the creation of a stable, moderate Pakistan. That, in turn, demands sustained international political investment in building and strengthening civilian institutions. But can that happen without a fundamental break from U.S. policies that continue to prop up a meddling army, fatten the ISI and encourage the military, intelligence and nuclear establishments to stay not accountable to the elected government?

If U.S. policy remains driven by political expediency and near-term objectives, an Islamist takeover of Pakistan could result from one of two scenarios: a collapse of central authority or, more likely, an intramilitary struggle in which the jihadists gain ascendancy.

Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in Delhi.
 
The Japan Times: Thursday, May 14, 2009
(C) All rights reserved