Brahma Chellaney, Taipei Times

Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics.

The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within.

This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future relationship with China. As political polarization deepens, Taiwan’s ability to forge consensus on critical security decisions becomes increasingly constrained — precisely when unity is most essential.

For decades, Taiwan’s security rested on an implicit guarantee: that American military superiority and democratic solidarity would shield the island from Chinese aggression. That certainty has crumbled under the weight of changing geopolitical realities.

The Trump administration’s disruptive approach to Indo-Pacific partnerships — including launching what amounts to an economic war against India, America’s key strategic partner — has introduced dangerous unpredictability into Asian security calculations. Meanwhile, growing American domestic political constraints and strategic exhaustion raise uncomfortable questions about Washington’s willingness to risk direct conflict with China over Taiwan.

These doubts emerge at the worst possible moment. China’s military provocations have become routine, with fighter jets and naval vessels regularly crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait in brazen displays of force. Diplomatically, Beijing has relentlessly chipped away at Taiwan’s international space, including poaching several of its diplomatic allies. Simultaneously, China wages an unprecedented influence campaign, deploying disinformation, economic inducements, and cyber operations to undermine Taiwan’s democratic institutions and social cohesion.

Perhaps most ominously, China has embarked on the most rapid and ambitious peacetime military expansion in human history. Beijing’s defense industrial complex produces warships, missiles, combat aircraft, and drones at a pace that dwarfs Cold War arms races. Its missile arsenal — now comprising thousands of precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles — can potentially devastate Taiwan’s military infrastructure.

The Chinese navy has become the world’s largest fleet by ship count, while China’s nuclear weapons stockpile expands at speeds unseen since the 1960s. Through such a buildup, Beijing is signaling to Taipei that absorption of Taiwan is inevitable and resistance futile. Beijing may calculate that overwhelming military superiority provides multiple pathways to absorption — either through direct invasion, economic strangulation via blockade, or gradual political capitulation under the weight of unsustainable military pressure.

Against this backdrop, Taiwan’s survival depends on abandoning outdated security assumptions and embracing harsh realities. Deterrence cannot rely solely on external guarantees; it must begin with credible self-defense capabilities that exploit Taiwan’s inherent geographic advantages.

In fact, Taiwan’s geography is its greatest asset. The island’s mountainous terrain, limited beaches suitable for amphibious landings, and rough waters around it for much of the year create natural defensive barriers — but only if Taiwan adopts the right military strategy.

This means prioritizing asymmetric capabilities over conventional big-ticket systems: mobile anti-ship missiles that can sink invasion fleets, naval mines to seal off landing zones, swarms of defensive drones, and distributed coastal defense units that can operate independently under intense missile bombardment.

Equally important is abandoning investments in vulnerable high-value targets. Advanced fighter jets and large surface ships become expensive liabilities when facing China’s missile barrages. Instead, Taiwan should focus on survivable, cost-effective systems that deny China quick victory and impose prohibitive costs on any invasion attempt.

Civilian resilience forms the other pillar of effective deterrence. Ukraine’s experience offers a lesson: resilience is as much about civilian preparedness as about frontline firepower.

Taiwan must expand reserve training programs, conduct regular civil defense drills, and establish distributed stockpiles of critical supplies including fuel, medical equipment, and communications gear. The goal is ensuring that Chinese missiles or a blockade cannot paralyze civilian infrastructure or break social cohesion.

China’s influence operations represent an equally dangerous threat that demands sophisticated countermeasures. Beijing’s strategy targets Taiwan’s democratic vulnerabilities through cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and covert political funding designed to polarize society and erode faith in democratic institutions.

Taiwan’s response must be equally comprehensive. Enhanced media literacy programs can inoculate citizens against online manipulation tactics. Electoral laws require strengthening to prevent covert Chinese financing of political candidates and parties. Cybersecurity capabilities must extend beyond government agencies to encompass private operators of critical infrastructure.

Most crucially, Taiwan’s democratic institutions must remain resilient, transparent, and trusted. The stronger its democracy, the less fertile ground exists for China’s influence operations.

While American support remains vital, Taiwan cannot afford complete dependence on Washington’s commitment. Instead, Taipei should cultivate deeper partnerships with other democracies that share interests in preventing Chinese hegemony.

Japan increasingly views Taiwan’s security as inseparable from its own national defense. India, which faces its own border pressures from China, shares an abiding interest in keeping the Indo-Pacific free from Chinese domination. Australia and Europe, too, are recognizing that Taiwan’s fate is an international concern.

Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy should operate on three levels: informal security dialogues and exercises that build cooperation habits with regional democracies; international legal frameworks emphasizing Taiwanese people’s right to chart their own future free from coercion; and expanded economic partnerships that make Taiwan’s isolation or conquest economically prohibitive for the international community.

None of these measures diminishes the importance of American deterrence, which remains the most significant counterweight to Chinese coercion. However, while continuing to deepen security ties with Washington, Taiwan must also hedge against the possibility that US intervention may be delayed, partial, or politically constrained.

The challenge is maximizing partnership while avoiding dependence. If Taiwan shows genuine resolve and capability, it strengthens the case for international support. Conversely, complacency will breed doubts about Taiwan’s commitment, undermining others’ willingness to take risks on its behalf.

China’s goal to absorb Taiwan is undeniable. What remains uncertain is whether Taiwan will take sufficient steps to ensure this ambition never succeeds. A strategy of layered deterrence — combining robust self-defense, democratic resilience, and expanded global partnerships — can make Chinese aggression far costlier and significantly less likely to achieve its objectives.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).

The world has become less predictable, less rules-based, and more shaped by the impulses of strongmen and short-term dealmaking. Against this backdrop, the fate of democratic Taiwan hinges on how global powers deal with an increasingly assertive China.

Brahma Chellaney, Taipei Times

The world has become less predictable, less rules-based, and more shaped by the impulses of strongmen and short-term dealmaking.

Nowhere is this more consequential than in East Asia, where the fate of democratic Taiwan hinges on how global powers manage — or mismanage — tensions with an increasingly assertive China.

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has deepened the global uncertainty, with his erratic, highly personalized foreign-policy approach unsettling allies and adversaries alike. Trump appears to treat foreign policy like a reality show.

Yet, paradoxically, the global unpredictability may offer Taiwan unexpected deterrence. For China, the risk of provoking the United States may now outweigh the temptation of taking Taiwan by force.

Trump’s foreign policy is less about strategy than instinct. Unlike past American presidents who embedded US commitments in alliances and treaties, Trump approaches diplomacy as a real estate mogul might: transactional, impulsive, and often devoid of historical context. For Taiwan, this raises uncomfortable questions. Can it continue to rely on a US security umbrella under a president who has questioned the value of NATO, threatened to pull US troops from South Korea, and hinted in the past at making deals with China at Taiwan’s expense?

Under a president whose loyalty to democratic norms is ambiguous and whose geopolitical thinking centers on short-term leverage, Taiwan could easily become a pawn in a larger bargain — or worse, left to fend for itself. Trump has previously oscillated between fiery rhetoric on China and overtures of camaraderie with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). His unpredictability breeds confusion in Taipei, and, perhaps more dangerously, could encourage miscalculation in Beijing.

However, unpredictability is not always a strategic liability. In the context of Taiwan’s security, it can act as a form of deterrence — especially when facing an increasingly authoritarian and repressive regime like China’s that prizes control and risk management.

Trump’s military strike on Iran last month, executed with little consultation or warning, sent a jolt through global capitals. For Beijing, it was a sharp reminder that a Trump-led America could respond to Chinese aggression not with diplomatic caution, but with military intervention.

This lesson is not lost on China’s leadership, especially at a time when intra-party power struggles in Beijing are raising questions about Xi’s one-man dictatorship.

Despite its military build-up and increasingly bellicose rhetoric on Taiwan, China remains fundamentally cautious about entering a war it cannot control. The US military still possesses unmatched power projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. And now, with Trump in office again, the risks of a US military response to a Taiwan invasion — while not guaranteed — appear less abstract than they might under a more cautious administration in Washington.

Indeed, the combination of Trump’s volatility and America’s military reach could force China to recalibrate its timetable on Taiwan.

Xi may still view “reunification” as a historic mission, but he must weigh that ambition against a backdrop of rising internal vulnerabilities — including economic stagnation, demographic decline, eroding international goodwill and sharpening power rivalries within the Chinese Communist Party. Trump’s return to power, with its promise of intensified economic confrontation and strategic pressure, only accentuates those challenges.

At the same time, the broader geopolitical environment is shifting in ways that offer Taiwan both risks and opportunities. On one hand, Trump’s disdain for traditional alliances weakens the cohesion of the democratic front that has helped shield Taiwan diplomatically and militarily. On the other hand, growing concerns about Chinese assertiveness — from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines and India — have created a more favorable regional climate for closer defense cooperation with Taiwan, even if done quietly and informally.

Europe, too, is awakening to the Taiwan question. While Trump’s disdain for the EU may hinder transatlantic coordination, the European Parliament and several key EU member states have become more vocal in opposing any change to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. These diplomatic gains, while modest, offer Taiwan a broader base of international sympathy in the event of a crisis.

Ultimately, Taiwan is navigating a world in flux — one where neither deterrence nor diplomacy can be taken for granted. Trump’s second term has added a layer of strategic fog to an already unstable international order.

But this fog is not entirely to Taiwan’s disadvantage. The fear that Trump might launch a military response to a Chinese invasion — not out of alliance loyalty, but out of rage or opportunism — may be precisely the uncertainty that keeps Beijing at bay.

Still, deterrence rooted in unpredictability is fragile and cannot substitute for a coherent long-term strategy.

Taiwan must be vigilant as it continues to strengthen its asymmetric defense capabilities, deepen its informal security partnerships and build public resilience. It must also avoid putting all its eggs in Washington’s basket, especially when that basket is being carried by a man who has repeatedly broken with tradition, institutions, and norms.

In an age where geopolitics is shaped as much by personality as by policy, Taiwan’s fate will hinge not just on its own resolve, but on its ability to read and adapt to a rapidly shifting international landscape.

In this precarious balancing act, Taiwan remains both a frontline of democracy and a test case for how smaller powers can survive — and even thrive — amid great-power struggles and global uncertainty.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).

China continues to militarize and repress Tibet while intensifying efforts to erase Tibetan culture, language and identity. Tibet’s imperiled future is a challenge to the global order, to religious freedom, and to Asia’s environmental security. And the time to act is now.

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

Three decades ago, China abducted the Panchen Lama — then a six-year-old boy — shortly after his recognition by the Dalai Lama, and installed a regime-picked imposter in his place. That abduction, one of the most audacious acts of spiritual and cultural repression in modern history, still haunts the Tibetan people.

Yet Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with the false Panchen Lama this month has served only to remind the world of the genuine Panchen Lama’s continued disappearance. That makes the Panchen Lama — the second-highest spiritual leader in Tibetan Buddhism — arguably the longest-held political prisoner anywhere.

Now, Xi is preparing to repeat that sinister act on a much grander scale. He is waiting for the Dalai Lama, who turns 90 on July 6, to pass away so that Beijing can impose its own puppet as the next spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism. This would be akin to the Italian government installing a state-appointed pope to lead the Catholic Church, a brazen affront to religious freedom and cultural sovereignty.

China’s ambitions go far beyond symbolism. With Xi’s regime intensifying efforts to erase Tibetan culture, language and identity, the looming succession of the Dalai Lama marks a pivotal and dangerous turning point. Although the Dalai Lama has yet to clarify the exact process for selecting his successor, Beijing is zealously laying the groundwork to seize control of Tibetan Buddhism from within.

The paradox is stark: The atheistic Chinese Communist Party is preparing to hand-pick the next Dalai Lama, even while escalating its crackdown on Tibetan religion and culture. Xi has called on Communist Party cadres to become “unyielding Marxist atheists,” effectively elevating communism to the level of a state religion. The goal is clear: to fashion a successor who pledges loyalty not to Tibetan Buddhism, but to the Chinese Communist Party.

But Tibet’s plight is not just spiritual or cultural — it is also ecological and geopolitical. The Tibetan Plateau, often dubbed the “Third Pole,” is Asia’s primary freshwater source and a cradle of biodiversity. It is the starting point of the continent’s major river systems, which sustain over 2 billion people downstream. China’s aggressive exploitation of Tibet’s natural resources, particularly water and minerals, has created long-term environmental risks for all of Asia.

Beijing is building mega-dams and water diversion projects that threaten to destabilize ecosystems and disrupt hydrological flows far beyond its borders. Tibet’s high altitude also plays a critical role in shaping monsoonal patterns and global atmospheric circulation. A 2023 scientific study even found an atmospheric connection between the Tibetan Plateau and the Amazon rainforest — proof that the world’s environmental fate is tied to Tibet’s future.

Despite its annexation in 1951, Tibet maintains a vibrant spirit of resistance. The Dalai Lama, viewed by Tibetans as the living embodiment of compassion and wisdom, remains their moral and spiritual leader. His renunciation of political power in 2011 in favor of a democratically elected government-in-exile only reinforced his legacy as a global symbol of nonviolent resistance.

That legacy remains untainted by any link to terrorism, even as China continues to militarize and repress Tibet. Under Xi, repression has intensified, with mass surveillance, religious restrictions and the forced assimilation of Tibetan children into Mandarin-language boarding schools — more than a million children are now separated from their families and culture. The unmistakable goal is to breed loyalty to the Communist Party by obliterating the Tibetan identity.

Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama’s health has declined. Following radiation therapy for prostate cancer in 2016 and knee replacement surgery in the U.S. last year, his international travel has drastically reduced.

Adding to the challenge is Beijing’s success in pressuring many countries — including Western democracies and Buddhist-majority states in Asia — to deny him entry. Only Japan has held firm. India, to its credit, remains the Tibetan leader’s sanctuary and moral ally, with New Delhi referring to him as “our most esteemed guest.” The Dalai Lama himself calls India his spiritual and cultural home.

Against this backdrop, China’s strategy to engineer the next Dalai Lama must be met with firm resistance. The stakes could not be higher — the continuity of Tibetan Buddhism as a living spiritual tradition hangs in the balance. To counter Beijing’s plan, a coordinated international response is urgently needed to affirm the right of Tibetan Buddhists to determine their own spiritual leadership without interference.

Fortunately, the U.S. has taken some meaningful steps. Its 2020 Tibetan Policy and Support Act affirms that the selection of the next Dalai Lama is solely a Tibetan religious matter. It explicitly warns of sanctions against Chinese officials who meddle in the process. In July 2024, President Joe Biden signed into law the bipartisan Resolve Tibet Act, which strengthens American policy in support of Tibetan self-determination and seeks to counter Chinese disinformation campaigns on Tibet.

But more must be done. The U.S. and India should forge a united front and rally other democracies to support the Dalai Lama’s vision and the Tibetan people’s rights. The Dalai Lama’s succession should be protected through a multilateral framework that involves Buddhist leaders, legal protections and diplomatic safeguards.

China’s effort to manipulate the centuries-old institution of the Dalai Lama is not merely a religious affront. It is a geopolitical gambit designed to consolidate control and extend influence across Asia. If Tibet’s voice is silenced and its future dictated by authoritarian fiat, the global costs — in spiritual, ecological and political terms — will be immense.

Tibet’s imperiled future is not just a Tibetan problem. It is a challenge to the international order, to religious freedom and to the environmental security of an entire continent. And the time to act is now.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

Brahma Chellaney, Nikkei Asia

U.S. President Donald Trump’s most consequential legacy may be his strategic pivot to confront China. For decades, successive American administrations pursued a policy of integrating China into the global economy, believing that economic liberalization would gradually lead to political reform. That gamble failed. Trump, during his first term, was the first U.S. president to openly acknowledge this failure and recalibrate policy accordingly.

Now, in his second term, Trump has launched a full-spectrum pushback against China’s expansionism and global ambitions. From curbing tech transfers to pressuring allies to reduce their reliance on Chinese supply chains, his administration has made confronting the communist behemoth the cornerstone of its foreign and economic policy.

By contrast, Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, maintained a more cautious or conciliatory approach, often prioritizing competition over confrontation with the People’s Republic of China. His Indo-Pacific strategy was to “manage competition with the PRC responsibly.” And in his last State of the Union address, while likening Russia’s actions to Hitler’s, Biden declared, “I want competition with China, not conflict.”

Trump has shifted decisively from managing China to countering it — economically, militarily and ideologically.

A hallmark of this new posture is Trump’s effort to redefine the global trading system. His push to link trade agreements to “market-economy” status directly targets China’s state-capitalist model.

Washington now insists that allies consult with it before signing trade deals with “nonmarket economies” like China. This move aims to align allied trade policies with U.S. interests and isolate Beijing by spotlighting its economic practices that rely on heavy state subsidies, forced technology transfers and market manipulation.

This push to bind trade deals to market-economy status could reshape the rules of international commerce.

Trump has also signed a sweeping memorandum targeting Chinese investments in U.S. companies. Citing national security concerns, the policy identifies China as a foreign adversary attempting to access America’s “crown jewels,” from cutting-edge technologies and critical minerals to farmland and port infrastructure. It proposes stringent curbs on Chinese investment in strategic sectors and restricts U.S. capital from flowing into Chinese industries that support Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy.

The administration, meanwhile, has further tightened export controls, especially in advanced sectors such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence. By blocking exports of cutting-edge chips to Beijing, Washington aims to slow China’s AI advances and blunt its military modernization.

Such weaponization of trade is designed not only to protect U.S. innovation but also to catalyze a broader global shift toward resilient and diversified supply chains.

Trump’s policies have spurred democracies worldwide to reassess their dependence on China, particularly in pharmaceuticals, critical minerals and electronics. If the world moves toward more robust and secure supply networks, it will be due in large part to Washington’s leadership.

Trump’s second-term strategy builds upon his first term’s actions, which included reversing a four-decade U.S. policy of aiding China’s economic rise that helped create the greatest strategic adversary America has ever faced.

His first-term actions extended to imposing tariffs on over $360 billion in Chinese goods, banning business with Chinese tech giants like Huawei and ZTE, and ramping up scrutiny of Chinese investments in the U.S. His administration also sanctioned several Chinese research institutions and tech companies involved in espionage or military-linked activities.

Strategically, Trump in 2017 unveiled the U.S. strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and resurrected the long-dormant Quad. And, signaling a break from decades of U.S. caution over the Taiwan question, he dramatically increased arms sales to Taiwan and elevated diplomatic engagement with Taipei through high-level visits.

Now, his administration is reorienting U.S. military architecture toward the Indo-Pacific to prepare for and, if necessary, prevail in a conflict with China.

A leaked “Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance” memorandum signed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth identifies China as the Department of Defense’s “sole pacing threat.” The Pentagon is not only boosting deterrence in the Taiwan Strait but also reinforcing its forward military presence and alliance cooperation across the Indo-Pacific.

Washington’s pressure is also nudging Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense by boosting military spending. A more self-reliant Europe, one that cooperates with the U.S. but is not dependent on it for its security, would enable Washington to redirect its focus to the Indo-Pacific. A stronger transatlantic alliance, anchored in mutual responsibility, not one-sided reliance of Europe on America, would better serve Western interests.

In challenging China’s ambitions to displace the U.S. as the preeminent global power, Trump is employing a comprehensive, multipronged strategy. It includes deploying tariffs as a political tool to extract economic concessions, the possible revocation of China’s most-favored nation trade status, expanded export restrictions and an ideological offensive that portrays the Chinese Communist Party as predatory, authoritarian and illegitimate.

But Trump views himself as a dealmaker, and he is open to cutting deals with Beijing that help reduce China’s huge trade surplus with America. This explains the U.S. agreement with China in Geneva to suspend most tariffs on each other’s goods pending further negotiations.

Importantly, Trump is reinforcing strategic partnerships with key Indo-Pacific powers, especially Japan and India, to counterbalance China’s regional clout. His administration’s actions have helped solidify a de facto coalition of democracies determined to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

By reversing decades of accommodationist U.S. policy, Trump has reset the terms of engagement with China. His second-term agenda makes clear that the era of hoping for China’s peaceful rise is over. Instead, his administration sees Beijing as the central challenge to global order and is determined to confront it with strength, coherence and resolve.

Containing China’s aggressive rise is no longer a peripheral issue in U.S. policy; it is the central axis around which Trump’s trade, technology, military and diplomatic strategies revolve. If this effort proves enduring, it may well define not just Trump’s legacy, but the trajectory of global geopolitics for decades to come.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the independent New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battleground” (Georgetown University Press), which won the Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

By Brahma Chellaney, The Hill

President Trump’s return to the White House is reshaping America’s foreign policy with a nationalist, protectionist edge. While this shift has frayed relationships with some traditional allies — especially in Europe, whose importance for U.S. policy appears to be eroding — the dynamics in Asia tell a different story.

American ties with key Asian partners like Japan and South Korea remain steady. And Washington is rebuilding a once-strained relationship with India, the world’s largest democracy and an increasingly pivotal power in the Indo-Pacific.

President Joe Biden failed to grasp the long-term strategic significance of the U.S.-India partnership. His administration prioritized outreach to China, resumed indulgence of Pakistan, welcomed the overthrow of an India-friendly government in Bangladesh and stayed largely silent on Chinese encroachments on Indian borderlands, which triggered a tense Sino-Indian military standoff that has still not been fully resolved. These moves, coupled with ideological posturing, brought bilateral ties to a low point.

The change in administration, however, has opened the door for a course correction. Both nations are now working to reestablish mutual respect and trust. Vice President JD Vance’s visit to India this week — accompanied by Second Lady Usha Vance, their children and senior administration officials — signals a new chapter in the relationship.

In a sign of renewed counterterrorism cooperation, the FBI last week arrested a Sikh militant accused of involvement in multiple terrorist attacks in India. Meanwhile, India, one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, has committed to liberalizing trade with the U.S., following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s White House visit in February. Modi, notably, was among the first world leaders to meet Trump after his return to office.

India’s appeal to American businesses is rising, especially as China’s economy falters and its demographic decline deepens. Long before the U.S. rekindled its trade war with Beijing, India’s massive consumer market was emerging as a vital alternative.

During Modi’s visit, he and Trump set an ambitious goal: more than doubling bilateral trade to $500 billion. The first phase of a U.S.-India trade agreement, expected to be finalized before Trump’s visit to India in the fall for the Quad grouping summit, is likely to see India slash tariffs on a wide range of American imports.

The Biden-era drift is clearly being reversed. Washington has cast Vance’s India trip as a key diplomatic mission aimed at strengthening strategic and economic ties with a nation that, like the U.S., views China as its principal adversary.

A robust India is key to maintaining a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, where China seeks regional hegemony. The first Trump administration recognized India’s central role by giving the country pride of place in its “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy.

Indeed, U.S.-India relations flourished in Trump’s first term. In 2019, Trump joined Modi at a massive rally in Houston attended by 50,000 Indian Americans and numerous U.S. lawmakers. The following year, Trump addressed more than 100,000 people at a rally in Ahmedabad, India — still the largest audience for any American president, at home or abroad. “America loves India, America respects India and America will always be faithful and loyal friends to the Indian people,” Trump declared.

The personal rapport between Trump and Modi — both unapologetic nationalists — has proven durable. That relationship is now instrumental not only in restoring bilateral ties but also in nudging India to reduce its relatively high tariffs. Although India cut some tariffs ahead of Modi’s February visit, Trump responded with a 27 percent tariff hike on Indian goods earlier this month as part of his global tariff campaign, before announcing a 90-day pause on all “reciprocal tariffs” to allow negotiations to proceed.

Trade remains a flashpoint. Trump’s “America First” agenda often collides with Modi’s “Make in India” initiative. At their joint White House news conference, Modi even borrowed from Trump’s own slogan, vowing to “Make India Great Again.”

Still, tensions that flared under Biden are beginning to ease. The arrest of the Sikh militant followed a Trump-Modi joint statement pledging “decisive action” against elements that “threaten public and diplomatic safety and security, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both nations.”

For the U.S. and India to coordinate effectively to keep the Indo-Pacific “free and open,” they must reconcile their policies toward India’s neighborhood. The divergence was stark under Biden, whose administration aided military-backed regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh while trying to oust Myanmar’s junta — moves that undercut regional stability. The Trump administration is now reviewing these policies with an eye toward coherence and consistency.

Vance’s visit, following a similar trip by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, underscores that the U.S.-India relationship is already bouncing back. Vance’s discussions with Modi are expected to deepen cooperation in areas ranging from strategic technology to defense interoperability, with both sides welcoming the “significant progress” toward a trade deal.

There is also a personal dimension to Vance’s diplomacy. Usha Vance, the first Hindu second lady in American history, is the daughter of Indian immigrants. The Indian American community — one of the fastest-growing and most prosperous immigrant groups in the U.S. — commands outsized influence, boasting the highest median household income among all ethnic groups.

Looking ahead, a potential Trump-brokered end to the Ukraine war would allow the U.S. to shift focus toward the Indo-Pacific, further energizing its partnership with India. This pivot would accelerate U.S.-India collaboration on critical and emerging technologies and enhance interoperability between the two countries’ armed forces, especially in naval and air operations.

Trump’s return to power is not merely restoring the U.S.-India relationship — it is revitalizing it with fresh urgency, grounded in mutual interests and shared concerns. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the epicenter of global power competition, the world’s oldest and largest democracies are once again aligning their strategies and rediscovering their common cause.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”

Since the Myanmar military’s overthrow of a civilian government in 2021, the US has taken a punitive approach to the country, emphasizing broad-based sanctions and aid to rebel groups. But far from promoting a democratic transition, this approach has perpetuated violence and suffering, while strengthening China’s strategic foothold.

Brahma Chellaney, Project Syndicate

Myanmar needs help. After more than four years of brutal civil war, the country has been hit by a 7.7-magnitude earthquake, the strongest it has suffered since 1946. The resulting humanitarian crisis is dire, and continues to escalate, but despite an extraordinary appeal for international aid from Myanmar’s military ruler, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the United States has largely failed to deliver.

To be sure, President Donald Trump has said that the US is “going to be helping” with the crisis response. But while China, India, and Russiamoved swiftly to provide emergency relief, including deploying rescuers and medical teams, the US has fallen far short. The Trump administration’s gutting of foreign-assistance programs – including mass firings and contract terminations at the US Agency for International Development (USAID) – is one reason why. A more important reason is that stringent US sanctions against Myanmar remain in place.

Even before the recent USAID cuts, the US was poorly positioned to deliver emergency aid to Myanmar. Since the military’s overthrow of a civilian government in February 2021, the US has taken a punitive approach to Myanmar. Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, implemented increasingly harsh sanctions, while providing “non-lethal” military aid to rebels seeking to overthrow the junta – policies that the Trump administration has so far upheld. Now several Democratic senators have urged sanctions waivers to allow quake relief to go to Myanmar.

In recent years, USAID assistance essentially has been channeled to rebel-controlled areas, where it has been used largely to establish local governance structures and provide emergency relief for internally displaced civilians. But the regions hardest hit by the earthquake remain under government control. America’s refusal to engage constructively with the junta has thus directly hampered efforts to deliver assistance where it is needed most.

More broadly, US policy toward Myanmar has done nothing to promote stability, let alone a democratic transition. On the contrary, while sanctions have done little damage to the military rulers, they have contributed to rampant lawlessness, enabling warlords, human traffickers, drug syndicates, arms dealers, and poachers to thrive. Myanmar has now surpassed Afghanistan as the world’s leading opium producer, and according to the Global Organized Crime Index, it has emerged as the “biggest nexus of organized crime,” with destabilizing spillover effects on neighboring Bangladesh, India, and Thailand.

US support for Myanmar’s fragmented resistance has compounded the human-rights catastrophe. Tellingly, the latest wave of Rohingya refugees are fleeing not from the military, which has historically committed all manner of atrocities against the minority, but from an anti-junta rebel group, the Arakan Army. So brutal are the rebels’ attacks that Rohingya militias now work with their former oppressors, the county’s armed forces.

Meanwhile, China’s strategic foothold in Myanmar is becoming stronger. Strangled by broad-based US-led economic sanctions, Myanmar’s leadership has had little choice but to allow China to exploit its vast natural resources, from natural gas and mineral ores to precious stones and gems like rubies and jade.

The US has made this mistake before. During Myanmar’s previous military dictatorship, the US pursued a punitive, isolating, sanctions-based policy for more than 20 years – and nothing changed (other than China gaining influence). It was only when then-President Barack Obama embraced strategic engagement, encouraging democratic reform with the easing of sanctions, that the tide began to turn. In 2015, three years after Obama became the first US president to visit the country, Myanmar elected its first civilian-led government in more than 50 years.

The US applied this lesson in Thailand, where, as in Myanmar, the military has traditionally been the dominant political force, having seized power 12 times in the past 90 years. When Thailand’s army chief staged a coup in 2014, the US pursued diplomatic engagement with the regime – an approach that ultimately helped facilitate a return to civilian rule in 2023.

The Trump administration should embrace a similar approach toward Myanmar today. This means, for starters, leveraging the earthquake as an opportunity to initiate limited engagement with the regime. Such engagement could allow for greater humanitarian access, improved de-escalation efforts, and enhanced security, particularly along Myanmar’s eastern border, where Chinese criminal networks operate cyber-scam centers that have stolen billions of dollars from overseas retirees and others (including in the US).

Moreover, the US should replace broad-based economic restrictions with targeted sanctions against individuals and entities directly responsible for human-rights violations. It should also roll back its military support for insurgents, which perpetuates violence, and increase direct humanitarian aid to foster stability. And it should work with ASEAN and other key regional actors, such as India and Japan, to advance a diplomatic conclusion of the civil war, guided by the recognition that a sustainable peace can be achieved only through engagement with all relevant parties – starting with Myanmar’s military.

Treating regime change in Myanmar as a moral crusade can end only one way: with the country spiraling further into chaos, to the benefit of transnational crime syndicates, narcotics traffickers, and America’s geopolitical adversaries. With a more pragmatic policy approach, however, the Trump administration can mitigate Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis, facilitate dialogue between the junta and opposition forces, and counter China’s growing influence in a strategically important country. The choice could not be clearer.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011), for which he won the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award.

© Project Syndicate, 2025.

Taipei Times

Early signs suggest that US President Donald Trump’s policy on Taiwan is set to move in a more resolute direction, as his administration begins to take a tougher approach toward America’s main challenger at the global level, China. Despite its deepening economic woes, China continues to flex its muscles, including conducting provocative military drills off Taiwan, Australia and Vietnam recently.

A recent Trump-signed memorandum on America’s investment policy was more about the China threat than about anything else. Singling out the People’s Republic of China as a foreign adversary directing investments in American companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies, it said that “PRC-affiliated investors are targeting the crown jewels of US technology, food supplies, farmland, minerals, natural resources, ports and shipping terminals.”

The memorandum has proposed imposing several economic restrictions — from stopping US companies and investors from investing in industries that advance Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy to preventing “PRC-affiliated persons from buying up critical American businesses and assets.”

More broadly, in seeking to end the Ukraine war, Trump has made clear his administration’s intent to shift the US strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, a pivotal region that is likely to shape the new world order. As US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it, Europe must take “responsibility for its own security” so that the US prioritizes “deterring war with China in the Pacific.”

The White House’s blunt message is that Europe, reliant on the US for its security, must shape up before many of the more than 100,000 American troops stationed there begin to be shipped out for likely deployment in the Indo-Pacific. Referring to China, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said, “In the Indo-Pacific, they are trying to drive us out.”

Meanwhile, a recent subtle but potentially significant change in the state department fact-sheet on Taiwan has attracted much attention, with Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung welcoming the “support and positive stance on US-Taiwan relations demonstrated in the relevant” document.

The state department dropped a highly symbolic phrase from its updated Taiwan fact-sheet. The fact-sheet from the previous administration of President Joe Biden had stated, “We do not support Taiwan independence.” This sentence was removed. And in another tweak to the previous US position, the new administration, while cautioning against “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side,” stated that it advocates a resolution of the Sino-Taiwan issue by “peaceful means, free from coercion.”

Rubio later said in a TV interview that, “We are against any forced, compelled, coercive change in the status of Taiwan.” Asked how the US under Trump would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Rubio stated, “America has existing commitments that it has made to prevent that from happening and to react to it, and that would be executed on.”

Against this backdrop, the US under Trump is less likely to stand idly by if China were to invade Taiwan. Unlike his predecessor Biden, who projected weakness partly because of his frail health, Trump claims to be a strong leader. Indeed, he has repeatedly asserted that, had he been the president in 2022, Russia would not have invaded Ukraine.

Effective deterrence, however, requires a credible US threat, backed up by requisite military deployments, of imposing significant costs on China if it attacks Taiwan.

A comprehensive strategy involving military, diplomatic, economic and information-warfare measures is necessary to deter Chinese aggression and maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. If deterrence were to fail, forcing the US to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the resulting war between the US and a near-peer adversary, as Rubio admitted, “would be a terrible thing for the world, and it would be a bad thing for China too.”

A multifaceted US-led strategy to deter a Chinese attack should include stepped-up arms sales to Taipei, building greater military interoperability with Taiwanese forces, strengthening Taiwan’s cybersecurity defenses and helping Taiwan to develop asymmetric warfare capabilities against China, while America increases the frequency and visibility of its military patrols in the Taiwan Strait and the wider region.

Strategic clarity to put China on notice should include clear and unambiguous statements that the US will defend Taiwan in the event of an attack, as well as high-level diplomatic visits to Taipei to demonstrate American support and commitment. The US must also help counter Chinese disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining Taiwan’s democracy and eroding support for Taipei in the international community.

According to a recent Chinese foreign ministry statement, “Gaza belongs to the Palestinians and is an integral part of the Palestinian territory.” But likewise Taiwan belongs to the Taiwanese and is integral to their territorial rights, distinct identity and democratic freedoms.

Biden’s troubled legacy left the Trump administration a mess in Ukraine and difficult policy choices on China’s aggressive expansionism. The only real winner from the Ukraine war has been China, which dwarfs Russia in terms of economic output, military spending and other material measures.

The last thing Trump would want is his legacy to be defined by failure to deter an overt Chinese aggression against Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not only shatter Trump’s image as a strong leader but also undermine his “Make America Great Again” movement. In this light, extricating the US from the Ukraine war and prioritizing deterrence against China make strategic sense.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press).

White House meeting with Modi follows close on the heels of Ishiba’s visit

Brahma Chellaney

Nikkei Asia

Donald Trump and Narendra Modi prepare to shake hands as they attend a joint press conference at the White House in Washington on Feb. 13, 2025.  © Reuters

U.S. President Donald Trump is seeking to swiftly reorient foreign policy in his second term, shifting America’s strategic focus from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific — an increasingly pivotal region in shaping the global order. Trump has already hosted the prime ministers of India and Japan separately and initiated efforts to end the Ukraine war, a conflict that has diverted U.S. attention from pressing Indo-Pacific challenges and made China the big winner.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, on his first day in office, held a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Quad, a strategic alliance of leading Indo-Pacific democracies that Trump revived in his first term after a decade-long dormancy. Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, speaking in Brussels on Feb. 12, warned Europe that “the U.S. will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency” and that Europe must take “responsibility for its own security” by leading “from the front” so that America prioritizes “deterring war with China” in the Indo-Pacific.

Vice President JD Vance followed up from European soil in Munich by reinforcing Hegseth’s warning — Europe needs to shape up before many of the more than 100,000 American troops stationed there begin to be shipped out. Vance’s statement that Europe’s main security threat is “from within” suggests the fraying transatlantic alliance is headed toward a fundamental transformation.

The U.S.-India strategic partnership was a cornerstone of Washington’s strategy from Trump’s first term for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a vision originally conceived by then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as a shorthand for a rules-based, liberal order. The China-Russia “no-limits partnership,” which developed during Joe Biden’s presidency, has only intensified the U.S. strategic imperative to forge a “soft” alliance with another nuclear-armed power: India.

Against this backdrop, Trump’s Feb. 13 meeting in Washington with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi underscored both leaders’ commitment to revitalizing the U.S.-India relationship.

Successive American presidents since Bill Clinton have left bilateral ties with India stronger than they inherited. However, under Biden, momentum stalled as differences cropped up, including over New Delhi’s reluctance to take sides in the Ukraine war and U.S. policies toward India’s neighbors, including Bangladesh, Myanmar and PakistanA Quad meeting is held on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, in May 2023.   © Reuters

The outcome of Modi’s White House visit attests to a good start toward rebuilding mutual trust. Trump and Modi, maintaining the warm rapport they developed in their first terms, exchanged a bear hug and projected unity at a joint news conference. Notably, they avoided discord over Trump’s hot-button issues like trade and immigration.

As he did with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on Feb. 7, Trump touted strong bilateral ties while pressing Modi for “fair” and balanced trade, including increased Indian imports of American hydrocarbons and weapons. In his trademark style of blending some public flattery with hard bargaining, Trump called Modi “a much tougher” and “much better negotiator than me,” just as he had said Ishiba is “a very strong person, I wish he wasn’t so strong.”

Trump, along with the Japanese and Australian prime ministers, is set to visit India in the fall for the Quad leaders’ summit, by which time he hopes significant progress will have been made by negotiators on the U.S.-India trade agreement to which Modi committed in Washington. This strategy mirrors Trump’s previous approach in leveraging tariffs to secure a trade pact with Japan in 2019.

As the U.S. pivots to the Indo-Pacific, stronger ties have become essential with India and Japan, China’s main Asian rivals strategically located on its opposite flanks. The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific will be largely shaped by developments in East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Japan, hosting over 80 U.S. military facilities and more American troops than any other U.S. ally, is critical to the defense of Taiwan, whose annexation by China would mark the end of U.S. global dominance. Meanwhile, India, locked in a lingering military standoff with China, has actively challenged Beijing’s power and capabilities in a way no other nation has in this century.

Long before Trump entered national politics, U.S. policymakers recognized the need to shift strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific, a region emerging as the world’s economic and geopolitical hub. In 2011, then-President Barack Obama unveiled a “pivot to Asia” strategy, but it remained largely rhetorical, lacking substantive strategic initiatives.

When Trump took office in 2017, he replaced Obama’s symbolic pivot with a comprehensive strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” He also fundamentally redefined U.S. policy toward Beijing, reversing a four-decade-old U.S. approach of aiding China’s economic rise by classifying that communist behemoth as a strategic rival and threat.

Biden maintained this approach, preserving the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, including the Quad as a key pillar, while acknowledging China as America’s primary challenger that is bent on world dominance. However, his administration’s entanglement in conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East left little space for a genuine pivot to the Indo-Pacific.

Trump’s new administration is prioritizing the resolution of these conflicts to focus on the Indo-Pacific, where U.S. global primacy is at stake. Ending involvement in the conflicts would free military resources for the Indo-Pacific, particularly from Europe.

More broadly, America’s grand strategy has long centered on driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing — a strategy that helped the West win the Cold War without direct military confrontation. However, thanks to Biden-era policies, the U.S. has become the bridge that unites Russia and China.

Ending the Ukraine war could provide an opportunity for Washington to peel Moscow away from Beijing or weaken the Sino-Russian partnership to help isolate China.

More importantly, it would allow the U.S. to concentrate on countering the challenge from a globally ascendant China, with support from allies like Japan and strategic partners like India, whose rise as an independent power meshes with the Trump administration’s aversion to friends’ dependency on the U.S.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the independent New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including “Water: Asia’s New Battleground” (Georgetown University Press), which won the Bernard Schwartz Book Award.