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About Chellaney

Professor, strategic thinker, author and commentator

A double whammy for India

Brahma Chellaney

India’s energy and diplomatic dilemmas have been compounded by murky big-power geopolitics, which has allowed the oil monarchies to ride out the Arab Spring but brought the region’s two remaining anti-Western regimes in Iran and Syria under intensifying pressure. The sharpening U.S.-Israeli geopolitical confrontation with Iran risks escalating to military hostilities. After all, even as Israel steps up its “shadow war” with Tehran, the U.S. has declared indirect war through an oil embargo designed to financially throttle Iran.

The risks of India getting sucked into this geopolitical fight or becoming a proxy battleground are real. Israel’s instant accusation that Iran was behind the New Delhi car bombing serves as a reminder. Why would Iran target someone unimportant — an Israeli diplomat’s wife — just when the West is breathing down India’s neck to cease importing Iranian oil? This is the worst possible time for Iran to alienate one of its last-remaining economic lifelines, India. Despite the explosive device’s sophistication, the car incident in New Delhi (like the one in Tbilisi) bore the characteristics of an amateurish job.

If Iran indeed was behind the attack, it connotes sheer recklessness and incompetence. There has been no instance of Iranian terrorism in India in the past but several instances of Pakistan-based terrorists targeting Israelis or other Jews in areas ranging from Jammu and Kashmir to Mumbai. Yet, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blaming Iran even before the police in New Delhi could complete the initial examination of the car-blast scene and consequently the media following just that angle, a possible link between Pakistan-aided terrorists and the attack has escaped public scrutiny. Significantly, the U.S., while condemning the bomb incidents in New Delhi, Tbilisi and Bangkok, has stopped short of endorsing the Netanyahu-led claims that Iran is behind the bombings.

Still, even as India faces the spectre of a proxy war between Israel and Iran on its soil, the blast incident only adds to the external pressures on New Delhi to break its energy ties with Iran.

More broadly, the narrow logic driving U.S. and Israeli policies has trumped larger considerations. Instead of seeking to reap long-term benefits by promoting genuine democratic transition across the Arab world, the U.S., for example, has deepened its alliance with oil monarchies, including the tyrannical House of Saud and the ambitious Qatari royalty, and winked at Bahrain’s brutal suppression of its Arab Spring movement. The long-term risks of aiding Islamist rulers or groups also have been overlooked.

This explains why the Arab Spring has brought no change to the oil monarchies. It is the Arab states with a presidential form of government that are at the centre of the ongoing profound changes, which, paradoxically, are sought to be influenced by the iron-fisted but deep-pocketed oil sheikhdoms.

Their already-swelling coffers — thanks to the U.S. energy embargo against Iran and rising oil prices — are set to overflow, increasing their leverage in the region and beyond.

The experience of the past half a century shows that the greater the transfer of oil wealth to these monarchies, the more they have funded fundamentalism and extremism, thereby contributing to the rise of international terrorism. In fact, the more wealth they have accumulated, the more the price of freedom has risen in the region.

In this light, the U.S. attempt to give international effect to its new Iran Sanctions Act threatens a double whammy for strategic-partner India. First, it will sabotage India’s energy-import-diversification strategy by making it place most of its eggs in the basket of the Islamist-bankrolling oil monarchies. India will become overly reliant on the wrong types of regimes and thus exposed to the games they play.

Over the years, the share of Iranian crude in India’s total oil imports has declined to barely 11 percent as part of a conscious Indian effort to reduce supply-disruption risks linked with the lurking potential for conflict. Given India’s soaring oil imports and search for new sources of supply, the Iranian share — even if the total quantity remains constant — will likely decline further. Still, as the nearest oil source for India, Iran offers lower shipment costs.

If India joins the total U.S. oil embargo against Iran, Indian refineries with a technical capacity to process only Iranian crude will be left high and dry. Oils from different countries vary in terms of two basic properties — specific gravity and sulphur content. Retrofitting those old refineries to process crude from other countries will be uneconomical.

Second, at a time when the U.S. is quickening its Afghanistan disengagement and seeking to cut a deal with the Taliban with little regard for Indian interests, jumping on the American sanctions bandwagon will rupture India’s relations with the very country central to its Afghanistan strategy — Iran, a conduit for the substantial Indian aid flow to Afghanistan. America’s Afghanistan-exit strategy — which is beginning to look like a sprint — only reinforces Iran’s geopolitical importance for India.

It should not be forgotten that India already has paid a heavy price for taking America’s side on some critical issues in its long-running battle against Iran, even though Washington doesn’t take India’s side in its disputes with China or Pakistan.

The Bush administration persuaded India not to conclude any new long-term oil and gas contracts with Iran and — in return for a civil nuclear deal with the U.S. — abandon the idea of a gas pipeline from Iran. By voting against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s governing board in 2005 and 2006, New Delhi invited Iranian reprisal in the form of cancellation of a 25-year, $22-billion liquefied natural gas deal which had terms highly favourable to India. That deal’s scrapping alone left India poorer by several billion dollars.

Now the U.S. embargo against Iran — the world’s third-largest net exporter of oil — has pushed international oil prices higher, increasing the oil-import bill of India and a number of other countries, while undercutting civil society in Iran and strengthening the clerical regime there. The embargo indeed is having a negative impact on the global economy by placing additional strain on oil supplies and threatening to slow economic growth.

Significantly, those states in favour of the total oil embargo on Iran (including the U.S., Britain, France and Germany) buy little oil from that country, while those countries advising caution (such as India, Japan, South Korea and China) are important importers of Iranian oil. These four Asian economies account for 60 percent of Iran’s oil sales. The U.S., in fact, stopped importing Iranian oil way back in 1987. The international division thus is between those that have nothing to lose and those that have much to lose.

Yet without offering any credible alternatives, Washington is mounting more pressures related to oil sourcing and payments that strike at the heart of energy-poor India’s efforts to secure stable, assured supplies. The Iran issue, in effect, has turned into a diplomatic litmus test as to whether India will stand up for its energy and geopolitical interests in the region or be co-opted to serve the short-term interests of its friends, particularly the U.S. and Israel.

A version of this article appeared in the Mint, February 17, 2012.

India’s near-abroad: Democracy in retreat

Brahma Chellaney

Mohamed Nasheed who was ousted at gunpoint as president of the Maldives

From the virtual coup d’état that deposed Maldives’ first democratically elected president to the undermining of an elected but toothless government in Pakistan by its Supreme Court, South Asia is witnessing a backsliding on democratic advances, just as the democratic awakening triggered by the “Arab Spring” movements has brought not democratic empowerment but more human-rights abuses in much of the Arab world.

The recent abortive coup attempt in Bangladesh has served as a warning that the world’s seventh most-populous country — while struggling to remain a democracy — is vulnerable to renewed army intervention. In its four-decade-long history, Bangladesh has experienced 23 coup attempts — some successful.

The forced resignation at gunpoint of its president, Mohamed Nasheed, a week ago has made the Maldives the third country in the region after Nepal and Sri Lanka where a democratic transition has gone wrong. The Maldives now seems in for prolonged instability.

A fourth country, Pakistan, has yet to begin a genuine democratic transition because the army chief remains its effective ruler. How can democratization begin if Pakistan’s army and Inter-Services Intelligence stay outside civilian oversight and decisive power remains with military generals?

To make matters worse, Pakistan’s Supreme Court seems to be playing the army’s game in moving to ease the prime minister out of office. A constitutional coup, instead of a military coup, will be a win-win situation for the army and ISI, allowing them to rule from behind the curtain through a more-pliable government, on which all the blame can be pinned for the violence and economic mess.

Sri Lanka’s human-rights situation under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s quasi-dictatorship continues to evoke international concern. Reversing the militarization of society, ending the control of information as an instrument of state policy, and promoting political and ethnic reconciliation remain daunting tasks in Sri Lanka.

The end of the 26-year civil war actually has emboldened Rajapaksa to step up attempts to fashion a mono-ethnic identity for a multiethnic Sri Lanka. This has important strategic implications for India in terms of the plight of Tamil civilians, refugee flows, and the potential for renewed civil strife.

In Nepal — a strategic buffer between India and restive Tibet, where China says it is launching a “war against secessionist sabotage” — the political disarray persists, with parties continuing to bicker over a new constitution. Nepal remains in danger of becoming a failed state, a development that will have major implications for India’s security.

More broadly, the political developments in the region underscore that regular elections, as in Pakistan or Sri Lanka, are no measure of progress on democratic transition. Genuine democratic empowerment at the grassroots demands more than the holding of elections.

The backsliding on democratization leaves India as the sole country in the region with a deeply rooted democracy and pluralism. But it also seriously weakens India’s interests.

India’s neighbourhood remains so chronically troubled that it confronts what can be called a tyranny of geography. As a result, India faces serious external threats from virtually all directions.

To some extent, this tyranny of a combustible neighbourhood is self-inflicted. If India faces security concerns over Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or even Pakistan, it is because of failures of past policy. And the rollback of democracy in South Asia only exposes India’s lack of clout to influence political developments in its backyard.

Today, the political chaos and uncertainty in the neighbourhood heighten the danger of spillover effects for India. It is no accident that India’s internal security is coming under growing pressure. An increasingly unstable neighbourhood also makes it more difficult to promote institutionized cooperation and integration in the region, including free trade.

Institutions are products — not drivers — of the political environment. In any continent, institutions have flourished only if there is political and economic compatibility between their member-states. When member-states have conflicting political and economic systems, the institutions have stunted. Divergent political systems are a major reason why Asia has failed to build real institutions. In South Asia, the underdeveloped SAARC, as a retarded institution, is more a hindrance than a help to regional cooperation. If all South Asian states became real democracies, the present barriers to open trade would erode.

More fundamentally, the rise of Islamist groups in several South Asian countries poses a direct challenge to Indian security. In 2001, the Taliban destroyed the monumental Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan. And on the day Nasheed was ousted, Islamists ransacked Maldives’ main museum in Male, the capital, and smashed priceless Buddhist statues. By destroying the 12th-century artefacts made of coral stone and limestone, they erased virtually all evidence of Maldives’ pre-Islamic past.

Encouraged by opposition politicians, Islamist groups in the Maldives are “getting more powerful,” according to Nasheed. And in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the military intelligence agency has nurtured jihadist groups, employing them for political purposes at home and across the national frontiers.

Regional experience has shown that autocratic rule, due to the absence of public accountability, tends to promote extremist elements, especially when those in power form opportunistic alliances with such forces. For example, Pakistan’s descent into a jihadist dungeon occurred not under civilian rule, but under two military dictators — one who nurtured and let loose jihadist forces, and another who took his country to the very edge of the precipice. Even today, the scourge of Pakistani terrorism emanates more from the country’s Scotch whisky-sipping generals than from the bead-rubbing mullahs.

When a democratic experiment gains traction, as in Bangladesh under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, it crimps the extremist forces’ room for manoeuvre.

A broader lesson that the regional retreat of democracy holds is that democratic progress will remain tenuous and reversible unless the old entrenched forces are cut to size and the rule of law firmly established.

For example, Maldives’ 2008 democratic election, which swept away decades-old authoritarian rule, became a beacon of hope, only to dissipate in less than four years. As Nasheed reminded all after being deposed, “Dictatorships don’t always die when the dictator leaves office … long after the revolutions, powerful networks of regime loyalists can remain behind and can attempt to strangle their nascent democracies.”

In fact, Nasheed has a message for the Arab Spring movements: “The problems we are facing in the Maldives are a warning for other Muslim nations undergoing democratic reform. At times, dealing with the corrupt system of patronage the former regime left behind can feel like wrestling with a Hydra: when you remove one head, two more grow back. With patience and determination, the beast can be slain. But let the Maldives be a lesson for aspiring democrats everywhere: the dictator can be removed in a day, but it can take years to stamp out the lingering remnants of his dictatorship.”

With India’s tyranny of geography only getting worse and putting greater pressure on its external and internal security, India has to evolve more-dynamic and innovative approaches to diplomacy and national defence. For example, if it is to advance its national interest by supporting democracy and pluralism in its neighborhood and beyond, it will need to go beyond government-to-government channels for disbursing its increasingly large aid. Its aid diplomacy must reach out to civil-society groups and other liberal constituencies that can take on retrograde elements. Only through forward thinking and more-vigorous defence and foreign policies can India hope to ameliorate its regional-security situation and play a bigger role on the world stage.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research, is the author, mostly recently, of Water: Asia’s New Battleground.

A version of this article appeared in The Economic Times, February 14, 2014.

China’s Drive to Lock Up Long-Term Supply of Strategic Resources

Date of the hearing: January 26, 2012

Title of the hearing: China’s Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the United States

Name of panelist: Brahma Chellaney

Panelist’s title and organization: Professor of Strategic Studies, Center for Policy Research, New Delhi

Testimony by Professor Brahma Chellaney before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 562
Washington, DC 20510

China has pursued an aggressive strategy to secure (and even lock up) supplies of strategic resources like water, energy and mineral ores. Gaining access to or control of resources has been a key driver of its foreign and domestic policies. China, with the world’s most resource-hungry economy, is pursuing the world’s most-assertive policies to gain control of important resources.

Much of the international attention on China’s resource strategy has focused on its scramble to secure supplies of hydrocarbons and mineral ores. Such attention is justified by the fact that China is seeking to conserve its own mineral resources and rely on imports. For example, China, a major steel consumer, has substantial reserves of iron ore, yet it has banned exports of this commodity. It actually encourages its own steel producers to import iron ore. China, in fact, has emerged as the largest importer of iron ore, accounting for a third of all global imports. India, in contrast, remains a major exporter of iron ore to China, although the latter has iron-ore deposits more than two-and-half times that of India.

But while buying up mineral resources in foreign lands, China now supplies, according to one estimate, about 95 percent of the world’s consumption of rare earths — a precious group of minerals vital to high-technology industry, such as miniaturized electronics, computer disk drives, display screens, missile guidance, pollution-control catalysts, and advanced materials. In a calculated way, Beijing has cornered the international market for these strategic minerals, which include cerium, neodymium, lanthanum, yttrium and dysprosium. It built its virtual monopoly by first quietly making some major foreign investments to get hold of important processing and manufacturing technologies for rare earths, which it mines largely in Inner Mongolia.

The international focus on China’s hydrocarbon and mineral-ore acquisition strategy, however, obscures the way it has systematically sought to corner the resources of international rivers. Its aggressive water strategy has resulted in water becoming a new divide in its relations with several of its neighbors, including India, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam.

Much of Asia is now at or near water-stressed conditions. This stress holds important implications for Asia’s continued rapid economic growth, socioeconomic stability, and environmental sustainability. China’s aggressive strategy is only helping to compound Asia’s water challenges.

While China can scour the world for oil, natural gas, and mineral ores to keep its economic machine humming, it does not have the same choice on water, which cannot be secured through international trade deals. So, it has started damming international rivers in a major way.

To be sure, China faces a growing gap between water supply and demand. In the Han heartland, the south is water-rich but the north is plagued by serious water shortages. The north is largely semiarid, yet the introduction of large-scale irrigated agriculture has turned the north into a breadbasket. This has created a strange paradox: the north now is seeking to rely on water transfers from the south via the Great South-North Water Diversion Project while remaining a food exporter to the south.

China’s over-damming of internal rivers and its inter-river and inter-basin water transfer projects are exacting heavy environmental costs, besides causing river depletion and pollution of water. With China now shifting its focus to transnational rivers that flow to neighboring countries, there is a serious risk that these international rivers could also become seriously degraded.

Some water-related facts about China stand out. China, the geographical hub of Asia, is the source of transboundary-river flows to the largest number of countries in the world — from Russia to India, and from Kazakhstan to the Indochina Peninsula. It is thus an upper riparian vis-à-vis almost all its neighbors. This unique status is rooted in China’s forcible absorption since 1949 of sprawling ethnic-minority homelands, which make up 60 percent of its landmass and are the origin of all the important international rivers flowing out of Chinese territory. The Tibetan Plateau, for example, is the world’s largest freshwater repository and the source of Asia’s greatest rivers, including those that are the lifeblood for mainland China and South and Southeast Asia.

Getting this preeminent riparian power to accept water-sharing arrangements or other cooperative institutional mechanisms has proved unsuccessful so far in any basin. Instead, its construction of upstream dams on several major international rivers, including the Mekong, Salween, Brahmaputra, Arun, Irtysh, Illy, and Amur, shows that China is increasingly headed in the opposite direction — toward unilateralist actions impervious to the concerns of downstream nations.

By building giant dams near the borders on the major rivers flowing to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, China is acquiring the capability to control cross-border flows and fashion water into a potential political weapon. Water is as essential as the air we breathe, and China is acquiring the capability to control the lion’s share of Asia’s cross-border river flows. This will give it tremendous leverage over its neighbors. In fact, with the rapid accumulation of Chinese economic and military power and the growing regional power asymmetry, Beijing has been emboldened to embark on water-diversion plans.

China’s frenzied dam building, far from slowing, has only picked up more momentum in the name of increasing its renewable-energy capacity. Even with 25,800 of the world’s approximately 50,000 large dams, China remains on a dam-building spree, with a plan to boost its hydropower-generating capacity from 170 gigawatts to 250 gigawatts by 2020. Renewable energy now serves as a useful plank to pursue what China has been doing for long — over-damming its rivers. The silting of the reservoir of the world’s biggest dam, Three Gorges, has only prompted the construction of more dams upstream, including in ecologically sensitive areas, to help flush the silt.

The plain fact is no country in history has been a greater dam builder than China. The dam-building spree started under Mao Zedong but it has accelerated in the post-Mao period. Although China already boasts more dams than the rest of the world put together, it has recently unveiled a mammoth 4-trillion-yuan ($635-billion) fresh investment in water infrastructure over the next decade, more than a third of which will be utilized for building dams, reservoirs, and other water-supply structures. Its vice minister of water resources announced October 12, 2011, that the new investment would be aimed at harnessing the waters of the country’s rivers, rebuilding or reinforcing more than 46,000 reservoirs, and extending the irrigation networks. The vice minister also admitted China’s uncontrolled economic growth has left up to 40 percent of its rivers badly polluted and that the country faced “huge pressures” on supplies of water. “Industrialization and urbanization, including ensuring grain and food security, are exerting higher demands on water supplies … while our water use remains crude and wasteful,” Jiao Yong said at a press briefing.

Yet, China has stepped up its reengineering of river flows in two ways: by portentously shifting its focus from internal rivers to international rivers; and by graduating from building large dams to building mega-dams. For example, its newest dams on the Mekong River are the 4,200-megawatt Xiaowan — taller than Paris’s Eiffel Tower and producing more electricity than the installed hydropower-generating capacity of all of the lower Mekong countries together — and the 5,850-megawatt Nuozhadu, which when complete will be even bigger in storage volume but not in height.

In mid-2010, China’s state-run hydropower industry published a map of major new dams approved for construction, including one on the Brahmaputra River at Metog (or “Motuo” in Chinese) that is to be twice larger than the 18,300-megawatt Three Gorges Dam, which Beijing likes to trumpet as the greatest architectural feat since the Great Wall was built despite the dam’s increasingly damaging effects on the Yangtze River system. The Metog site is close to the disputed border with India.

Daduqia, almost on the border with India, has been officially identified as the site for another mega-dam to impound the Brahmaputra’s waters. Both Metog and Daduqia are to harness the force of a nearly 3,000-meter drop in the river’s height as it takes a sharp southerly turn from the Himalayan range into India. This area is in the Brahmaputra’s “Great Bend,” so called because the river there makes a hairpin-style turn around Mount Namcha Barwa, forming the world’s longest and steepest canyon in the process. The Brahmaputra Canyon — twice as deep as the Grand Canyon in the U.S. — holds Asia’s greatest untapped water reserves.

China’s state-owned media has not tried to conceal the linkage between the ongoing infrastructure development in this remote, high-altitude region around the canyon and official plans to harness the Brahmaputra’s resources. For example, Xinhua has quoted a tourism official as saying that the new highway from Metog to Bomi, which links up with the Sichuan-Tibet highway, will permit the tapping of the rich water resources in the Brahmaputra canyon. A high-altitude airport in Nyangtri city not far from these two dam sites has also been built. The next goal is to build a railroad to the region.

In addition, China has planned the “Great Western Route,” the proposed third leg of the Great South-North Water Diversion Project, whose first two legs in the Han heartland are scheduled to be completed in 2014. The “Great Western Route,” by contrast, is centered on the Tibetan Plateau. It is designed to take the waters of the Brahmaputra, the Salween, the Mekong, and three Yangtze tributaries to the Yellow River, the main river of northern China which also originates in Tibet. Work on the Great Western Route — or least some components of it — is likely to begin after the first two legs of the Great South-North Water Diversion Project are complete. Despite their staggering environmental and social costs, China is fast completing the first two legs. Along the middle route, which starts in Hubei Province and snakes 1,300 kilometers to Beijing, about 350,000 villagers are being relocated to make way for this diversion.

Yet another fact sticks out: In the next one decade, according to international projections, the number of dams in the developed countries is likely to remain about the same, while much of the dam building in the developing world, in terms of aggregate storage-capacity buildup, will be concentrated in just one country — China.

The consequences of such frenetic construction are already visible. First, China is now involved in water disputes with almost all its riparian neighbors, even North Korea, with which it shares two border rivers. Beijing reacted angrily to the recent decision of the government in Burma (Myanmar) to halt a controversial Chinese-led dam project on Burmese territory. The now-stalled $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam, located at the headwaters of Burma’s largest river, the Irrawaddy, was designed to pump electricity into China’s power grid, despite the fact that Burma suffers daily power outages. The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of China’s State Council, in fact, had hailed Myitsone as a model overseas project serving Chinese interests. The Burmese decision thus shocked China’s government, which had begun treating Burma as a reliable client state (one where it still has significant interests, including the construction of a multibillion-dollar oil and natural-gas pipeline).

China’s upstream dam building on the Mekong on a massive scale has rightly attracted a lot of attention. The Mekong, whose watershed is shared by six countries, is the lifeblood for continental Southeast Asia. Ignoring the concerns of downstream states, China has continued work on a cascade of giant dams in Yunnan Province just before the river enters the area where the borders of Burma, Thailand, and Laos converge. Through a cascade of 12 planned dams, China has sought the tap the river’s hydropower reserves as it gushes from the high gorges on its route from the Tibetan Plateau to lower Yunnan. Transparency has become an important interstate issue, with the governments in Southeast Asia calling upon Beijing to shed its opacity and provide detailed technical information on its existing and upcoming dams.

Dam building on the Mekong, of course, extends beyond China. Emulating the example set by China, Laos and Cambodia have proposed building several dams either on the Mekong or its tributaries. In fact, Laos, whose catchment region generates 35 percent of the Mekong’s annual flows, has drawn an ambitious program to power its development through hydropower exports by becoming “the battery of Asia.” Interestingly, the majority of the planned Laotian and Cambodian dams involve Chinese financial, design, or engineering assistance, with the projects designed to export electricity to China. Yet it is China’s cascade of upstream mega-dams that promises to wreak the greatest ecological damage, besides affecting cross-border flows.

China’s increasing exploitation of the resources of the Irtysh, Illy, and Amur rivers has turned water into a major bone of contention with downstream Kazakhstan and Russia. The Amur River (known as Heilong Jiang in Chinese) separates the Chinese and Russian parts of Manchuria. The Irtysh is the main tributary of the Ob River, which traverses the Omsk Region in southwestern Siberia. China has pursued a series of canals, dams, and hydropower stations on the Irtysh and Illy rivers as part of its western development program, spurring Russian and Kazakh concern. Kazakhstan has officially expressed deep concern that the Chinese projects on the Illy River, for example, could turn Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash into another Aral Sea, which has shrunk to less than half its original size.

As part of its new renewable-energy drive unveiled in the recent five-year plans for 2011-2015, China has clearly signaled that mega-dams on the Salween and Brahmaputra would be taken up as priority strategic projects, in addition to dams on the Arun River, which flows into Nepal before becoming a major tributary of the Ganges in India.

The concerns over the Chinese dam building on the Salween, known as Gyalmo Ngulchu in Tibetan, Thanlwin in Burmese, and Nu Jiang (“the Angry River”) in Chinese, have centered on the threat to the Three Parallel Rivers area, which was added to the World Heritage List by UNESCO in 2003. But no sooner had that decision been made by UNESCO than China announced plans to build 13 mega-dams on the Salween in Yunnan, nine of them in its National Nature Reserves. That led to an international uproar, which prompted the Chinese government to shelve the dam-building plans. But since last year, in the name of boosting renewable energy and combating climate change, the same plans are being revived. The Three Parallel Rivers area, located on the southeastern rim of the Tibetan Plateau in Yunnan Province, is inhabited by 16 different ethnic groups and is rated as one of the world’s most biologically diverse temperate regions.

China has dammed the Salween in Tibet — where it originates on the outer Himalayan rim — as exemplified by its 34-meter-high dam at Chalong in Nagchu Prefecture. It has also completed half of the 88 planned water projects, many of them small or medium-size hydropower plants, on the Salween and its tributaries in Yunnan Province’s Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture. The current concern is focused on the cascade on giant dams it intends to build on the Salween in Yunnan near the Three Parallel Rivers area, where the Salween, the Mekong, and the Jinsha (a Yangtze tributary) run roughly parallel, north to south.

China already has built 11 dams on the Brahmaputra River, which flows from Tibet to Bangladesh via northeastern India. Most of these dams are modest in size, with some of them linked to the Three Rivers Development Project involving the Brahmaputra and its two key tributaries, the Kyichu (or the Lhasa River) and the Nyangchu. In March 2009, however, the chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Government unveiled plans for major new hydropower stations on the Brahmaputra. A series of six major dams will now come up in the upper-middle reaches of the Brahmaputra, to the southeast of Lhasa, with construction of the first — the run-of-the-river Zangmu hydropower project — beginning in 2009 itself. India, through its technical-intelligence capability, however, has identified 24 Chinese projects in progress on the Brahmaputra, a majority of them small- to medium-size dams. The larger dams are coming up at Jiacha, Lengda, Zhongda, Langzhen, and Jiexu.

If China proceeds to build a dam twice larger than the Three Gorges Dam at Metog, it will have a devastating impact on Bangladesh, whose very future is threatened by environmental and climate change. The Chinese diversion would mean environmental devastation of large parts of Bangladesh, which is not a small state but the world’s seventh most populous nation, with more than 167 million citizens. Although tiny Monaco boasts the world’s highest population density, the country with the greatest population density other than a microstate is Bangladesh.

The Brahmaputra is the most important river of Bangladesh. With its indigenous renewable water resources estimated at just 105 cubic kilometers (km3) per year — of which the groundwater part is limited to 21.1 km3 — Bangladesh heavily depends on the inflowing rivers from India that originate either there or in Tibet. That the waters of the Brahmaputra are the lifeblood for the largest number of Bangladeshis can be seen from the fact that more than half of Bangladesh’s total quantity of transboundary waters is delivered by this river alone.

The People’s Liberation Army remains an enthusiastic backer of the plan to divert the waters of the Brahmaputra. The plan comprises two projects: the construction at the river’s “Great Bend” of a dam more than twice as large as the Three Gorges Dam, and the Brahmaputra’s diversion northward as part of the so-called Great Western Route. PLA generals were the first to encourage federal authorities to examine the idea of rerouting the Brahmaputra’s waters northward. The mega-plan proposal not only received the support of a number of PLA generals, but the technical assessments that had been carried out until then prompted the influential General Zhao Nanqi in October 2000 to declare: “Even if we do not begin this water diversion project, the next generation will. Sooner or later it will be done.”

In 2006 Li Ling, the author of Tibet’s Waters Will Save China (Xizang Zhi Shui Jiu Zhongguo: Da Xi Xian Zai Zao Zhongguo Zhan Lue Nei Mu Xiang Lu) and an ex-army officer himself, was quoted as saying that PLA generals support the diversion project. In fact, the publication of Li Ling’s book Tibet’s Waters Will Save China in November 2005 and its government-sponsored distribution among policy and engineering circles signaled an official interest in launching the Greater Western Route project. The book details the ambitious Brahmaputra-to-Tianjin diversion plan. Li’s plan has sought to overcome the obstacles posed by the tall mountains and the world’s longest, steepest canyon at the “Great Bend” by moving the main diversion point farther upstream.

Domestically, China new focus on water megaprojects in the traditional homelands of ethnic minorities has triggered fresh tensions along ethnic fault lines over displacement and submergence at a time when the Tibetan Plateau, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia have all been wracked by protests against Chinese rule. The projects, as mentioned earlier, threaten to replicate in international rivers the serious degradation haunting China’s internal rivers. Having extensively contaminated its own major rivers through reckless industrialization and overexploitation of resources, China now threatens the ecological viability of river systems tied to other Asian nations in its bid to meet its thirst for water and energy.

Significantly, China is also the largest dam builder overseas. From Pakistan-held Kashmir to Burma’s troubled Kachin and Shan states, China has widened its dam building to disputed or insurgency-torn areas, despite local backlash. Units of the People’s Liberation Army are engaged in dam and other strategic projects in the restive, Shiite region of Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-held Kashmir.

Thirty-seven Chinese financial and corporate entities are currently involved in more than 100 major dam projects in the developing world. Some of these entities are very large and have multiple subsidiaries. For instance, Sinohydro Corporation, the world’s largest hydroelectric-equipment exporter, boasts 59 overseas branches.

For downriver countries, a key concern is China’s opacity on its hydroengineering projects. It usually begins work quietly, almost furtively, and then presents the project as an unalterable fait accompli and as holding transboundary flood-control benefits.

Worse still, China rejects the very notion of a water-sharing arrangement or treaty with any riparian neighbor. The terms “water sharing,” “shared water resources,” “treaty” and “common norms and rules” are an anathema to it. It is one of only three countries that voted against the 1997 United Nations Convention that lays down rules on the shared resources of international watercourses.

So, there are water treaties among states in South and Southeast Asia, but not between China and any of its neighbors. That the country with a throttlehold over the headwaters of major Asian rivers is also a rising superpower, with a muscular confidence increasingly on open display, only compounds the regional security challenges.

China is willing to share hydrological data with riparian neighbors (that is, the statistics on river water flows) but not their waters. In fact, China deflects attention from its refusal to share water, or to enter into institutionalized cooperation to manage common rivers sustainably, by flaunting the accords that it has signed on sharing flow statistics with riparian neighbors. These are not agreements to cooperate on shared resources, but rather commercial accords to sell hydrological data that other upstream countries provide free to downriver states.

Yet, despite such a record, China continues to employ public diplomacy to try and assuage concerns in neighboring countries. Its public-relations machine keeps repeating the message that China has no intention of pursuing projects that would be “detrimental” to the interests of neighboring countries. Even as it builds new dams on international rivers, it speciously contends that they are not detrimental to downriver countries’ interests.

Jiao Yong, the Chinese vice minister of water resources, said on September 12, 2011: “The Yarlung Tsangpo [Brahmaputra] river flows across China’s Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Many Chinese citizens have been calling for greater usage of this river. However, considering the technical difficulties, the actual need of diversion, and the possible impact on the environment and state-to-state relations, the Chinese government has no plans to conduct any diversification project in this river.” Although the vice minister spoke of no “diversification” plan on Brahmaputra, some Indian newspapers misinterpreted his remark as no “diversion” plan. The minister, in his terse and inscrutable comment, began by emphasizing “the actual need of diversion.” The point is that China usually begins quietly on any project and then presents the project as an unalterable reality.

Against this background, there is a significant risk of greater inter-riparian tensions and politicization of water in Asia. The time has come to exert concerted external pressure on China to rein in its dam frenzy and embrace international environmental standards and water-sharing arrangements.

In March 2010, the State Department rightly upgraded water as “a central U.S. foreign policy concern,” noting that as rising populations face diminishing water resources, “the probability of conflict will increase.” The State Department must now spotlight the threat to Tibetan waters from China’s hydroengineering projects and its refusal to accept institutionalized cooperation with co-riparian states. Water, in fact, is a geopolitical weapon in China’s hands that it can potentially use against lower-riparian countries, whose economies depend on the flow of river waters from the Tibetan Plateau.

(c) U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

No Escape from Empire’s Graveyard

Column internationally syndicated by Project Syndicate, February 2012

With the stage set for secret talks in Qatar between the United States and the Taliban, US President Barack Obama’s strategy for a phased exit from war-ravaged Afghanistan is now being couched in nice-sounding terms that hide more than they reveal. In seeking a Faustian bargain with the Taliban, Obama risks repeating US policy mistakes that now haunt regional and international security.

Since coming to office, Obama has pursued an Afghan strategy that can be summed up in three words: surge, bribe, and run. The military mission has now entered the “run” part, or what euphemistically the administration began calling the “transition to 2014.” But with the White House recently deciding to end combat operations in Afghanistan by 2013 — a year earlier — the “run” part is starting to look like a sprint.

The central objective is to cut a deal with the Taliban so that the US and its NATO partners exit the “graveyard of empires” without losing face. This approach — aimed more at withdrawing forces as soon as possible than at ensuring enduring peace and regional stability — is being dressed up as “reconciliation,” with Qatar, Germany, and the United Kingdom getting lead roles in facilitating a settlement.

Yet what stands out is how little the US has learned from the past. In critical respects, it is beginning to repeat its own mistakes, whether by creating or funding new local militias in Afghanistan, or by striving to come to terms with the Taliban. As with the covert war that the US waged in the 1980’s in Afghanistan against Soviet military intervention, so, too, have short-term interests driven US policy in the current overt war.

To be sure, any leader must work to extricate his country from a protracted war, so Obama is right to seek an end to this one. But he was not right in laying out his cards in public and emboldening the enemy.

Within weeks of assuming office, Obama publicly declared his intention to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan, before he even asked his team to work out a strategy. A troop surge that lasted up to 2010 was designed not to rout the Taliban militarily, but to strike a political deal with the enemy from a position of strength. Yet, even before the surge began, its purpose was undercut by the exit plan, followed by a publicly announced troop drawdown, stretching from 2011 to 2014.

A withdrawing power that first announces a phased exit and then pursues deal-making with the enemy undermines its regional leverage. It speaks for itself that the sharp deterioration in US ties with the Pakistani military has occurred since the drawdown timetable was unveiled. The phased exit encouraged Pakistani generals to play hardball. Worse, there is still no clear US strategy on how to ensure that the endgame does not undermine Western interests or further destabilize the region.

The US envoy to the region, Marc Grossman, has already held a series of secret meetings with the Taliban. Qatar has been chosen as the seat of fresh US-Taliban negotiations in order to keep the still-skeptical Afghan government at arm’s length (despite the pretense of “Afghan-led” talks), and to insulate the Taliban negotiators from Pakistani and Saudi pressure. Meanwhile, even as a civil-military showdown in Pakistan compounds Washington’s regional challenges, the new US push to contain Iran threatens to fuel greater turbulence in neighboring Afghanistan.

In truth, US policy on the Taliban, at whose birth the CIA played midwife, is coming full circle for the second time in little more than 15 years. The Clinton administration acquiesced in the Taliban’s ascension to power in 1996 and turned a blind eye as that thuggish militia, in league with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, fostered narcotics trafficking and swelled the ranks of Afghan war alumni waging transnational terrorism. With the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the chickens came home to roost. In declaring war on the Taliban, US policy came full circle.

Now, US policy, with its frantic search for a deal with the Taliban, is about to complete another orbit. Indeed, the Qatar-based negotiations highlight why the US political leadership has deliberately refrained from decapitating the Taliban. The US military has had ample opportunities (and still has) to eliminate the Taliban’s Rahbari Shura, or leadership council, often called the Quetta Shura because it relocated to that Pakistani city.

Yet, tellingly, the US has not carried out a single drone, air, or ground strike in or around Quetta. All of the US strikes have occurred farther north, in Pakistan’s tribal Waziristan region, although the leadership of the Afghan Taliban and of its allied groups, like the Haqqani network and the Hekmatyar band, is not holed up there.

Like the US occupation of Iraq, the NATO war in Afghanistan will leave behind an ethnically fractured country. Just as Iraq today is, for all intents and purposes, ethnically partitioned, it will be difficult to establish a post-2014 government in Kabul whose writ runs across Afghanistan. And, just as the 1973 US-North Vietnam agreements were negotiated after the South Vietnamese regime was shut out of the talks, the US today is shutting out the Afghan government, even as it compels President Hamid Karzai to lend support and appears ready to meet a Taliban demand to transfer five incarcerated Taliban leaders from Guantánamo Bay.

These negotiations, in which the US is seeking the creation of ceasefire zones to facilitate its forces’ withdrawal, can only undercut the legitimacy of the Karzai government and bring the Quetta Shura back to center stage. But Afghanistan is not Vietnam. An end to NATO combat operations will not mean the end of the war, because the enemy will target Western interests wherever they may be. America’s fond hope to contain terrorism regionally promises instead to ensure that Afghanistan and Pakistan remain a festering threat to regional and global security.

Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi and the author of Asian Juggernaut.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2012.
www.project-syndicate.org

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Els aliats naturals a l’àsia

Brahma Chellaney

Democràcies marítimes com el Japó i l’índia han de cooperar per crear a l’àsia un ordre estable i liberal Els dos països han iniciat un diàleg estratègic amb els EUA al qual és possible que també s’afegeixi Austràlia

La Vanguardia (Català), 30 ene 2012

EB. CHELLANEY, n un moment en què l’ascens econòmic, diplomàtic i militar de la Xina projecta l’ombra d’un desequilibri de poder sobre l’àsia, la visita fa poques setmanes del primer ministre japonès, Yoshihiko Noda, a l’índia ha consolidat una relació que s’està intensificant ràpidament entre dos aliats naturals. Ara la tasca del Japó i l’índia és afegir un contingut estratègic concret als seus vincles.

L’equilibri de poder que està sorgint a l’àsia estarà determinat principalment pels esdeveniments a l’àsia oriental i a l’oceà Índic. Així, doncs, el Japó i l’índia tenen un paper important per exercir en la preservació de l’estabilitat i la contribució a la salvaguarda de rutes marines d’importància decisiva a la regió indopacífica, en sentit més ampli, caracteritzada no només per la confluència dels oceans Índic i Pacífic, sinó també per la seva importància per al comerç mundial i els subministraments energètics.

Les regions d’àsia amb auge econòmic són costaneres, per la qual cosa democràcies marítimes com el Japó i l’índia han de cooperar per tal de crear a l’àsia un ordre estable, liberal i basat en les normes. Com va dir el primer ministre indi, Manmohan Singh, a la reunió de la cimera de l’àsia oriental celebrada a Bali, l’ascens continu d’àsia no està automàticament assegurat i “depèn de l’evolució d’una estructura cooperativa”.

El Japó i l’índia, com a països amb pocs recursos energètics i dependents en gran manera de les importacions de petroli del golf Pèrsic, estan profundament preocupats pels afanys mercantilistes encaminats a assegurar-se el domini dels subministraments energètics i les rutes de transport per a aquests. Així, doncs, el manteniment d’un àmbit marítim pacífic i legal, incloent-hi una llibertat de navegació sense traves, és decisiu per a la seva seguretat i benestar econòmics. Aquesta és la raó per la qual han acordat iniciar maniobres aèries i navals conjuntes a partir del 2012; un dels senyals del pas d’una actitud encaminada a subratllar els valors compartits cap a una altra d’encaminada a protegir interessos compartits.

De fet, malgrat la seva complicada política interna i els seus escàndols endèmics, l’índia i el Japó tenen la relació bilateral que s’intensifica més ràpidament a l’àsia actual. Des que van anunciar una “associació estratègica i global” l’any 2006, el seu compromís polític i econòmic s’ha intensificat notablement. Una congruència en augment d’interessos estratègics va propiciar la Declaració Conjunta sobre Seguretat i Cooperació del 2008, una fita important en la creació d’un ordre asiàtic estable, en el qual una constel·lació d’estats vinculats per interessos comuns ha arribat a ser decisiva per garantir l’equilibri en un moment en què els canvis actuals en el poder incrementen les amenaces a la seguretat.

La declaració conjunta va seguir el model de l’acord de cooperació en matèria de defensa del 2007 amb Austràlia, l’altre país amb el qual el Japó, aliat militar dels Estats Units, té un acord de cooperació en matèria de seguretat. La declaració sobre seguretat de l’índia i el Japó va engendrar, al seu torn, un acord similar entre l’índia i Austràlia el 2009.

El mes d’agost passat va entrar en vigor un acord de lliure comerç entre el Japó i l’índia, abans conegut com a acord d’associació econòmica general i, en resposta a la utilització punitiva per part de la Xina del seu monopoli a la producció procedent de terres rares per interrompre aquesta classe d’exportacions al Japó durant la tardor del 2010, els dos països han acordat cooperar en matèria de desenvolupament de terres rares, que tenen una importància decisiva per a una gran diversitat de tecnologies energètiques ecològiques i les aplicacions militars.

Actualment, el nivell i la freqüència del compromís bilateral oficial són extraordinaris. La visita de Noda a Nova Delhi va formar part d’un compromís per part dels dos països de celebrar una cimera anual, a la qual assistiran els seus primers ministres.

Més important encara és que el Japó i l’índia mantinguin ara diversos diàlegs ministerials anuals: un diàleg estratègic entre els ministres d’afers Exteriors, un altre sobre seguretat entre els ministres de Defensa, un altre de normatiu entre el ministre de Comerç i Indústria de l’índia i el ministre d’economia, Comerç i Indústria del Japó i d’altres més sobre afers econòmics i energètics.

I, per acabar de completar tot això, el Japó, l’índia i els Estats Units van iniciar un diàleg estratègic trilateral a Washington el 19 de desembre. La incorporació dels Estats Units ha de reforçar la cooperació entre l’índia i el Japó. Com va dir recentment el ministre d’afers Exteriors del Japó, Koichiro Gemba, “El Japó i els Estats Units estan intensificant una relació estratègica amb l’índia” i el diàleg trilateral és “un exemple concret de col·laboració” entre les tres democràcies principals d’àsia i el Pacífic. És probable que la cooperació esmentada esdevingui quadrilàtera amb la inclusió d’austràlia.

El Japó i l’índia han d’enfortir la seva encara incipient cooperació estratègica fent seves dues idees que requereixen un canvi subtil en el pensament i la política japonesos. Una és la de crear la interoperabilitat entre les seves formidables forces navals que, en cooperació amb altres armades amigues, pot reforçar la pau i l’estabilitat a la regió indopacífica. Com va dir l’ex primer ministre japonès, Shinzo Abe, en un discurs recent a Nova Delhi, la finalitat ha de ser que “aviat abans que tard, l’armada del Japó i la de l’índia estiguin perfectament interconnectades”. Actualment, el Japó només té interoperabilitat naval amb les forces dels Estats Units.

La segona idea és la de desenvolupar en comú sistemes de defensa. L’índia i el Japó cooperen en matèria de defensa mitjançant míssils amb Israel i els Estats Units, respectivament. No hi ha motius perquè no ho facin en matèria de defensa amb míssils i altres tecnologies per a la seguretat mútua. La cooperació esmentada ha de ser completa i no s’ha de limitar al diàleg estratègic, la cooperació marítima i les maniobres navals ocasionals.

A la Constitució del Japó, imposada pels Estats Units, no hi ha una prohibició d’exportacions d’armes, sinó només una decisió governamental adoptada ja fa molt i que, en qualsevol cas, s’ha relaxat. De fet, la decisió original es referia a armes, no a tecnologies.

Les associacions econòmiques més estables del món, incloent-hi la comunitat atlàntica i l’associació entre el Japó i els Estats Units, descansen sobre la col·laboració en matèria de seguretat. Els vincles econòmics que manquen del suport de les associacions estratègiques solen ser menys estables i fins i tot inestables, com es fa palès en les relacions econòmiques que l’índia i el Japó tenen amb la Xina. Mitjançant una estreta col·laboració estratègica, el Japó i l’índia han d’encapçalar l’afany de crear llibertat, prosperitat i estabilitat a la regió indopacífica.

Escaping Afghanistan, the graveyard of empires

BRAHMA CHELLANEY

The Japan Times, January 21, 2012

Since coming to office, President Barack Obama has pursued an Afghan war strategy summed up in just four words: “surge, bribe and run.” The U.S.-led military mission has now entered the “run” part, or what euphemistically is being called the “transition to 2014” — the year Obama arbitrarily chose as the deadline to wind down all NATO combat operations.

The central aim is to cut a deal with the Taliban — even if Afghanistan and the region pay a heavy price — so that the United States and its NATO partners exit the “Graveyard of Empires” without losing face. This effort to withdraw as part of a political settlement without admitting defeat is being dressed up as a “reconciliation” process, with Qatar, Germany and Britain getting lead roles to help facilitate a U.S.-Taliban deal.

Yet what stands out is how little the U.S. has learned from past mistakes. In some critical respects, it is actually beginning to repeat past mistakes, whether by creating or funding new local militias in Afghanistan or striving to cut a deal with the Taliban. As in the covert war it waged against the nearly nine-year Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, so too in the current overt war, U.S. policy has been driven by short-term considerations, without much regard for the interests of friends in the wider region.

To be sure, Obama was right to seek an end to this protracted war. But he blundered by laying out his cards in public and emboldening the enemy.

Within weeks of assuming office, Obama publicly declared his intent to exit Afghanistan, before he even asked his team to work out a strategy. He quickly moved from the Bush-initiated counterinsurgency strategy to limited war objectives centered on finding a face-saving exit. A troop surge that lasted up to 2010 was designed not to militarily rout the Taliban but to strike a political deal with the enemy from a position of strength. But even before a deal could be negotiated, rising U.S. casualties and war fatigue prompted him to publicly unveil a troop drawdown, stretching from 2011 to 2014. If the surge failed to militarily contain the Taliban, it was largely because its purpose had been undermined by Obama at the very outset.

A withdrawing power that first announces a phased exit and then pursues deal-making with the enemy undermines its regional leverage. It speaks for itself that the sharp deterioration in U.S. ties with the Pakistani military has occurred in the period after the drawdown timetable was unveiled. The phased exit has encouraged the Pakistani generals to play hardball.

Worse, there is still no clear U.S. strategy on how to ensure that the endgame does not undermine the interests of the free world or further destabilize the region. It is also unclear whether the U.S. after 2014 will be willing to rely on its air power and special forces to keep Afghanistan in the hands of a friendly government and army — or whether it will do what it has just done in Iraq: pull out completely and wash its hands off the country.

Think of a scenario where Obama had not played his cards in public. Immediately after coming to office, Obama could have used his predecessor’s diversion of resources to the Iraq war to justify a troop surge in Afghanistan while exerting full pressure on the Pakistani generals to tear down insurgent sanctuaries. Had that happened without the intent to exit being made public, not only would many Afghan and American lives have been saved, but also the side desperate for a deal today would have been the Taliban, not the U.S.

The outcome of the current effort to clinch a deal with a resurgent Taliban is uncertain. Even if a deal materializes and is honored by the Taliban on the ground, it cannot by itself pacify Afghanistan.

Although Afghanistan historically was designed as a buffer state, it does not today separate empires and conflicts. Rather, it is the center of not one but multiple conflicts with cross-border dimensions. Given Afghanistan’s major ethnic and political divides, genuine national reintegration and reconciliation would make a lot of sense.

However, instead of opening parallel negotiating tracks with all key actors, with the aim of eventually bringing them together at the same table, the U.S. is pursuing a single-track approach focused on achieving a deal with the Taliban. Such is its single-mindedness that a conscious effort is under way to keep out representatives of the National Front (formerly Northern Alliance) from even international conferences on Afghanistan.

In fact, the choice of Doha, Qatar, as the seat of U.S.-Taliban negotiations has been made with the intent to cut out the still-skeptical Afghan government and to insulate the Taliban negotiators from Pakistani and Saudi pressures. The choice also meshes with U.S. efforts to build Qatar as a major promoter of Western interests in the Arab world, on the lines of Saudi Arabia.

Just as oil wealth has propelled the Saudi role, gas wealth is driving the Qatari role — best illustrated by Qatar’s military and financial contributions to regime change in Libya and its current involvement in fomenting a Sunni insurrection in Alawite-ruled Syria, the last remaining beacon of secularism in an increasingly Islamist-oriented Arab world.

Meanwhile, the new U.S. containment push against Iran threatens to compound the internal situation in Afghanistan. Iran’s nuclear program is a factor behind the new containment drive. But a bigger factor is the intent not to allow Iran to be the main beneficiary of the end of U.S. military operations in Iraq and the planned NATO exit from Afghanistan. Yet, without getting Iran on board, building a stable Iraq or Afghanistan will be difficult.

In truth, U.S. policy is coming full circle again on the Pakistan-fathered Afghan Taliban, in whose birth the CIA had played midwife. President Bill Clinton’s administration acquiesced in the Taliban’s ascension to power in Kabul in 1996 and turned a blind eye as that thuggish militia, in league with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, fostered narco-terrorism and swelled the ranks of the Afghan war alumni waging transnational terrorism. With 9/11, however, the chickens came home to roost. In declaring war on the Taliban in October 2001, U.S. policy came full circle.

Now, U.S. policy is coming another full circle on the Taliban in its frantic search for a deal. This has been underscored by a series of secret U.S. meetings with the Taliban last year and the current moves to restart talks in Qatar by meeting the Taliban’s demand for the release of five of its officials who are held at Guantánamo Bay. Mohammed Tayeb al-Agha, an aide to the one-eyed Taliban chief Mohammad Omar, has emerged as the Taliban’s chief negotiator with Marc Grossman, America’s Afghanistan-Pakistan (Afpak) envoy.

The Qatar-based negotiations serve as another reminder why the U.S. political leadership has refrained from decapitating the Taliban’s top command-and-control. The U.S. military has had ample opportunities to eliminate the Taliban’s Rahbari Shura, or leadership council, often called the Quetta Shura because it relocated to the Pakistani city in 2002.

Yet, tellingly, the U.S. military has not carried out a single drone, air or ground strike against the shura. All the U.S. strikes have occurred farther north in Pakistan’s tribal Waziristan region, although the leadership of the Afghan Taliban or its allied groups like the Haqqani network and the Hekmatyar band is not holed up there.

The sanctity of existing borders has become a powerful norm in world politics. Border fixity is seen as essential for peace and stability. Yet, paradoxically, the norm has allowed the emergence of weak states, whose internal wars spill over and create wider regional tensions and insecurities. In other words, a norm intended to build peace and stability may be creating conditions for greater regional conflict and instability. This norm is likely to come under challenge in the Afpak belt, where the dangers of political fragmentation cannot be lightly dismissed.

When history is written, the legacy of the NATO war in Afghanistan will mirror the legacy of the U.S. occupation of Iraq — to leave an ethnically fractured nation. Just as Iraq today stands ethnically partitioned in a de facto sense, it will be difficult to establish a government in Kabul post-2014 whose writ runs across Afghanistan.

More important, Afghanistan is not Vietnam. An end to NATO combat operations will not mean the end of the war because the enemy will target Western interests wherever they may be. The U.S. hope to regionally contain terrorism is nothing more than self-delusion. If anything, this objective promises to keep the Afpak belt as a festering threat to regional and global security.

Brahma Chellaney is an Asian geostrategist and the author of six books.
The Japan Times: Saturday, Jan. 21, 2012

Asia’s New Tripartite Entente

Column internationally syndicated by Project Syndicate, January 2012 

The launch of trilateral strategic consultations among the United States, India, and Japan, and their decision to hold joint naval exercises this year, signals efforts to form an entente among the Asia-Pacific region’s three leading democracies. These efforts — in the world’s most economically dynamic region, where the specter of a power imbalance looms large — also have been underscored by the Obama administration’s new strategic guidance for the Pentagon. The new strategy calls for “rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific” and support of India as a “regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.”

At a time when Asia is in transition and troubled by growing security challenges, the US, India, and Japan are seeking to build a broader strategic understanding to advance their shared interests. Their effort calls to mind the pre-World War I Franco-British-Russian “Triple Entente” to meet the threat posed by the rapid rise of an increasingly assertive Germany.

This time, the impetus has been provided by China’s increasingly muscular foreign policy. But unlike the anti-German entente a century ago, the aim is not to contain China. Rather, US policy is to use economic interdependence and China’s full integration into international institutions to dissuade its leaders from aggressively seeking Asian hegemony.

Indeed, the intention of the three democratic powers is to create an entente cordiale without transforming it into a formal military alliance, which they recognize would be counterproductive. Yet this entente could serve as an important strategic instrument to deter China’s rising power from sliding into arrogance. The three partners also seek to contribute to the construction of a stable, liberal, rules-based regional order.

After their recent first round of strategic dialogue in Washington, the US, Japan, and India will hold more structured discussions in Tokyo, aimed at strengthening trilateral coordination. Over time, the trilateral initiative could become quadrilateral with Australia’s inclusion. A parallel Australia-India-US axis, however, is likely to precede the formation of any quadrilateral partnership, especially in view of the earlier failure to launch such a four-party coalition.

Important shifts in American, Japanese, and Indian strategic preferences and policies, however, are needed to build meaningful trilateral collaboration. Japan, America’s treaty ally, has established military interoperability only with US forces. Following its 2008 security-cooperation declaration with India, Japan must also build interoperability with Indian naval forces, so that, as former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has said, “Japan’s navy and the Indian navy are seamlessly interconnected.”

American and Indian forces have conducted dozens of joint exercises in recent years, but some US analysts complain that India still hews to “nonalignment” in power politics by guarding its strategic autonomy. In reality, India is just being more cautious, because it is more vulnerable to direct Chinese pressure from across a long, disputed Himalayan border. Whereas Japan is separated from China by an ocean and the US is geographically distant, China has sharply escalated border violations and other incidents in recent years to increase pressure on India, even as the US has maintained tacit neutrality on Sino-Indian disputes.

But, in view of America’s dire fiscal challenges, the Obama administration has just announced plans for a leaner military and greater reliance on regional allies and partners. This demands that the US transcend its Cold War-era hub-and-spoke system, whose patron-client framework is hardly conducive to building new alliances (or “spokes”). India for example, cannot be a Japan to the US. Indeed, the US has worked to co-opt India in a “soft alliance” devoid of treaty obligations.

The hub-and-spoke system, in fact, is more suited to maintain Japan as an American protectorate than to allow Japan to contribute effectively to achieving the central US policy objective in Asia: a stable balance of power. A subtle US policy shift that encourages Tokyo to cut its overdependence on America and do more for its own defense can more effectively contribute to that equilibrium.

Such a shift is likely to be dictated by the US imperative to cut defense expenditure further, in order to focus on the comprehensive domestic renewal needed to arrest the erosion in its relative power. If the US is to rely less on prepositioned forward deployments and more on acting as an offshore balancer, it will need to make fundamental changes in its post-1945 security system.

The three entente parties must also understand the limits of their partnership. The broad convergence of their strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific region does not mean that they will see eye-to-eye on all issues. Consider, for example, their earlier contrasting approaches toward Burma, or their current differences over the new US energy sanctions against Iran.

Building true military interoperability within the entente will not be easy, owing to the absence of a treaty relationship between the US and India, and to their forces’ different weapon systems and training. But, given that no formal tripartite alliance is sought, limited interoperability may mesh well with this entente cordiale’s political objectives. Indeed, the entente’s political utility is likely to surpass its military value.

Even so, the deepening cooperation between the US, India, and Japan can help to strengthen maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region — the world’s leading trade and energy seaway — and shape a healthy and stable Asian power equilibrium.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India, and Japan.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2012.

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The lasting lesson of 1962

Brahma Chellaney

As the 50th anniversary year of China’s 1962 invasion, 2012 should serve as a time of reflection on what lessons that attack still holds for India.

Given that the Year of the Dragon — a monster that has been universal since before biblical times — begins on January 23, this year holds significance for China’s other neighbors as well. After all, the declared intent of the 1962 war — “to teach a lesson” — was publicly restated in the 1979 Chinese aggression against Vietnam and appeared to guide Beijing’s top-heavy response in the boat incident with Japan in the fall of 2010.

By roaring at its neighbors and picking territorial fights with them, China lived up to the Year of the Tiger that 2010 represented in its astrology. Then in 2011, the Year of the Rabbit, China seemed to emulate that burrowing animal. It blasted more tunnels through mountain ranges in its borderlands. And — as was apparent, for example, from its use of different cards against India, including the stapled-visa issue and cross-frontier incursions — it demanded “carrots” (rabbit’s favorite) to eschew irascible behavior. Will it breathe fire in the Year of the Dragon?

One facet of China’s grand strategy has remained constant over the years. Strategic deception and military surprise are enduring elements in Chinese strategy. The 1962 war was a classic example of the fusion of these two elements.

Integral to deception is taking an opponent by surprise, as emphasized in Sun Tzu’s Art of War some 2,500 years ago. Since the Communists came to power, China has been involved in the largest number of military conflicts in Asia. In all these conflicts, Chinese forces struck with no forewarning.

Indeed, a 2010 Pentagon report points out that China has repeatedly carried out military pre-emption in the name of defense: in 1950 (Tibet invasion, followed immediately by entry into Korean War), 1962, the 1969 border conflict with the Soviet Union, and the 1979 attack on Vietnam. According to the report, “The history of modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which China’s leaders have claimed military pre-emption as a strategically defensive act.” China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974 was another example of offense as defense.

The 1962 attack — justified as a defensive act by Beijing, which used Nehru’s unguarded remarks (“our instructions are to free our territory”) to brand India the aggressor — stands out for China’s masterly blending of deception and surprise. The invasion, mounted from two separate fronts, caught India off guard. The “stab-in-the-back” was best summed up by Nehru, who told the nation that “a powerful and unscrupulous opponent, not caring for peace or peaceful methods” had returned “evil for good.”

The aggression was cleverly planned and timed. It coincided with the start of the Cuban missile crisis, which put the Soviet Union and the U.S. on the edge of a nuclear Armageddon. And the very day the U.S. quarantine of Cuba was lifted to help end the Cuban missile crisis, China ceased its 32-day aggression against India. The cunning timing — just when global attention was focused on averting a nuclear catastrophe — ensured that India received no outside help.

The deception began much earlier, in keeping with the utility of deception in Chinese strategic culture for both peacetime functions and warfighting applications. One example of peacetime deception was Premier Zhou En-lai’s 1960 New Delhi visit, during which he dangled the carrot of a border settlement without putting his money where his mouth was. Of course, it didn’t take much effort to trick the Indians, who had convinced themselves that by merely signing the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, they had bought peace with China.

If anything, this agreement — which incorporated five principles of peaceful coexistence — provided a perfect cover for China to launch aggressive plans against India, including its quiet construction of a highway through the Aksai Chin Plateau in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and furtive nibbling at Indian territories across the Himalayas. The period up to 1954 marked Communist China’s annexation and consolidation of rule in Tibet, whereas the post-1954 phase heralded its belligerence toward India, culminating in the surprise invasion. The iniquitous Panchsheel Agreement — under which India, without any quid pro quo, surrendered its extra-territorial rights in Tibet and recognized the “Tibet region of China” — constituted a watershed in opening the path to hostilities.

It took a war humiliation for India to wake up to the reality that a nation can get peace only if it is able to defend peace.

Today, as part of its larger game of deception, China identifies Taiwan as the primary focus of its defense strategy. That is to divert international attention from its single-mindedness on achieving broader military goals. Taiwan serves metaphorically as a red carpet on which to invite all the bulls while Beijing busily seeks to accomplish bigger tasks.

If the countries around India have become battlegrounds for China’s moves to encircle India, it is because Beijing heeds Sun Tzu’s counsel: “Contain an adversary through the leverage of having made its neighbourhood hostile.” According to Sun Tzu’s core guidance, “The ability to subdue the enemy without any battle is the ultimate reflection of the most supreme strategy.”

China employs deception to also camouflage its refusal to accept the territorial status quo with several of its neighbours. It is disturbing the status quo even on cross-border river flows. The insistence on changing the status quo, coupled with its strategic opacity and penchant to take an adversary by surprise, only increases the unease in Asia over its rise. Indeed, the more than three-decade-old border talks with India mesh well with China’s use of strategic deception.

As long as the territorial status quo is not accepted, the possibility that the Chinese military will strike again cannot be ruled out. As U.S. National Intelligence Director James Clapper said in his prepared testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 31, “The Indian Army believes a major Sino-Indian conflict is not imminent but the Indian military is strengthening its forces in preparation to fight a limited conflict along the disputed border, and is working to balance Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean.”

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s emphatic statement in the Lok Sabha in December 2011 that “China will not attack India” thus seems more than gratuitous. Can anyone turn a blind eye to the Chinese state-run newspaper and military publications launching an anti-India tirade and warning New Delhi of the consequences of a confrontation with China? Some military analysts in China have publicly discussed the merits of a 1962-style short, sharp, decisive border war that helps put India in its place for the next few decades? Disturbingly, the more timorous Singh has been, the more belligerent China has become.

India needs to counter the asymmetrical capabilities China is fashioning to take an adversary by surprise. Its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, for example, are being designed to “shock and awe” in space. China is already waging a quiet cyber-war, as if to underscore its ability to sabotage vital infrastructure in wartime. Moreover, its military is developing a blitzkrieg approach to warfare: a surprise blitz will seek to stun, confound and overwhelm an opponent.

The lasting lesson of 1962 is that India must be ready to repulse any kind of attack, including by undercutting the aggressor where it is the weakest. Otherwise, China’s Achilles’ heel — Tibet — will become a stronger launch-pad for aggressive acts.

A version of this article appeared in The Times of India of January 22, 2012.

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Asia’s Natural-Born Allies

A Project Syndicate column

At a time when China’s economic, diplomatic, and military rise casts the shadow of a power disequilibrium over Asia, the just-concluded visit of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda to India cemented a fast-growing relationship between two natural allies. Now the task for Japan and India is to add concrete strategic content to their ties.

Asia’s emerging balance of power will be determined principally by events in East Asia and the Indian Ocean. Japan and India thus have an important role to play in preserving stability and helping to safeguard vital sea-lanes in the wider Indo-Pacific region — a region defined not only by the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, but also by its significance for world trade and energy supplies.

Asia’s booming economies are coastal, so maritime democracies like Japan and India must work together to help build a stable, liberal, rules-based order in Asia. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said at the East Asia Summit (EAS) meeting in Bali last month, Asia’s continued rise is not automatically assured, and is “dependent on the evolution of a cooperative architecture.”

Japan and India — as energy-poor countries heavily reliant on oil imports from the Persian Gulf — are seriously concerned by mercantilist efforts to assert control over energy supplies and the transport routes for them. So the maintenance of a peaceful and lawful maritime domain, including unimpeded freedom of navigation, is critical to their security and economic well-being. That is why they have agreed to start holding joint naval and air exercises from 2012 — just one sign of a shift from emphasizing shared values to seeking to protect shared interests.

Indeed, despite their messy domestic politics and endemic scandals, India and Japan have the fastest-growing bilateral relationship in Asia today. Since they unveiled a “strategic and global partnership” in 2006, their political and economic engagement has deepened remarkably.

A growing congruence of strategic interests led to their 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, a significant milestone in building a stable Asian order, in which a constellation of states linked by common interests has become critical to ensuring equilibrium at a time when ongoing power shifts accentuate security challenges.

The joint declaration was modeled on Japan’s 2007 defense-cooperation accord with Australia — the only other country with which Japan, a US military ally, has a security-cooperation arrangement. The India-Japan security declaration, in turn, spawned a similar Indian-Australian accord in 2009.

A free-trade agreement between Japan and India, formally known as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), entered into force in August. And, in response to China’s punitive use of its monopoly on rare-earths production to cut off such exports to Japan during the fall of 2010, Japan and India have agreed to joint development of rare earths, which are vital for a wide range of green-energy technologies and military applications.

Today, the level and frequency of official bilateral engagement is extraordinary. Noda’s visit to New Delhi was part of a commitment by the two countries to hold an annual summit, attended by their prime ministers.

More important, Japan and India now conduct several annual ministerial dialogues: a strategic dialogue between their foreign ministers; a security dialogue between their defense ministers; a policy dialogue between India’s commerce and industry minister and Japan’s minister of economy, trade and industry; and separate ministerial-level energy and economic dialogues.

And, to top it off, Japan, India, and the US initiated a trilateral strategic dialogue in Washington on December 19. Getting the US on board can only bolster India-Japan cooperation. As Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba said recently, “Japan and the US are deepening a strategic relationship with India,” and the trilateral dialogue is “a specific example of collaboration” among the three leading Asia-Pacific democracies. Such collaboration is likely to become quadrilateral with Australia’s inclusion.

Japan and India need to strengthen their still-fledgling strategic cooperation by embracing two ideas, both of which demand a subtle shift in Japanese thinking and policy. One is to build interoperability between their formidable naval forces, which, in cooperation with other friendly navies, can undergird peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. As former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe put it in a recent speech in New Delhi, the aim should be that “sooner rather than later, Japan’s navy and the Indian navy are seamlessly interconnected.” Currently, Japan has naval interoperability only with US forces.

The second idea is to co-develop defense systems. India and Japan have missile-defense cooperation with Israel and the US, respectively. There is no reason why they should not work together on missile defense and other technologies for mutual security. Their defense cooperation must be comprehensive and not be limited to strategic dialogue, maritime cooperation, and occasional naval exercises.

There is no ban on weapon exports in Japan’s US-imposed Constitution, only a longstanding government decision, which in any case has just been relaxed. In fact, the original decision related to weapons, not technologies.

The most-stable economic partnerships in the world, including the Atlantic community and the Japan-US partnership, have been built on the bedrock of security collaboration. Economic ties that lack the underpinning of strategic partnerships tend to be less stable and even volatile, as is apparent from the economic relationships that India and Japan have with China. Through close strategic collaboration, Japan and India must lead the effort to build freedom, prosperity, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research, is the author of Water: Asia’s New Battleground.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.

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The world’s most “dammed” country

The map of planned new dams released by state-run HydroChina Corporation in 2010 shows that China's dam-building spree is anything but slowing. It reveals the planned construction of a dam twice as large as the Three Gorges Dam at Metog (‘‘Motuo’’ in Chinese), just before the Brahmaputra River enters India.

Brahma Chellaney

India Today, December 26, 2011

China’s frenzied dam building recently hit a wall in Myanmar, whose bold decision to halt a controversial Chinese dam project on its territory has acted as a catalyst to a series of developments, including the first visit of a US secretary of state to that country in more than half a century. Despite the setback in Myanmar, China remains the world’s biggest dam builder at home and abroad. No country in history has built more dams than China. In fact, China today boasts more dams at home than the rest of the world combined. 

Before the Communists came to power in 1949, there were only 22 dams of any significant size in China. But now China has more than half of the almost 50,000 dams in the world that are classified as “large” because they have a height of at least 15 m or a storage capacity of more than 3 million cubic metres. This feat means that China has completed on an average at least one large dam per day since 1949. If dams of all sizes are counted, the number in China surpasses 85,000.

Another striking fact is that China is also the global leader in exporting dams. Its state-run companies today are building more dams overseas than the other international dam builders put together. As many as 37 Chinese financial and corporate entities are involved in more than 100 major dam projects in the developing world. Profit motives and a diplomatic effort to showcase its engineering prowess drive China to build dams overseas. China’s declaratory policy of “non-interference in domestic affairs” actually serves as a virtual licence to pursue dam projects that flood ethnic-minority lands and forcibly uproot people in other countries, just as it is doing at home by shifting its dam-building focus from the dam-saturated internal rivers to the international rivers originating in the Tibetan plateau, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria.

China contends that its role as the global leader in exporting dams has created a “win-win” situation for the host countries and its companies. Yet evidence from a number of project sites shows that those dams are imposing serious costs. These projects, in fact, often serve to inflame anti-Chinese sentiment, as underscored by grassroots protests at several sites in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Indeed, by taking much of the workforce from home to build dams and other projects abroad-a practice that runs counter to its own 2006 regulations that call for “localisation”-China reinforces a perception that it is engaged in exploitative practices. Chinese convicts have also been used as labourers on projects in countries too poor and weak to protest.

As the world’s most “dammed” country, China is already the     world’s largest producer of hydropower, with an installed generating capacity of more than 170 gigawatts. Yet its ambitious plans to significantly boost hydro-generating capacity by damming international rivers have embroiled it in water disputes with almost all neighbours, even North Korea. More broadly, China’s dam-building passion has spawned two developments. First, Chinese companies now dominate the global hydropower-equipment export market. And second, the growing clout of the state-run hydropower industry within China has led Beijing to aggressively seek dam projects overseas by offering attractive, low-interest loans to other governments. At home, it recently unveiled a mammoth $635-billion fresh investment in water infrastructure over the next decade, more than a third of which is to be channelled for building dams, reservoirs, and other supply structures.

China’s over-damming of rivers and its inter-river and inter-basin water transfers have already wreaked havoc on the natural ecosystems, causing fragmentation and depletion of rivers and thereby promoting exploitation of groundwater beyond the nature’s replenishment capacity. The social costs have been even more staggering, a fact reflected in Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s stunning admission in 2007 that China relocated a total of 22.9 million Chinese since 1949 to make way for water projects-a number bigger than the entire population of Australia, Romania or Chile. Since that admission, another 3,50,000 residents, mostly poor villagers, have been officially uprooted. So, by official count alone, 1,035 citizens on an average have been forcibly evicted daily in the past 62 years for water projects.

With Beijing now increasingly damming transnational rivers such as the Mekong, Salween, Brahmaputra, Irtysh, Illy and Amur, the new projects threaten to “export” the serious degradation haunting China’s internal rivers to those rivers. The time has come to exert concerted external pressure on Beijing to rein in its dam frenzy and embrace international environmental standards. 

Brahma Chellaney is the author of the newly released Water: Asia’s New Battleground. (c) India Today, 2011.