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About Chellaney

Professor, strategic thinker, author and commentator

New fault lines in international relations

Bridge Global Divides 

New fault lines signal rising geopolitical risks 

Brahma Chellaney

Times of India,  January 28, 2008

Davos: In the World Economic Forum meeting of top political, business, intellectual and civil-society leaders, the discussions centred on a range of major international challenges — from new threats to the growing strains on water and other resources. But the discussions also brought home the point that at a time of ongoing shifts in economic and political power, greater international divisiveness is making it more difficult to build a consensual approach on the pressing challenges. 

            Indeed, new fault lines and global divides are emerging. Major shifts in power, as history testifies, are rarely quiet. They usually create volatility in the international system, even if the instability is relatively short-lived. The new divisiveness may reflect such a reality. But unlike in past history, the qualitative reordering of power now underway is due not to battlefield victories or military realignments but to a factor unique to the modern world: rapid economic growth.

            The power shifts are linked to Asia’s phenomenal economic rise, the speed and scale of which has no parallel in history. Asia already has emerged as the world’s main creditor and economic locomotive. That development is helping alter equations, with the IMF in perceptible decline and troubled US and European financial institutions turning to Asia and the Middle East for bailouts. 

            While we know the world is in transition, we still do not know what the new order would look like. That has also contributed to the divisiveness. The ongoing shifts signify not only a world characterized by greater distribution of power, but also new uncertainties. Technological forces today are playing a greater role in shaping geopolitics than at any other time in history.

            The more the world changes, however, the more it remains the same in some critical aspects. The information age and globalization, despite spurring profound changes in polity, economy and security, have not altered the nature of international relations. In fact, the rapid pace of technological and economic change is itself a consequence of nations competing fiercely and seeking relative advantage in an international system based largely on national security.  

  For example, the tensions between internationalism and nationalism in an era of a supposed single “global village” raise troubling questions about international peace and stability. With greater public awareness from advances in information and communications technologies encouraging individuals and even some states to more clearly define their identity in terms of religion and ethnicity, a divide is emerging between multiculturalism and artificially enforced monoculturalism. The rise of international terrorism indeed shows that the information age is both an integrating and dividing force.

            The emerging political, economic and security divides are no less invidious. The world is moving beyond the North-South divide to a four-tier economic division: the prosperous West; rapidly growing economies like those in Asia; countries that have run into stagnation after reaching middle-income nation status; and a forgotten billion people living on the margins of globalization in sub-Saharan Africa. There is also a resource divide, with the resource-hungry employing aid and arms exports as a diplomatic instrument for commodity outreach. As the spectre of resource conflict has grown, the contours of a 21st-century version of the Great Game have emerged. 

            In modern history, the fault line between democrats and autocrats has at times been papered over through a common geopolitical interest. But today the failure to build greater political homogeneity by defining shared international objectives carries the risk that, in the years ahead, political values could become the main geopolitical dividing line. Also, with the rise of unconventional transnational challenges, a new security divide is mirrored both in the failure to fashion a concerted and effective international response to such threats, including terrorism, and the divisiveness on issues like climate change.

           There is clearly a need to improve global geopolitics by building cooperative political approaches that transcend institutions whose structure is rooted in a world that no longer exists. The reality is that just as the G-8, to stay relevant, has initiated the so-called Outreach for dialogue with the emerging powers, the five unelected yet permanent members of the Security Council can no longer dictate terms to the rest of the world and need to share executive authority with new powers.      

            It was a mistake to believe that greater economic interdependence by itself would improve geopolitics. In today’s market-driven world, trade is not constrained by political differences, nor is booming trade a guarantee of moderation and restraint between states. Better politics is as important as better economics. That in turn calls for several major steps whose initiation so far has sought to be frustrated: institutional reforms, greater transparency in strategic doctrines and military expenditures, and cooperative approaches on shared concerns. No international mission today can yield enduring results unless it comes with consistency and credibility and is backed by consensus — the three crucial Cs.

          With Davos attracting 27 heads of state, 113 cabinet ministers, 74 of the top 100 global companies’ CEOs and 2,300 other delegates this year, the unique forum can help promote innovative thinking. Davos’s central message is that silo thinking can only increase global geopolitical risks at a time of greater fluidity and financial volatility. 

            The writer was on the faculty of the just-concluded World Economic Forum meeting.

© The Times of India, 2008

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Editorial/LEADER_ARTICLE_Bridge_Global_Divides/articleshow/2735918.cms

Burma and Tibet: At the Core of India-China Relations

Counter China’s Designs

Burma and Tibet
are pivotal to Indian strategy 

Brahma
Chellaney

Times of India, January 16, 2008

One issue emblematic of the Sino-Indian
strategic dissonance is Burma.
Indeed, there are several important parallels between Burma and the vast
territory whose annexation brought Han forces to India’s borders for the first
time in history — Tibet. India
and China may be
5,000-year-old civilizations but the two had no experience in dealing with each
other politically until Tibet’s
forcible absorption made them neighbours. In contrast, India has had close historical ties with Tibet and with Burma, part of the British Indian
empire until 1937. The majority people of Burma, the Burmans, are of Tibetan
stock, and the Burman script, like the Tibetan one, was taken from Sanskrit.

Today, Tibet
and Burma
are at the centre of the India-China relationship. Having lost the
traditionally neutral buffer of Tibet,
India sees Burma as a hedge against China’s
authoritarian rise. It is significant that the resistance against repressive
rule in both Tibet and Burma is led by iconic Nobel laureates, one
living in exile in India and
the other with close ties to India
but under house arrest in Rangoon.
Equally remarkable is that the Dalai Lama and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi received the Nobel peace prize in quick
succession for the same reason: For leading a non-violent struggle, in the
style of Mahatma Gandhi.

Yet another parallel is that heavy repression
has failed to break the resistance to autocratic rule in both Tibet and Burma. More than half a century
after Tibet’s
annexation, the Tibetan struggle ranks as one of the longest and most-powerful
resistance movements in modern world history. With no links to violence or
terror, it actually stands out as a model. Similarly, despite detaining Suu Kyi
for nearly 13 of the past 19 years, the junta has failed to suppress the
democracy movement, as last September’s monk-led mass protests showed.

        For the autocrats in Beijing, who value Burma
as an entryway to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean,
the demonstration of people’s power in a next-door state was troubling news
because such grassroots protests could inspire popular challenge to their own
authoritarianism. Having strategically penetrated resource-rich Burma, Beijing is
busy completing the Irrawaddy Corridor involving road, river, rail and
energy-transport links between Burmese ports and Yunnan.

For India,
such links constitute strategic pressure on the eastern flank. China is already
building another north-south strategic corridor to the west of India — the
Trans-Karakoram Corridor stretching right up to Pakistan’s Chinese-built Gwadar
port, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz — as well as an east-west
strategic corridor in Tibet across India’s northern frontiers. In Burma, Beijing
is also helping construct a 1,500-km highway leading to Arunachal Pradesh.  

Such links hold serious implications for India
because they allow Beijing to strategically
meddle in India’s
restive northeast and step up indirect military pressure. Operating through the
plains of Burma in India’s northeast is much easier than having to
operate across the mighty Himalayas. In 1962,
Indian forces found themselves outflanked by the invading People’s Liberation
Army at certain points in Arunachal (then NEFA), spurring speculation that some
Chinese units quietly entered via the Burmese plains, not by climbing the
Himalayas.

The potential for Chinese strategic mischief has to be viewed against
the background that the original tribal insurgencies in the northeast were
instigated by Mao’s China,
which trained and armed the rebels, be it Naga or Mizo guerrillas, partly by
exploiting the Burma
route. During World War II, the allied and axis powers had classified Burma as a “backdoor to India”. Today, India shares a porous 1,378-km border with Burma, with
insurgents operating on both sides through shared ethnicity. 

Tibet and Burma are going to stay pivotal to
Indian security.  The centrality of the
Tibet issue has been highlighted both by China’s Tibet-linked territorial claim
to Arunachal and by its major inter-basin and inter-river water transfer
projects in the Tibetan plateau, the source of all of Asia’s major rivers
except the Ganges. By damming the Brahmaputra and Sutlej and toying with the
idea of diverting the Brahmaputra waters to the parched Yellow River, Beijing is threatening to fashion water into a weapon
against India.

The junta has run Burma
for 46 years, while the communist party has ruled China for 59 years. Neither model
is sustainable. The longest any autocratic system has survived in modern
history was 74 years in the Soviet Union. But
while Burma has faced
stringent sanctions since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, the post-Tiananmen
sanctions against China did
not last long on the argument that engagement was a better way to bring about
political change — a principle not applied to impoverished Burma. 

         India cannot afford to shut itself out of
Burma, or else — with an
increasingly assertive China
to the north, a China-allied Pakistan on the west, a Chinese-influenced Burma
to the east, and growing Chinese
naval interest in the Indian Ocean
— it will get encircled. Just as India has not abandoned the Tibetan cause and
indeed remains the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile despite doing
business with China, India will continue to support the Burmese democracy
movement and remain home to large numbers of refugees and dissidents despite a
carefully calibrated engagement with the junta aimed at promoting political
reconciliation and stemming the growing Chinese clout.


The writer is a strategic affairs analyst.

© The Times of India,
2008

India-China Ties: Hype and Reality

The Three Ts of India-China Relations

Brahma Chellaney

Asian Age, January 15, 2008

No Indian prime minister has ever returned from China without the visit being hailed by his spinmeisters as path-breaking. Yet despite all the touted “breakthroughs” over the decades, China has steadily become a bigger strategic challenge for India, opening new fronts by tenaciously pursuing congagement, or engagement with containment. Sardar Patel’s words still ring true: “Even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as friends.” The wooden slogans China today mouths on its relations with India are as empty as the ones at home behind which its communist rulers shelter, such as President Hu Jintao’s catchphrase, “harmonious society.”

Just as Beijing is haunted by three Ts domestically — Tiananmen, Taiwan and Tibet — its relationship with New Delhi is defined by three Ts — territorial disputes, Tibet and trade, with the first two issues stuck and the third booming to China’s heavy advantage. Mirroring its exploitative commerce with Africa, Beijing primarily buys iron ore and other raw materials from India and sells industrial goods while reaping a ballooning trade surplus. Yet some in India innocently see this embarrassing and unsustainable pattern of trade as proof of progress in bilateral ties.

If growing trade signified political warmth, Japan and China, with at least eight times higher trade, would be the best of friends. Trade between any two states in today’s market-driven world is not constrained by political differences, unless political barriers have been erected. Flourishing economic ties indeed do not guarantee moderation and restraint in the absence of progress on bridging political differences, as shown by the increasing Chinese military incursions across the border into India and China’s muscular diplomacy toward Japan and Vietnam.

While India and China have built a stake in maintaining the peaceful diplomatic environment on which their continued economic modernization and security depend, they have made little progress in resolving their political differences and building strategic congruence. That is why the proclaimed “India-China strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity” remains devoid of content. The two sides can only showcase their fast-growing trade and high-level visits, such as President Hu’s November 2006 India tour and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Beijing trip this week.

Yet a careful examination of what is being showcased reveals disconcerting trends.

Let us start with the summit-level meetings. The promises incorporated in the joint declaration signed with much fanfare at the end of each prime ministerial or presidential visit are quickly forgotten. Take the following pledge in the joint declaration that was signed when Hu visited New Delhi: “Along with the talks between the Special Representatives, the Joint Working Group (JWG) on the India-China boundary question shall expedite their work, including on the clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control (LAC) and the implementation of confidence-building measures. It was agreed to complete the process of exchanging maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the LAC on the basis of already agreed parameters as soon as possible.” Nearly 14 months have gone by without any success to revive the dormant JWG, let alone to begin exchanging maps of the eastern sector (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh) and the western sector (Jammu and Kashmir).

The harsh reality is that Beijing is loath to clarify the frontline because such an action would relieve military pressure on India. So, despite 27 years of continuous border negotiations, India and China remain the only neighbours in the world not separated even by a mutually defined line of control. Indeed, it took two full decades of negotiations before Beijing exchanged maps with India of just one sector — the least-disputed middle segment (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh). But having done that in 2001, it quickly broke its word to exchange maps of the other two sectors.

A first step to a settlement of any dispute is clarity on a line of control or at least appreciation of the “no go” areas so that provocative or unfriendly actions can be eschewed. Exchanging maps showing each other’s military positions, without prejudice to rival territorial claims, is a preliminary step to first define, then delineate and finally demarcate a frontline. Beijing’s disinclination to trade maps underlines its aversion to clinch an overall border settlement or even to remove the ambiguities plaguing the long, rugged LAC.

In fact, the real reason the two countries are locked in what is already the longest and most-barren negotiating process between any two countries in modern world history is that China — not content with the one-fifth of the original state of J&K it occupies — seeks to further redraw its frontiers with India, coveting above all Tawang, a strategic doorway to the Assam Valley. Seeking to territorially extend the gains from its annexation of Tibet, Beijing unabashedly follows the principle that what it occupies is Chinese territory beyond question and what it claims should be on the negotiating table for barter.

Is it thus any surprise that new strains have appeared in Sino-Indian ties even as the old disputes remain unresolved? The hoopla accompanying Singh’s visit can hardly obscure recent developments that call attention to the underlying tensions between Asia’s two continental-sized powers that are rising at the same time in history.

The developments include about 300 Chinese military incursions across the LAC in the past 24 months alone — or more than three a week; the Chinese military action two months ago in provocatively demolishing some unmanned Indian forward posts near three disputed bunkers at the Bhutan-Sikkim-Sikkim trijunction; and the Chinese foreign minister’s message to his Indian counterpart last May that Beijing no longer felt bound by a 2005 agreement on “guiding principles” that any border-related settlement should not disturb settled populations.

This hard line appears tied to two factors. First, rising economic and military power is encouraging Beijing to pursue a more muscular foreign policy. And second, China has acquired a capability to rapidly deploy forces against India by significantly expanding its infrastructure in Tibet, with roads built right up to the LAC and the new railway to Lhasa being extended southwards.

Now let us turn to the galloping trade, which officially jumped 10-fold from $2.5 billion in 2000-01 to $25 billion in 2006-07, catapulting China in six years from the ninth largest to the second largest trading partner of India. According to provisional figures released by China, the two-way trade actually surpassed $38 billion in calendar 2007.

All that seems very impressive until one looks at the trade pattern, which disturbingly shows India as a raw-material appendage to China’s rising industrial might. At the end of fiscal 2006-07, more than 50 per cent of Indian exports to China comprised just one item — iron ore. When other primary commodities were added, that figure totalled 85 per cent of the exports. In return, India has been importing more and more Chinese processed goods, to the extent that it has become import-dependent on China for steel tubes and pipes.

The fact is that Beijing is conserving its own non-renewable resources by encouraging its industry to meet production needs through imports. China, for example, has substantial reserves of iron ore, yet it has emerged the world’s largest iron importer, accounting for a third of all global imports. A quarter of China’s iron-ore imports come alone from India, to which it then sells finished tubes and pipes.

India’s estimated iron-ore reserves of 18 billion metric tons will last between 30 and 50 years, if the country were to boost its per capita iron-ore consumption from the present 30 kilograms to the developed world’s 300- to 400-kilogram level. China, on the other hand, has estimated iron-ore reserves of 472 billion metric tons, although the average iron content in its deposits is only 32.1 per cent. It was industrialist Ratan Tata who publicly contended that if China, with larger deposits, could treat iron ore as a strategic resource, India ought to do the same.

Add to the inequitable trade pattern the galloping imbalance, with China enjoying a trade surplus of $10.7 billion in calendar 2007, due in part to its cryptic barriers that have left even world-class Indian software and pharmaceutical companies out in the cold. China’s trade surpluses are with the United States, Europe and India. With the rest of the world, it actually has a trade deficit.

Even if China-India trade overtakes US-India trade — a likely scenario — political issues will continue to divide Beijing and New Delhi.

Had China pursued political progress with India even at half the speed at which it has pushed its exports, the relationship today would have looked less unpredictable. Instead, as if to underscore its mercantilist approach, it has sought to enlarge its one-sided advantages by pressing India to enter into a free-trade agreement with it. It is like asking New Delhi to reward it for its political intransigence and muscle-flexing.

China’s growing assertiveness comes at a time when a high-stakes geopolitical competition is sweeping Asia, centred on building new alliances, ensuring power equilibrium, and securing a larger share of energy and mineral resources. That Asia is big enough to accommodate the ambitions of both China and India is a bromide you will hear only from Indian leaders; for Beijing, Asia has to be China-oriented.

The challenge arising from Beijing’s determination to emerge as Asia’s unchallenged power cannot be addressed if India simplistically believes it has just two options: Pursue a feckless policy toward China or brace up for confrontation. That is a false choice that can only stifle the several options India has between those two extremes. While keeping cooperation as the public leitmotif of its relations with Beijing, New Delhi has to start reclaiming lost leverage in order to fashion a more result-oriented, realpolitik policy.

(c) Asian Age, 2008

Indian prime minister visits China January 13-15, 2008

The PM’s China
visit comes when Beijing has hardened its stance
on territorial disputes

Dragooned
by the dragon

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY

The Hindustan Times, January 7, 2008

At
a time when Beijing is pursuing a more muscular policy — from provocatively
seeking to assert its jurisdiction
over islets claimed by Vietnam to whipping up spats
with Germany, Canada and the US over the Dalai Lama — Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh is embarking on a New
Year visit to China as part of an agreement reached during
President Hu Jintao’s November 2006
trip “
to hold regular summit-level meetings”.
But
while Hu clubbed his India trip with a visit to “all-weather ally” Pakistan —
just as his Premier Wen Jiabao did in
2005 — Singh will pay his respect by
going only to China, instead
of travelling also to, say, Japan or
Vietnam.

            Singh’s
visit is to follow more than a year of assertive Chinese
moves that have run counter to efforts to
build a stable Sino-Indian
relationship based on equilibrium and forward thinking. Two things
have happened. One, China has hardened its stance on
territorial disputes with India
— a reality the very small, largely symbolic joint
anti-terrorist army exercise in Yunnan cannot obscure.
And two, as the Dalai Lama pointed
out in a recent address in Rome, Beijing is taking an increasingly harsh position on Tibet, pretending there is no Tibetan issue to resolve.

            The
Tibet issue is at the core of the India-China
divide, and without Beijing beginning a
process of reconciliation and healing
in Tibet and coming to terms with history, there is little prospect
of Sino-Indian differences being
bridged. Beijing
itself highlights the centrality of the Tibet issue by laying claim to Indian territories on the basis of
alleged Tibetan ecclesial or tutelary links
to them, not any professed Han connection.  

            But with the Dalai Lama having publicly repudiated such claims, a discomfited Beijing has
sought to persuade his representatives in
the ongoing dialogue process that the
Tibetan government-in-exile support China’s
position that Arunachal Pradesh is part of traditional Tibet. The fact is that with China’s
own claim to Tibet
being historically dubious, its
claims to Indian territories are doubly suspect, underlining its attempts at incremental annexation.

            The
tough, uncompromising Chinese approach contrasts sharply with the forbearing positions of the Indian government and the Dalai
Lama. New Delhi,
for instance, has bent over backwards
to play down aggressive Chinese
military moves along the still ill-defined
line of control. The Dalai Lama, for
his part, is beginning to face muted criticism from restive Tibetans
for having secured nothing from Beijing two decades after changing the struggle for liberation from Chinese imperial conquest to a struggle for autonomy
within the framework of the People’s
Republic. As the Dalai Lama himself admitted in
Rome, “Our
right hand has always reached out to the Chinese
government. That hand has remained
empty…” 

            Examples
of China’s increasing hardline
stance on India range from its ambassador’s Beijing-supported
bellicose public statement on Arunachal on the eve of Hu’s visit, to its foreign minister’s May
2007 message to his Indian counterpart that China
no longer felt bound by the 2005 agreement that any border-related settlement
should not disturb settled populations. Add to that the October admission by
the Indo-Tibetan Border Police chief that there had been 141 Chinese military incursions
in the preceding
12 months alone — or about three incursions a week on average.

            Beijing’s
strategy is to interminably drag out its separate negotiating processes with India and the Dalai Lama’s envoys in order to wheedle out more and more concessions. In
line with that, China’s
negotiators have been in full
foot-dragging mode, seeking to keep the discussions merely at the level of
enunciating principles,
positions and frameworks — something
they have done splendidly in
negotiations with India
since 1981 and with the Dalai Lama’s
envoys since 2002. 

            As
several Chinese scholars have acknowledged,
Beijing
is not as keen as New Delhi
to resolve the territorial disputes. Having
got what it wanted either by military aggression or furtive encroachment, Beijing values
its claims on additional Indian territories as vital leverage to keep India under
pressure. Similarly, not content with the Dalai Lama’s abandonment of the
demand for independence, Beijing
continues to publicly vilify him and
portray his envoys’ visits for negotiations as personal trips. It has further tightened
its vise on Tibet
by ordering that all lama reincarnations
get its approval, renewing political repression, and encouraging the ‘Go West’ Han-migration
campaign.

            Gratuitously,
New Delhi has
downplayed instances of belligerent activity by the People’s Liberation Army, denying at times even the undeniable — like the PLA’s destruction
of a few unmanned Indian forward posts at the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction
in November. Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor has called PLA cross-border forays
into Bhutan
“a matter between” Bhutan
and China,
as if India
is not responsible for Bhutanese defence. 

            It
is not accidental that China’s hardline approach has followed its infrastructure
advances on the Tibetan plateau, including the opening of a new railway,
airfields and highways. The railway, by arming Beijing
with a rapid military-deployment capability, is transforming the
trans-Himalayan military equations.

            Beijing has also been emboldened by a couple
of major Indian missteps. During Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s June 2003 visit,
it wrung the concession it always wanted from India
— a clear and unambiguous recognition of Tibet
as part of China. Vajpayee not
only inexcusably linked troubled Tibet with a non-issue, Sikkim, but also his
kowtowing on Tibet stripped India of leverage on the larger territorial
disputes with China. Little
surprise, therefore, that Beijing now presents Arunachal as
an outstanding issue that demands
‘give and take’, cleverly putting
the onus on India
to achieve progress. It aims to dragoon New
Delhi into ceding at least Tawang,
populated
not by Tibetans, but by Monpas, a distinct
tribe.

            This
line of attack has been further bolstered
by the 2005 ‘guiding principles’, one of which calls for
“meaningful
and mutually acceptable adjustments” to respective positions. India was craven enough to
agree to this principle, although it
is negotiating with an aggressor
state that aims to keep it off balance and prevent a settlement by seeking to extend its territorial gains.

Having conceded the Tibet
card, what “meaningful and mutually
acceptable adjustments” can India
demand from China? Such
adjustments, as Beijing
insists, have to be primarily on India’s part.
The new Chinese assertiveness on
Arunachal since 2006 thus is not
unplanned but the cumulative result of Indian missteps.

India can expect no respite from
Chinese pressure, given Beijing’s growing propensity to flex its muscles, as
underscored by its anti-satellite weapon test last January, its recent
large-scale war game in the South and East China Seas, its public showcasing of
new military hardware like the Jin-class, nuclear-capable submarine, its
strategic moves around India, and its last-minute cancellation of a
long-planned Hong Kong visit by the US carrier, Kitty Hawk. If anything, China is likely to further up the ante against India.

New Delhi thus cannot stay caught in a
double-bind. To blur the line between diplomacy and appeasement, and to
emphasize show over substance, is only to play into Beijing’s gameplan. It is past time India injected
greater policy realism by shedding deluding platitudes and placing premium on
substance and leveraged diplomacy.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=ff9aae5c-8c75-4c83-9090-83ea113eea22&MatchID1=4617&TeamID1=3&TeamID2=4&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1163&PrimaryID=4617&Headline=Dragooned+by+the+dragon

China adds muscle to its foreign policy

China’s muscle-flexing diplomacy

Beijing is beginning to take its gloves off, says Brahma
Chellaney

India Abroad, January 4, 2008

Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh’s forthcoming visit to China, close on the heels of a small anti-terrorist
exercise between Chinese and Indian soldiers, cannot obscure a larger reality:
Rising economic and military power is emboldening Beijing to pursue a more
muscular foreign policy. Having earlier
preached the gospel of
its “peaceful
rise,” China
is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident of the muscle it has
acquired.

From provocatively seeking
to assert its jurisdiction
over islets claimed by Vietnam in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, to
whipping up diplomatic spats with Germany,
Canada and the United States over their hospitality to the
Dalai Lama, Beijing
is now demonstrating an increasing propensity to flex its muscles.

Other recent
instances of China’s growing assertiveness include its demolition of a few
unmanned Indian forward posts at the Tibet-Bhutan-Sikkim tri-junction, its
large-scale war game in the South and East China Seas, its public showcasing of
new military hardware like the Jin-class, nuclear-capable submarine, its
strategic moves around India, and its last-minute cancellation of a long-planned
Hong Kong visit by the U.S. carrier, Kitty
Hawk
.

Ever since it
surprised the world by successfully carrying out an anti-satellite weapon test
in January 2007, China’s
Communist leadership has been less coy to project national power. It seems
unconcerned that such muscle-flexing has triggered anti-China demonstrations in
Hanoi and Ho
Chi Minh City and spurred unease in other neighboring
states.

            For more than a year, Beijing has been signaling a tougher stance on its
territorial disputes with India.
Examples of China’s increasing
hardline stance on India range from
the Chinese ambassador’s Beijing-supported bellicose public statement on
Arunachal Pradesh on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s November 2007 New Delhi visit,
to the Chinese foreign minister’s May 2007 message to his Indian counterpart
that China no longer felt bound by a
2005 agreement that any border-related settlement should not disturb settled
populations. Add to that the October 2007 admission by the chief of India’s
Indo-Tibetan Border Police that there had been 141 Chinese
military incursions in the preceding
12-month period alone.

In that
light, the recent five-day Sino-Indian anti-terrorist maneuver in Yunnan province was
largely symbolic. In fact, barely 100 soldiers from each side were involved in this
practice of urban counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism drills. Yet, given
the new strains in the relationship, the joint exercise was viewed as a welcome
step.

Codenamed
“Hand in Hand,” this exercise was the first between the Indian Army and the
People’s Liberation Army. A Sino-Indian naval maneuver was held last spring, as
part of an Indian effort to placate Beijing over
the first Japan-U.S.-India trilateral naval exercises off the Tokyo Bay.

During Dr. Singh’s
impending visit to Beijing, little progress can
be expected toward resolving the territorial disputes that divide India and China. Yet, if the Sino-Indian
relationship is to become stable, a settlement of those disputes is necessary.

A first step to a settlement of any dispute is clarity on
a line of control or appreciation of
the “no go” areas so that provocative or unfriendly actions can be eschewed.
Protracted India-China negotiations over the past 26 years, however, have
failed to remove the ambiguities plaguing their long line of control. Beijing, seeking to keep India under strategic pressure, has
been loath to clearly define the frontline.

It is often overlooked that India
and China
are old civilizations but new neighbors. It was the 1951 Chinese annexation of the historical buffer, Tibet, that
brought Chinese troops to what is
now the Sino-Indian frontier. Just
11 years later, China
invaded India. Today, both countries have
built a stake in maintaining the peaceful diplomatic environment on which
their economic modernization and security depend. Yet the wounds of the 1962
war have been kept open by China’s publicly
assertive claims to additional Indian territories.

That
China is not a status quo power, at
least territorially, is evident from the way it has placed Taiwan under a
permanent threat of force and asserted land and maritime claims vis-à-vis other
neighbors. Its claims on India,
however, involve the largest chunks
of territory. Arunachal alone is more than double the size of Taiwan.

Through its forceful claims, Beijing
itself highlights that at the core of its disputes with India is Tibet. Having
gobbled up Tibet, Beijing
now lays claim to Indian territories, on the basis not of any purported Han
connection, but of Tibetan Buddhist ecclesiastical influence
or alleged longstanding tutelary
relations with them. Therefore, to focus on Arunachal or even Tawang is not
only to miss the wood for the trees, but also to play into
China’s
attempts at incremental territorial
annexation.   

Yet India
has needlessly retreated to a more and more defensive position, bringing
itself under greater Chinese
pressure. Rather than gain leverage
by adopting a nuanced position on Tibet, India
continues to be overcautious in its diplomacy, even when Beijing
acts antagonistically. In recent weeks, for example, New Delhi has bent over backward to play down
aggressive PLA moves along the line of control.

Indeed, New Delhi’s acquiescence to China’s
annexation of Tibet has come to haunt it, as Beijing today seeks to extend the
territorial gains from its Tibet
occupation by pushing a bald principle
in the border negotiations with India: What is ours is ours to keep, but what
is yours must be shared with us. It insists that India
at least cede Tawang, a critical corridor between Lhasa
and the Assam Valley
of immense military import because it overlooks the chicken-neck that connects India with its
northeast. 

            The
reality is that the trans-Himalayan military equations have altered ever since China opened the railway to Lhasa in July 2006. The railway, which is now being extended southward to Xigatse and then beyond to
the Indian border, not only strengthens China’s hold over Tibet, but also arms Beijing with a rapid military deployment
capability against India. It may
not be a coincidence that China’s
growing hardline
approach has followed its infrastructure
advances on the Tibetan plateau, in the form of the railway and new airfields
and highways. It is now building the
world’s highest airport at Ngari, on the southwestern edge of Tibet.

            Given
the creeping conventional military
asymmetry, India’s
need for a reliable nuclear-deterrent capability has never been greater. Not
only are conventional weapons far more expensive, but also India is
heavily dependent on their imports. Yet, through the insidious
nuclear deal with the United States,
New Delhi is willing
to accept fetters on the full-fledged development of its indigenous deterrent,
with the external affairs minister
unabashedly telling Parliament
recently that his government and party are a “strong believer in total nuclear disarmament” and “we do not believe
in nuclear weaponization in a massive way.” This assertion comes when India has yet to build and deploy even a barely
minimal deterrent against China. 

            In
fact, in his meandering replies in the two Houses of India’s parliament to the
nuclear-deal debate, Pranab Mukherjee actually castigated the predecessor
government for exercising the
nuclear option, claiming that, “When
in 1974 Shrimati Indira Gandhi went
for the nuclear explosion, it was not for indulging in
weaponization… She categorically mentioned: ‘I wanted to have the
technology.  I wanted to test the
competence of the Indian scientists, Indian technicians and Indian engineers.’ The purpose was the peaceful use of the
civilian nuclear programme.” Further criticizing the exercise of the option, he
said: “We used to have a pledge from 1974 till 1998, almost quarter of a
century, that we shall keep our options open.”

            Mukherjee
also turned India’s publicly enunciated “credible minimal
deterrent” on its head by calling it
“minimum credible deterrent,” which
implies that the deterrent’s credibility would be kept to a minimum — as it has been. “We want minimum credible deterrent, from our security
perspective,” he declared in the
Rajya Sabha, the upper House, on December 5. 
 

            While
China
calculatedly bolsters its political and military leverage, Indian leaders continue to send out counterproductive signals. In his
November 29 reply in the Lok Sabha —
the lower House — to the parliamentary debate on the same subject, Mukherjee
was ecstatic about Sonia Gandhi’s visit to China
in late October: “
During the visit of chairperson of UPA [United Progressive Alliance], the type
of warmth she felt … is envy of anybody, any world statesman… She was the first
person from outside to visit People’s Republic of China”
after the Chinese Communist Party’s 17th National Congress.

            So what if she was the first? The
CPC’s National Congress had no bearing
on Chinese policy toward India. All it
did was to reinforce China’s
totalitarian political system, even as President Hu used the word “democracy”
61 times in his speech to the
Congress. Should she have gone to China at a time when Beijing had
hardened its policy toward India?
After all, she went there not as a private citizen but as the power behind Prime Minister
Singh. The pomp and ceremony with
which she was received reflected her status as India’s most powerful politician. 

            Such a symbolically potent visit to
an adversarial state cannot be undertaken for personal image-building, or other egotistical purposes, or to promote
politically partisan interests.
Criticism of her party and government for being
pro-U.S. may have prodded her to demonstrate balance by visiting China. But given
the visible toughening of the Chinese stance, the visit was ill-timed. Indeed,
through her visit, she only played into
the hands of Beijing,
whose India
diplomacy emphasizes show over substance so as to provide cover for exerting strategic pressure. 

            It
is not just New Delhi’s diffidence that
encourages Beijing
to up the ante. Too often in the
past, the personal image-building of
an Indian leader has taken precedence over the unflinching pursuit of the country’s long-term interests.  

            A
more egregious case than Sonia Gandhi was the sphinx-like
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose June 2003 official visit to Beijing
was designed for Machiavellian partisan interests.
By mid-2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee was getting
ready for early national elections, which he wanted to contest on the “India Shining”
plank of having made peace with both
China
and Pakistan.
Having turned his Pakistan policy on its head in April 2003 by publicly extending “a hand of friendship” to the very country he
had isolated since the terrorist
attack on India’s parliament,
he set out less than three months later to befriend Beijing.

            His
mollycoddling cost India dear. Beijing wrung
the concession it always wanted from India
— a clear and unambiguous recognition of Tibet
as part of China. To justify
his yielding to the Chinese demand, Vajpayee claimed credit for beginning
“the process by which Sikkim
will cease to be an issue in
India-China relations.” But while he
formally recognized Tibet as
“part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China,” Beijing to this day has not officially
acknowledged Sikkim to be
part of the territory of the Republic
of India. It has only
ceased its cartographic mischief in
depicting Sikkim
as an independent kingdom — a mischief of little consequence for India, as the people of Sikkim, along with the rest of the world, had
accepted Sikkim’s
1975 merger.

            Not only was Vajpayee’s linking of troubled Tibet
with a non-issue, Sikkim, inexcusable, but it also stripped India of leverage on the larger territorial
disputes with China. It is no
wonder that Beijing now presents Arunachal as
an outstanding issue that demands
“give and take,” ingeniously putting
the onus on India
to achieve progress.    

While one can expect to
hear the same empty platitudes on Sino-Indian relations during Singh’s visit, India can
ill-afford another misstep. In fact, the challenge for Indian diplomacy is to
retrieve lost leverage by gently shining a spotlight on the central issue, Tibet, and building a web of strategic
partnerships with other important democracies in Asia
and elsewhere.

Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the Centre for
Policy Research, New Delhi.

(c) India Abroad, New York, 2008

_____________________________

This is an official PRC map, showing Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as part of China and historical Tibet gerrymandered:

Why India’s Powerful Anti-Deterrent Lobby Supports Nuclear Deal With The U.S.

Pro-Deal But Anti-Deterrent

None of today’s deal pushers wanted India to go overtly nuclear. They are thus not concerned that the nuclear deal will adversely affect the still-nascent deterrent.

Brahma Chellaney

Asian Age, Saturday, January 5, 2008

With the Indian team now in Vienna for further safeguards-related negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, one remarkable fact has escaped attention in the national debate over the divisive nuclear deal with the United States. Those in the political establishment and outside who are stridently pushing the deal may be a varied lot but share one common trait: None had advocated or desired that India go overtly nuclear. This lot thus is unabashedly blasé about the deal’s fetters on a still-nascent deterrent whose development it didn’t support in the first place.

Check their backgrounds and you will find that the deal pushers — whether they are political leaders, bureaucrats, analysts or simply drum-beaters — did not favour testing in the period between 1994 and 1998 when a succession of five Indian governments wrestled with the issue of whether the window of opportunity was closing for India to exercise its long-held nuclear option. In fact, today’s most-ardent deal peddlers — without exception — worked hard within the government or outside in those critical years to stop India from breaking out of its nuclear straitjacket.

A fresh reminder that those for the deal remain against a credible deterrent came during the recent Parliament debate on the subject when the external affairs minister, speaking in place of a loath-to-reply prime minister, repeatedly castigated the predecessor government for crossing the nuclear Rubicon, saying that action breached the long-standing official policy to retain the nuclear option, not to exercise it. As Pranab Mukherjee put it, “We used to have a pledge from 1974 till 1998, almost quarter of a century, that we shall keep our options open.”

Given the growing conventional military asymmetry with China, India’s need for a reliable nuclear deterrent that can survive a first strike has never been greater. Not only are conventional weapons far more expensive, but also India is heavily dependent on their imports. Yet, through the insidious deal with the US, New Delhi is accepting constraints on its indigenous deterrent’s development, with Mukherjee bluntly telling Parliament that his government and party were a “strong believer in total nuclear disarmament” and did not want India to emerge as a major nuclear power. “That is the foreign policy, that is the philosophy,” he proclaimed.

Oddly, such an assertion comes when India has yet to build and deploy even a barely minimal deterrent against China. No government leader has claimed, or can assert, that the country today can effectively deter China, its primary challenge. Indeed, the key task India faces today is to build a stout deterrent, however small, that can help deter an increasingly assertive China that has gone from preaching the gospel of its “peaceful rise” to taking its gloves off.

From provocatively demolishing some unmanned Indian forward posts at the Tibet-Bhutan-Sikkim tri-junction, to aggressively asserting its jurisdiction over islets claimed by Vietnam in the the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, and to sparking diplomatic spats with Germany, Canada and America over the official hospitality or honour they extended the Dalai Lama, Beijing of late has shown an increasing propensity to flex its muscles.

By sheltering behind calcinatory and delusional rhetoric, New Delhi overlooks a central reality: In today’s world, a country can impose its demands on another not necessarily by employing direct force but by building such asymmetric capabilities that a credible threat crimps the other side’s room for manoeuvre. Nothing better illustrates this danger than New Delhi’s own action in pulling the wool over public eyes by denying the Chinese demolition of the Indian forward posts, lest questions be asked at home as to what it has done in response to the provocation. It even goes to the extent of needlessly downplaying the increasing cross-border Chinese military incursions.

The more India falls behind its minimum-deterrence needs, the more likely it will pursue a feckless China policy.

Unlike conventional weapons, systems of nuclear deterrence have to be developed indigenously and without the lure of illicit kickbacks. A decade after declaring itself a nuclear-weapons state, India’s primary focus today is more on buying high-priced conventional weapons from overseas (reflected in its emergence as a top arms importer in the world) than on plugging gaps in its deterrence. Consequently, India’s goal of erecting a credible and survivable nuclear deterrent, as the private intelligence service Stratfor put it, is at least a decade away.

Yet the government pooh-poohs the deal-related implications but flaunts its “firm commitment on disarmament, firm commitment on non-proliferation, which [is] embedded in our civilization and in our history,” to quote the irrepressible Mukherjee. Only powers with surplus or obsolescent weapons needing disposal trumpet their interest in arms control and disarmament, not a nation dependent on others to meet its basic defence needs.

To concerns that the deal impeded India’s deterrent plans and eliminated the leeway the country enjoyed in 1974 and 1998 to test, the minister responded with derision. “Shri Advani also pointed out that there will be no tests. Do you not want Programme III [Pokhran III]?” he taunted the leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha who had walked out with his party MPs before the speech.

In the other House, a less-mocking Mukherjee had this to say: “If India considers it necessary, it will undertake the test. As we did it in 1974, as we did in 1998, and the consequences will also follow. It is as simple as that.” The minister did not elaborate on what those consequences would be, although they have been spelled out unambiguously by America — the termination of all cooperation, the right to seek the return of what has been supplied, and getting other supplier-states to also cut off cooperation.

Consider this: Those in office today are willing to enter into nuclear cooperation with the US on the explicit understanding that if a future government tested, fuel and spare-part supplies and other cooperation would cease. They are also willing to saddle the country with a host of legally irrevocable obligations — from accepting permanent international inspections on all its civilian facilities to adhering to US-led cartels from which India has been excluded.

There were no such conditions, not even an implied test ban, when India first entered into civil nuclear cooperation with the US in 1963, at a time when it had been militarily humiliated by China and was strapped for cash. Generous low-interest US credit persuaded India to drop its preference for a natural uranium-fuelled power plant and accept a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) station dependent on external fuel supply, in keeping with US policy to sell only such leverage-gaining reactors. Yet when America unilaterally walked out of its 123 Agreement with India in 1978, why did New Delhi not exercise its right to terminate IAEA inspections at Tarapur, the sole plant set up under the accord?

Declassified US documents show that the CIA had correctly assessed that India would not end its obligations even after America had broken its word, but instead would seek US help to find a substitute fuel supplier to keep electricity flowing to the Bombay region. That is exactly what happened. But in return, to this day, India has exacerbated its spent-fuel problem at Tarapur by granting the US a right it didn’t have even if it had not walked out of that accord — a veto on Indian reprocessing of the accumulating discharged fuel.

In that light, ask yourself: Having invested tens of billions of dollars in importing several new nuclear-power plants and having created electricity dependency, would India be able to test, when the basis of new cooperation is an explicit test prohibition written into Hyde Act’s Section 106, an unequivocal US “right of return” enshrined in the 123 Agreement’s Article 14(4), and the recourse to an alternative fuel supplier foreclosed by US law? Even Mukherjee could only waffle.

Still, Mukherjee turned India’s publicly enunciated doctrine of a “credible minimal deterrent” on its head by calling it “minimum credible deterrent,” which implies that the deterrent’s credibility would be kept to a minimum — as it has been. “We want minimum credible deterrent, from our security perspective,” he declared in the Rajya Sabha. This came after he confessed, “I was a little confused when Shri Yashwant Sinha tried to play with the words ‘credible minimum deterrent,’ whether it is minimal or whether it is minimum or whether it is credible. I then asked my officers to brief me on this.”

As defence minister, Mukherjee was down-to-earth and focused on national interest. But as EAM, he risks becoming external to national interests, unless he chooses his briefers more carefully.

This was underlined during the debate not only by the factually incorrect statements he made (highlighted in my last column) but also by the troubling sense of history he articulated: “When in 1974 Shrimati Indira Gandhi went for the nuclear explosion, it was not for indulging in weaponization… She categorically mentioned, ‘I wanted to have the technology. I wanted to test the competence of the Indian scientists, Indian technicians and Indian engineers’.” Here is a senior minister telling the Lok Sabha in earnest that the onerous technology sanctions India still confronts were triggered by a test whose sole purpose was the then PM’s itching but aimless desire to test the competence of scientists and engineers!

Indira Gandhi, India’s only strategically minded PM, was definitely not part of the sizable constituency opposed to nuclear weaponization that the country has had for long. This constituency has always comprised two groups — those anti-nuclear on honest ideological grounds, including many Gandhians and leftists; and those disingenuously citing pragmatism but being rank ideologues in giving primacy to economics over larger strategic considerations or wanting a nuclear policy that paid obeisance to the nuclear Pope, the US.

Faced with a fait accompli following the surprise 1998 tests, many in the second group were quick to embrace the new reality and some to even welcome it. That matched the nimbleness with which American policy shifted its own goal — from dissuading India from crossing the nuclear threshold to preventing its emergence as a full-fledged nuclear-weapons state by bringing it into the US-fashioned non-proliferation regime. It is that revised goal that today serves as the foundation of a deal whose embedded constraints, in the words Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Joseph Biden, “will limit the size and sophistication of India’s nuclear-weapons programme.”

Yet there has been no dearth of reminders since the abortive 1999-2000 attempt to get India into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that the powerful anti-deterrent lobby has not fully reconciled to the country’s overt nuclearization. Unable to undo India’s nuclear-weapons-state status, this lot has sought to do the next best it can: Sell India’s nuclear soul. The deal, whose vaunted energy benefits now stand thoroughly discredited, mortgages India’s future security at the altar of US non-proliferation interests.

(c) Asian Age, 2008

Time to compel Musharraf to go into exile

The Jihad Culture of Pakistan

Though ruling under the pretext of preventing instability, Pakistan’s military regime is a threat to national and international security.

Brahma Chellaney

Japan Times, January 3, 2008

After having fretted over a rising pro-democracy tide, Pakistan’s ruling military can expect to be the main gainer from former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s killing at the very public park where the 1951 assassination of the country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, helped smother a fledging democracy and open the way to the military’s entry into politics.

Just as Pakistan become increasingly Islamized following the 1979 execution of Bhutto’s father — Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto — by the general who deposed him, the daughter’s assassination will help reinforce Islamist radicalization under continued military rule.

In fact, Bhutto — the first woman in modern world history to be democratically elected to govern an Islamic state — met her violent end three kilometers from where her father was hanged. Add to the family tragedy the separate killings of her two brothers, one poisoned in 1985 in the French Riviera and the other fatally shot in 1996, with both cases still unsolved.

With Pakistan’s politics today teetering on a knife’s edge, the main loser is likely to be President Pervez Musharraf, who is widely perceived to have done too little to protect Bhutto or to rein in the jihadists, some with cozy ties to his establishment. The official move to deflect public suspicion of regime involvement in the assassination by meretriciously laying the blame on the amorphous Al Qaeda has only highlighted the need for an independent international investigation along the lines of the United Nations probe into ex-Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s killing.

Given that Pakistan identified the two December 2003 assassination attempts on Musharraf as an inside job by charging four junior army officers and six air force men, suspicion is bound to linger that elements within an ever-more radicalized establishment bumped off Benazir — an outspoken critic of the jihadists who had emerged as the leader most likely to bring about political change in a country tired of its present military ruler.

Just days before her assassination, Bhutto said in a Washington Post interview that she was concerned that some of the people around Musharraf have sympathy for the militants and was “shocked to see how embedded” the state system of support for extremists is.

Musharraf’s credibility was in tatters even before the murder, but now his days in power appear more numbered than ever. In its 60-year history, Pakistan has already had four military takeovers and four Constitutions. With the assassination dimming the possibility of a democratic transition in a country of 165 million citizens where governments have always been booted out but never been voted out, a new military face could easily take over power on the pretext of saving an imploding state. Such a takeover will be inevitable if violent protests persist, the two main political parties shun Musharraf, and the U.S. (a key party in Pakistani politics) distances itself from the dictator it has propped up for long.

The likely perpetuation of military rule is not good news for international or regional security or for Pakistan’s own future, given how the country has sunk deeper in fundamentalism, extremism and militarism since the last coup in 1999. While the military will continue to defend its holding the reins of power as a necessary evil in the service of a greater good, its political role will only keep Pakistan on the boil.

For more than eight years, Musharraf has justified his dictatorship as vital for bringing stability to Pakistan even as his rule has taken it to the brink of disaster. “The country is paying a very heavy price for the many unpardonable actions of one man — Pervez Musharraf,” as former Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif put it. “These are the darkest days in Pakistan’s history. And such are the wages of dictatorship.” Today, a nuclear-armed, terror-exporting Pakistan has become a problem not just regionally but globally, with almost every major international terror attack since 9/11 being traced back to Pakistani territory. Pakistan has also been the source of the greatest leakage of nuclear secrets.

It is the military that created and nurtured the forces of jihad and helped Islamist groups gain political space at the expense of mainstream parties. Musharraf’s record is glaring: He welcomed with open arms the three jihadists India freed in late 1999 to end the hijacking of Flight IC-814, helping one to form the terrorist Jaish-e-Mohammed group and harboring another until his subsequent role in the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl could no longer be hidden. Musharraf has filled Pakistani jails more with democracy activists than with jihadists, even as he has used the threat from the latter to cling on to power.

Without the military’s vise on power being broken and the rogue Inter-Services Intelligence agency being tamed, Pakistan will continue to menace regional and international security. What steaming Pakistan needs is a safety valve in the form of democratic empowerment of its restive masses. But what military rule has created is a pressure-cooker society congenial to the continued growth of extremism.

Getting the military to return to the barracks, admittedly, has become more difficult. The generous spoils of power under Musharraf’s prolonged rule have fattened the military, which now controls fields as varied as agriculture and education and runs businesses ranging from banks to bakeries.

Add to that the new draconian powers that have been retained despite Musharraf’s lifting of the six-week emergency rule — declared to engineer his “reelection” as president. These powers allow Musharraf to continue muzzling the judiciary and media without attracting the odium of continued emergency rule. But the more powers Musharraf has usurped over the years, the more dependent he has become on his military and intelligence and, therefore, less able to sever their ties with extremist elements.

Yet another factor helping to keep the military in power is U.S. aid. Indeed, all Pakistani military rulers since the 1950s have oiled their dictatorships with copious aid from America, whose foreign policy has allowed narrow geopolitical objectives to override long-term interests. Since 2001 alone, the U.S. aid has totaled $11 billion, most of it in military hardware and cash support for Pakistan’s operating budget. So munificent has the aid been that the Pakistan military — the world’s fifth largest — now relies on Washington for a quarter of its entire budget.

Such aid, far from producing counterterrorist successes, has enabled Pakistan to become the main sanctuary of transnational terrorists, with U.S. officials admitting that much of the American money has been diverted to fund acquisition of large weapon systems against India. As the country next-door, India will be affected the most by any surge in Pakistani terrorism. In fact, the Al Qaeda network is now increasingly made up not of Arab and Afghan fighters but of homegrown Pakistani extremists.

Washington, however, still values the Pakistan military as a key instrument to advance its regional interests. Just as it helped keep the jihad-spewing General Zia ul-Haq in power for a decade to take on Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the U.S. seeks a pliant ruler in Islamabad today because it employs Pakistan as a gateway to military operations in Afghanistan, a base for clandestine missions into Iran and a vehicle for other geopolitical interests.

Consequently, the U.S. has neither leaned too heavily on Pakistan to achieve enduring antiterrorist results nor exposed its military’s complicity in the sale of nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea. It also has shied away from pressing Musharraf to make renegade nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan available for international questioning.

Today, President George W. Bush’s preoccupation with a self-created mess in Iraq cannot obscure a larger reality: Pakistan, not Iraq, is the central front in the global battle against terrorism. But before a disastrous U.S. policy on Pakistan starts to match the Iraq folly, Bush ought to end America’s reliance on the Pakistan military and his own misbegotten effort to help find a civilian mask for the Pakistani dictator.

Bhutto’s murder is a horrific reminder that unraveling Pakistan’s jihad culture won’t be easy but is essential. The battle against international terrorism cannot be won without demilitarizing Pakistan’s blood-soaked polity and de-radicalizing its society. Otherwise, Pakistan (which its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah bewailed was a “moth-eaten travesty”) could itself unravel.

Before yet another general makes a power-grab, the international community under U.S. leadership needs to step in to get the present ruler to cede power to an all-party government that inspires public trust and can hold free and fair elections. Musharraf is terminally unpopular and highly vulnerable at this juncture, and to let go of this opportunity would be to allow Pakistan to descend into an abyss of endless violence and terrorism. Having exiled others in the past, Musharraf — now the main font of discord in Pakistan — should be made to go into exile himself.

Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.

The Japan Times, 2008
(C) All rights reserved
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20080103bc.html

Pressure-cooker Pakistan needs a safety valve

Military is the problem

Steaming Pakistan needs a democratic safety valve

Brahma Chellaney

Times of India, January 3, 2008

After having fretted over a rising pro-democracy tide, Pakistan’s ruling military can expect to be the main gainer from Benazir Bhutto’s killing at the very public park where the 1951 assassination of the country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, paved the way for the military to step into politics. Just as Pakistan become increasingly Islamized following the 1979 execution of Bhutto’s father by the general who deposed him, the daughter’s assassination will help reinforce Islamist radicalization under continued military rule. In fact, she met her violent end three kilometres from where her father was hanged.

With Pakistan’s politics teetering on a knife’s edge, the main loser will be Musharraf, who did too little to protect Bhutto or to rein in the jihadists, some with continuing cosy ties to his establishment. Given that authorities identified the two December 2003 assassination attempts on him as an inside job by charging four junior army officers and six air force men, suspicion is bound to linger that regime-linked elements bumped off Bhutto, the most likely agent of political change in a country tired of its ruler. Just days before her murder, Bhutto said in a Washington Post interview that she was concerned that “some of the people around him [Musharraf] have sympathy for the militants” and “shocked to see how embedded” the state support for extremists is.

Musharraf’s credibility was in tatters even before the murder, but now his days in power appear more numbered than ever. In its 60-year history, Pakistan has already had four military takeovers and four Constitutions. With the assassination dimming the possibility of a democratic transition in a country where governments have always been booted out but never been voted out, a new military face could easily take over power on the pretext of saving an imploding state. Such a takeover will become certain if violent protests persist, the two main political parties shun Musharraf, and the US (a key party in Pakistani politics) moves away from the dictator it has propped up for long.

The likely perpetuation of military rule is not good news for international or regional security or for Pakistan’s own future, given how the country has sunk deeper in fundamentalism, extremism and militarism since the last coup. While the military will continue to defend its holding the reins of power as a necessary evil in the service of a greater good, its political role will only keep Pakistan on the boil. For more than eight years, Musharraf has justified his dictatorship as vital to bring stability to Pakistan even as his rule has taken it to the brink. Today, a nuclear-armed, terror-exporting Pakistan has become a problem not just regionally but globally.

Make no mistake: It is the military that created and nurtured the forces of jihad and helped Islamist groups gain political space at the expense of mainstream parties. Musharraf’s record is glaring: He welcomed with open arms the three extremists India freed to end the hijacking of Flight IC-814, helping one to form the terrorist Jaish-e-Mohammed and harbouring another until he kidnapped and murdered reporter Daniel Pearl. Musharraf has filled Pakistani jails more with democracy activists than with jihadists.

Without the military’s iron grip on power being broken and the rogue ISI being tamed, Pakistan will continue to menace regional and international security. What steaming Pakistan needs is a safety valve in the form of democratic empowerment of its restive masses. But what military rule has created is a pressure-cooker society congenial to the growth of extremism.

Getting the military to return to the barracks, admittedly, has become more difficult. The spoils of power have fattened the military, which now controls fields as varied as agriculture and education and runs businesses ranging from banks to bakeries. Add to that the new draconian powers that have been retained despite Musharraf’s lifting of the six-week emergency rule — declared to engineer his “re-election” as president. Yet another factor is US aid, which is so munificent that the Pakistan military — the world’s fifth largest — now relies on Washington for a quarter of its entire budget.

US policy, sadly, remains wedded to the Pakistan military. That needs to end, along with Bush’s misbegotten effort to help put a civilian mask on Musharraf, before a disastrous Pakistan policy starts to match the Iraq folly. Bhutto’s murder is a horrific reminder that unravelling Pakistan’s jihad culture won’t be easy but is essential. The battle against international terrorism cannot be won without demilitarizing Pakistan’s blood-soaked polity and de-radicalizing its society, or else Pakistan — Jinnah’s “moth-eaten travesty” — could itself unravel.

Musharraf once boasted that he is like a cat with nine lives. But given that he has already survived nine assassination attempts, he may be living on borrowed time. Before yet another general makes a power-grab, the international community under US leadership needs to step in to get the present ruler to cede power to an all-party government that inspires public trust and can hold free and fair elections. Musharraf is terminally unpopular and highly vulnerable at this juncture, and to let go of this opportunity would be to allow Pakistan to slip into a vortex of endless violence and terrorism. Having exiled others in the past, Musharraf should now be made to go into exile himself.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Opinion/LEADER_ARTICLE_Military_Is_The_Problem/articleshow/2670132.cms

Climate security as a new factor in international relations

CLIMATE CHANGE: A NEW FACTOR IN

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY?

Brahma Chellaney

Strategy (December 2007), Global Forces 2007

Australian Strategic Policy Institute

 

What we face today is a climate crisis that has arisen due to the relentless build‑up of

planet‑warming greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The ocean-atmosphere system that

controls the world’s climate has become vulnerable to adverse change. For long, global

warming had not been taken seriously, and even the few who did see its threat potential,

viewed the matter as simply an environmental or economic issue. Climate security is a new

concept, which acknowledges that global warming carries international and national security

implications. The most severe effects of climate change are likely to occur where states are

too poor or fragile to respond or to adapt adequately. If the world is to control or minimise

the likely major geopolitical and human-security consequences, climate change needs to be

elevated beyond scientific discourse to a strategic challenge requiring concrete counteraction

on the basis of a broad international consensus.

Intra-state and inter-state crises over water and food shortages, inundation of low-lying

areas, or recurrent droughts, hurricanes or flooding may lead to large displacements of

citizens and mass migrations, besides exacerbating ethnic or economic divides in societies.

It is thus important to examine the risks of global warming, including potential situations

in which climatic variations could be a catalyst for conflict within or between states. What

climate-change effects, for example, could destabilise the geopolitical environment and

trigger resource-related disputes or wars? Would resource-rich states seek to build virtual

fortresses around their national boundaries to preserve their advantage and insulate

themselves from the competition and conflict elsewhere? How would climate change

impinge on military operations?

Risk assessment is an essential component of strategic planning. Such assessment can help

focus attention on the key elements of climate security in order to evolve appropriate policy

responses to safeguard broader national security.

 

The broader context

Despite extensive research since the early 1990s, the extent of future climate change remains

uncertain and difficult to project. To some, global warming, far from causing gradual,

centuries-spanning change, may be beginning to push the climate to a tipping point. There

is no scientific evidence yet that the global climatic system is close to a critical threshold.

But there is ample evidence of accelerated global warming and the potential for adverse

security‑related effects resulting from unwelcome changes in climate.

The degree and pace of future climate change will depend on four factors:

(i) the extent of the energy- and development-related increase of greenhouse gases and

aerosol concentrations in the atmosphere

(ii) the impact of deforestation, land use, animal agriculture and other anthropogenic factors

on climate variation

(iii) the impact of natural influences (including from volcanic activity and changes in the

intensity of the sun) on climate variation

(iv) the extent to which temperature, precipitation, ocean level and other climatic features

react to changes in greenhouse-gas emissions, aerosol concentrations and other

elements in the atmosphere.

For example, clouds of aerosol particles from biomass burning and fossil-fuel consumption

are contributing to the accelerated thawing of glaciers. While aerosol particles play a

cooling role by reflecting sunlight back into space, they also absorb solar radiation and

thus contribute to global warming. According to a study by Veerabhadran Ramanathan

et al, which employed general circulation model simulations, the vertically extended

atmospheric brown clouds observed over the Indian Ocean and Asia, along with the increase

in anthropogenic greenhouse gases, ‘may be sufficient to account for the observed retreat of

the Himalayan glaciers’.1

The climate crisis is a consequence of the rapid pace of change in the contemporary world.

Technological forces are playing a greater role in shaping geopolitics than at any other

time in history. Political and economic change has also been fast-paced. Not only are new

economic powers emerging, but the face of the global geopolitical landscape has changed

fundamentally in the past two decades. As new actors emerge on the international stage,

the traditional dominance of the West is beginning to erode.

Such rapid change has contributed since the end of the Cold War to the rise of

unconventional challenges, including the phenomenon of failing states, growing

intrastate conflicts, transnational terrorism, maritime-security threats, and threats to

space-based assets. Climate change, although not a new phenomenon, belongs to this list

of unconventional challenges. As Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller has rightly put it,

‘In contrast to traditional foreign policy and security threats, climate change is not caused by

“hostile” enemies. It is different from terrorism, which we can fight, and weapons of mass

destruction, which we can destroy. This time it is not about political values. It is about our

production and consumption patterns’.2

The challenge of climate change is really the challenge of sustainable development. In the

continuing scramble to build economic security, energy security, food security, water security

and military-related security—all on a national basis—the world now is beginning to face

the harsh truth that one nation’s security cannot be in isolation of others. In fact, the rapid

pace of economic, political and technological change in the world is itself a consequence

of nations competing fiercely for relative advantage in an international system based

largely on national security. Climate change is a legacy of such assertive promotion of

national interests.

The climate crisis, of course, has been accentuated by rapid economic development in

Asia, which today boasts the world’s fastest-growing economies, besides the fastest-rising

military expenditures and the most dangerous hot spots. Asia, through its dynamism and

fluidity and as home to more than half of the world’s population, is set to shape the future

of globalisation. It also has a critical role in the fight against climate change, as underscored

by a recent Dutch report that China has now overtaken America as the world’s biggest

greenhouse-gas emitter on a national, rather than a per capita, basis.

It is true that a US resident is currently responsible, on an average, for about six times more

greenhouse-gas emissions than the typical Chinese, and as much as eighteen times more

than the average Indian. But it is also true that if Asians continue to increase their output of

greenhouse gases at the present rate, climate change would be seriously accelerated.

We should not forget, however, that Asia is only bouncing back from a 150-year decline,

and is now seeking to regain economic pre-eminence in the world. According to an Asian

Development Bank study, Asia, after making up three-fifths of the world’s GDP at the

beginning of the industrial age in 1820, saw its stake decline to one-fifth in 1945, before

dramatic economy recovery has helped bring it up to two-fifths today. In keeping with its

emerging centrality in international relations and relatively young demographics, Asia serves

as a reminder that the ongoing power shifts foreshadow a very different kind of world.

Like other unconventional challenges, the challenge thrown up by global warming can only

be tackled effectively by building and maintaining a broad international consensus. Indeed,

the ongoing power shifts in the world have made such consensus building a sine qua non

for the success of any international undertaking. With greater distribution of power, the

traditional America-centric and Euro-centric world is also changing. The old divides (like the

East-West and North-South) are giving way to new divides. Even though world economic

growth is at a thirty-year high, with global income now totalling $51 trillion annually, the

consensus on globalisation is beginning to fracture.

 

Strategic implications

Combating climate change is an international imperative, not merely a choice. The new

global spotlight on climate change has helped move the subject into the international

mainstream. There is now growing recognition that climate security needs to be an

important component of international security, as evidenced by the 2007 special debates on

climate change in both the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.

There is an ominous link between global warming and security, given the spectre of resource

conflicts, failed states, large-scale migrations and higher frequency and intensity of extreme

weather events, such as cyclones, flooding and droughts. Some developments would

demand intervention by the armed forces. Climate change has been correctly characterised

as a ‘threat multiplier’.

In terms of long-term geopolitical implications, climate stress could induce perennial

competition and conflict that would represent a much bigger challenge than any the world

faces today, including the fight against the al‑Qaeda or the proliferation of dual‑use nuclear

technologies among the so-called ‘rogue’ states. After all, climate stress, and the attendant

cropland degradation and scarcity of fresh water, are likely to intensify competition over

scarce resources and engender civil strife.

Such are its far-reaching strategic implications that climate change could also foster or

intensify conditions that lead to failed states—the breeding grounds for extremism,

fundamentalism and terrorism. Although an unconventional challenge by itself, climate

change is likely to heighten low-intensity military threats that today’s conventional forces

are already finding difficult to defeat—transnational terrorism, guerrilla movements

and insurgencies.

Furthermore, climate change could increase the severity, duration and the collateral impact

of a conflict, besides triggering mass dislocation. For example, the South Pacific islands, as

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said in the second of four reports

in 2007, are likely to be hit by an increased frequency of tropical storms and be battered by

rising sea levels, forcing the likely migration of many residents to Australia and New Zealand.

Besides worsening droughts and increasing fires and flooding in Australia and New Zealand,

global warming could threaten ecologically rich sites like the Great Barrier Reef and the

sub-Antarctic islands.

That is why climate change ought to be on the national and global security agenda.

Securitising the risks of climate change also helps to turn the issue from one limited to

eco-warriors to a subject of major international concern. That in turn may help facilitate the

heavy-lifting needed to give the problem the urgency and financial resources it deserves.

Having succeeded in highlighting climate change as an international challenge, however,

the emphasis now has to shift to building consensus on combating climate change.

Most importantly, the international community needs to move beyond platitudes to

agreed counteraction.

The security-related challenges posed by climate change can be effectively dealt with only

through a cooperative international framework. No international mission today can hope

to achieve tangible results unless it comes with five Cs: coherence, consistency, credibility,

commitment and consensus. Indeed, this is the key lesson one can learn from the way the

global war on terror now stands derailed, even as the scourge of transnational terrorism has

spread deeper and wider in the world.

Climate change is a real and serious problem, and its effects could stress vulnerable nations

and spur civil and political unrest. Yet the creeping politicisation of the subject will only make

it harder to build international consensus and cooperation on a concrete plan of action. Take

the insistence of some to add climate security to the agenda of the United Nations Security

Council. If climate change were to become part of the agenda of the Security Council—a

hotbed of big-power politics—it would actually undercut such consensus building. With

five unelected, yet permanent, members dictating the terms of the debate, we would get

international divisiveness when the need is for enduring consensus on a global response to

climate change.

Politics has also come in the way of reaching an agreement, even in principle, on defining

what is popularly known as the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ of the developed

and developing states. At the Group of Eight (G‑8) Outreach Summit in mid-2007 in

Germany, for instance, leaders of the G‑8 powers and the new Group of Five (G‑5) comprising

the five emerging economies—China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa—talked

past each other. The G‑8, in its declaration, asked ‘notably the emerging economies to

address the increase in their emissions by reducing the carbon intensity of their economic

development’. And the G‑5 retorted by placing the onus of dealing with climate change on

the developed nations, asking them to make significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions

first. ‘Greenhouse-gas mitigation in developed countries is the key to address climate change

given their responsibilities in causing it’, noted a G‑5 policy paper presented to the leaders of

the G‑8. This to-and-fro cannot hide the imperative for an equitable sharing of responsibility.

While being on the green bandwagon has become politically trendy, the action often

involves little more than lip service to climate security. Sometimes the political action makes

the situation only worse. Take the Bush Administration’s embrace of corn-derived ethanol.

The move does little to fight climate change or reduce US dependence on imported oil.

But it does a lot to create a windfall for the farm lobby by boosting grain prices. It began

as a promise of a free lunch—to encourage farmers to grow more corn so that ethanol

companies could use it to reduce America’s dependence on imported oil without affecting

US consumers. Instead it has shown that there can be no free lunch. The ripples from the

ethanol boom have already meant higher prices for corn, wheat, fertilizer and the food on

our table—and rising US dependence on imported fertilizers.

Generous subsidies are at the core of the Bush Administration’s goal of replacing over the

next decade 15% of domestic gasoline use with biofuels (corn ethanol and biodiesel). This

target is sought to be propped up through a subsidy of 51 cents a gallon for blending ethanol

into gasoline, and a import tariff of 54 cents a gallon to help keep out cheap sugarcane-based

ethanol from Brazil. To achieve that 15% target would require the entire current US corn crop,

which represents 40% of the global corn supply.

Having unleashed the incentives to divert corn from food to fuel, the United States is now

reaping higher food prices. The price of corn has nearly doubled since 2006. At the beginning

of 2006, corn was a little over $2 a bushel. Now in the futures markets, corn for December

2007 delivery is selling at $3.85 a bushel, despite projections of a record 12.5 billion-bushel

corn harvest in the United States this year. With corn so profitable to plant, farmers are

shifting acreage from wheat, soybeans and other grains, putting further upward pressure on

food prices. The losers are the poor. As of June 2007, a bushel of soybeans was up 36% from a

year earlier. The price of wheat is projected to rise 50% by the end of 2007.

With the European Union also jumping on the ethanol bandwagon, a fundamental issue

has been raised—how can ethanol be produced and delivered in keeping with the needs of

sustainable development? The political claim that corn-derived ethanol is environmentally

friendly has to be seen against the fact that, compared to either biodiesel or ethanol from

rice straw and switchgrass, corn has a far lower energy yield relative to the energy used to

produce it. It should also not be forgotten that growing corn demands high use of nitrogen-based

fertilizers—produced from natural gas. The 16% increase since 2006 in US corn

cultivation has resulted in a big surge in US fertilizer demand—as much as an extra 1 million

metric tons in 2007. There are two other factors that should not be overlooked—(i) because

ethanol yields 30% less energy per gallon than gasoline, the fall in mileage is significant; and

(ii) adding ethanol raises the price of blended fuel over unblended gasoline because of the

extra handling and transportation costs.

The craze for ethanol is also encouraging the felling of tropical forests in a number of

countries to make way for corn, sugar and palm-oil plantations to fuel the world’s growing

thirst for ethanol. That is senseless: to fight climate change, the world needs forests more

than ethanol. Forests breathe in carbon dioxide and breathe out oxygen every day, helping

to keep our planet cool. Besides storing carbon and reducing the effects of greenhouse-gas

emissions, forests filter pollution and yield clean water.

It is important to know that despite the justifiable attention on China’s rapidly growing

industrial pollution, the destruction of the world’s tropical forests contributes more to

global warming every year than the carbon-dioxide emissions from Chinese coal‑fired power

plants, cement and other manufacturing factories, and vehicles. Fortunately, the massive

enthusiasm over biofuels is now finally beginning to give way to realism and even concern

that biofuels pose a threat to global food security and biodiversity.

Another invidious way climate change is being politicised is through embellishment of the

technical evidence on global warming. Take the reports of the IPCC, a joint body of the World

Meteorological Organization and UN Environment Programme. Ever since the IPCC in 1990

began releasing its assessments every five or six years, the panel has become gradually wiser,

with its projected ocean-level increases due to global warming on a continuing downward

slide. As a body, the IPCC remains on a learning curve.

From projecting in the 1990s a 67-centimetre rise in sea levels by the year 2100, the IPCC has

progressively whittled down that projection by nearly half—first to 48.5 centimetres in 2001

and then to 38.5 centimetres in 2007. Should the world be worried by the potential rise of the

oceans by 38.5 centimetres within the next 100 years? You bet. We need to slow down such a

rise. But if a rise of 38.5 centimetres does occur, will it mean catastrophe? Not really.

If the world didn’t even notice a nearly 20-centimetre rise in sea levels in the past century, a

slow 38.5-centimetre ascent of the oceans over the next 100 years cannot mean a calamity

of epic proportions. Yet the scaremongering has picked up steam—‘the Netherlands would

be under water’, ‘millions would have to flee Shanghai’, ‘Bangladesh’s very existence would

be imperilled’.

Climate change is a serious challenge with grave security implications, but it doesn’t

mean we are doomed. It is important to see things in a balanced way. There can be

genuine differences in assessing the likely impact of global warming. The Stern Report,

for example, seems more alarmed over potential climate-change implications than the

IPCC.3 Such differences among experts are understandable. What is unconscionable is the

scaremongering. Doomsday ayatollahs should not be allowed to dictate the debate.

Yet another facet of the current climate-change geopolitics is that the term, global warming,

is being stretched to embrace environmental degradation unrelated to the effects of the

build-up of greenhouse gases and aerosol concentrations in the atmosphere. What has

climate change to do with reckless land use, overgrazing, contamination of water resources,

overuse of groundwater, inefficient or environmentally unsustainable irrigation systems,

waste mismanagement or the destruction of forests, mangroves and other natural habitats?

Some of these actions, of course, may contribute to climate variation but they do not arise

from global warming.

Climate change cannot be turned into a convenient, blame-all phenomenon. If man-made

environmental degradation is expediently hitched to climate change, it would exculpate

governments for reckless development and allow them to feign helplessness. In such a

situation, like the once-fashionable concept of human security, climate change could become

too diffused in its meaning and thereby deflect international focus from tackling growing

fossil-fuel combustion, the main source of man-made greenhouse gases.

It is important to distinguish between climate change and environmental change. Hurricane

Katrina and perennial flooding in Bangladesh, for instance, are not climate-change

occurrences but result from environmental degradation. Frequent flooding in Bangladesh

is tied to upstream and downstream deforestation and other activities resulting from

increased population intensity. Climate change, certainly, could exacerbate such flooding.

Given its serious long-term strategic implications, climate change calls for concerted

international action. But if counteraction were to be turned into a burden-sharing drill

among states, it would fail because distributing ‘burden’ is a doomed exercise. Neither

citizens in rich states are going to lower their living standards by cutting energy use, nor will

poor nations sacrifice economic growth, especially because their per-capita CO2 emissions

are still just one-fifth the level of the developed world.

What is needed is a new political dynamic that is not about burden-sharing but about

opportunity centred on radically different energy and development policies. This means not

only a focus on renewable energy and greater efficiency, but also a more-urgent programme

of research and development on alternative fuels and carbon-sequestration technologies.

CO2 is not dangerous to human beings by itself. But too much CO2 in the atmosphere is

dangerous for climate stability because it changes the heat balance between Earth and the

Sun. Yet CO2 emissions account for 80% of the planet-warming greenhouse gases. The other

20% share is made up of potent gases like methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride

(SF6). The man-made SF-6 is used to create light, foam-based soles to cushion joggers’ feet.

The European Union, with effect from June-end 2007, has rightly prohibited the sale of

such footwear. Methane, on the other hand, is released in coalmining, gas extraction, and

from landfill, cattle and various other sources. Methane capture, however, holds attractive

commercial value: it is the main ingredient of natural gas.

Given that the world has either developed or attempted to build common international

norms on trade, labour practices, human rights, nuclear non‑proliferation, etc., fashioning

common global standards on CO2 emissions is necessary. To help control excess carbon

intensity in the manufacture of goods, such standards could be made to apply to trade

practices, too. In the same way that we seek to ensure that imports are not the products of

child labour or other unfair labour practices, objective and quantifiable standards could be

developed to regulate trade in goods contaminated by carbon intensity.

That would help to put on notice countries that do not seem to care about the carbon

intensity of their manufacturing. Cheap imports, for example, from China—the world’s

back factory—would become subject to such standards, putting pressure on both large

importers like Wal‑Mart and Beijing itself to move towards more environmentally friendly

manufacturing. In the wake of the multiple scandals in 2007 over tainted Chinese food

and drug exports, such an exercise would be part and parcel of efforts to raise industry

standards and promote public-health and environmental safety. It could also help to instil

accountability: the importer of goods ought to be no less culpable in the emission of CO2

than the exporter.

If CO2 and non‑CO2 levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are not controlled, the

higher average temperatures in the world could adversely upset the climate balance on

which human civilisation and other species depend. Development and climate protection

have to be in alignment with each other, because it cannot be an ‘either or’ proposition.

Against this background, it is becoming apparent to most that the costs of inaction

outweigh the costs of action. The issue is not about horse-trade or burden. It is about

sharing opportunity to create a better future. The opportunity is also about promoting

green-technology developments. Ultimately, technology may offer salvation, given the

power and role of technological forces today. Even if geo-engineering options to fix climate

change are seen to belong to the realm of science fiction today, they still need to be pursued.

As the history of the past century shows, scientific discoveries that seemed improbable at

a given moment became a reality within years. Albert Einstein in 1932, for example, judged

the potential of nuclear energy as a mirage. But 13 years later, the cities of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki lay in nuclear ruins.

Likely security-related effects

The actual national security-related effects of climate change are likely to vary from region

to region. For example, Australia’s size, resources, small population and geographical location

position it better to cope with the effects of climate change. The same is the case with

Canada. Japan, an insulated island chain with rugged terrain, could rely on its impressive

social cohesion to induce resource conservation and other societal adaptation to climate

change. But some parts of the world are likely to be severely hit by climate change and suffer

debilitating security effects.

By and large, warming is expected to be the least in the islands and coastal areas, and the

greatest in the inland continental areas. Several studies have shown that global warming

is likely to actually strengthen monsoon circulation and bring increased rainfall in the

monsoonal seasons.4 Changes in non‑monsoon, or dry-season, rainfall have been more

difficult to assess. The likely increased rainfall suggests that climate change is not going

to be an unmitigated disaster. Rather, adaptation to climate change would demand the

development of new techniques.

Climate change is also likely to bring about important shifts in temperature patterns, a rise

in sea levels, and an increase in the frequency and intensity of anomalous weather events,

such as cyclones, flooding and droughts. These trends, cumulatively, could play havoc with

agriculture and also impact on conservation strategies. The weaker the economic and social

base and higher the reliance on natural resources, the more a community is likely to be

adversely affected by climate change.

While it is scientifically not possible to predict future events with any degree of certainty,

it is possible to draw some reasonable but broad conclusions, with the aim of controlling

anthropogenic factors contributing to climate change. The likely security-related effects of

climate change can be put in three separate categories:

1. Climate change is likely to intensify inter-state and intra-state competition over natural

resources, especially water, in several parts of the world. That in turn could trigger

resource conflicts within and between states, and open new or exacerbate existing

political disputes.

2. Increased frequency of extreme weather events like hurricanes, droughts and flooding,

as well as the rise of ocean levels, are likely to spur greater inter-state and intra-state

migration—especially of the poor and the vulnerable—from delta and coastal regions to

the hinterland. Such an influx of outsiders would socially swamp inland areas, upsetting

the existing fragile ethnic balance and provoking a backlash that strains internal and

regional security. Through such large-scale migration, the political stability and internal

cohesion of some nations could be undermined. In some cases, this could even foster or

strengthen conditions that could make the state dysfunctional.

3. The main casualty of climate change, clearly, is expected to be human security. Social

and economic disparities would intensify within a number of states, as climatic change

delivers a major blow to vulnerable sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, and to

low-lying coastal and delta areas. In an increasingly climate change-driven paradigm, the

tasks of good governance and sustainable development would become more onerous

and challenging.

The economically disruptive effects of ocean-level rise and frequently occurring extreme

weather events are likely to lead to create major national challenges, as those displaced are

forced to relocate inland. Jobs in the countryside, however, will not be easy to come by for

migrants who are compelled to move into the hinterland due to loss of their agricultural land

and production. That might only encourage mass influx into the already-crowded cities in the

developing world.

The impact of climate variability on society will mean change in the social‑economic-political

environments on which the security of individuals, communities and states rest. Such

variability would affect crop yields and the availability of water, energy and food, including

seafood. The case for angst over the security implications of climate change has been

underlined by an unclassified 2003 Pentagon study, which warned of large population

movements and contended that diplomatic action would be needed to control likely conflict

over resources in the most impacted areas, especially in the Caribbean and Asia. According

to the report,5 climate change would affect Australia’s position as a major food exporter,

while the food, energy and water situation in densely populated China would come under

severe strain by a decreased reliability of the monsoon rains and by colder winters and hotter

summers. It paints one possible scenario in these words: ‘Widespread famine causes chaos

and internal struggles as a cold and hungry China peers jealously across the Russian and

western borders at energy resources’.

The report hypothesised massive Bangladeshi refugee exodus to India and elsewhere, as

recurrent hurricanes and higher ocean level make ‘much of Bangladesh nearly uninhabitable’.

Other scenarios discussed in the report include the possibility of the United Stated building

a fortress around itself to shield its resources, besides getting locked in political tensions

with Mexico through actions such as a cut-off of water flow from the Colorado River into

lower‑riparian Mexico in breach of a 1944 treaty.

In general, according to the report, ‘Learning how to manage those populations, border

tensions that arise and the resulting refugees will be critical. New forms of security

agreements dealing specifically with energy, food and water will also be needed. In short,

while the US itself will be relatively better off and with more adaptive capacity, it will find

itself in a world where Europe will be struggling internally, [with] large number [of] refugees

washing up on its shores, and Asia in serious crisis over food and water. Disruption and

conflict will be endemic features of life’.

It should not be forgotten that in some situations, the effects of climate change are likely to

foster or intensify conditions that lead to failed or failing states. That in turn would adversely

impact regional and international security. In such cases, the more resource-secure countries

would have to either aid such states or face the security-related consequences from the

growing lawlessness and extremism there.

Notwithstanding the game of chicken currently being played between the North and the

South, it is the developing world that is likely to bear the brunt of climate change because it

has a larger concentration of hot and low-lying regions and lesser resources to technologically

adapt to climate change. The poorer a country, the less it would be able to defend its people

against the climate-change effects, which would potentially include more‑severe storms,

the flooding of tropical islands and coastlines, higher incidence of drought inland, resources

becoming scarcer, and a threat to the survival of at least one‑fourth of the world’s species.

While the overriding interest of developing countries is still economic growth and poverty

eradication, climate change can actually accentuate poverty. In fact, when rural economies

get weakened, livelihoods are disrupted and unemployment soars, frustrations and anger

would be unleashed, fostering greater conflict within and between societies.

 

Potential water wars

Two major effects of climate change are beyond dispute: (i) declining crop yields putting

a strain on food availability and prices: and (ii) decreased availability and quality of fresh

water owing to accelerated glacial thaw, flooding and droughts. The second factor can only

compound the first. In fact, water, food and energy constraints can be managed in inter‑state

or intra-state context through political or economic means only up to a point, beyond which

conflict becomes likely.

The likely impact on the availability of water resources is a critical component of the

security‑related challenges posed by climate change. Hundreds of millions of people in the

world are already without access to safe drinking water. This situation would aggravate

markedly if current projections of climate change come true. Accelerated snow melt from

mountains and faster glacier thaw could deplete river-water resources and potentially drive

large numbers of subsistence farmers into cities.

No region better illustrates the danger of water wars than Asia, which has less fresh water—

3,920 cubic metres per person—than any other continent outside of Antarctica, according to

a 2006 United Nations report.6 This report states that when the estimated reserves of lakes,

rivers and groundwater are added up, Asia has marginally less water per person than Europe

or Africa, one-quarter that of North America, nearly one-tenth that of South America and

twenty times less than Australia and Pacific islands. Yet Asia is home to 60% of the world’s

population. The sharpening Asian competition over energy resources, driven in part by high

GDP growth rates and in part by mercantilist attempts to lock up supplies, has obscured

another danger: water shortages in much of Asia are becoming a threat to rapid economic

modernisation, prompting the building of upstream projects on international rivers. If water

geopolitics were to spur interstate tensions through reduced water flows to neighbouring

states, the Asian renaissance could stall.

As Asia’s population booms and economic development gathers speed, water is becoming

a prized commodity and a potential source of conflict. Climate change threatens supplies

of this limited natural resource, with some Asian nations either jockeying to control

water sources or demanding a say in the building of hydro projects on inter-state rivers.

Competition over water is likely to increase political tensions and the potential for conflict.

Water, therefore, has emerged as a key issue that would determine if Asia is headed

toward mutually beneficial cooperation or deleterious interstate competition. No country

would influence that direction more than China, which controls the aqua-rich Tibetan

plateau—the source of most major rivers of Asia.

Tibet’s vast glaciers and high altitude have endowed it with the world’s greatest river

systems. Its river waters are a lifeline to the world’s two most-populous states—China and

India—as well as to Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand

and Vietnam. These countries make up 47% of the global population.

Yet Asia is a water-deficient continent. The looming struggle over water resources in Asia has

been underscored by the spread of irrigated farming, water-intensive industries (from steel

to paper making) and a growing middle class seeking high water-consuming comforts like

dishwashers and washing machines. Household water consumption in Asia is rising rapidly,

according to the UN report, but such is the water paucity that not many Asians can aspire

for the lifestyle of Americans, who daily use 400 litres per person, or more than 2.5 times the

average in Asia.

The spectre of water wars in Asia is also being highlighted both by climate change and by

man-made environmental degradation in the form of shrinking forests and swamps that

foster a cycle of chronic flooding and droughts through the depletion of nature’s water

storage and absorption cover. The Himalayan snow melt that feeds Asia’s great rivers could

be damagingly accelerated by global warming.

While intra-state water-sharing disputes have become rife in several Asian countries—from

India and Pakistan to Southeast Asia and China—it is the potential inter-state conflict over

river-water resources that should be of greater concern. This concern arises from Chinese

attempts to dam or redirect the southward flow of river waters from the Tibetan plateau,

where major rivers originate, including the Indus, the Mekong, the Yangtze, the Yellow, the

Salween, the Brahmaputra, the Karnali and the Sutlej. Among Asia’s mighty rivers, only the

Ganges starts from the Indian side of the Himalayas.

The lopsided availability of water within some nations (abundant in some areas but

deficient in others) has given rise to grand ideas—from linking rivers in India to diverting

the fast‑flowing Brahmaputra northward to feed the arid areas in the Chinese heartland.

Inter‑state conflict, however, will surface only when an idea is translated into action to

benefit oneself at the expense of a neighbouring nation.

As water woes have aggravated in its north owing to environmentally unsustainable

intensive farming, China has increasingly turned its attention to the bounteous water

reserves that the Tibetan plateau holds. It has dammed rivers, not just to produce

hydropower but also to channel the waters for irrigation and other purposes, and is

presently toying with massive inter-basin and inter-river water transfer projects.

Chinese hydro projects on the Tibetan plateau are increasingly a source of concern to

neighbouring states. For example, after building two dams upstream on the Mekong, China

is building at least three more on that river, inflaming passions downstream in Vietnam,

Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Several Chinese projects in west-central Tibet have a bearing

on river-water flows into India, but Beijing is loath to share information. After flash floods in

India’s northern Himachal Pradesh state, however, China agreed in 2005 to supply New Delhi

data on any abnormal rise or fall in the upstream level of the Sutlej River, on which it has

built a barrage. Discussions are still on to persuade it to share flood-control data during the

monsoonal season on two Brahmaputra tributaries, Lohit and Parlung Zangbo, as it already

does since 2002 on the Brahmaputra River, which it has dammed at several places upstream.

The ten major watersheds formed by the Himalayas and Tibetan highlands spread out

river waters far and wide in Asia. Control over the 2.5 million-square-kilometre Tibetan

plateau gives China tremendous leverage, besides access to vast natural resources. Having

extensively contaminated its own major rivers through unbridled industrialisation, China

now threatens the ecological viability of river systems tied to South and Southeast Asia in its

bid to meet its thirst for water and energy.

Tibet, in the shape and size it existed independently up to 1950, comprises approximately

one-fourth of China’s land mass today, having given Han society, for the first time in history,

a contiguous frontier with India, Burma, Bhutan and Nepal. Tibet traditionally encompassed

the regions of Ü-Tsang (the central plateau), Kham and Amdo. After annexing Tibet, China

separated Amdo (the present Dalai Lama’s birthplace) as the new Qinghai province, made

Ü-Tsang and western Kham the Tibet Autonomous Region, and merged remainder parts of

Tibet in its provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu.

The traditional Tibet is not just a distinct cultural entity but also the natural plateau, the

future of whose water reserves is tied to ecological conservation. As China’s hunger for

primary commodities has grown, so too has its exploitation of Tibet’s resources. And as

water woes have intensified in several major Chinese cities, a group of ex-officials in China

have championed the northward rerouting of the waters of the Brahmaputra River in a book

self-enlighteningly titled, Tibet’s Waters Will Save China.

Large hydro projects and reckless exploitation of mineral resources already threaten Tibet’s

fragile ecosystems, with ore tailings beginning to contaminate water sources. Unmindful of

the environmental impact of such activities in pristine areas, China has now embarked on

constructing a 108-kilometer paved road to Mount Everest, located along the Tibet-Nepal

frontier. This highway is part of China’s plan to reinforce its claims on Tibet by taking the

Olympic torch to the peak of the world’s tallest mountain before the 2008 Beijing Games.

As in the past, no country is going to be more affected by Chinese plans and projects in

Tibet than India. The new $6.2-billion Gormu-Lhasa railway, for example, has significantly

augmented China’s rapid military-deployment capability against India just when Beijing

is becoming increasingly assertive in its claims on Indian territories. This hardline stance,

in the midst of intense negotiations to resolve the 4,057-kilometer Indo-Tibetan border,

is no less incongruous than Beijing’s disinclination to set up what it had agreed to during

its president’s state visit to New Delhi last November—a joint expert-level mechanism on

interstate river waters.

Contrast China’s reluctance to establish a mechanism intended for mere ‘interaction and

cooperation’ on hydrological data with New Delhi’s consideration towards downstream

Pakistan, reflected both in the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (which generously reserves 56% of

the catchment flow for Pakistan) and the more-recent acceptance of World Bank

arbitration over the Baglihar Dam project in Indian Kashmir. No Indian project has sought to

reroute or diminish trans-border water flows, yet Pakistan insists on a say in the structural

design of projects upstream in India. New Delhi gladly permits Pakistani officials to inspect

such projects. By contrast, Beijing drags its feet on setting up an innocuous interaction

mechanism. Would China, under any arrangement, allow Indian officials to inspect its

projects in Tibet or accept, if any dispute arose, third-party adjudication?

If anything, China seems intent on aggressively pursuing projects and employing water as

a weapon. The idea of a Great South-North Water Transfer Project diverting river waters

cascading from the Tibetan highlands has the backing of President Hu Jintao, a hydrologist

who made his name through a brutal martial‑law crackdown in Tibet in 1989. In crushing

protestors at Tiananmen Square two months later, Deng Xiaoping actually took a page out of

Hu’s Tibet playbook.

The Chinese ambition to channel the Brahmaputra waters to the parched Yellow River has

been whetted by what Beijing touts as its engineering feat in building the giant, $25-billion

Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze—a project that has displaced a staggering 1.4 million

citizens. The Three Gorges Dam is just an initial step in a much-wider water strategy centred

on the Great South-North Water Transfer Project. While China’s water resources minister told

a Hong Kong University meeting in October 2006 that, in his personal opinion, the idea to

divert waters from the Tibetan highlands northwards seems not viable, the director of the

Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee said publicly that the mega-plan enjoys official

sanction and may begin by 2010.

The Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo to Tibetans) originates near Mount Kailash and,

before entering India, flows eastward in Tibet for 2,200 kilometres at an average height

of 4,000 meters, making it the world’s highest major river. When two other tributaries

merge with it, the Brahmaputra becomes as wide as 10 kilometres in India before flowing

into Bangladesh.

The first phase of China’s South-North Project calls for building 300 kilometres of tunnels

and channels to draw waters from the Jinsha, Yalong and Dadu rivers, on the eastern

rim of the Tibetan plateau. Only in the second phase would the Brahmaputra waters be

directed northwards. In fact, Beijing has identified the bend where the Brahmaputra forms

the world’s longest and deepest canyon just before entering India as holding the largest

untapped reserves for meeting its water and energy needs. As publicly sketched by the chief

planner of the Academy of Engineering Physics, Professor Chen Chuanyu, the Chinese plan

would reportedly involve using nuclear explosives to blast a 15-kilometre-long tunnel through

the Himalayas to divert the river flow and build a dam that could generate twice the power

of the Three Gorges Dam.

While some doubts do persist in Beijing over the economic feasibility of channelling Tibetan

waters northwards, the mammoth diversion of the Brahmaputra could begin as water

shortages become more acute in the Chinese mainland and China’s current $1.2 trillion

foreign-exchange hoard brims over. The mega-rerouting would constitute the declaration of

a water war on lower-riparian India and Bangladesh.

It is patently obvious that if water were to become an underlying factor in inter-state

tensions in Asia, and increasingly a scarce and precious commodity domestically, water wars

would inevitably follow. The water-related challenges also underscore the necessity for Asia

to adapt alternatives based on newer technologies and methods. Given that several Asian

states will inescapably have to reduce their reliance on the natural bounty of the Himalayas

and Tibetan highlands as temperatures rise and the glacier and snow melt accelerates,

efficient rain-water harvesting will have to be embraced. The silver lining for the continent is

that the rise in temperatures under enhanced greenhouse conditions is likely to bring more

rainfall through the South-West and South-East Monsoon in the summer and the North-East

Monsoon in the winter. The abundant monsoonal supply thus would need to be tapped

through cost-effective technologies to provide a practical answer to the challenges arising

from dwindling river waters.

 

Concluding observations

Climate change is not just a matter of science but also a matter of geopolitics. Without

improved geopolitics, there can be no real fight against climate change. The growing

talk on climate change is not being matched by action, not even modest action. Even as

some countries have succeeded in shining the international spotlight on climate change,

international diplomacy has yet to develop necessary traction to deal with the challenges of

global warming.

At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro,

189 countries, including the United States, China, India and all the European nations, signed

the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreeing to stabilise greenhouse gases

at a low enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate

system. Yet, fifteen years later, no country has done that. US per capita greenhouse-gas

emissions, already the highest of any major nation, continue to soar. A leaked Bush

Administration report in March 2007 indicated that US emissions were likely to rise almost

as fast over the next decade as they did during the previous decade. Now, renewed global

efforts are on to reach yet-another agreement to do what the international community had

promised to carry out fifteen years ago.

The Group of Eight (G‑8) agreed in June 2007 to try and clinch a new global UN-sponsored

climate change deal (to succeed or extend the Kyoto Protocol from 2013), but failed to agree

on a timetable for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, which went into

affect in February 2005, expires in 2012. But while the G‑8 leaders agreed to seek ‘substantial’

cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions and to give ‘serious consideration’ to the goal of halving

such emissions by 2050, this is still at the level of just talk.

The important point to remember is that about twenty countries produce 80% of global

CO2 emissions. So you don’t need all the 191 UN members on board to combat climate

change. One way to build international consensus on this issue is to engage states whose

CO2 emissions share is 1% or more.

It is also important to note that CO2 emissions are not exactly a function of the level of

development. The United States, for example, belches twice as much CO2 per capita as Japan,

although the two countries have fairly similar per-capita incomes. The US Environmental

Protection Agency admits that about 6.6 metric tonnes of greenhouse gases are emitted

per person in America, easily placing that country No. 1 in the world in per-capita emissions.

Take the case within the United States: California has held its per capita energy consumption

essentially constant since 1974, while per capita energy use for the United States overall

during the same period has jumped 50%. Through a mix of mandates, regulations and high

prices, California has managed to cut CO2 emissions and yet maintain economic growth. Now

it is seeking to reduce automobile pollution, promote solar energy and cap its CO2 emissions.

Yet another point to note is that a global climate policy alone will not solve the current

climate crisis. Climate change indeed may be the wrong end of the problem to look at. Given

that nearly two-thirds of the greenhouse-gas emissions are due to the way we produce and

use energy, we need to focus more on alternate energy policies.

Unless we address energy issues, we won’t be able to address climate change. Energy use,

however, sustains economic growth, which in turn buttresses political and social stability.

Today four-fifths of the world’s energy comes from fossil fuels—coal, oil, natural gas. Until

we can either replace fossil fuels with cost-effective alternatives or find practical ways to

capture CO2 emissions, the world would remain wedded to the fossil-fuel age. According

to projections by the Paris-based International Energy Agency, total energy demand in the

world is to rise 68% by 2030, with most of the increases occurring in developing countries.

Reliance on fossil fuels would marginally rise from 80% in 2002 to 82% in 2030. Given this

scenario, all states need to endeavour to reduce their energy intensity—the ratio of energy

consumption to economic output.

The harsh reality is that the global competition over energy resources has become

intertwined with geopolitics. This competition now is overtly influencing strategic thinking

and military planning in a number of key states. China, for example, cites energy interests

to rationalise its ‘string-of-pearls’ strategy, which aims to hold sway over vital sea lanes

between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through a chain of bases, naval facilities and military

ties. But if energy security has become a foreign-policy challenge, whether in Europe or in

Asia or elsewhere, why shouldn’t climate security similarly be made a foreign-policy issue?

If there is any good news on the climate-change front, it is the ongoing attitudinal shift in

the world—from the United States to Australia, and from China to Brazil. A prerequisite to

any policy shift is an attitudinal shift. In the coming years, the world hopefully will see policy

shifting both at the national and international levels to help build climate security.

It should not be forgotten that the human mind is innovative. History is a testament to

human civilisation successfully overcoming dire situations and warnings. It has averted, for

example, the ‘Malthusian catastrophe’, put forward by Thomas Malthus in a 1798 essay. The

thesis contended that population growth would outstrip the Earth’s agricultural production,

leading to famine and a return to subsistence-level conditions. Actually, with a lesser and

lesser percentage of human society engaged in agriculture, the world is producing more

and more food. If people are still going hungry, it is because of poverty. Another catastrophe

was predicted by a 1972 Club of Rome study, titled, Limits to Growth, which examined the

consequences on economic growth of a rapidly growing world population and finite resource

supplies. Indeed, since the study was released, global economic growth, far from showing

any limits, has continued to boom.

As a real and serious problem, climate change should be seen as challenging human ability

to innovate and live in harmony with nature. In the past, the international community

has indeed reached agreements on environmental challenges, such as the control of

trans-boundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes (the Basel Convention)7

and the phasing out of chlorofluorocarbons (the Montreal Protocol). The CFCs and other

chlorine- and bromine-containing compounds have been implicated in the accelerated

depletion of ozone in the Earth’s stratosphere. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That

Deplete the Ozone Layer, along with national‑policy decisions, compelled industry and the

scientific community to collaborate and develop safe alternatives to CFCs. That should inspire

hope for international action on controlling greenhouse gases as part of a public-private

partnership to create a Planet Inc. To propel such action and encourage industry to invest in

alternate technologies, a mix of economic incentives and regulations are vital.

 

Endnotes

1 Veerabhadran Ramanathan et al, ‘Warming Trends in Asia Amplified by Brown Cloud

Solar Absorption’, Nature, Volume 448, Number 7153 (2007).

2 Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller of Denmark, Speech at Chatham House, London, June 26,

2007. Official text released by the Danish foreign ministry.

3 The British government-commissioned report by Nicholas Stern, released in November

2006, contended that a temperature increase in the range of 5 degrees Celsius would

over time cause a sea-level rise enough to threaten the world’s top cities like London,

Shanghai, New York, Tokyo and Hong Kong. The Stern report also pointed to the need for

rapidly developing countries like China and India to be part of a global effort to tackle the

problem of climate change, even though the main responsibility (as the report admitted)

lies with rich nations that must act now to start reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.

4 P. Whetton, A.B. Pittock and R. Suppiah, ‘Implications of Climate Change for Water

Resources in South and Southeast Asia’, in Climate Change in Asia: Thematic Overview

(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1994); Robert T. Watson, Marufu C. Zinyowera Richard

H. Moss, David J. Dokken (Eds.), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special

Report on The Regional Impacts of Climate Change An Assessment of Vulnerability (1997);

R. Suppiah, ‘The Asian Monsoons: Simulations From Four GCMs and Likely Changes Under

Enhanced Greenhouse Conditions’, A.J. Jakeman and B. Pittock (eds.) Climate Impact

Assessment Methods for Asia and the Pacific, Proceedings of a regional symposium,

organised by ANUTECH Pty. Ltd. on behalf of the Australian International Development

Assistance Bureau 10–12 March 1993, Canberra, Australia (1994); Climate Impact

Group, Climate Change Scenarios for South and Southeast Asia (Aspendale, Australia:

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, 1992).

5 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its

Implications for National Security Scenario (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,

October 2003).

6 United Nations, The State of the Environment in Asia and the Pacific (New York:

United Nations, October 2006).

7 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and

their Disposal. Details at: http://www.basel.int/

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2007

2007 was a year of Chinese muscle-flexing

China puts muscle to policy

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY

Japan Times 

NEW DELHI — Rising economic and military power is emboldening Beijing to pursue a more muscular foreign policy. Having earlier preached the gospel of its "peaceful rise," China is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident of the muscle it has acquired.

From provocatively seeking to assert its jurisdiction over islets claimed by Vietnam in the South China Sea to whipping up diplomatic spats with Germany, Canada and the United States over their hospitality to the Dalai Lama, Beijing has shown an increasing propensity to flex its muscles.

Other such recent instances include China’s demolition of a few unmanned Indian forward posts at the Tibet-Bhutan-Sikkim tri-junction, its large-scale war game in the South and East China Seas, its public showcasing of new military hardware like the Jin-class, nuclear-capable submarine, its strategic moves around India, and its last-minute cancellation of a long-planned Hong Kong visit by the U.S. carrier, Kitty Hawk. Beijing also refused to let two American minesweepers enter Hong Kong harbor for shelter during a Pacific storm.

Ever since it surprised the world by successfully carrying out an anti-satellite weapon test last January, China’s communist leadership has been less coy about projecting national power. The apparent aim is to fashion a Beijing-oriented Asia. It seems unconcerned that its assertive stance has triggered anti-China demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and spurred unease in other neighboring states.

It is against this background that the heads of government of Asia’s other two major powers — Japan and India — are paying official visits to China. While Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s tour begins Thursday, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is scheduled to make a New Year visit two weeks later, as part of an agreement reached during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s November 2006 New Delhi visit "to hold regular summit-level meetings."

Little progress, however, can be expected during these visits toward resolving the territorial or maritime disputes that divide Japan and China, and India and China. Yet, if the China-India-Japan strategic triangle is to become stable, a settlement of those disputes is necessary. A first step to a settlement of any dispute is clarity on a line of control or appreciation of the "no go" areas so that provocative or unfriendly actions can be eschewed.

The best way for China and Japan to explore for hydrocarbons in the East China Sea is through joint development of fields, given the intricate, difficult-to-resolve claims and legal ambiguities. But China’s gunboat diplomacy across the median line in the East China Sea and unilateral drilling moves have impeded such progress.

The world’s two most populous nations, China and India, have been scowling at each other across a 4,057-km disputed Indo-Tibetan frontier. Protracted negotiations over the past 26 years have failed to remove even the ambiguities plaguing this long line of control. Beijing, seeking to keep India under strategic pressure, has been loath to clearly define the front line.

Singh’s visit is to follow more than a year of assertive Chinese moves that have run counter to declared efforts to build a stable Sino-Indian relationship based on equilibrium and forward thinking.

Two things have happened. One, China has hardened its stance on territorial disputes with India. And two, as the Dalai Lama pointed out in a recent address in Rome, Beijing is taking an increasing harsh position on Tibet, pretending there is no Tibetan issue to resolve.

The Tibet issue is at the core of the India-China divide, and without Beijing beginning a process of reconciliation and healing in Tibet and coming to terms with history, there is little prospect of Sino-Indian differences being bridged.

Beijing itself highlights the centrality of the Tibet issue by laying claim to Indian territories on the basis of alleged Tibetan ecclesial or tutelary links to them, not any professed Han connection.

With the Dalai Lama having publicly repudiated such claims, a discomfitted Beijing has sought to persuade the Tibetan government-in-exile to support China’s position that India’s northeastern Arunachal Pradesh state is part of traditional Tibet. The fact is that with China’s own claim to Tibet being historically dubious, its claims to Indian territories are doubly suspect, underlining its attempts at incremental annexation.

The uncompromising Chinese approach contrasts sharply with the forbearing positions of the Indian government and the Dalai Lama. New Delhi, for instance, has bent over backward to play down recent aggressive Chinese military moves along the ill-defined line of control.

The Dalai Lama, for his part, is beginning to face muted criticism from restive Tibetans for having secured nothing from Beijing two decades after changing the struggle for liberation from Chinese imperial conquest to a struggle for autonomy within the framework of the People’s Republic. As the Dalai Lama himself admitted in Rome, "Our right hand has always reached out to the Chinese government. That hand has remained empty."

Examples of China’s increasing hardline stance on India range from the Chinese ambassador’s Beijing-supported bellicose public statement on Arunachal Pradesh on the eve of Hu’s visit, to the Chinese foreign minister’s May 2007 message to his Indian counterpart that China no longer felt bound by a 2005 agreement that any border-related settlement should not disturb settled populations. Add to that the October admission by the chief of India’s Indo-Tibetan Border Police that there had been 141 Chinese military incursions in the preceding 12-month period alone.

Beijing’s strategy is to interminably drag out its separate negotiating processes with India and the Dalai Lama’s envoys in order to wheedle out more and more concessions.

In line with that, China’s negotiators have been in full foot-dragging mode, seeking to keep the discussions merely at the level of enunciating principles, positions and frameworks — something they have done splendidly in negotiations with India since 1981 and with the Dalai Lama’s envoys since 2002.

As several Chinese scholars have acknowledged, Beijing is not as keen as New Delhi to resolve the territorial disputes. Having got what it wanted either by military aggression or furtive encroachment, Beijing values its claims on additional Indian territories as vital leverage.

Similarly, not content with the Dalai Lama’s abandonment of the demand for independence, Beijing continues to publicly vilify him and portray his envoys’ visits for negotiations as personal trips. It has further tightened its vise on Tibet by ordering that all lama reincarnations must get its approval, renewing political repression, and encouraging the "Go West" Han-migration campaign.

It is not accidental that China’s hardline approach has followed its infrastructure advances on the Tibetan plateau, including the opening of a new railway, airfields and highways. The railway, by arming Beijing with a rapid military-deployment capability against India, is transforming the trans-Himalayan military equations.

How the China-Japan, China-India and Japan-India equations evolve in the coming years will have a critical bearing on Asian security. But through its growing assertiveness, China is already showing that its rise is dividing, not uniting, Asia.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is a regular contributor to The Japan Times.

The Japan Times: Wednesday, Dec. 26, 2007

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