The Dangers of Policy
Mint, February 11,
It may be the lack of a real opposition in the country that
allows the government to make abrupt shifts in foreign policy under external
persuasion without so much as offering a reasoned explanation to the Indian
public for the switch.
India first fell in line on Afghanistan at the London
conference, organized principally to gain an international stamp of approval for
U.S. President Barack Obama’s strategy to negotiate a deal with the “moderate”
Taliban (as if there can be moderates in an Islamist
militia that enforces medieval practices). The external affairs minister
returned from London saying India was
willing to give that strategy a try.
Soon thereafter, New Delhi
announced it was resuming dialogue with Pakistan at the foreign secretary
level. What prompted New Delhi
to do that? Mum is the word. What has Pakistan done or delivered on the
anti-terror front to deserve this gesture? The answer: nothing. Yet, once again,
dialogue has been delinked from terrorism, as if the Indian leadership has
learned nothing from the Sharm-el-Sheikh goof.
Government decisions anchored neither in a well-thought-out
strategy nor in principles can only undermine national interests. No sooner had
New Delhi announced its U-turn on Pakistan than Washington upped the annual U.S.
aid for Islamabad from the next fiscal year to $3.2 billion — a historic high. What
Obama is providing Pakistan
in one year is exactly the amount one of his predecessors, Ronald Reagan, gave Pakistan over
six years. Yet New Delhi
has not made a peep.
It was left to an ex-U.S. senator,
Larry Pressler, to urge India
to speak up on the dangerous drift in Washington’s
Afpak strategy, including propping up Pakistan with generous aid and lethal-arms
transfers. “When the U.S.
leaves Afghanistan, India will have a Pakistan
‘on steroids’ next door and a Taliban state to deal with in Afghanistan,” according to
With Obama pushing for a deal with the Pakistan-backed
Afghan Taliban, Islamabad
already is feeling vindicated. Obama is
sending an additional 30,000 U.S.
troops not to militarily rout the Taliban but to strike a deal with the enemy
from a position of strength. As his top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has admitted,
the aim of the surge is to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, not to
beat back the insurgency.
U.S. Ambassador Karl
Eikenberry has put it in his leaked November cables to Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, “More troops won’t end the insurgency as long as Pakistan
sanctuaries remain.” Yet,
Washington already is holding indirect talks
with the Afghan militia’s shura, or
top council, whose members are holed up in Quetta,
capital of Pakistan’s
sprawling Baluchistan province. The talks have
been conducted through the Pakistani, Saudi and Afghan intelligence agencies. McChrystal has cited Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates as a possible
venue for formal talks.
The more sensible thing to do would be to dismantle the
Pakistani military’s sanctuaries and sustenance infrastructure for the Afghan
Taliban and militarily decapitate the latter’s command center in Baluchistan. But Obama has not hidden his intent to end
war before he comes up for reelection in 2012. Indeed, as if to hearten the Afghan Taliban and their
sponsors, the Pakistani military, he has reiterated July 2011 as the
timeline for a gradual U.S.
military withdrawal to begin.
To facilitate his pursuit of such narrow interests, Obama
has been pressuring India
to come on board. And to rationalize the planned Faustian bargain with the
Taliban, the White House has drawn a specious distinction between Al Qaeda and the Taliban and sought to discriminate
between “moderate” Taliban and those that rebuff deal-making. So, McChrystal classifies the
thuggish Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a moderate because he is “most likely to cut a
The Afghan Taliban
leadership — with an elaborate command-and-control structure oiled by
petrodollars from Arab sheikhdoms and proceeds from opium trade — operates from
the comfort of sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Fathered by Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence and midwifed by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency in 1994, the Taliban rapidly emerged as a Frankenstein’s monster. Yet
President Bill Clinton’s administration acquiesced in the Taliban’s ascension
to power in Kabul
in 1996 and turned a blind eye as that militia, in league with the ISI,
fostered narcoterrorism and swelled the ranks of the Afghan war alumni waging
however, the chickens came home to roost. In declaring war on the Taliban in
October 2001, U.S.
policy came full circle. Now, desperate to save a faltering military campaign, U.S. policy is coming another full circle as Washington advertises its readiness to strike a deal with
the Quetta shura.
which is on the front lines of the global fight against international
terrorism, is likely to bear the brunt of the blowback of Obama’s Afpak
strategy, just as it came under terrorist siege as a consequence of the
Reagan-era U.S. policies in that belt. A Talibanized Pakistan with a Taliban
government in Afghanistan would encourage every violent
Islamic group that can inflict mass casualties on civilians in India.
The U.S., separated
by a cushion of thousands of miles, thinks it can get away by playing dangerous
games in the Afpak belt. But as a friend, India
should be openly advising the U.S.
against seeking to unwittingly repeat the very mistakes of past American
policy that have come to haunt Western and Indian security. That’s what friends are for.
To toe the U.S.
line on Afpak deferentially
is to become an accessory in the current lurch toward disaster.
Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic
studies at the Centre for Policy Research.