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Professor, strategic thinker, author and commentator

A slew of distortions over the U.S.-India nuclear deal

Stretching The Truth

The Hindustan Times, September 18, 2008

 

Phoney claims are being repeated to mould public perceptions on the India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, writes Brahma Chellaney.

 

As if the corrosion of its state institutions was not enough, India is being pummelled by an officially scripted onslaught of half-truths and outright deception over the vaunted Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Phoney claims are being repeated even after they stand publicly discredited by President George W. Bush’s latest ‘Hyde Package’ to Congress and his administration’s earlier leaked letter to a congressional panel. It is as if truth no longer matters.

 

Can the obsessive deal-peddling take precedence over everything? Has no thought been given to the lasting damage that an unabashedly partisan approach relying on politicized bureaucrats and spin doctors would wreak? If the refusal to hold the traditional monsoon session of Parliament is unprecedented — setting a precedent toxic for the future of democracy — no less ominous is the deliberate spread of a slew of distortions to push the deal-making, without the consensus-building Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had promised. Making false claims without any qualms, especially to cover up broken promises to Parliament, is no mean matter.

 

The U.S. says loudly the deal is fully governable by its Hyde Act, an India-specific NPT. But New Delhi still markets the loosely worded 123 agreement as the only binding document — an accord that actually arms the U.S. with a unilateral right to suspend cooperation “immediately”. Bush publicly asserts that the 123 agreement’s fuzzy fuel-supply assurances do not “transform these political commitments into legally binding commitments”. Recipient India responds by trying to give international-law lessons to supplier America.

 

The leaked letter embarrassingly discloses that “the Indian government shares our understanding” that fuel-supply assurances are not “meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear-explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments”. The letter derides as “a high level of generality” the PM’s claim in Parliament about a linkage between “lifetime” fuel supply and perpetual international inspections.

 

The PM tells Parliament India has “secured upfront” a “permanent consent” to reprocess spent fuel. Bush publicly contradicts him by saying this right “will not come into effect until India establishes a new national reprocessing facility” and agrees to special “arrangements and procedures” with the U.S. in the years ahead. And Bush’s ‘Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement’ attests that the reprocessing consent, once granted, can be withdrawn. However inadvertently, Washington has helped bust several other Indian claims, including that New Delhi has accepted inspections only by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

 

Yet, deal-aggrandizing distortions continue to swirl at such a pace that they get picked up and recycled as facts by a pliable media before anyone can controvert them. Flogging fabrications indeed has proven so useful in shaping public perceptions that claims are becoming more brazen. Take the claim that the deal marks the end of the technology-control regime against India.

 

Easing high-technology and civilian-space export controls is not even part of this deal. What the deal seeks to open are lucrative exports for “IAEA-safeguarded” Indian facilities while specifically denying dual-use technologies. In return for being allowed to import commercial power reactors and fuel under tight safeguards, India has been made to accept conditions that no nuclear-weapons state will countenance.

 

Bush’s ‘Hyde Package’ makes clear the U.S. has no intent to allow any sensitive transfers, including of civil enrichment and reprocessing technology. The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group waiver, similarly, is based on an understanding not to export sensitive items to India. This understanding, reflected in the various national statements, part of the negotiating record, should be seen against the Hyde Act’s open call to “further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies”.

 

Indeed, Section 3(a) of the NSG waiver explicitly ties exports to India to the NSG Guidelines’ Paragraphs 6 and 7, which incorporate a presumption of denial of sensitive items. This restriction is reinforced by the Guidelines’ Part 2, Paragraph 4. With the NSG nearing consensus to impose an overt ban on sensitive sales to a non-NPT state like India, what is now implicit will become explicit. As for dual-use technologies, the NSG Guidelines already annex an exhaustive list of such items barred for export.

Contrast this with the PM’s July 22 contention in Parliament that the deal frees “trade in dual-use high technologies” and his September 6 claim that the NSG waiver “marks the end … of the technology-denial regime”. All technology controls against India ought to go. But even after the deal takes effect, India will still face barriers to high-technology flow, including the U.S. Commerce Department’s dual-use export controls.  The U.S. Congress, for instance, has cross-linked civil nuclear cooperation to the continuance of U.S. export controls against New Delhi in an unrelated area, with the Hyde Act stipulating that U.S. missile sanctions law (which prohibits dual-use space exports) will still apply to India even after it “unilaterally adheres” (as it quietly did last week) to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

If high-technology and civilian-space trade is to be opened fully, it will require New Delhi to do more than pull the wool on public eyes at home — persuade Washington to apply to India the same standard it does to another non-NPT state, Israel. The partisan rancour springing from the deal’s political mismanagement has done India a great disservice. The truth-stretching threatens to do worse.

Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.aspx?sectionName=&id=ed78240b-bff0-4f02-96e5-3ec1b482812bNucleardealimbroglio_Special&&Headline=Stretching+the+truth

Indian leadership pursues deal-making at the cost of deterrent-building

Mortgaging nuclear crown jewels

The Indian leadership’s nuclear deal-making comes at the cost of deterrent-building. If the deal takes effect, India will become another Pakistan to U.S. policy, locked in a dependent relationship, with its nuclear crown jewels effectively mortgaged.

Brahma Chellaney

The Hindu, September 17, 2008

 

Whatever happened to India’s vaunted "credible minimal deterrent?" Despite having Asia’s oldest nuclear programme, India still does not have a minimal, let alone credible, deterrent, as defined by its own nuclear doctrine. Yet to secure a dubious civil nuclear deal, India is allowing the various good-faith declarations it made on July 18, 2005, to be turned into binding, enforceable international commitments. If this deal takes effect, India can forget about being a strategic peer of China. It will become another Pakistan to U.S. policy, locked in a dependent relationship, with its nuclear crown jewels effectively mortgaged.

The idea to build energy “security” by importing high-priced, foreign fuel-dependent power reactors is an absurdity — a money-spending boondoggle that is sure to rake up kickbacks for some but leave India insecure and buffeted by outside pressures. The deal, in effect, will ensnare India in a wide non-proliferation net and undermine its autonomy to build a full-fledged deterrent. India has already paid a heavy international price for its nuclear programme, but its deterrent capabilities remain nascent, thanks to the tentativeness and pusillanimity of those who have led it over the years. But just when it seemed ready to take off, it is being fastened to oppressive non-proliferation constraints whose sum effect would be, as U.S. Democratic vice presidential nominee Joseph Biden said earlier, “to limit the size and sophistication of India’s nuclear-weapons programme.”

With India wedged in a unique nuclear crescent stretching from Israel to China, a deal effectively capping its deterrent capability at the present rudimentary level will be a grievous blunder. Yet, as symbolized by his refusal to celebrate the 10th anniversary four months ago of India going overtly nuclear, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh remains fixated on deal-making, instead of deterrent-building. Dr. Singh’s polarizing single-mindedness on the ballyhooed deal has injected bitter divisiveness into an issue that centres on the future of India’s nuclear programme. Had Dr. Singh done what he had repeatedly promised — “build the broadest possible national consensus” — India would not have undercut its negotiating leverage. By turning it into a matter of personal prestige and desperately wanting a successful outcome, he has allowed the deal to attract, however inadvertently, additional conditions at every stage of its evolution.

Certain give-and-take is inevitable in any deal. But this deal has picked up such onerous conditions that it now threatens to cast a political albatross around India’s neck. To help build a personal legacy, the deal-making threatens to saddle the country with a damaging legacy. This is execrable, given the unparalleled manner India’s internal and external security has come under serious strain on Dr. Singh’s watch. At a time of growing insecurity, India can ill-afford to narrow its future strategic options. Yet, aided by a hundred spin doctors and an impressionable national media, the deal has been parlayed in larger-than-life dimensions, with its benefits liberally embellished and its fetters cloaked.

India’s constantly shifting goalpost can be seen from the manner it went from demanding a “clean and unconditional” exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to seeking just a “clean” waiver, and then agreed with the U.S. to one text revision after another in Vienna, rendering the NSG process outcome pretty messy. That is exactly the path it treaded earlier to secure the U.S. legislative waiver (in the form of the conditions-laden Hyde Act), the bilateral 123 Agreement and the safeguards accord. The blunt fact is that the NSG waiver, however cleverly worded, cannot allow India to escape from the U.S.-set conditions by turning to other suppliers, as the publicly released correspondence between the Bush administration and the House Foreign Affairs Committee brings out starkly.

Any material violation of the eclectic non-proliferation commitments India is assuming will trigger a cut-off of cooperation by all supplier-states, leaving its civil power reactors high and dry, yet subject to permanent international inspections. Indeed, the greater the investments it makes in imports-based generating capacity, the greater will be its vulnerability to external penal actions and the constriction of its strategic options. Today, its goal of erecting a credible and survivable nuclear deterrent, as the private intelligence service Stratfor has put it, remains at least a decade away.

The manner a nuclear deal can be employed as a foreign-policy instrument has been underscored by the U.S. action to punish Russia over Georgia by scuppering a key deal with Moscow that was until recently a top Bush priority. That deal would have opened extensive U.S.-Russian nuclear trade, besides allowing Moscow to import, store and possibly reprocess spent fuel from proposed U.S. reactor exports to countries like India. If America can openly invoke a deal as a castigatory instrument against nuclear peer Russia, it certainly would have less hesitation to do so against an India that would become hopelessly dependent on foreign fuel and replacement parts under a patently inequitable deal whose fuel-supply assurances, in Bush’s own words, are not legally binding but mere “political commitments,” ostensibly to help Dr. Singh save public face. After all, didn’t the U.S. invoke that very instrument against India in response to its 1974 test, impeding deterrent-building and instilling the political timidity that has come to epitomize the Indian state?

The latest deal-making ought to be seen as culmination of the process the U.S. set in motion in 1974 to bring India to heel. It imposes on India obligations that no other nuclear-armed state will countenance. The watertight civil-military separation, for instance, will destroy what the then Atomic Energy Commission chairman, R. Chidambaram, in 1996 described as “the lateral synergy which exists between the one and the other … You can’t have one without the other.” It also compels India to shut down its main military-production workhorse, the Cirus reactor — the biggest cumulative contributor of weapons-grade plutonium to India’s stockpile, as a recent U.S. Energy Department-funded study by Paul Nelson et al points out. Given that work on a replacement reactor has not begun to date, the Cirus dismantlement in two years’ time will surely result in a significant shortfall in bomb-grade plutonium production.

In addition, the deal seeks to qualitatively and quantitatively crimp deterrent-building through varied non-proliferation fetters. The deal-tied U.S.-legislative and multilateral review processes will subject to the glare of international scrutiny Indian nuclear actions and activities, including any “significant changes,” as the Hyde Act mandates, “in the production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced.”

While inhibiting deterrent-building as per the U.S. goal to keep India’s capabilities regionally confined, the deal would help instil Indian security dependency on America. In fact, more than commercial nuclear power, it is U.S. arms exports and closer Indo-U.S. strategic ties that the deal is likely to promote. Before long, Dr. Singh is expected to sign three agreements that U.S. officials are pressing to forge closer bilateral military ties. One is a logistic support accord, another is to provide for end-use monitoring of transferred U.S. weapon systems, and the third is to promote military-communications interoperability.

Since the deal was unveiled, India has agreed to buy systems the U.S. has already sold Pakistan, including maritime reconnaissance aircraft, military transport planes and Harpoon missiles. This raises the question whether New Delhi is seeking to build a first-rate military with strategic reach and an independent nuclear deterrent, or a military that will remain irredeemably dependent on imports and serve as a money-spinning dumping ground for conventional weapons India can do without. A gas leak this year killed an Indian officer and five sailors on board a 1971-vintage amphibious transport ship junked by the U.S. navy and bought by India months earlier.

Such reckless and wasteful arms purchases at the expense of an indigenous deterrent will become more common, if the nuclear deal takes effect. While offering an immensely lucrative opening for outside vendors, the deal will saddle India with a retarded deterrent. India is being effectively tethered to an India-specific NPT, the Hyde Act, with Bush’s legislative submissions to win congressional ratification labelled the “Hyde Package.” Even the NSG waiver is in harmony with the Hyde Act, mirroring its core conditions. It is still not too late for New Delhi to step back from the precipice of a self-injurious deal and return to the unfinished task of deterrent-building, or else India will remain for the foreseeable future a subcontinental power with global power pretensions.

 

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author, most recently, of Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan.

Controversy over U.S.-India nuclear deal hasn’t done anyone any good

Nuclear Distraction

By BRAHMA CHELLANEY
WALL STREET JOURNAL
September 10, 2008

The U.S.-India civil nuclear deal came one step closer to final approval over the weekend, as the international Nuclear Suppliers Group granted its imprimatur. Yet the controversy over the proposed pact remains as fierce as ever, not least in India. As a result, ironically, it’s still possible the deal could end up distracting both sides from the hard work of deepening their relationship.

This is mainly a consequence of how the deal has been oversold by politicians both in New Delhi and in Washington. From the time it was unveiled more than three years ago as an agreement-in-principle, its backers have framed the deal in terms of broader strategic objectives. Supporters in India have argued it will cement U.S.-India ties and facilitate technology transfers in fields beyond commercial nuclear power. Backers in the U.S. have argued the deal will make it easier for Washington to call on India as a counterweight to China’s influence, and expand commercial opportunities for Americans.

But none of these claims is entirely realistic. In fact, these arguments merely distort the debate. In India, the nuclear deal has become a flashpoint for partisan debates about India’s place in the world and how it should manage its relationship with the U.S. This will make the deal, and possibly the relationship, less stable if power changes hands between parties in a general election in India due at the latest by next April. And it’s created unrealistic expectations in Washington.

In short, the hype over the nuclear deal needs to be tempered by certain realities.

First among these is that a durable U.S.-India partnership cannot be built on strategic opportunism, but rather must grow from shared national interests. In coming years, India will increasingly be aligned with the West economically. But strategically it can avail itself of multiple options, even as it moves from nonalignment to a contemporary, globalized strategic framework. In keeping with its long-standing preference for policy independence, India is likely to become multialigned, while tilting more toward the U.S.

Some clarity on this point from the deal’s backers in New Delhi might have made it easier to secure support. It would also have helped had Prime Minister Manmohan Singh done what he had repeatedly promised: "build the broadest possible national consensus in favor of the deal." He should not have turned the deal into an openly partisan issue, for it will have to be implemented well after his government’s term.

The danger now is that if the opposition wins the national election, it may re-open negotiations on the nuclear deal. That could risk sending the wrong signal about India’s general commitment to maintaining positive relations with the U.S., given the significance this particular deal has assumed in that relationship.

The deal’s backers in Washington have also been guilty of overselling it, albeit in different ways. On the strategic level, they have argued that the deal will bring India into the U.S. camp as a regional counterweight to China’s growing influence. But it appears unlikely that India would allow itself to be used as a foil against an increasingly assertive China, lest Beijing step up military pressure along the long disputed Himalayan frontier and surrogate threats via Pakistan, Burma and Bangladesh. India, as would any country, will continue to craft policy based on its own interests.

The Bush administration is also going overboard in touting the commercial benefits. As Bush administration letter to Congress, released last week, states, the deal is supposed to help revive the U.S. nuclear-power industry through exports and "access to Indian nuclear infrastructure," allowing "U.S. companies to build reactors more competitively here and in the rest of the world — not just in India." With its acute shortage of nuclear engineers, the U.S. intends to tap India’s vast technical manpower.

But not all of this is entirely realistic, especially expectations that India will be a boom market for U.S. nuclear exports. Even with the deal, nuclear power will continue to play a modest role in India’s energy mix. With the proposed import of eight 1,000-megawatt reactors within the next four years, the share of nuclear power in India’s electricity generation is unlikely to rise above the current 2.5%.

The Indian economy will probably not get much of a boost from the deal as a result. Furthermore, private investment in nuclear power will be hindered by many factors. The messy terms of the deal itself, with its many eclectic provisions designed to assuage nonproliferation concerns, will still impose many barriers on the transfer of nuclear fuel and technology, and not all of the conditions are even explicitly spelled out. Political uncertainty in India will also remain given the strong partisan opposition. And time is short to ratify the pact in Washington before elections in the U.S. bring in a new Congress and new administration.

The nuclear deal does play a role in bolstering U.S.-India ties (albeit not as much as politicians would have you believe). India has agreed to fully support U.S. nonproliferation initiatives, for example, and to consider participating in U.S.-led multinational military operations. And as a thank-you for the role President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice personally played in securing the suppliers group’s approval, Prime Minister Singh is expected to sign shortly three agreements that U.S. officials say are critical to forge closer bilateral military ties. These will facilitate cooperation on logistical operations, provide for monitoring of the end uses of transferred weapons systems, and enhance communications interoperability. But the two sides could have made progress on all these fronts independent of a civil nuclear deal.

The deal may also benefit ongoing negotiations over sales of military equipment to India. In addition to the orders it recently placed for American maritime reconnaissance aircraft and military transport planes, India — one of the world’s biggest arms importers — is gearing up to buy other American weapon systems. If Congress ratifies the nuclear deal, America is most likely to clinch the intense international competition to sell India 126 fighter-jets in a $10-billion contract. In this contest, Lockheed Martin has pitched its F-16 against Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

Yet such progress isn’t dependent on a civil nuclear deal. Indeed, that may be the greatest danger of the current discussion. Because it has become such a controversial issue, the nuclear deal is threatening to overwhelm the broader dialogue India and the U.S. need to sustain about their relationship. The raging controversy hasn’t done anyone any good.

Mr. Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author, most recently, of "Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan" (HarperCollins, 2007).

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122098853203415865.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Spin overwhelms reality on Indo-U.S. nuclear deal

Nowhere to hide from Hyde

 

As had been pledged by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the NSG waiver has turned out to be “fully consistent” with the Hyde Act, mirroring its core conditions on India. Yet, New Delhi’s continuing efforts to spin reality betray a consummate contempt for the intelligence of the Indian people.

 

Brahma Chellaney

Asian Age, September 10, 2008

 

What happens when the government of the day refuses to hold the traditional monsoon session of Parliament, lets loose countless spin doctors on a malleable national media and relies largely on information control to thrust a controversial nuclear deal on the nation? The result is what you saw last weekend: orgiastic self-congratulation and breathless newspaper headlines like, “India Enters Nuclear Club”, “Nuclear Dawn” and “From A Pariah To A Power”.

 

It was as if India had finally come of age by testing intercontinental-range nuclear capability. The exultation, however, was over a deal that would cap India’s still-nascent nuclear-weapons capability and turn the country’s nuclear-power industry from self-reliance to imports dependency while leaving the national exchequer poorer by billions of dollars.

 

            The elation over a conditional exemption for India from the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group rules should come as no surprise: the Indian press ran fairly similar headlines less than two years ago when the U.S.-legislative waiver was approved — the so-called Hyde Act. Today that very Act has come to symbolize abominable conditions.

Before long, reality will catch up with the latest spin, too. The NSG exemption indeed conditions exports to India to three layers of riders:

(i)                  New Delhi indefinitely honouring its July 18, 2005, commitments;

(ii)                Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s September 5, 2008, pledges; and

(iii)               satisfying all the myriad provisions of Parts 1 & 2 of the NSG Guidelines, except the “full-scope” rule calling for international inspections on each and every nuclear facility.

That the Hyde Act represents the mother of all conditions can be seen from the shadow it has cast over the NSG waiver. Consider the following:

 

Despite the NSG exemption, India says it will await the outcome of the U.S. congressional ratification process before signing bilateral agreements with other suppliers, including France and Russia. Why? Because in conformity with the Hyde Act, which stipulates that an NSG exemption for India should not take effect before the final congressional consent, New Delhi reached an understanding with Washington prior to the NSG waiver not to sign contracts with other suppliers until the U.S. Congress had done its part. Mukherjee has gone to the extent of calling that understanding “the procedure”.

 

This is just one example of how New Delhi itself honours the Hyde Act while speciously claiming the bilateral 123 Agreement supersedes that Act. Even after the recently disclosed Bush administration letter made it explicit that America is bound also by the Hyde Act and the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act, New Delhi still claims the 123 Agreement is the only binding document.

 

Mukherjee phrased several of his September 5 pledges to the NSG in language echoing the Hyde Act’s India-specific stipulations. In doing so, he went beyond India’s July 2005 commitments.

 

The Hyde Act wants India to support “international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants”. Mukherjee obligingly has pledged, “We support international efforts to limit the spread of ENR equipment or technologies to states that do not have them”. The Hyde Act asks for “substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol”, and Mukherjee deferentially assures “early conclusion of an Additional Protocol”.

 

The Act demands efforts to minimize the risk of “regional arms races”, and Mukherjee submits India will stay away from “any arms race, including a nuclear arms race” and temper “the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility”. His promise, to work for “the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime”, also echoes the Act’s call.

 

Just as the Hyde Act classifies India as a non-nuclear-weapons state (NNWS) and makes it subject to the U.S.legal provisions valid for NNWSs, the NSG waiver applies nuclear-trade conditions set for NNWSs. Apart from being allowed to retain some nuclear facilities in the military realm, India is being treated, both by the U.S. and NSG waivers, as a NNWS, for all intents and purposes.

 

By linking transfers to India to compliance with the extensive, technically couched conditions in Parts 1 & 2 of the NSG Guidelines — terms applicable only to NNWSs — the US-led cartel has cast a wide non-proliferation net, with India now required to abjure activities proscribed for NNWSs, including testing.

Mirroring the Hyde Act’s bar on the transfer of civil reprocessing, enrichment and heavy-water technologies or equipment (except for a multinational or U.S.-supervised facility in India), the NSG waiver is based on a publicly acknowledged understanding not to export such items to India. This understanding is no surprise in view of the Hyde Act’s open call “to further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India”.

 

Indeed, the NSG waiver explicitly ties sensitive exports to the presumption of their denial contained in NSG Guidelines Paragraph 6 (titled, “Special Controls on Sensitive Exports”) and Paragraph 7 (“Special Controls on Export of Enrichment Facilities, Equipment and Technology”).

While the Hyde Act’s bar on Indian testing is explicit, the one in the NSG waiver is implicit, yet unmistakeable. The waiver is overtly anchored in NSG Guidelines Paragraph 16, which deals with the consequence of “an explosion of a nuclear device”. The waiver’s Section 3(e) refers to this key paragraph, which allows a supplier to call for a special NSG meeting, and seek termination of cooperation, in the event of a test or any other “violation of a supplier-recipient understanding”.

The leaked Bush administration letter has cited how this Paragraph 16 rule will effectively bind India to the Hyde Act’s conditions on the pain of a U.S.-sponsored cut-off of all multilateral cooperation. As Japan has placed on the NSG record following the waiver approval, “the logical consequence” of an Indian test would be “to terminate trade”. Put simply, India will not be able to escape from the U.S.-set conditions by turning to other suppliers.

Yet, even as India’s voluntary test moratorium has been turned into a multilateral legality, New Delhi is still seeking to pull the wool on public eyes.

Like the Hyde Act, the NSG waiver seeks to crimp the Indian deterrent’s space by subjecting Indian actions and activities to the glare of international scrutiny. While the Hyde Act demands that “the President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed” about “significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material produced”, the NSG is to regularly “confer and consult” with India on its pledges. The NSG waiver even raises the spectre of new conditions but offers India only empty “consultations” on future amendments.

 

Against this background, is it any surprise that, just as they did after the Hyde Act’s passage, the spin doctors have fanned out across the airwaves to claim the NSG waiver as another “victory” for India? Looking straight into the camera, they fib, betraying a consummate contempt for the intelligence of the Indian people.

 

It is worth pausing to remember Abraham Lincoln’s words:It is true you may fool all of the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all of the time; but you can’t fool all of the people all of the time”.

 

http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/opinion/op-ed/nowhere-to-hide-from-hyde.aspx

Text of the India-related waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG)

NSG Rule-Change Allowing Civil Nuclear Cooperation With India

1. At the Plenary meeting on September 6, 2008, the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group decided that they:

a. Desire to contribute to the effectiveness and integrity of the global non-proliferation regime, and to the widest possible implementation of the provisions and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

b. Seek to avert the further spread of nuclear weapons;

c. Wish to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of all states;

d. Seek to promote fundamental principles of safeguards and export controls for nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes; and

e. Note the energy needs of India.

2. Participating Governments have taken note of the steps that India has voluntarily taken with respect to the following commitments and actions:

a. Deciding to separate civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and to file a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with IAEA, in accordance with its Separation Plan (circulated as INFCIRC/731);

b. Concluding negotiations with the IAEA and obtaining approval by the Board of Governors on August 1, 2008, for an “Agreement between the Government of India and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities,” in accordance with IAEA safeguards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Bovernors Document GOV/1621);

c. Committing to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India’s civil nuclear facilities;

d. Refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread;

e. Instituting a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment and technology;

f. Harmonizing its export control lists and guidelines with those of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and committing to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group guidelines; and

g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and its readiness to work with others towards the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

3. Based on the commitments and actions mentioned above, as reiterated by India on September 5, 2008, and without prejudice to national positions thereon, Participating Governments have adopted and will implement the following policies on civil nuclear cooperation with IAEA-safeguarded Indian civil nuclear program:

a. Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) of INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part 1, Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA-safeguarded civil nuclear facilities, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as revised, and provided that transfers of sensitive exports remain subject to paragraphs 6 and 7 of Guidelines.

b. Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of INFCIRC/254/Rev .7/Part 2, Participating Government may transfer nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA-safeguarded civil nuclear facilities, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of INFCIRC/254/Part 2, as revised.

c. At each Plenary, Participating Governments shall notify each other of approved transfers to India of Annexure A and B items listed in INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as revised. Participating Governments are also invited to exchange information, including about their own bilateral agreements with India.

d. With a view to intensification of dialogue and cooperation with India, the Chairman is requested to confer and consult with India and keep the Plenary informed of these consultations.

e. Participating Governments will maintain contact and consult through regular channels, including the Consultative Group and Plenary, for the purpose of considering matters connected with the implementation of all aspects of this Statement, taking into account relevant international commitments or bilateral agreements with India. In the event that one or more Participating Governments consider that circumstances have arisen which require consultations, Participating Governments will meet, and then act in accordance with Paragraph 16 of the Guidelines.

4. In order to facilitate India’s adherence to INFCIRC/254/Parts 1 and 2 and to remain current in its implementations of the Guidelines, the NSG Chair is requested to consult with India regarding changes to and implementation of the Guidelines and inform the Plenary of the outcome of the dialogue with India. Consultations with India regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their effective implementation by India. 

5. Upon request by Participating Governments, the Chairman is requested to submit this Statement to IAEA Director General with a request that it be circulated to all Member States.

U.S. disclosure puts Indian prime minister on the defensive

Revelations unravel hype and spin

The nuclear deal poses one of the most divisive challenges India has ever faced. The latest U.S. revelations on its conditions point to the manner the deal has been politically mismanaged by the Indian government.

Brahma Chellaney  The Hindu newspaper, September 5, 2008

The Bush administration had imposed a virtual gag order on its January 2008 written responses to congressional questions because their public disclosure, as the state department acknowledged, would contradict the Indian government’s claims and torpedo the nuclear deal. “We’ve handled answers to sensitive questions in an appropriate way that responds to congressional concerns,” the department said last March, ruling out their public release.

Oddly, the House Foreign Affairs Committee kept the administration’s unclassified answers under wraps for nearly eight months until the committee’s new chairman — a known deal critic — made them public this week to help build pressure on the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to impose explicit conditions on India, too. The pointed questions and the candid replies, contained in the 26-page released letter available at http://www.hcfa.house.gov/110/press090208.pdf, reveal the following:

First, the deal involves no binding U.S. fuel-supply assurance. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had told the Lok Sabha on August 13, 2007 that “detailed fuel supply assurances” by the U.S. for “the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors” are “reflected in full” in the 123 Agreement. But the letter discloses the U.S. will render help only in situations where supply disruption results “through no fault” of India’s, such as a trade war or market-related conditions. The supply assurances, it states, are not “meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear-explosive test or a violation of nonproliferation commitments.”

What is embarrassing for New Delhi is that the letter reveals that, “We believe the Indian government shares our understanding of this provision.”

Second, the deal is explicitly conditioned to India not testing again. Dr. Singh told the Lok Sabha as recently as July 22, 2008 that, “I confirm there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns.” The Bush administration letter, however, reveals that India has been left in no doubt that all cooperation will cease “immediately” if it tested.

“As outlined in Article 14 of the 123 Agreement, should India detonate a nuclear-explosive device, the United States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with India immediately, including the supply of fuel, as well as request the return of any items transferred from the U.S., including fresh fuel,” it states.

Third, the letter affirms that the 123 Agreement is in “full conformity” with the Hyde Act. In a press release on July 2, 2008, the Prime Minister’s Office made the following claim: “The 123 Agreement clearly overrides the Hyde Act and this position would be clear to anyone who goes through the provisions.” But the Bush administration, in answer to the question whether the 123 Agreement “overrides the Hyde Act regarding any conflicts, discrepancies or inconsistencies,” has stated that the accord is “fully consistent with the legal requirements of the Hyde Act.”

Fourth, the U.S. says it has retained the right to suspend or terminate supplies at its own discretion. The disclosed letter, by affirming an unfettered U.S. right to suspend all supplies forthwith, plainly contradicts Dr. Singh’s assertion in Parliament on August 13, 2007 that an “elaborate multi-layered consultation process” would help protect India from a Tarapur-style fuel cut-off. The letter also reveals the U.S. has the right to suspend or terminate cooperation in response to Indian actions that extend beyond a test, including “material violation” of the 123 Agreement or the safeguards accord with the IAEA.

Even after cooperation has been formally terminated, India — the letter points out — would remain subject to “the application of safeguards (Article 10), reprocessing consent (Article 6) and peaceful use (Article 9),” as per the 123 Agreement.

Fifth, there is no explicit U.S. consent to India’s stockpiling of lifetime fuel reserves for safeguarded power reactors. Dr. Singh had on August 13, 2007 vouched for “U.S. support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply for the lifetime of India’s reactors.” But the Bush administration’s letter states that the 123 Agreement’s provisions are in no way inconsistent with the Hyde Act’s stipulation — the so-called Obama Amendment — that the supply of fuel be “commensurate with reasonable operating requirements.” It contends that “it is premature to conclude that the strategic reserve will develop in a manner inconsistent with the Hyde Act,” meaning that India will be able to stockpile fuel only for “reasonable operating requirements,” a concept it acknowledged had been left undefined.

Sixth, the letter makes clear the 123 Agreement has granted India no right to take corrective measures. Rather, India’s obligations are legally irrevocable. The issue of what India meant by “corrective measures,” the letter stated, could be clarified only in the safeguards accord. (The recently concluded safeguards accord, however, makes only a passing preambular reference to “corrective measures,” without defining the term.) The letter further indicates there is no link between perpetual safeguards and perpetual fuel supply, with the permanence of safeguards being “without conditions.”

Contrast this with what Dr. Singh claimed August 13, 2007: “India’s right to take ‘corrective measures’ will be maintained even after the termination of the Agreement.” Or Dr. Singh’s assurances to Parliament since March 2006 that India’s acceptance of perpetual international inspections will be tied to perpetual fuel supply. In fact, the Bush administration letter mockingly calls Dr. Singh’s statement on explicit linkage “a high level of generality.”

Seventh, the letter states the “U.S. government will not assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items, whether under the Agreement or outside the Agreement.” That rules out the U.S. transfer of civil reprocessing and enrichment equipment or technologies to India even under safeguards. The letter suggests that the hope enshrined in Article 5(2) of the 123 Agreement of a future amendment to permit sensitive transfers was merely intended to help the Indian government save face in public.

Under the 123 Agreement, India has agreed to forego reprocessing until it has, in the indeterminate future, won a separate, congressionally vetted agreement, after having built a new, state-of-the-art, dedicated reprocessing facility. The new facility, as the letter says, will take “many years” to design and build. But the letter also indicates that no U.S. export of items for this facility will be permitted, given that reprocessing is a “sensitive” activity.

Recently, Dr. Singh told Parliament that the deal “will open up new opportunities for trade in dual-use high technologies … to accelerate industrialization of our country.” The letter, however, discloses that the deal is to specifically deny dual-use nuclear technologies and items. Easing high-technology and civilian space export controls is not part of this deal.

Eighth, the letter, contradicting Dr. Singh’s claim in Parliament, acknowledges that the 123 Agreement provides for “fall-back safeguards.” In addition to the Hyde Act mandating “fall-back U.S. safeguards” through Section 104 (d)(5)(B)(iii) in case “budget or personnel strains” in the IAEA render it “unable” to fully enforce inspections, the 123 Agreement provides for fall-back safeguards, the letter states.

Given that international inspections on India’s entire civilian programme will cost millions of dollars annually and entail deployment of many technical experts, the U.S. intent is to ensure that, in the event the IAEA is unable to arrange such resources, India does not escape with less intrusive or stringent safeguards than those applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states.

Dr. Singh has denied that India had agreed to safeguards by any entity other than the IAEA. But the Bush administration letter reveals that, “The Government of India has expressed its view that for the purposes of implementing the U.S.-India Agreement, Agency safeguards can and should be regarded as being ‘in perpetuity.’ At the same time it fully appreciates that paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the [123] Agreement does not limit the safeguards required by the Agreement to Agency safeguards” [emphasis added].

In light of these revelations, is it any surprise that systematic efforts have been made in India to inflate the deal’s benefits and shroud its conditions? The partisan manner the deal has been pursued, ever since it was sprung as a surprise on the nation in July 2005, has only undermined India’s negotiating leverage. Consequently, the deal has attracted additional conditions at every stage of its evolution. The NSG process will be no exception.

Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author, among others, of “Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S.-India Conflict.”

Indian prime minister’s polarizing obession with nuclear deal

Thanks, but no thanks 

Brahma Chellaney

DNA newspaper, September 1, 2008

India’s
leadership deficit has never been more conspicuous. Internal security has come
under serious strain. External security is no better. Yet, the government seems
reluctant to shed its ostrich-like approach. Even the falling GDP growth rate
has not stirred the government into action.

            The prime
minister’s fixation on one issue — the Indo-US nuclear deal — is clearly
proving costly. What has been a legacy-building issue for him threatens to
saddle the country with a political albatross. The US realizes that Manmohan Singh,
having invested immense political capital in the deal, desperately wants a
successful outcome. A failed deal would represent a serious loss of face for
him, given the manner he has staked his reputation and government’s future on
this issue. For the US,
this means an opportunity to load the deal with more conditions.

            By playing
the good cop and acquiescing to some of its Western allies playing the bad cop
in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, the US has succeeded in driving home
the message that the NSG will not approve without conditions a waiver to its
rules. Such has been the message’s effect that India itself has moved the goalpost
— from a “clean and unconditional” NSG exemption to seeking just a “clean”
waiver. Put simply, New Delhi
will accept an NSG waiver if the built-in conditions are so couched that it can
publicly save face. A “clean” waiver would be one whose conditions are not
obtrusive.

            Some
conditions implicit in the earlier US draft — discussed at the August 21-22 NSG
meeting — could, however, become explicit. The earlier draft was cleverly worded, although in essence it conformed to the
Hyde Act. First, it sought to spread
a wide non-proliferation net around India by
demanding its compliance with the entire set of NSG rules. 
Apart from being allowed to
retain some nuclear facilities in the military realm, India was to be treated, for all
intents and purposes, as a non-nuclear-weapons state and thus subject to the non-proliferation
conditions applicable to such states — a provision also built into the Hyde
Act. This stipulation will remain in the waiver.

            Second, the earlier draft’s
implicit test ban on India
may now become more explicit. The rejected draft had first listed India’s
commitments, including to a test moratorium, and then recommended permitting
exports to “safeguarded” Indian nuclear facilities, “provided that the transfer
satisfies all other provisions” of Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines. Given
that these guidelines relate to transfers to non-nuclear-weapons states, India was
being asked to abjure activities proscribed for non-nuclear-weapons states. But
now with several NSG members demanding a more-explicit prohibition, the choice
is to replicate the Hyde Act’s unambiguous Section 106 language or emulate the
semantic jugglery of the 123 Agreement.

Third, on the issue of prohibiting India’s
access
to
civil enrichment and reprocessing technologies, the choice before the NSG is no
different than on the test ban. The rejected draft incorporated an implicit
prohibition on such technology exports by stipulating that the transfers
satisfy
the various provisions of NSG Guidelines, which (in Part 2,
Section 4) carry a presumption of denial of reprocessing and enrichment
equipment and technology even under safeguards. While the Hyde Act incorporates
an explicit embargo, and even mandates that the US
“work with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further
restrict the transfers” of such technologies to India, the 123 Agreement’s
prohibition is tacit.

            Whatever the waiver’s final
shape, the blunt fact is that the various good-faith declarations made by India in the July 18, 2005, joint statement with
the US
are all being turned into binding, enforceable commitments multilaterally,
after having been explicitly incorporated into the Hyde Act and implicitly into
the 123 Agreement
. Today, India is being asked to unilaterally
adhere to the guidelines of a cartel that won’t admit it as a member
. If the NSG were to change its
guidelines in the future to impose new conditions — a spectre the rejected
draft raised, only to offer empty consultations with New Delhi on subsequent
amendments — India will find itself at the receiving end, after having invested
billions of dollars in imported, foreign fuel-dependent reactors.

            The reason the deal has
become very divisive in India
is because it has been politically mismanaged. By turning it into a partisan
issue domestically, New Delhi
has only weakened its leverage in negotiations. It is thus no surprise that the
deal has attracted newer conditions at every stage of its evolution. The NSG
process will be no exception. But rather than spin the NSG outcome as another
“victory” for India,
the wise course then would be to say thanks, but no thanks.  


© 2005-2008 Diligent Media Corporation Ltd. All rights reserved.

Bush administration’s answers to congressional questions on the U.S.-India nuclear deal

Embarrassing revelations on the nuclear deal

Brahma Chellaney Rediff September 3, 2008

The Bush administration, through a gag order on its written responses to congressional questions, had sought to keep the Indian public in the dark on the larger implications of the nuclear deal, lest the accord run into rougher weather. But now its 26 pages of written answers have been publicly released by a senior congressman.

The administration’s January 2008 letter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee — made public by Representative Howard L. Berman (the committee chairman) and available at http://www.hcfa.house.gov/110/press090208.pdf — confirms facts that were known but were being denied by the Indian government. Consider the following:

 

The U.S. has given no binding fuel-supply assurance to India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had told the Lok Sabha on 13 August 2007 that “detailed fuel supply assurances” by the U.S. for “the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors” are “reflected in full” in the 123 Agreement. But the Bush administration has denied this. Its letter to the House Committee states that the U.S. will render help only in situations where “disruptions in supply to India … result through no fault of its own,” such as a trade war, or market disruptions, or an American company’s inability to deliver. “The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of nonproliferation commitments,” the letter said.

What is embarrassing for New Delhi is that the letter reveals that, “We believe the Indian government shares our understanding of this provision.”

The letter also affirms that the U.S. has given no legally binding fuel-supply assurance of any kind to India, only “presidential commitments” subject to U.S. law.

 

No U.S. consent to India’s stockpiling of lifetime fuel reserves for safeguarded power reactors. Prime Minister Singh had told the Lok Sabha on 13 August 2007 that, “This Agreement envisages, in consonance with the Separation Plan, US support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply for the lifetime of India’s reactors.” But the Bush administration’s letter to the House Committee clearly signals that India will not be allowed to stockpile such fuel stocks as to undercut U.S. leverage to re-impose sanctions.

The letter states that the 123 Agreement’s provisions are in no way inconsistent with the Hyde Act’s stipulation — the so-called Obama Amendment — that the supply of fuel be “commensurate with reasonable operating requirements.” It contends that “it is premature to conclude that the strategic reserve will develop in a manner inconsistent with the Hyde Act,” meaning that India will be able to stockpile fuel only for “reasonable operating requirements”, a concept left undefined.

 

U.S. civil nuclear cooperation is explicitly conditioned to India not testing ever again. Prime Minister Singh told the Lok Sabha as recently as 22 July 2008 that, “I confirm that there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns. All that we are committed to is a voluntary moratorium on further testing.” Last year, he had told Parliament that, “There is nothing in the Agreement that would tie the hands of a future Government or legally constrain its options to protect India’s security and defense needs.” The Bush administration, however, has told the House Committee that India has been left in no doubt that all cooperation will cease “immediately” if New Delhi conducted a test. “As outlined in Article 14 of the 123 Agreement, should India detonate a nuclear-explosive device, the United States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with India immediately, including the supply of fuel, as well as request the return of any items transferred from the United States, including fresh fuel,” the letter states.

 

After the public release of the letter, the state department had this to say on the testing issue: "The Indians understand what our views are with regard to nuclear testing. We have made them clear. And they understand those. There was no attempt to cover up anything." Department spokesman Robert Wood went on to say: "Certainly, India’s obligations under the 123 agreement are very clear and the Indians have agreed to a moratorium on testing. And we expect they will adhere to that commitment."

 

The U.S. has retained the right to suspend or terminate supplies at its own discretion. The Bush administration letter plainly contradicts the Prime Minister’s assertion in Parliament on 13 August 2007 that, “An elaborate multi-layered consultation process has been included with regard to any future events that may be cited as a reason by either Party to seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the [123] Agreement.” The letter states that the U.S. right to suspend all supplies forthwith is unfettered. And that the U.S. has the right to suspend or terminate cooperation in response to Indian actions that extend beyond a nuclear test, including “material violation” of the 123 Agreement or the safeguards accord with the IAEA.

Even after cooperation has been formally terminated, India — the letter points out — would remain subject to “the application of safeguards (Article 10), reprocessing consent (Article 6) and peaceful use (Article 9)," as per the Hyde Act. While the Indian government continues to say it will be bound only by the 123 Agreement, the Bush administration letter makes it explicit that the U.S. will be bound also by the Hyde Act and the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act. 

 

The letter makes clear that the 123 Agreement has granted India no right to take corrective measures in case of any fuelsupply disruption. Rather, India’s obligations are legally irrevocable. The issue of what India meant by “corrective measures,” the letter stated, could be clarified only in the safeguards accord. [The recently concluded safeguards accord, however, makes only a passing preambular reference to “corrective measures,” without defining the term.] The letter further indicates there is no link between perpetual safeguards and perpetual fuel supply. It quotes Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that, “We’ve been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of safeguards is permanence of safeguards without conditions.”

Contrast this with what Prime Minister Singh claimed in Parliament on 13 August 2007: “India’s right to take ‘corrective measures’ will be maintained even after the termination of the Agreement.” Or Singh’s assurances to Parliament since March 2006 that India’s acceptance of perpetual international inspections will be tied to perpetual fuel supply. In fact, the Bush administration letter mockingly says Singh’s statements on explicit linkage are “a high level of generality, and we are not in a position to speak for the Indian government as to whether anything more specific was intended by these words.”

 

The Bush administration’s letter states that the 123 Agreement is in “full conformity” to the Hyde Act provisions. In a press release as recently as July 2, 2008, the Indian Prime Minister’s Office made the following claim: “The 123 Agreement clearly overrides the Hyde Act and this position would be clear to anyone who goes through the provisions.” But the Bush administration letter, in answer to the question whether the 123 Agreement “overrides the Hyde Act regarding any conflicts, discrepancies or inconsistencies," states that the accord is “fully consistent with the legal requirements of the Hyde Act.”

 

The letter assures Congress that the “U.S. government will not assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items, whether under the Agreement or outside the Agreement.” That rules out the U.S. transfer of civil reprocessing and enrichment equipment or technologies to India even under safeguards. It also raises questions over the U.S. granting India operational consent to reprocess spent fuel with indigenous technology.

Under the 123 Agreement, India has agreed to forego reprocessing until it has, in the indeterminate future, won a separate, congressionally vetted agreement, after having built a new, state-of-the-art, dedicated reprocessing facility. The new facility, as the letter says, will take “many years” to design and build. But the letter also indicates that no U.S. export of items for this facility will be permitted, given that reprocessing is a “sensitive” activity.

On the issue of future sensitive transfers, the 123 Agreement had held out hope for India by stating in its Article 5(2) that, “Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement.” But the Bush administration’s letter to Congress has dashed that hope by clarifying that the U.S. government has no plans to seek to amend the deal to allow any sensitive transfers. It has labeled the 123 Agreement with India as a “framework” accord that cannot “compel such transfers.” In other words, it suggests that the hope enshrined in Article 5(2) was merely intended to help the Indian government save face in public.

Contrast this with what Prime Minister Singh said in Parliament on August 17, 2006 — that India wanted the “removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy, ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to reprocessing spent fuel.” Lest there be any ambiguity regarding this benchmark, he added: “We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation as amplified above.” Earlier, on August 3, 2005, Singh told Lok Sabha that he had received “an explicit commitment from the United States that India should get the same benefits of civilian cooperation as [an] advanced country like the United States enjoys.”

Recently, Singh made the following dream-selling claim in Parliament July 22, 2008: “It will open up new opportunities for trade in dual-use high technologies, opening up new pathways to accelerate industrialization of our country.” The deal, however, is intended to open commercially lucrative exports for safeguarded Indian facilities while specifically denying, as the Bush administration letter makes clear, dual-use nuclear technologies and items. Easing high-technology and civilian space export controls is not part of this deal.

 

The Bush administration letter, contradicting New Delhi’s claim in Indian Parliament, acknowledges that the 123 Agreement provides for “fall-back safeguards.” In addition to the Hyde Act mandating “fall-back U.S. safeguards” through Section 104 (d)(5)(B)(iii) in case “budget or personnel strains” in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) render it “unable” to fully enforce inspections, the 123 Agreement provides for fall-back safeguards in the following words in its Article 10(4): “If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.” Given that international inspections on India’s entire civilian programme will cost millions of dollars annually and entail deployment of many technical experts, the U.S. intent is to ensure that, in the event the IAEA is unable to arrange such resources, India does not escape with less intrusive or stringent safeguards applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states.

Singh and his handlers have repeatedly denied that India had agreed to any safeguards by any entity other than the IAEA. But the Bush administration letter reveals embarrassingly that, “The Government of India has expressed its view that for the purposes of implementing the U.S.-India Agreement, Agency [IAEA] safeguards can and should be regarded as being ‘in perpetuity.’ At the same time it fully appreciates that paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the [123] Agreement does not limit the safeguards required by the Agreement to Agency safeguards.”

Dr. Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author, among others, of Nuclear Proliferation: The US-India Conflict.

The Strategic Importance of Water in Asia

Billions of people suffer from acute water crisis

The Nation, Bangkok
August 25, 2008

Hundreds of millions of people in Asia are suffering from the acute water crisis caused by the adverse impact of climate change and China’s ambitious hydro-engineering projects that divert river water cascading from the Tibetan highlands, the source of almost all the major rivers of Asia.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research  was speaking at the seminar, "The Strategic Importance of Water in Asia", held at Bali, Indonesia, by Singapore-based Media Programme Asia of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Chellaney said that after reviewing the environmental situation in Asia, he found the water crisis in Asia is being aggravated both by climate change and by manmade environmental degradation in the form of shrinking forests and swamps that foster a cycle of chronic flooding and drought through the depletion of nature’s water and absorption cover.

Citing the survey conducted by the Remote Sensing Department of the China Aero Geophysical Survey, he said the study had warned that the Himalayan glaciers could be reduced by nearly a third by 2050 and up to half by 2090 at the current rate. The glacial melt would further deplete Tibet’s water resources, which are the lifeline for the people of southern and southeastern Asia and China.

He explained that the Tibetan plateau is a source of almost all the major rivers of Asia. Tibet’s vast glaciers, huge underground springs and high altitude have endowed it with the world’s greatest river systems.

Its river waters are a lifeline to the world’s two most populous states,  China and India,  as well as to Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam. These countries make up 47 per cent of world population. "The Himalayan snow melt that feeds Asia’s great rivers could be damagingly accelerated by global warming," he warned.

 

He said the impact from climate change was not the only cause of the water crisis in Asia. The Chinese South-North Water Diversion (SNWD) Project is also a major reason for the water crisis, he warned. The project is aimed at supporting the growth and development of industry in China.

The US$62billion (Bt2.1 trillion) canal project includes three water-diversion routes connecting the Yangtze River, the Huai River, the Yellow River and the Hai River to help bring water to parched regions such as the Shandong province and the municipalities of Tianjin and Beijing.

The SNWD plan is to create three new waterways to run along the east, centre and southwest of China. Just the first phase of project entails an investment of some $15 billion. 

The project’s eastern route, transporting water to the north from the Yangtze through a tunnel burrowed beneath the Yellow River, will involve expansion of the 1,600-km imperial Grand Canal into the world’s longest aquaduct. The 1,200-km-long central route, also intended to relieve pressure on the Yellow River, will pass beneath the Yellow River too in channelling water towards Beijing.

The most ambitious part of this project is to divert river waters cascading from the Tibetan highlands. This challenging phase includes a series of canals and tunnels along a 1,215-km route bissecting the eastern Tibetan Plateau to connect the upper reaches of the Yangtze with the upper reaches of the Yellow. The tunnels would have to be cut through the earthquake-prone Bayankala Mountains.

In the Tibetan plateau, China’s South-North Project calls initially for building 300 km of tunnels and channels to draw waters from the Jinsha, Yalong and Dadu rivers, located on the eastern rim of the plateau. The possible diversion of the Brahmaputra waters northward is to come later.

 The idea of diverting the Brahmaputra waters would adversely affect the dry-season availability of Brahmaputra waters downstream in India and Bangladesh while increasing wet-season flooding.

The river’s ecological health is already being affected through the growing number of irrigation reservoirs and hydropower plants upstream. Overexploitation could reduce sediment transportation downstream, affecting agriculture in northeastern India and Bangladesh, besides eroding the river-centred biodiversity of fish and aquatic organisms in Tibet. Also, owing to the high ambient salt levels along the watershed, irrigation-induced salinity is already threatening the widespread farming introduced in the upstream basin.

Water is a key issue that would determine if there will be greater cooperation or greater competition in Asia," he said.

"The bad news is that water management is still not a major priority for most Asian governments, at the federal or state levels" he added.

However, in a bid to mitigate the adverse impact from the water crisis, which would cause conflict in many areas, Chellaney called on all Asian governments to focus on water management of shared interstate water resources as an important component to build regional and climate security.

India: The Global Bridge-Builder on the Ganges

Brückenbauer am Ganges 

Beitrag von Brahma Chellaney

Erschienen in: Ausgabe Juli/August 2008

Auf dem Weg zu einer multipolaren Weltordnung tun sich Brüche auf: Die ressourcenhungrigen Schwellenländer beuten die wirtschaftlich Abgehängten aus. In Asien verbünden sich demokratische Staaten gegen autokratische Regime. Indien kann dank seiner demokratischen, konsensgeprägten Traditionen helfen, diese Spaltungen zu überwinden.

…ie Weltordnung ist noch nicht multipolar und nicht mehr unipolar. Amerika hat es in dem Jahrzehnt seit dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion bis zum Ende der neunziger Jahre verpasst, unter seiner Ägide eine liberale Weltordnung zu etablieren. Das mag die Vermutung nahe legen, die heutige sei eine nichtpolare Ordnung, in der vielfältige Bündnisse zwischen verschiedenen Akteuren der strategische Imperativ sind. Aber durch das Auftreten neuer Protagonisten auf der geopolitischen Bühne ist es nur eine …

http://www.internationalepolitik.de/archiv/jahrgang-2008/die-ohnmacht-der-machtigen/bruckenbauer-am-ganges.html

English version:

Bridge-builder on the Ganges

India’s Ascent in a Rapidly Changing Global Order

Brahma Chellaney | New global fault lines are evident as power — economic and political — has shifted eastward. Yet, the current international structures shun this reality — to their own peril. As a conduit between the East and West, India can help promote collaboration and consensus.

Internationale Politik, Vol. 7-8 (2008)

While the world is not yet multipolar, it is no longer unipolar, as it had been from the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse to at least the end of the 1990s — a period in which America failed to fashion a new liberal world order under its direction. What we have today is a world still in transition. This may appear to some as a nonpolar world in which multiple engagements between and among different actors have become a strategic imperative. But with the emergence of new players in the geopolitical marketplace, it is only a matter of time before multipolarity begins to characterize the international order.

The ongoing power shifts are primarily linked to Asia’s phenomenal economic rise, the speed and scale of which has no parallel in world history. Seat of ancient civilizations and home to the majority of the world’s population, Asia is bouncing back after a relatively short period of decline. Asia’s share of the world’s economy totaled 60 percent in 1820 at the advent of the industrial revolution. It then went into sharp decline over the next 125 years. Today, it already accounts for 40 percent of global production — a figure that could, according to some projections, rise to 60 percent within the next quarter of a century.

The shifts in economic and political power foretell a much different world — a world characterized by a greater distribution of power, but also by new uncertainties. As history testifies, tectonic shifts in power are rarely quiet. Such shifts usually create volatility in the international system, even if such instability is short-lived. The new international divisiveness may reflect such a reality. Indeed, with the revolution in technology over the past 25 years, we live in a world of rapid change. But unlike in past history, the qualitative reordering of power now underway is due not to battlefield victories or military realignments but to a peaceful factor unique to the modern world: rapid economic growth.

The paradox is that the power shifts are happening even as the United States remains the world’s sole superpower and thus militarily preeminent. Yet the reality is that after the triumphalism of the 1990s, this decade has helped underscore an erosion of US soft and hard power, with many seeing Iraq, Afghanistan, Hurricane Katrina, and the Middle East muddle as symbols of such decline. In an era of greater international fluidity as well as political and financial turbulence, as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted, “Whenever Americans start talking about idealism and optimism, international audiences groan.”[1]

Today’s international divisiveness, in part, mirrors the reality that power and influence are no longer one and the same in international relations. Despite its preeminence, the United States’ influence has been on the decline — a trend unlikely to be reversed even with a new administration in Washington. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States to set the international agenda on its own or just with its traditional allies. To secure issue-based support, the United States now has to reach out to states beyond its network of traditional allies. At the same time, one must concede that, for the foreseeable future, the United States is likely to remain the most decisive force in international politics and security.

Another factor has also contributed to the divisiveness: While we know the world is in transition, we still do not know what the new order will look like. The impasse or lack of movement on key international issues, therefore, should not come as a surprise. These issues include climate change, nuclear disarmament, international terrorism, global pandemics, and the Doha round of world trade talks. The most pressing challenges today are international in nature and thus demand international responses or solutions. Yet the existing international institutions, including the United Nations, are proving inadequate to deal with such global challenges, in part because such institutions no longer reflect the prevailing power structure. Their representational deficit, and the ensuing impact on their capacity to play an effective, forward-looking role, have become glaring.

The more the world changes, however, the more it remains the same in some critical aspects. The information age and globalization, despite spurring profound changes in polity, economy and security, have not altered the nature of international relations. In fact, the rapid pace of technological and economic change is itself a consequence of nations competing fiercely and seeking relative advantage in an international system based largely on national security.

Nearly a century after chemical arms were introduced in World War I and more than six decades following the nuclear incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world is at the threshold of new lethal and precision weapons, as underlined by the ongoing research on lasers, information weapons, space-based platforms, anti-satellite weapons, and directed energy systems. Technological forces are now shaping geopolitics and power equations in ways unforeseen before in history.

We live in a Hobbesian world, with power coterminous with national security and success. The past century was the most momentous in history technologically, with innovations fostering not just rapid economic change, but bringing greater lethality to warfare. Consequently, the 20th century was the bloodiest. Weapons of mass destruction and missiles came to occupy a central military role. In the new century, the advance of technology and the absence of relevant safeguards or regimes evoke possible scenarios of deadly information and space warfare. Such are the challenges from the accelerated weaponization of science that instead of disarmament, rearmament today looms large on the horizon, with the arms race being extended to outer space.

Once the economic power structure changes internationally, shifts in military power will inevitably follow, even if in stages. Seen against the ongoing changes, the transatlantic order of the past 60 years will have to give way to a truly international order. The new order, unlike the current one founded on the ruins of a world war, will have to be established in an era of international peace and thus be designed to reinforce that peace. That means it will need to be more reflective of the consensual needs of today and have a democratic decision-making structure.

Until that happens, the new global fault lines will continue to signal rising geopolitical risks. The tensions between internationalism and nationalism in an era of a supposed single “global village,” for instance, have raised troubling questions about international peace and stability. With greater public awareness from advances in information and communications technologies encouraging individuals and even some states to more clearly define that identity in terms of religion and ethnicity, a divide has emerged between multiculturalism and artificially enforced monoculturalism. The rise of international terrorism shows that increased access to information is both an integrating and dividing force.

The political, economic, and security divides are no less invidious. The world is moving beyond the North-South divide to a four-tier economic division: the prosperous West; rapidly growing economies like those in Asia; countries that have run into stagnation after reaching middle-income nation status; and a forgotten billion people living on the margins of globalization in sub-Saharan Africa. These marginalized people have no stake in globalization. The international neglect of Africa has created a vacuum that China has sought to exploit by aggressively building commercial and political links with a number of African states.

There is also a global resource divide, with the resource-hungry employing aid and arms exports as a diplomatic instrument for commodity outreach. As the specter of resource conflict has grown, the contours of a 21st-century version of the Great Game have emerged in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Competition over oil and gas resources, driven by rapid economic growth in Asia, indeed constitutes one key dimension of the emerging Great Game.

The ongoing global shifts in economic power are manifest from the changes occurring in the energy and materials sectors, with the growth in demand moving from the developed to the developing world, principally Asia. Energy prices are going to stay high and volatile for the foreseeable future, given these shifts and the soaring demand in countries like China and India, which together are projected to double their oil demand between 2003 and 2020. However, despite the total consumption of energy in the Asia-Pacific having grown by 70 percent between 1992 and 2005, per capita energy consumption is still relatively low by international standards: 749 kilogram of oil equivalent in 2005, compared with the global average of 1,071. Not only will per capita consumption grow sharply in Asia, “on the supply side, Asia’s strong demand environment for energy and basic materials, coupled with its low labor costs, means that the region will increasingly become a global producer of aluminum, chemicals, paper, and steel.”[2]

Slaking the tremendous thirst of the fast-growing Asian economies and meeting the huge demands of the old economic giants in the West are at the core of the great energy dilemma facing the world in the 21st century. Finding an energy “fix” has become imperative if the Asian and other emerging economies are to continue to grow impressively and if the prosperous countries are to head off a slump. Such a fix would have to be rooted in three essential elements: low-cost, preferably renewable alternatives to fossil fuels; greater energy efficiency; and minimizing or eliminating greenhouse-gas emissions. The ongoing structural shifts in global energy markets carry important long-term political and economic implications, in addition to challenging the stability of these markets.

Also, with the rise of unconventional transnational challenges, a new security divide is mirrored both in the failure to fashion a concerted and effective international response to such threats, including transnational terrorism, and the divisiveness on issues like climate change. Efforts are needed to bridge the divide between the traditional security threats and the new unconventional threats that are increasingly the focus of international attention and concern.

Yet another global divide is centered on political values. At a time when a qualitative reordering of power is reshaping international equations, major players are playing down the risk that contrasting political systems could come to constitute the main geopolitical dividing line, potentially pitting an axis of autocracies against a constellation of democracies. The refrain of the players is that pragmatism, not political values, would guide their foreign-policy strategy. Yet the new Great Game under way plays up regime character as a key element.

Ordinarily, the readiness to play by international rules ought to matter more than regime form. But regime character often makes playing by the rules difficult. In modern history, the fault line between democrats and autocrats has at times been papered over through a common geopolitical interest. But today the failure to build greater political homogeneity by defining shared international objectives carries the risk that, in the years ahead, political values could become the main geopolitical dividing line.

It is well established that democracies rarely go to war with each other, even though democratic governments may not be more wedded to peace than autocracies. What role outsiders can play to help democracy take root, however, remains a difficult issue internationally. Yet that issue looms large in relation to Asia. Unlike Europe where democracy has become the norm, only 16 of Asia’s 39 countries surveyed by Freedom House are really free.[3] And as shown by the World Press Freedom Index by the Paris-based international rights group, Reporters Without Borders, a number of Asian countries are among the worst suppressors of freedom, with North Korea ranked at the very bottom of the 167-nation list, Burma 163rd, China 159th, Vietnam 158th, Laos and Uzbekistan 155th, Bangladesh 151st, Pakistan 150th, Singapore 140th and the Philippines 139th.[4]

With the Asia-Pacific region becoming more divided in the face of conflicting strategic cultures, major democracies are likely to be increasingly drawn together to help advance political cooperation and stability through a community of values. It can hardly be overlooked that China’s best friends are fellow autocracies, including pariah states, while those seeking to forestall power disequilibrium in the Asia-Pacific happen to be on the other side of the values-based divide. In that light, political values could easily come to define a new geopolitical divide.

What may seem implausible globally, given America’s lingering tradition of propping up dictators in the Arab-Islamic world, is thus conceivable in the Asia-Pacific theater as a natural corollary to the present geopolitics. It was China that took the lead in 2001 to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to help unite it with Eurasian strongmen in a geopolitical alliance. Designed originally to bring the Central Asian nations under the Chinese sphere of influence, the SCO is today shaping up as a potential “NATO of the East.” Yet, when Australia, India, Japan, and the United States started the exploratory Quadrilateral Initiative in 2007,[5] Beijing was quick to cry foul and see the apparition of an “Asian NATO.” A Chinese diplomatic protest to each Quad nation followed.

The Quad, founded on the historically valid hypothesis of democratic peace, was supposed to serve as an initial framework to promote security dialogue and interlinked partnerships among major Pacific Rim democracies. Such collaboration is already being built. As an idea, the Quad will not only survive the current vicissitudes, but it also foreshadows what is likely to come. But for the divergent geopolitical interests at play, the differing political values would not matter so much.

More broadly, there is need to improve global geopolitics by building cooperative political approaches that transcend institutions whose structure is rooted in a world that no longer exists. The reality is that just as the G-8, to stay relevant, has initiated the so-called Outreach for dialogue with the emerging powers, the five unelected yet permanent members of the UN Security Council can no longer dictate terms to the rest of the world and need to share executive authority with new powers.

It was a mistake to believe that greater economic interdependence by itself would improve geopolitics. In today’s market-driven world, trade is not constrained by political differences, nor is booming trade a guarantee of moderation and restraint between states.

Better politics is as important as better economics. That requires several major steps whose initiation so far has been frustrated: institutional reforms; greater transparency in strategic doctrines and military expenditures; and cooperative approaches on shared concerns. No international mission today can yield enduring results unless it comes with consistency and credibility and is backed by consensus — the three crucial “Cs.”

Against this background, what role can India play? India’s growing geopolitical weight, high GDP growth rate, and abundant market opportunities have helped increase its international profile. It is widely perceived to be a key “swing state” in the emerging order.

Given the greater political and financial volatility in the world, geopolitical risks today are higher. As a “swing” geopolitical factor, India has the potential to play a constructive role to help mitigate those risks by promoting collaborative international approaches. It is obvious that new thinking and approaches are needed to bridge the global fault lines and build great international cooperation and consensus on the larger geopolitical issues.

India has important advantages that it could exploit to play the role of a bridge between the East and West. Not only is it the world’s largest democracy, India also is the most diverse country. With a sixth of humanity living within its borders, India is more linguistically diverse than even Europe. India is where old traditions go hand-in-hand with post modernity, epitomized by the image of electronic voting machines being carried to a village balloting station atop an elephant.

India also has its constraints. Its neighborhood is more combustible than ever, with an arc of failing or problem states posing serious security-related challenges. Democracy may be India’s biggest asset. But Indian democracy tends to function by the rule of parochial politics. Putting a forward-looking national agenda ahead of parochial short-term politics is not easy. Furthermore, partly due to its historical experiences, the Indian state is intrinsically cautious and shy rather than proactive.

Yet India has a long, historical record of playing a mainstream, cooperative role in international affairs. With its wealth of philosophy and a culture emphasizing compromise, conciliation, and creativity, India views the world as a stage not for civilizational wars but for building bridges and meeting common challenges. Over the centuries, Indian civilization has thrived on synthesis. This ability to synthesize is one of the great strengths that India needs to employ internationally.

It is such traditions that explain, for example, why India lacks the US zeal to export democracy. Instead it looks at democracy in practical terms, as “the most effective means to reconcile the polyglot components of the state,” according to former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He notes: “India, striving neither to spread its culture nor its institutions, is thus not a comfortable partner [of the United States] for global ideological missions.”[6]

Yet India will continue to pride itself as a model of a non-Western democracy. While the concepts of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are normally associated with the West, India can claim ancient traditions bestowing respect to such values. As the 1998 Nobel economics laureate, Amartya Sen, has said, “A good example is the Emperor Ashoka in India, who during the 3rd century B.C. covered the country with inscriptions on stone tablets about good behavior and wise governance, including a demand for basic freedoms for all — indeed he did not exclude women and slaves as Aristotle did…”[7] According to economist Sen, “The claim that the basic ideas underlying freedom and tolerance have been central to Western culture over the millennia and are somehow alien to Asia is, I believe, entirely rejectable.”

Another issue relates to India’s role in helping shape a stable balance of power. At a time of warming US-Indian relations, too much is made about America’s desire to use India to hold China in check. A durable US-Indian partnership can be built not on strategic opportunism but on shared national interests. Shared interests mean far more than shared democratic values. It appears unlikely that India would allow itself to be used as a foil against another power.

In the coming years, India will increasingly be aligned with the West economically. But, strategically, it can avail of multiple options, even as it moves from the nonalignment of its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to a contemporary, globalized practicality. Given the new international equations and power shifts, nonalignment in its original form holds no relevance today. But many Indians believe that the concept of following an independent foreign policy is still relevant.

In keeping with this long-standing preference for policy independence, India is likely to retain the option to forge different partnerships with varied players to pursue a variety of interests in diverse settings. That means that from being nonaligned, it is likely to become multialigned, while tilting more towards Washington even as it preserves the core element of nonalignment — strategic autonomy. In other words, India is likely to continue to chart its own course and make its own major decisions. A multialigned India pursuing omnidirectional cooperation for mutual benefit with key players will be better positioned to advance its interests and promote cooperative international approaches in the changed world.

In the Asian context, India’s interests lie in ensuring that strategic competition among the key players does not deteriorate into a major geopolitical confrontation. The deepening mistrust and nationalistic chauvinism in Asia threaten to create conditions that could seriously harm the interests of all the states. The common challenge thus is to find ways to minimize mutual mistrust and maximize avenues for reciprocally beneficial cooperation. But this can be done not by shying away from the contentious issues in Asia but by seeking to tackle them in a practical way.

India cannot but be concerned about the way the energy competition is beginning to make Asian geopolitics murkier. What is striking is that the new flurry of alliance formation or partnerships in Asia is being led by Asia’s rising powers, not by the United States, which has policed Asia since the end of World War II. In that light, Asian cooperation and security will be very much influenced by the equations between and among the major players. The need to secure stable energy supplies will drive the major players to increasingly integrate their energy policy with foreign policy, as they consciously promote diplomatic strategies geared toward seizing energy-related opportunities overseas.

Energy-driven competition must not be allowed to aggravate interstate rivalries. Mercantilist efforts to assert control over oil and natural gas supplies and transport routes certainly risk fuelling tensions. Given the lack of regional institutions in Asia to avert or manage conflict, the sharpening energy geopolitics makes the need for Asian energy cooperation more pressing. A challenge for India, China, and the other important Asian economies is to manage their energy needs through more efficient transport and consumption and more cooperative import policies. Multinational cooperation on the security of sea lanes is essential to avert strategic friction in Asia. Where maritime claims overlap, the answer to any such dispute cannot be unilateral drilling or production by one side. Disputes over what are legitimate zones of energy exploration in open seas need to be managed through an agreed code of conduct.

In an increasingly interdependent Asia, the interests of India, China, Japan and other players can hardly be advanced if they are seen as engaged in efforts to reduce the promotion of security to a zero-sum game. In fact, as the three main Asian powers, India, China, and Japan can set a model for other states in Asia by establishing stable political relationships that put the accent on mutually beneficial cooperation. Without these powers taking the lead, it may not be possible to deal with the increasingly complex security, energy, and development challenges facing Asia. Deterrence, stability, and peace have been at the heart of Asia’s growing dynamism and prosperity. These elements need to be preserved and strengthened to help fully ripen the Asian renaissance.

The challenges the world confronts today are unique. The issues are new — ranging from accelerating global warming to uncontained international terrorism — and their reach is truly global. In past history, the competition for a balance of power was centered on Europe. Even the Cold War was not really an East-West rivalry but a competition between two blocs over Europe. For the first time, we are facing the task of building power equilibrium across the world while simultaneously having to both adjust to new power shifts and deal with transnational challenges.

Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. His latest book is Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan.


[1] US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Keynote Address at the World Economic Forum meeting, Davos, January 23, 2008, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/01/99624.htm.

[2] Ivo J. H. Bozon, Warren J. Campbell, and Mats Lindstrand, “Global Trends in Energy,” The McKinsey Quarterly, Number 1 (2007), p. 48.

[3] Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2006).

[4] Reporters Without Borders, “World Press Freedom Index,” http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=554.

[5] The Quadrilateral Initiative was not intended to be a formal institution. However, the Republican presidential nominee, Senator John McCain, in an article has said: “As president, I will seek to institutionalize the new quadrilateral security partnership among the major Asia-Pacific democracies: Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.” McCain also has larger ambitions: A “worldwide League of Democracies” that could be a “unique handmaiden of freedom.” John McCain, “An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2007).

[6]Henry A. Kissinger, “Anatomy of a Partnership,” Tribune Media Services, March 10, 2006.

[7] Amartya Sen, “East and West: The Reach of Reason,” The New York Review of Books, July 20, 2000.

(Internationale Politik is Germany’s leading foreign-affairs monthly published by the German Council on Foreign Relations.)